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TURKISH- GERMAN UNIVERSITY
INSTITUTE OF SOCIAL SCIENCES
EUROPEAN AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

COMPARISON OF REGIONAL FOREIGN POLICIES
DURING 2007-2019: REPUBLIC OF TURKEY AND RUSSIAN
FEDERATION

MASTER'S THESIS

Zeynep Ceren Gldal

ADVISOR

Asst.Prof.Dr. Ebru Turhan

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DIŞ POLİTİKALARINA DAİR BİR KARŞILAŞTIRMA
YÜKSEK LİSANS TEZİ

Zeynep Ceren Güldal

(1681011105)

DANIŞMAN

Asst.Prof.Dr. Ebru Turhan

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Zeynep Ceren Gldal

1681011105

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Thesis Advisor: Asst. Prof. Dr. Ebru Turhan

Other Jury Members: Prof. Dr. Murat Erdođan

Asst. Prof. Dr. Rahime Sleymanođlu Krm

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ÖZET

2007 VE 2019 YILLARI ARASINDAKİ TÜRKİYE CUMHURİYETİ VE RUSYA FEDERASYONU BÖLGESEL DIŞ POLİTİKALARINA DAİR BİR KARŞILAŞTIRMA

Bu tez çalışması Türkiye Cumhuriyeti'nin ve Rusya Federasyonu'nun Orta Doğu bölgesine yönelik dış politikalarını incelemektedir. Bu çalışma Türkiye ve Rusya'nın bölgesel güç olmak için geliştirdikleri bölgesel dış politikaları detaylı örneklerle ele almaktadır. Çalışmada Türkiye ve Rusya'nın çevre ülkelerle ve küresel güçlerle olan etkileşimleri ve algılanışları da incelenecektir. Bu çalışma iki ülkenin sürdürdüğü politikaların çeşitli coğrafi ihtiyaçlarını nasıl etkilediğini göstermeyi amaçlamaktadır. Bu nedenle, olaylar arasında mantıksal bir ilişki kurmak için John Stuart Mill tarafından geliştirilen benzerlik metodu kullanılmaktadır. Bu açıdan, bölgede istikrar sağlayan bir rol oynamak, güç kapasitesi, bölgesel liderlik ve barışçıl olmak ve bu durumun komşu devletler tarafından kabul görmesi gibi faktörler ele alınarak Türkiye ve Rusya'nın bölgesel güç olma kavramı analiz edilmiştir. Bu çalışma, aynı bölgede bulunan bir grup devletlerin oluşturduğu sosyal yapının, güvenlik modellerinin incelemesi amacıyla Bölgesel Güvenlik Kompleksi Teorisi'ni ele alacaktır. Türkiye ve Rusya'nın mevcut bölgesel dış politikalarının arka planını anlamak için ise bölgenin dinamikleri incelenecektir.

Anahtar Kelimeler : Dış Politika, Bölgesel Güç, Türkiye Cumhuriyeti, Rusya Federasyonu, Orta Doğu, Asgeri Güç,

Tarih: 29.11.19

ABSTRACT

COMPARISON OF REGIONAL FOREIGN POLICIES DURING 2007-2019: REPUBLIC OF TURKEY AND RUSSIAN FEDERATION

This thesis analyzes the regional foreign policies of the Republic of Turkey and the Russian Federation in the Middle East. It investigates the role of regional foreign policies of Turkey and Russia for attaining regional power through detailed examples. Perceptions and interactions with global powers and neighboring countries surrounding Russia and Turkey will be analyzed throughout the thesis. Furthermore, the thesis aims to demonstrate how the policies of both countries impact their diverse geographic needs. Hence, the method of agreement is used to establish the presence of causal relationship among these events as developed by John Stuart Mill. In this regard, considering the factors such as playing a stabilizing role in the region as well as playing a role as a regional leader and peacemaker, understanding the responsibilities towards neighbors' abilities to maintain regional security, the capacity to represent leadership, and acceptance by neighboring states, regional power conditions of Turkey and Russia were analyzed. It will touch upon the regional security complex theory in order to examine the security patterns as a social construct by a group of states in the same region. The dynamics of the region will be examined to understand the present background of regional foreign policies of Turkey and Russia.

Keywords: Foreign Policy, Republic of Turkey, Russian Federation, Middle East, Regional power, Military power

Date: 29.11.2019

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AEOI	Atomic Energy Organization of Iran
APEC	the Asian-Pacific Economic Cooperation
ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
ASELSAN	Askeri Elektronik Sanayi, Military Electronic Industries
BRICS	Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa
BSEC	Black Sea Economic Cooperation
BSEC	Black Sea Economic Cooperation
CINC	Composite Index of National Capacity
CIS	Commonwealth of Independent States
CoE	the Council of Europe
EU	European Union
FNSS	Nurol Savunma Sanayii
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GECF	Gas Exporting Countries Forum
GNA	The Government of National Accord
IAEA	International Atomic Energy Agency
ISIS	Islamic State of Iraq and Syria
JCPOA	Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action
KRG	Kurdish Regional Government
LEU	Low Enriched Uranium
MENA	Middle East and North Africa
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NPT	Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Treaty
PYD	The Democratic Union Party
SCAF	Supreme Council of the Armed Forces

SCO	Shanghai Cooperation Organization
TAI	Turkish Aircraft Industries
TBMM	Grand National Assembly of Turkey
TESEV	Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation
TSKGV	Turkish Armed Forces Foundation
TUSAS	Turkish Aerospace Industries
UN	United Nation
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNIFIL II	United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon
UNSC	United Nation Security Council
US	United States
YPG/PKK	People’s Protection Units/ Kurdistan Workers’ Party

INTRODUCTION AND PURPOSES

Recent developments in regional foreign policy may be used as explanatory factors for international politics. A state is encouraged to set up effective regional policies once it has achieved significant economic growth. The reason for this is that once a country has a strong economy, it is in a position to make important decisions. However, conflict in the region could lead states to pursue broader political activism in the surrounding region. Thus, this thesis will study Turkish and Russian regional foreign policies in light of these countries' efforts to become regional powers in the period from 2007 to 2019 in the Middle East. The similarities and differences between the regional foreign policy agendas of the Russian Federation and the Republic of Turkey have been chosen for comparison. The power and the capabilities of Turkey and Russia need to be considered in their processes of becoming regional powers, and military power and economic growth are key factors for assessing a country as a regional power¹.

