Could size ceilings make the TBTF regime more effective?

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dc.contributor.authorKellermann, Kersten
dc.contributor.authorNuroğlu, Elif
dc.date.accessioned2025-02-20T08:46:33Z
dc.date.available2025-02-20T08:46:33Z
dc.date.issued2024
dc.departmentTürk-Alman Üniversitesien_US
dc.description.abstractThis chapter examines the use of size ceilings for banks as a regulatory tool to enhance the effectiveness of the too big to fail (TBTF) regime. It introduces the concept of systemically important banks (SIBs) and explores the essential features of TBTF regime. The chapter argues that the optimal size of a bank from a business perspective may differ from its socially optimal size. Furthermore, it is argued that due to the challenge posed by a potential bailout, there is a legitimate public interest in the home country of a SIB to prevent the bank from growing beyond a socially acceptable and sustainable size. The chapter also provides a brief discussion of recent events in Switzerland related to the Credit Suisse crisis, where the effectiveness of the TBTF legislation was called into question. © 2023 Peter Lang Group AG, Lausanne. All rights reserved.
dc.identifier.endpage165en_US
dc.identifier.isbn978-363190582-1
dc.identifier.isbn978-363190581-4
dc.identifier.scopus2-s2.0-85189228241
dc.identifier.startpage147en_US
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12846/1795
dc.indekslendigikaynakScopus
dc.language.isoen
dc.publisherPeter Lang AG
dc.relation.ispartofSustainable Finance: Challenges, Opportunities and Future Prospects
dc.relation.publicationcategoryKitap Bölümü - Uluslararası
dc.rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/closedAccess
dc.snmzKA_Scopus_20250220
dc.subjectBank regulationen_US
dc.subjectSystemically important banksen_US
dc.subjectTBTF regimeen_US
dc.subjectToo big to failen_US
dc.subjectToo big to saveen_US
dc.titleCould size ceilings make the TBTF regime more effective?
dc.typeBook Part

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