Could size ceilings make the TBTF regime more effective?
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Tarih
2024
Yazarlar
Dergi Başlığı
Dergi ISSN
Cilt Başlığı
Yayıncı
Peter Lang AG
Erişim Hakkı
info:eu-repo/semantics/closedAccess
Özet
This chapter examines the use of size ceilings for banks as a regulatory tool to enhance the effectiveness of the too big to fail (TBTF) regime. It introduces the concept of systemically important banks (SIBs) and explores the essential features of TBTF regime. The chapter argues that the optimal size of a bank from a business perspective may differ from its socially optimal size. Furthermore, it is argued that due to the challenge posed by a potential bailout, there is a legitimate public interest in the home country of a SIB to prevent the bank from growing beyond a socially acceptable and sustainable size. The chapter also provides a brief discussion of recent events in Switzerland related to the Credit Suisse crisis, where the effectiveness of the TBTF legislation was called into question. © 2023 Peter Lang Group AG, Lausanne. All rights reserved.
Açıklama
Anahtar Kelimeler
Bank regulation, Systemically important banks, TBTF regime, Too big to fail, Too big to save
Kaynak
Sustainable Finance: Challenges, Opportunities and Future Prospects