In order to understand the acceptance of leadership roles, it is helpful to analyze the regional foreign policies of both countries. Over the last few decades, Turkey has been widely perceived as a decisive actor in the region and a significant global player. The functions and efficiency of its policies may be measured and compared with those of other rivaling countries in the region. Hence, Russia is also acting as a regional power among other various power centers in the region, and that is why it was chosen as a comparative country in order to analyze the applications of different and similar foreign policies. The Republic of Turkey and the Russian Federation have both considerably changed their economic systems. Implementing a new strategy, such as reforming the economy numerous times, is a reflection of change within that economy. This led to significant economic growth for both states, better enabling them to achieve their respective goals. Numerous economic and social reforms have been implemented by both Turkey and Russia to substantially facilitate the development of both countries. Economic growth has paved the way for new phases in numerous regional

¹ Ehteshami, A.(2014).Middle East Middle Powers: Regional Role, International Impact. *Uluslararası İlişkiler*, 11, 42, 29-49. Retrieved August 23, 2017, from https://www.uidergisi.com.tr/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/42_1.pdf

policies. The leaders of Turkey and Russia consider it a fundamental right to display leadership in the region without directly threatening Western allies. The year 2007 is the starting point for this thesis because this year saw the most successful outcome of any general election in the history of the Turkish Republic. One year after that, Russia's presidential elections were held and Dmitry Medvedev was appointed as the new president. From that starting point, this thesis states that a comparative analysis of the regional foreign policies of Turkey and Russia is essential to better understand the political climate of both countries. Assessment of the regional foreign policy priorities of both countries may best be achieved with an operational definition of the term "regional power." The lack of consensus on the definition of "regional power" will arguably lead to limitations on statements of regional power. However, Daniel Flesmes defined regional power as comprising four main pillars: a claim to leadership, the acceptance of that leadership by other states, power resources, and the possession of foreign policy instruments². Stefan Schirm³ and Maxi Schoeman⁴ maintain that regional power involves six categories, which include playing a stabilizing role in the region, power capacity, playing a role as a regional leader and peacemaker, understanding the responsibilities towards neighbors' abilities to maintain regional security, the capacity to represent leadership, and acceptance by neighboring states. Schoeman and Schirm's classification will help establish a basis for analyzing Turkish and Russian regional foreign policies. "Power," meanwhile, is defined as the ability or capacity to do something⁵. Regional power could be linked with gross domestic product (GDP), population, military power, technological resources, power resources, and/or the perception of other states⁶. The

² Flesmes, D.(2007). Conceptualising Regional Power in International Relations: Lessons from the South African Case. *German Institute of Global Area Studies*. August 23, 2017, from https://www.giga-hamburg.de/en/system/files/publications/wp53_flesmes.pdf

³ Schirm S.(2005) Führungsindikatoren und Erklärungsvariablen für die neue internationale Politik Brasiliens. *Lateinamerika Analysen*, 107-30. Retrieved November 17, 2017 from http://www4-sowi.rz.ruhr-uni-bochum.de/mam/content/Isip/artikel_brasilien.pdf

⁴ Schoeman M. South Africa as an Emerging Middle Power: 1994-2003 in *State of the Nation: South Africa 2003-2004*, eds. by John Daniel, Adam Habib and Roger Southall, (Cape Town: HSRC Press, 2003.), 349-67

⁵ English Oxford Living dictionary (n.d). Retrieved November 17, 2017, from <https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/power>

⁶ Nolte, D. (2007). How to Compare Regional Powers: Analytical Concepts and Research Topics. *ECPR Joint Session of Workshops, Helsinki, Preliminary Version* Retrieved October 7, 2017 from <https://ecpr.eu/Filestore/PaperProposal/212a550d-597b-4f60-86df-ec73a8e43707.pdf>

economic position of a state in the region could be summarized by its GDP. First, a state's economic activity in the region may likely increase its visibility in world politics. Thus, economic activity could be a particular indicator for regional power, and the scope of economic activity is assessed by GDP. The population, meanwhile, may reflect potential social and economic development across different countries throughout the region. Moreover, the capacity of military power is a major indicator in defining regional power. Complex political and security problems across different countries in the region may relatively increase the importance of military power in achieving foreign policy goals. Producing the latest technology in military equipment may further reflect on operational capacity in the region. Thus, regional conflict resolution may be an indicator of regional power. "Soft power," on the other hand, could be defined as the transfer of values and norms across different countries. Schirm holds the view that the perceptions of other states are indicators of regional power in the international system. There is a concept of regional power and regional policy acting in international relations. However, this thesis presents the terminology regarding regional power. The concept of regional power is defined from many perspectives throughout the introduction.

RESEARCH QUESTION

This dissertation will examine comparative analyses of the regional foreign policies of the two countries. Comparative analyses will be used to explain policy priority of both countries by drawing on key assumptions in case studies.

The main research question will be:

What factors have had an impact on Turkish and Russian regional foreign policy and their abilities to become regional powers, and to what extent?

This has triggered subsequent questions such as:

1. How do the neighboring countries surrounding Russia and Turkey and great power view new regional actors?

2. How can Turkey and Russia security policies be effective solving regional conflicts?
3. What strategies are being used by Turkey and Russia securing peace in the region as regional power?

LITERATURE REVIEW

The terms “emerging powers,” “regional powers,” and “middle powers” represent a broad topic that many scholars have addressed in published articles on international affairs. Regional power gained particular academic importance in the first decade of the 21st century. A large amount of research has been conducted on rising powers, regional powers, and the BRIC states (i.e. Brazil, Russia, India, and China). Despite the popularity of the concept of “region,” the regional power of middle powers is rarely discussed in the fields of international relations or area studies. Studies to date have primarily focused on ideas specific to emerging powers, and particularly China, India, and Brazil. In “Emerging powers and BRICS,” Oliver Stuenkel examines the ongoing social transformation in emerging powers⁷. Many scholars critically analyze regional power from an economics perspective. Robert Kappel, in “On the economics of regional powers: comparing China, India, Brazil, and South Africa,” uses descriptive statistics to explore the economies of those four regional powers⁸. The economics of regional powers when the countries in question have large populations are able to play a dominant role in trade within the region. In other words, researchers have offered different explanations for why a state is perceived as a regional power. The information gathered by such researchers reveals how regional powers exercise economic power; likewise, recent changes in Turkish foreign policy have attracted the interest of scholars of international relations. To illustrate, Emre Hatipoglu and Glenn Palmer, in “Contextualizing change in

⁷ Stuenkel, O.(2014). Emerging Powers and Status: The Case of the First Brics Summit. *Asian Perspective*. 38(1). Retrived November 11.12.2017 from

https://bibliotecadigital.fgv.br/dspace/bitstream/handle/10438/17520/Emerging_Powers_and_Status_The_Case_of_the_1st_BRIC_Summit.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y

⁸ Kappel, R.(2010). On the Economics of Regional Powers:Comparing China, India, Brazil, and South Africa. *GIGA German Institute of Global and Area Studies* .145. Retrived November 11, 2017 from https://www.giga-hamburg.de/de/system/files/publications/wp145_kappel.pdf

Turkish foreign policy: the promise of the ‘two-good’ theory,” conceptualize recent changes in Turkish foreign policy with the two-good theory⁹. They state that the values of gross domestic product (GDP) and the Composite Index of National Capabilities (CINC) are becoming leading indicators in representing changes in Turkish foreign policy in recent years. In developing a stronger economy, Turkey has become more able to invest foreign aid, initiate military conflicts, and recall ambassadors. Hatipoglu and Palmer recognize that the use of economic sanctions is also another tool for changing the status quo. Turkey’s invest military projects ways to change the status quo. Further academic work has been conducted about the regional power realm of international relations. In *Regional Leadership in the Global System: Ideas, Interests and Strategies of Regional Powers*, Daniel Flesmes identifies the dominating capability of states in a region with the role of hard power, tested with the power transition theory¹⁰. The significance and the implications of regional leadership in the global system were discussed by Daniel Flesmes in his work on transition theory. Power transition theory was first presented by A.F.K. Organski in 1958¹¹. Organski and his colleagues held the view that the international system is hierarchical and is based on the distribution of power. They further indicated the presence of pyramidal hierarchies in international systems. Hierarchical pyramids follow a specific order. The dominant nation is at the top of the international order, followed by a great power, a middle power, and a small power, while colonies are at the lowest level of the hierarchical pyramid. There are two particularly important determinants in the power transition model that link power and satisfaction. Power and satisfaction may be indicators of peace and stability. Hence, Flesmes used power and satisfaction as indicators of peace and stability while attaining regional

⁹Hatipoglu, E. & Palmer, G. (2016). Contextualizing Change in Turkish Foreign Policy: the Promise of The Two-Good Theory . *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*, 29,1, 231-250. Retrived November 11 2017 from <https://doi.org/10.1080/09557571.2014.888538>

¹⁰Flesmes, D.(2010). In *Regional Leadership in the Global System: Ideas, Interests and Strategies of Regional Powers*. (1st ed.). Newyork : *Routledge*. Retrieved November 11.12.2017 from (<https://books.google.com.tr/books?id=GffsCwAAQBAJ&pg=PT3&dq=In+Regional+Leadership+in+the+Global+System:+Ideas,+Interests+and+Strategies+of+Regional+Powers,+Daniel+Flesmes&hl=tr&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwizto-SqZHIAhUDr6QKHXL8CpUQ6AEIKTAA#v=onepage&q=In%20Regional%20Leadership%20in%20the%20Global%20System%3A%20Ideas%2C%20Interests%20and%20Strategies%20of%20Regional%20Powers%2C%20Daniel%20Flesmes&f=false>)

¹¹ Organski, A. F. K., and Jacek Kugler. *The War Ledger*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980

leadership in the global system. Power transition theory claims that there is a likely connection among power, dissatisfaction, and war. The power transition model describes regulations within the international order in terms of diplomatic, economic, and military interactions. A dissatisfied state is a newly rising country that challenges the status quo by creating conditions of war in the international system. However, a number of advanced or developed democratic countries arose in a decade of satisfied coalitions and peaceful zones. Thus, he categorizes regional powers based on power transition theory: Saudi Arabia is illustrated as a financial regional power, Israel as a military regional power, and Iran as an ideological power in the Middle East. In “Iran and Venezuela: Ideology-driven foreign policies in comparison,” Henner Fürtig and Susanne Gratius conceptualize the regional foreign policies of Iran and Venezuela. They also draw on foreign policy implementations of Venezuela and Iran regarding subregional hegemonic power. However, Fürtig and Gratius state that Venezuela and Iran cannot be regional powers in the Middle East due to the gap between real enthusiasm and real power, among other reasons, although they predict that Iran can become a dominant state in the Persian Gulf sub-region. The workshop papers addressing “The Justice and Development Party and Turkish Foreign Policy in the Middle East,” in a volume edited by Zeynep N. Kaya analyzing the relationships between Turkish domestic politics and foreign policy in the Middle East, focus on major challenges and significant transformations¹². The aim is to explain which factors shape Turkish foreign policy at both domestic and regional levels. In the domestic context, foreign policy decisions are made by the government, but non-governmental actors and social, economic, political, and historical factors also shape Turkish foreign policy. In the regional context, the rising power of the Justice and Development Party (Turkish acronym: AKP) facilitates certain foreign policies regarding the Turkish position on engagement in the Middle East. The regional policy of “zero problems with neighbors” has yielded disappointing results with regional security threats. This work examines regional factors in Turkey’s foreign policy with regional analyses of the linkage between domestic and foreign policies of Turkey.

¹² Kaya, N. Z.(2016). The AKP and Turkish Foreign Policy in the Middle East . *LSE Middle East Centre Collected Papers*, 5, 5-48. Retrieved November,11, 2017 from https://eprints.lse.ac.uk/66139/1/Kaya_AKPForeignPolicy_2016.pdf

“Regional power transition and the future of Turkey” by Birol Ali Yeşilada and Osman Göktuğ Tanrikulu also uses power transition theory and human development theory to examine regional power transitions for Turkey¹³. The first finding is that the regional hegemon is not satisfied with the status quo, which is the most likely probability of conflict between regional rivals. Here, the conflictual relations between Turkey and Iran and Turkey and Russia may be observed. Turkey and Russia are described as unsatisfied actors; as Russia’s relative power declines and Turkey’s power increases, conflict between them in the future grows inevitable. Yesilada, Efird, and Noordijk also find that Turkey’s membership in the EU would likely create more neutral relations with its rivals. In “How to compare regional powers: analytical concepts and research topics,” Detlef Nolte examines the concept of regional power by combining different approaches in IR theory¹⁴. He uses a comparison of realist balance-of-power theories, power transition theory, and regional security complex theory in order to compare regional powers’ approaches and accordingly define regional power. Realist approaches highlight that states compete to maximize their power when scarce resources exist in the international order. Power transition theory, on the other hand, emphasizes that the system is not anarchical; it is stable and hierarchal. The power hierarchy illustrates this vision of stability in the region. A dominant nation is at the top of the international order and states compete for that hierarchal position. Nolte also defines secondary regional powers and the regional middle powers by using different approaches, “Turkey: A regional power facing a changing international system” by Şaban Kardaş analyzes the position of Turkey as a regional power in terms of its activity within the regional–global nexus, behavioral attitudes, and the nature of the regional order¹⁵. He uses regional security complex theory to explain regional order, and he applies constructivist and realist perspectives in order to define regional order, in which material capacity and social processes play important roles. He states that systems ranging from unipolarity to

¹³ Yeşilada, B. & Tanrikulu, O. (2016). Regional Power Transition and the Future of Turkey. *Uluslararası İlişkiler* 13., 23-46 Retrieved November 11, 2018 from <https://dergipark.org.tr/tr/download/article-file/540897>

¹⁴ Nolte, D.(2010). How to Compare Regional Powers: Analytical Concepts and Research Topics . *British International Studies Association* , 36, 881–901 November 11, 2018 from doi:10.1017/S026021051000135X

¹⁵Kardaş, Ş. (2013). Turkey: A Regional Power Facing a Changing International System, *Turkish Studies*, 14:4, 637-660, November 11, 2018 from doi: 10.1080/14683849.2013.861111

multipolarity seek patterns of amity and enmity as a way of classifying regional orders. Behavioral attributes of regional powers reflect integration and interaction with the environment and their perceptions of self and other. He further emphasizes that regional powers that are not classified as global powers apply global-level considerations in their foreign policy behaviors. Turkey's recent foreign policy has seen increased influence in distant regions with behaviors characteristic of a regional power as determined by its position in the regional-global nexus. Turkey's foreign policy has recently been active not only in regional affairs but also global affairs, which makes Turkish regional power all the more visible among its rivals.

In spite of the growing number of works conducted by researchers, a gap still exists in terms of explaining the regional power capability field of international relations and area studies. A growing number of academic studies have undertaken comparisons of Brazil and Venezuela, Japan and Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Iran, or Turkey and Iran. However, Turkey and Russia have rarely been the subject of a single study. Hence, in this thesis, these two leading regional powers will be used to expand on not only regional power studies but also general foreign policy towards the Middle East in a particular period of time. This thesis places emphasis on a wide conceptual and comparative perspective, suggesting that the regional power political relations of Russia and Turkey reflect concerns about international relations and a longstanding interest in political theory. Efforts are made to investigate the role of regional foreign policy and how it influences regional cooperation aimed at resolving conflict. Information about these countries' military capacity distribution is also applied to foresee which regional states might enjoy higher levels of cooperative interaction in order to be perceived as regional powers. Interactions with regional states are analyzed in detail in order to better understand the motives of regional powers in unifying security efforts within the region. The security policies of the leading regional powers, namely Turkey and Russia, will be examined according to perceptions of them as regional powers by surrounding states and also a great power, namely the USA. This thesis aims to adapt well-established international relations theories to put forward hypotheses about variations in effective regional conflict solution, This thesis aims to adapt well-established international relations

theories to put forward hypotheses about variations in effective regional conflict solution, cooperation, the securing of peace, and the use of diplomatic platforms.

This thesis will provide comparative information regarding Turkey and Russia's capabilities of attaining regional power; this topic has not yet been widely studied by scholars and hence this work aims to fill the gap in the literature. The implementation of the regional foreign policies of both countries is used to explain how they became regional powers and how they are working to secure peace in the Middle East. Recent developments in the Middle East will also be studied along with Turkey and Russia's foreign policy implementations with the aim of discovering an alternative explanation for their political presence. The significance and implications of regional power will be discussed throughout this work in light of the regional security complex theory on regional and international levels. This theory may be analyzed on various levels, such as the power capacity of a state, its relations with its neighbors in the region, the positions of superpowers in the region, and state-to-state interrelations in the region. Turkey and Russia's strengths in terms of policy in the Middle East will also be examined, along with regional foreign policies towards the Middle East regarding the Middle East's military capacity and security policies. Military capacity, interactions with neighbors, acceptance by neighbors, and global power are indicators applied in this thesis with the aim of giving an alternative explanation of Turkey and Russia's attainment of regional power.

CONCEPTUAL AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

The theoretical framework consists of concepts that scholars apply in scientific research for the relevant cases. This thesis presents a conceptual background about regional power in order to evaluate the research and findings. With this goal in mind, providing a definition of "region" will help highlight why the selected topic is valid for use in this study. A region is usually defined as a group of states that are positioned in the same geographical area. Moreover, the definition of "region" has triggered questions of physical proximity in groups

of states on the topic of sharing a communal identity. Besides these aforementioned arguments, various studies suggest that the local proximity of states is not the only component of define a regional group; but also states sharing a same culture and identity without geographic criteria are largely specified as a regional group. Political, economic, and security arrangements assign the mutual engagement of a group of states. Thus, Peter J. Katzenstein elaborates that it is socially constructed in terms of the implementation of practices, polices, values, and mutual commitment in a group of states¹⁶. Regionally integrated states may likely adopt common positions in international and regional disputes as well as undertaking international organization in response to political cooperation.

The term “power” indisputably suggests the ability to do something or act in a particular way¹⁷. Hans Morgenthau as a classical realist emphasizes the struggle for power¹⁸. Morgenthau explains the desire for power by human nature. Everyone desires power due to its nature and the prospect of having their state dominate its rivals. For realists, sufficient strength in economics and military power are relative to each other. Structural realists (e.g., Kenneth Waltz and John Mearsheimer) think that there is no higher authority in the international system and the system is in anarchy so states try to increase their power in order to survive in this system. They ignore differences of cultural and regime types of states, whether democratic or autocratic, and the influence on how states act towards others. A relatively important point here is that states are more or less powerful than others. For classical realists, power is an end in itself; for structural realists, power is a means to an end, namely survival. The understanding of power diverges into two pillars for realists, which are building military power and armored divisions. Classical realism brings the analysis of the security affairs of countries whose foreign policies are centered on security affairs. Morgenthau is strength on aspects of sources of power, armed forces, the nation’s character

¹⁶ Nolte, D. (2007).How to Compare Regional Powers: Analytical Concepts and Research Topics.*ECPR Joint Session of Workshops, Helsinki, Preliminary Version* Retrieved October 7, 2017 from <https://ecpr.eu/Filestore/PaperProposal/212a550d-597b-4f60-86df-ec73a8e43707.pdf>

¹⁷ English Oxford Living dictionary(n.d). Retrieved November 17, 2017, from <https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/power>

¹⁸ Political Realism in International Relations(2010). *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*. Retrieved November 17, 2017 from <https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/realism-intl-relations/#pagetopright>

, and the quality of governance. Realists have also suggested that Turkey's actions could be understood as balancing moves against other regional powers or against the USA¹⁹.

Theoretical viewpoint of classical realism fit into concept of regional power. Schrim and Schoeman are some of the well-known scholars who define the term "regional power". The significance and implications of regional power will be discussed throughout this dissertation in light of the regional security complex theory—on regional and international levels. Hence This thesis will touch upon the regional security complex theory. In addition, power structure in the region contains various theories associated with the regional security complex theory—this will also be explained. Barry Buzan and Ole Waever establish the trends of regional security complex theory in security patterns. The definition of power and the role of regional power and middle power have been used to convey understanding of the present background of regional foreign policies of Turkey and Russia. Regional and global power structure is a core dynamics in understanding the policy preferences of Turkey and Russia. Understanding and evaluating the basic dynamics of their policy preferences allows for a better view of how the theory should be examined. Buzan and Waever explain security interdependence among groups of states existing in the same geographical area in their theory on security complexes. Security patterns are not only theorized, but also economic, social, and global patterns of international relations are theorized as well²⁰. The theory has also covered periphery and core relations in response to superpowers and regional powers. The difference between regional powers and superpowers has to do with influences on global issues. Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver introduce regional security complex theory "set of units whose major processes of securitization, desecuritisation, or both are so interlinked that their security problems cannot reasonably be analyzed or resolved apart from one another". Egypt to Iran and from Turkey to Yemen is formed regional security complex since at least the 1990–1 Gulf War²¹. Waever

¹⁹ Hill, F., Taşpınar, O.(2006). Turkey and Russia: Axis of the excluded? Survival. *Routledge* 48,1, 81-92

Retrieved from October 12 2017 from doi 10.1080/00396330600594256

²⁰ Nolte, D. (2007).How to Compare Regional Powers: Analytical Concepts and Research Topics.*ECPR Joint Session of Workshops, Helsinki, Preliminary Version* Retrieved October 7, 2017 from <https://ecpr.eu/Filestore/PaperProposal/212a550d-597b-4f60-86df-ec73a8e43707.pdf>

²¹ Hazbun, W. (2018).Regional Powers and The Production of Insecurity in the Middle East. Middle East and North Africa Regional Architecture Working Papers, No 11, Retrieved December 7, 2018 from https://www.iai.it/sites/default/files/menara_wp_11.pdf

& Buzan believe that the security of each state is brought into operation with other states in the same region. The dynamic nature of regional security is among a group of states in the surrounding region. The theory of regional security complex could be analyzed in various levels, such as: the power capacity of a state, its relation with its neighbors in the region, positions of superpowers in the region, and state-to-state interrelation in the region²².

The power hierarchy has illustrated this vision of stability in a region. The fear of an insecure entity under the framework of stability and domestic order, in response to the state and the nation, interprets this potential fear of insecure entities. Superpowers may see comprehensive interests at global levels, however, states in the region may influence their regions in advance²³. Thus, Nolte claims that Turkey, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Iraq, Brazil, Israel, India, Iran, and Nigeria would all be under the classification of regional powers. The structure is defined as a regional security complex by the regional power. Regional power capacities are limited in the regions previously mentioned. Higher authority, apart from the region, should not be taken to global power capacity (in terms of regional power on a global level) by any means. In addition to this, the category of being a superpower maybe listed as power and material capacities, and this may impact international operations and recognition of other global powers in international systems²⁴. Groups of states within a close geographical region have fundamental concerns, such as building links with economy, security, and political activities.

This thesis will compare the regional foreign policies of Turkey and the Russian Federation in the last few decades. The implementation of Turkey and Russia's security policies will be analyzed based on their regional impacts in the surrounding Middle Eastern and European regions. Hence, it has triggered subsequent hypothesis:

²² Buzan, B., & Wæver, O. (2003). *Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security* (Cambridge Studies in International Relations). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Retrieved October 12, 2017 from doi:10.1017/CBO9780511491252

²³ Nolte, D. (2007). How to Compare Regional Powers: Analytical Concepts and Research Topics. *ECPR Joint Session of Workshops, Helsinki, Preliminary Version* Retrieved October 7, 2017 from <https://ecpr.eu/Filestore/PaperProposal/212a550d-597b-4f60-86df-ec73a8e43707.pdf>

H1

Political instability in neighboring countries has a positive impact on shaping a regional power's regional foreign policy in politically unstable areas.

H2

If a country cooperates more with other regional states, then it is more likely to be a regional power it because it unifies security within in the surrounded region.

H3

If a country has the advantage of greater power capacity over a competitor it will be more able to secure peace and in turn more capable of attaining regional power and enforcing the rules of regional order.

H4

If a country is incapable of meeting criteria of becoming a regional power, then using diplomatic platforms in order to become a regional power will help especially if has also been selected as a mediating country to resolve conflict and maintain its position in the region

METHODOLOGY AND RESEARCH DESIGN

The research design of this thesis employs the method of agreement described by John Stuart Mill in his 1843 book, *A System of Logic*. He formulated five principles identifying causal connections, namely the method of agreement, the method of difference, the joint method of agreement and difference, the method of residues, and the method of concomitant variations. The Method of Agreement define: "If two or more instances of the phenomenon under investigation have only one circumstance in common, the circumstance in which alone all the instances agree, is the cause (or effect) of the given phenomenon²⁵".

²⁵ Mills, A. J., Durepos, G., & Wiebe, E. (2010). *Encyclopedia of case study research* (Vols. 1-0). Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications, Inc. doi: 10.4135/9781412957397

The method of agreement generally uses comparative social science processes by simple elimination where experimentation is impossible²⁶. The principle of elimination is tested to eliminate accidental factors and reveal genuine causes. It basically explains the causes of events by analyzing the most different cases and seeking a common factor or outcome. A cause must precede its effect. The method of agreement seeks a singular case that is present for all positive instances to conclude that it was this circumstance that caused the phenomenon.²⁷

Symbolically, the method of agreement can be represented as:

A B C D occur together with w x y z
A E F G occur together with w t u v

Therefore A is the cause, the effect, or part of the cause of w²⁸.

In this context, this method also aims to identify one circumstance that is associated with the one phenomenon in which the researcher is interested. Hence, this method allows us to discover the impacts of Turkish and Russian regional foreign policies on attaining regional power in the Middle East. Searching for the cause of enhanced relations with these countries' neighbors in the Middle East will lead to the result in question, which is attaining regional power.

By verifying a hypothesis, the research strategy to be used will be based on assessing the most influential, similar, and contrasting sets of data. When a hypothesis is able to be tested and investigated, research methodology can be applied, which entails a description of the main assumptions and principles of a given problem. If two or more factors appear in the

²⁶Hasić, J.(2015). Identifying and Testing Causal Mechanisms by Applying J.S. Mill's Indirect Method of Difference. *Anali Pravnog fakulteta u Zanici* 457-471. . Retrieved October 7, 2019 from

<https://www.prf.unze.ba/Docs/Anali/AnaliBr14god7/14.pdf>

²⁷ Heuveln, V. B. (2000). Preferred Treatment of Mill's Methods: Some Misinterpretations by Modern Textbooks. *Informal Logic*, 20, 19-42 Retrieved October 7, 2019 from doi: 10.22329/il.v20i1.2252

²⁸Nuland, B. S.(2004). The Doctors' Plague: Germs, Childbed Fever, and the Strange Story of Ignac Semmelweis. *W. W. Norton & Company: Reprint edition*. Retrieved October 7, 2019 from http://wps.prenhall.com/wps/media/objects/5909/6050951/MyLogicLab_ebook/MLL_Copi_13e_Ch12/013_6141390_Ch12_04.pdf

study of a phenomenon with one of the leading possible causal circumstances, we may discover the cause of the observed phenomenon.²⁹ The method of agreement is preferred when experimentation is impractical. It is relevant when there is only one circumstance in common to allow the hypotheses to be proven. Among the sets of foreign policy strategies of Turkey and Russia, a common factor that is used for attaining regional power may be revealed. The method of agreement is thus used as the research design to explain the process of elimination and arrive at a causal inference.

In the context introduced here, the method of agreement is applied in this thesis to any common cause in Turkey and Russia attaining regional power. It will be useful in this regard to compare how Turkey and Russia enhanced their relations within the surrounding region and used military power against states in the Middle East as a part of attaining regional power. Along with the set of Turkish and Russian regional foreign policies, this thesis also addresses other factors, such as historical backgrounds, and how they may have impacted the goals of Turkey and Russia as regional powers.

Diplomacy as a first approach is a special circumstance that may reflect Turkey and Russia's regional foreign policies as a way to find solutions where the result includes an increase in regional power.

Primary and secondary resources will be examined throughout the thesis, including official reports, policy analyses, recent articles, speeches by politicians and representatives of non-governmental organizations, and strategy papers. The primary and secondary resources are evaluated in a framework of case modes of analysis. Process tracing will be employed for evidence of causal mechanisms, consisting of both dependent and independent variables³⁰. The definition of process tracing is the systematic analysis of indicative evidence selected in light of research questions given by the researcher. If theories are tested via theory building and explanation, this is an example of process tracing, especially if the outcome leads to

²⁹ Hasić, J.(2015). Identifying and Testing Causal Mechanisms by Applying J.S. Mill's Indirect Method of Difference. *Anali Pravnog fakulteta u Zanicu* 457-471. . Retrieved October 7, 2019 from <https://www.prf.unze.ba/Docs/Anali/AnaliBr14god7/14.pdf>

³⁰ Bennet, A. & George L. A. *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences*. MIT Press: Cambridge, Massachusetts London, England. . Retrieved October 7, 2017 https://www.academia.edu/19264308/Case_Studies_and_Theory_Development_in_the_Social_Sciences

qualitative analysis. Developing a causal mechanism in the research design of this thesis involves process tracing to see whether it is present in a given case. Process tracing aids in the empirical testing of hypotheses defined with the desire to trace causal mechanisms. Collecting the data necessary for testing a theory is done in an attempt to explain causal inferences, outline the evidence, and further support the hypotheses.

Furthermore, it is also a tool that is used for conceptualizing different types of contradictory data in existing literature. For instance, general principles and causal mechanisms are used to explain several sets of events. This explanation of the observed outcome of the events is where tracing is done and this is more theory-centric.

ORGANIZATION AND OUTPUT OF THESIS

In the first chapter, it will be examined that the similarities and differences of regional foreign policies retain the original structure of the policy preferences. Turkey's regional activities will be a study in discovering an alternative explanation as to why it is a political entity. Turkey's foreign policy implementations towards neighbors will also be a study in also discovering an alternative explanation for its political presence. In terms of Turkey's strength on policy in the Middle East, its regional foreign policy towards the Middle East will also be examined; this is in regards to the Middle East's military capacity and security policies. Turkey employment of military power as regional foreign policy instruments will be examined as well. The second chapter, it will be examined that Russia's regional activities will be observed, where an alternative explanation will be proposed in regards to its political entity in the area. Interaction with its neighboring countries and relations with its distributed states will be used as a study in learning how it shapes its policies. Russia's regional foreign policy implementations will also be observed, where alternative explanations will be discussed in terms of its political presence in the region. Like Turkey, Russia's regional foreign policy towards the Middle East will also be argued; this is in regards

to the Middle East's military capacity and security policies. Similar and different factors in Russia's and Turkey's interactions with surrounding states that have caused them to be perceived as regional powers will be explored. The use of diplomatic platforms and international organizations will also be examined in light of perceptions of regional power. It is assumed that the implementation of similar regional foreign policies will lead to the same results for these historically different countries. Thesis will be finalized with limitations on regional foreign policy and a final statement will be given along with attaining regional power.

1. TURKEY'S REGIONAL FOREIGN POLICY STRATEGIES

This thesis will analyze Turkey becoming a regional power and its regional foreign policy towards its neighboring countries in the Middle East. The Republic of Turkey was established with a secular political structure according to Kemalist principles, traditionally Western-oriented. During the Cold War, Turkey was a threat to the Soviet Union due to its close ties with the Western bloc. Turkey's needs for major support for its economics and security led it to rely on the West and the United States within the bipolar international system. Turkish foreign policy was thus based on security and cooperation with the West, mainly the USA, against a common enemy. The USA strengthened its relations with Turkey as a new ally against that common enemy with the Marshall Plan, a post-war recovery program offered to Europe, which Turkey also took advantage of for economic and military aid. This was followed by NATO membership in 1952³¹. In order to diminish the spread of Soviet influence, Turkey tried to develop new security policies. Hence, its aim of reaching the level of contemporary civilizations had an active member of international organizations. However, in the mid-1960s and mid-1970s, Turkey had closer ties with its Middle Eastern neighbors as a consequence of the Cyprus dispute³². Finding itself almost isolated in the

³¹ Turkey's Relations with NATO. *Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs*. Retrieved October 7, 2018 from <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/nato.en.mfa>

³² Dal, E. P. (2016). Conceptualising and Testing the Emerging Regional Power of Turkey in the Shifting International Order. *Third World Quarterly*, Retrieved November 11, 2018 from DOI: 10.1080/01436597.2016.1142367

international arena, it sought alternative foreign policy with the Middle East. Turkey's active participation in the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) not only led the country to not be involved in conflict in the Middle East; it also led to a willingness to play a mediating role there. In the early stages of Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, which began on August 2, 1990, Turkish policies were based on bilateral relations with many actors³³. Turkey was committed to the UN's decisions and allowed the USA to use Turkish bases in the later stages of the invasion. This cooperation was expected to help Turkey gain US support for full membership in the EU. In the following years, instable domestic policies and civil-military regimes in Turkey again triggered a search for alternative foreign policy. With the Helsinki Council, Turkey became an official candidate for EU accession, and the Europeanization of foreign policy began with accession negotiations with the European Union on October 3, 2005³⁴. Implementation of European norms on minority and human rights, and international legitimacy, thus became the new agenda of Turkey. Diminishing tension with Turkey's neighbors was also emphasized in the new foreign policy agenda and a more active approach in foreign policy towards its neighbors was adopted. In other words, EU-inspired foreign policy strategies were suggested. The rhetoric was first directly changed in the administration of foreign policy. Turkey adopted new tools and instruments in foreign affairs due to its geostrategic position and history. The concept of "Strategic Depth" was developed by Ahmet Davutoglu, an academic and the Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs from 2009 to 2014, and also the Prime Minister of Turkey in 2015³⁵. The concept of Strategic Depth was a new alternative for explaining Turkish foreign policy. This concept was based on Turkey's geostrategic location³⁶. The terms "geographical geo-economics," "geocultural," and

³³ Nachmani, A. (2018). Turkey and the Gulf War Coping with Intertwined Conflicts. *Manchester University Press*. Retrieved October 7, 2019 from <https://doi.org/10.7765/9781526137937.00006>

³⁴ Bac, M. M & Gursoy, Y. (2009). Is There a Europeanization of Turkish Foreign Policy? An Addendum to the Literature on EU Candidates. *RECON Online Working Papers Series, 11*, Retrieved October 7, 2018 from doi: 10.1080/14683849.2010.506734

³⁵ Grigoriadis, N. I. The Davutoğlu Doctrine and Turkish Foreign Policy. *Bilkent University / ELIAMEP. Working Paper Nr8/2010*. Retrieved October 7, 2018 http://www.eliamep.gr/wp-content/uploads/2010/05/%CE%9A%CE%95%CE%99%CE%9C%CE%95%CE%9D%CE%9F-%CE%95%CE%A1%CE%93%CE%91%CE%A3%CE%99%CE%91%CE%A3-8_2010_loGriqoriadis1.pdf

³⁶ Rabasa, A., Larrabee, S. F. (2008). *The AKP's Foreign Policy*. Rabasa, A., & Larrabee, S. F. *The Rise of Political Islam in Turkey*. 75-90. Santa Monica, CA : RAND Corporation. 2008. Retrieved October 7, 2018 from https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2008/RAND_MG726.pdf

“geopolitical” are particularly important terms in the world of politics and the most important phrase was “zero problems with neighboring countries.” Thus, Turkey expanded its interactions with its neighboring countries. Turkey’s strategic location and historical and cultural ties make it central in regional and international systems³⁷. To illustrate, Turkey is the successor state of the Ottoman Empire, which is the source of its significant historical and cultural ties with the Balkans, the Middle East, and Central Asia. These factors may likely be significant in enabling Turkey to become a regional power based on strategic depth. Furthermore, the doctrine of strategic depth goes on to indicate that Turkey can establish diversified alliances, increase freedom of action, and gain leverage both regionally and internationally to counteract its ties with the West. The notion of strategic depth explicitly highlighted that Turkey could attain regional power if it eliminated hostility and established good relations with all of its neighbors . In terms of recent actions, Turkish foreign policy has exclusively drawn attention to the Middle East since Turkey has become a rising diplomatic power. It is important to note that Turkey has taken several steps to acquire the role of policy-maker in the region. When examining policy areas, regional foreign policies must be considered. The significant economic growth in the Republic of Turkey under the Justice and Development Party (Turkish: AKP) government and the use of new foreign policy strategies with its neighbors have been important phases for the transformation that has occurred in foreign policy. Schoeman and Schrim’s classification of regional power will help form the basis for analyzing Turkish foreign policy in the Middle East. Hence, Turkey’s relations with its neighbors constitute one of the pillars that are illustrated.

1.1.TURKEY’S RELATION WITH ITS NEIGHBORS: FOREIGN RELATIONS IN TRANSITION

Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East has been reshaped under the Justice and Development Party. Turkey has been observed as the most important diplomatic actor in the

³⁷ Han, D., A., Omurcan E., Senol, O. (2016). Turkey’s Foreign Policy and the Middle East Under AKP Rule (2002-2012) . *Zeszyty Naukowe Uczelni Vistula*, 48(3). 5-24. Retrieved October 7, 2018 from <http://cejsh.icm.edu.pl/cejsh/element/bwmeta1.element.desklight-f6268d19-d83f-4126-ad53-52dbfb0fd710>

region and has paved the way for building a bridge in maintaining cross-cultural dialogue across the region. The traditional hard-power approach no longer has a place in the policy or agenda of Turkey. In this framework, Turkey has tried to normalize its relationships with its neighbors. This has improved ties with countries such as with Iran, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia, which are seen as regional powers, and has fostered strength and cooperation with Sunni Arab states in the Middle East. This cooperation reflected the expanding recognition of Turkish leadership and stability along its borders. This has required commitment with Turkey's neighbors in the Middle East and deeper involvement in the regional efforts for peace.

Turkey's recent foreign policy strategy towards the Middle East included expanding good relations with its neighbors. As a result, Turkey started to improve its relationships with neighboring regions in order to "expand its sphere of influence," as stated by Davutoglu in the "Strategic Depth" doctrine. Schoeman and Schrim's classification of regional power involves understanding the responsibilities towards a neighbor's ability to maintain regional security, which is also among Turkey's main strategies for being perceived as a regional power. Consequently, Turkey improved its relationships with its neighbors in light of cooperation in several areas in order to achieve aim of attaining regional power as regional foreign policy.

1.1.2. Turkey's Regional Foreign Policy Towards Iraq

Regional foreign policies after WWII have been the primary approach to emerging as a status quo power without interfering in internal affairs. The Gulf War Crisis of 1990-1991 was a major challenge to the status quo in the region. Turkey hosted hundreds of thousands of refugees from Iraq after the Gulf War, which took place in 1991³⁸. Turkey's new activism was reflected in its relations with Arab countries. As a result of regional dynamics, questions of borders in the region had a direct impact on Turkey's foreign policy. It led to a self-help system for states to ensure security and survival. Turkey's foreign policy in the region was

³⁸ Loescher, G.(2003, February 3). A disaster waiting to happen. *The Guardian*. Retrieved November 7, 2018 from <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2003/feb/02/iraq.immigration>

most often security-related. The US invasion of Iraq eliminated Saddam Hussein's regime but led to ethnic and religious groups fighting for their interests³⁹. Transformation in Iraq after 2003 emphasized new regional powers with security-oriented foreign policy. Thus, political instability and a lack of central power led regional players, such as Iran, Syria, and Turkey, to grow in terms of their influence in Iraq. Turkey's influence over developments in Iraq started with the Turkish military's participation in the American-led coalition's invasion of Iraq being rejected by the Grand National Assembly of Turkey (Turkish: TBMM). With 533 parliamentarians in session, there were 250 "no" votes, 19 abstentions, and 17 absences⁴⁰. In the last few years, Turkey's foreign policy shifted with a non-military approach towards Iraq. It was maintain equal distance with all ethnic and religious groups in Iraq. Economic interaction provided a tool for transformation of Turkish regional policy towards its neighbors, particularly Iraq. To illustrate, Turkish companies invested in the infrastructure in Northern Iraq and Turkey held the Fifth Donors Conference of the World Bank-UNDP Iraq Trust Fund, emphasizing Turkey's readiness for reconstruction in Iraq as well openness to the foreign market and Turkish trade volume with Iraq reached \$9 billion in 2011⁴¹. Turkey's diplomatic engagement with the Kurdish question Regional Government (KRG) was made clear when Turkey opened its consulate in Erbil in March 2010⁴². It followed Erdogan's visits to Baghdad, Najaf, and Erbil, where, in the capital of the autonomous Kurdish government, a diplomatic agreement was reached with all parties in Iraq. Turkey started acting as a mediator between Syria and Iraq when Iraq blamed Syria for bombings in Iraq in August 2009⁴³. Turkey played an active role in negotiating with all Iraqis—Kurds and

³⁹Bac, M.M.(2014) Changing Turkish foreign policy towards Iraq: new tools of engagement, *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*, 27:3, 538-552, November 11, 2018 from DOI: 10.1080/09557571.2013.840560

⁴⁰Boudreaux, R.& Zaman, A.(2003 March 2). Turkey Rejects U.S. Troop Deployment . *Los Angeles Times*. Retrieved October 7, 2018 from <https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-2003-mar-02-fg-iraq2-story.html>

⁴¹ Altunışık, B. M.(2007). Turkey's Security Culture and Policy Towards Iraq. *Perceptions Spring-Summer*. Retrieved October 7, 2018 from <http://sam.gov.tr/wp-content/uploads/2012/02/MelihaAltunisik.pdf>

⁴² Calderwood, J.(2011, June 22). Open for business: Turkey's bankers tap into Kurdish boom. *The National*. Retrieved October 7, 2018 <https://www.thenational.ae/world/mena/open-for-business-turkey-s-bankers-tap-into-kurdish-boom-1.415086>

⁴³ Syria-Iraq Ties Cool Over Bomb Charges(2009,August 28). *Institute for War and Peace Reporting*, SB No. 73, Retrieved October 7, 2018 from <https://www.refworld.org/docid/4a9e7dafc.html>

Arabs, Sunnis and Shias—once the US government withdrew its forces from Iraq. Tariq al-Hashimi, former Iraqi Vice President, stated that “Turkey has played a sincere, neutral, and a great role to remove differences among Iraqi political groups”⁴⁴. Disputes between Baghdad and Erbil regarding the exportation of oil could have had very serious problems for the stability of the country. Turkish diplomatic engagements with Iraq were challenged when conflict occurred between rival groups. After Iraqi Vice President al-Hashimi was removed from power, he was granted permission to reside in Turkey⁴⁵.

The Kurdish question had become a cornerstone in the long history of relations between Turkey and Iraq. Turkish-Iraqi relations have mostly been security-oriented due to instability in Iraq and the Kurdish autonomous region in Iraq’s north. Turkey has insisted on the territorial integrity of Iraq, stating that expansion of the Kurdish region would lead to violence between ethnic groups such as the Turkmen, Arabs, and Kurds, with likely spillover into Turkey. Instability along Turkey’s borders is a handicap for Turkey’s acceptance as a full member of the EU⁴⁶. In addition to this, Turkey focused on protecting its southern border and also supply to Europe energy via Nabucco pipeline as an energy hub. Turkey has an essential role to play in the conflict over Kirkuk, particularly regarding the Turkmen population and their preferences. Instability in the region is not only a challenge for Turkey’s acceptance as a regional power; it is also unclear whether the Arab states consider Turkey to be closer to them or to the West. In conclusion, the long-term strategy and intentions towards Iraq represent an alternative way of regaining Turkey’s economic and political advantages in order to be accepted as a regional power. Nevertheless politically and socially instability in Iraq has limited impact on Turkey acceptance as regional power by neighbors states. The Kurdish question is another issue that limits perceptions of Turkey’s ability as a regional power to maintain regional security.

⁴⁴ Turkish FM Meets Iraqi Vice President Tariq al-Hashimi(2010, October, 08).World Bulletin. Retrieved October 7, 2018 from <https://www.worldbulletin.net/amp/diplomacy/turkish-fm-meets-iraqi-vice-president-tariq-al-hashimi-h64923.html>

⁴⁵ Bac, M, M.(2014).Changing Turkish foreign policy towards Iraq: new tools of engagement, *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*, 27:3, 538-552, DOI: 10.1080/09557571.2013.840560

⁴⁶ Barkey, J. H.(2010). Turkey’s New Engagement in Iraq Embracing Iraqi Kurdistan. *United States Institute of Peace: Special Report 237* Retrieved October 7, 2018 from https://carnegieendowment.org/files/USIP_SR_Turkey_Iraq.pdf

1.1.3. Turkey's Diplomatic Engagement in Iran

During early years of 1980s and 1990s two neighboring countries namely, Turkey and Iran relation were tense. Turkey accused Iran of supporting the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) and Iran accused Turkey of supporting opposition groups fighting against the Islamic regime⁴⁷. However, US invasion of Iraq was milestone improvement of the Turkish-Iranian relationship. The relationship between Turkey and Iran was viewed in a more positive light after the Justice and Development Party came into power in 2002⁴⁸. To illustrate, it is one of the leading countries which congratulated the sixth president of Iran, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, on his reelection in 2009⁴⁹. This departure of Turkish foreign policy naturally brought close ties with surrounding neighbors, such as Iran and Syria, although there was tension between them in the 1970's and 80's. The interactions between Turkey and Iran will be examined in two phases, which are: 1) fighting against terrorism and 2) developing strategies on nuclear power. The first phase is fighting against terrorism and terrorist groups as well as border control.

The Kurdish minority populations in Iran, Turkey, and Syria impacted close ties of these countries due to shared interests. Rising out of independent Kurdish states is contrary to those states, so preventing this movement allowed them cooperate with each other in various areas. Iran and Turkey share similar security questions, such as the PKK and PJAK. However, autonomy of Kurds in Iraq may likely pose potential destabilization effects in Iran and Turkey. Thus, both countries must jointly cooperate against the establishment of an independent Kurdish state in Northern Iraq, especially after the Iraq War in 2003. Iran

⁴⁷ Habibi, N.(2012). Turkey and Iran: Growing Economic Relations Despite Western Sanctions. *Crown Center for Middle East Studies, No 62*. Retrieved February 17, 2018 from <https://www.brandeis.edu/crown/publications/middle-east-briefs/pdfs/1-100/meb62.pdf>

⁴⁸ Han, D., A., Omurcan E., Senol, O. (2016). Turkey's Foreign Policy and the Middle East Under AKP Rule (2002-2012). *Zeszyty Naukowe Uczelni Vistula*, 48(3). 5-24. Retrieved October 7, 2018 from <http://cejsh.icm.edu.pl/cejsh/element/bwmeta1.element.desklight-f6268d19-d83f-4126-ad53-52dbfb0fd710>

⁴⁹ Erdbrink, T. (2017). Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, Ex-President of Iran, Files to Run Again. *The Newyork Times*. Retrieved February 17, 2018, from <https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/12/world/middleeast/mahmoud-ahmadinejad-iran-presidential-election.html>

assumed that opposing autonomous Kurds in the region was viewed as a fight against U.S. hegemony. Since then, Turkey has been favor of territorial integrity in Iraq. Iran wanted to cooperate with Turkey over concerns about terrorism. Iran viewed Turkey as an ally and sincere problems with the U.S. made it guard itself from the Western alliance. On the other hand, this may likely include a paradox⁵⁰. Iran also shared the same view about the autonomous Kurds, but it doesn't want control of the oil and gas in Northern Iraq by means of Turkey. Although there is a paradox, both states improved their ways of cooperation on security issues, especially with concern to border control and terrorism. Thus, the cooperation agreement was signed by Iran and Turkey in order to define the PKK as a terrorist organization in July of 2004 and the meeting was held during the visit of the Secretary General of the Supreme National Security Council of Iran, Larindzhani, in May of 2006⁵¹. Prime Minister Erdoğan Foreign Minister Abdullah Gul, and Secretary General of the National Security Council of Turkey, Alpdogan, attended the meeting and agreed to intensify cooperation to exclude the PKK camps and bases⁵². In addition to working, visits of high officials to High Security Commission Meetings were held more than a decade apart. The topic of the meeting was to fight against terrorism and to secure borders. The two countries signed a memorandum of understanding to advocate their cooperation and to develop a way to cope with threats made by the PJAK and PKK in April of 2008⁵³. They also intensified bilateral security cooperation efforts. To illustrate, Ilker Basbug, who is a former commander of Turkey's land forces, stated that Turkey and Iran are not only in charge of this collective operation against terrorism, but are also sharing information and organizing their

⁵⁰ Karacasulu, N., & Aşkar K., İ. (2011). Iran-Turkey Relations in the 2000s: Pragmatic Rapprochement. *Pragmatic Rapprochement. Ege Academic Review*. 11 ,1, 111-119. Retrieved October 7, 2018 from doi: 10.21121/eab.2011119592

⁵¹ Han, D., A., Omurcan E., Senol, O. (2016). Turkey's Foreign Policy and the Middle East Under AKP Rule (2002-2012). *Zeszyty Naukowe Uczelni Vistula*, 48(3). 5-24. Retrieved October 7, 2018 from <http://cejsh.icm.edu.pl/cejsh/element/bwmeta1.element.desklight-f6268d19-d83f-4126-ad53-52dbfb0fd710>

⁵² Larrabee, F., & Nader, A. (2013). Nuclear Issue. In *Turkish-Iranian Relations in a Changing Middle East* 23-30. RAND Corporation. Retrieved October 23 from <http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7249/j.ctt4cgdbg.8>

⁵³ McCurdy, D. (2008). Turkish- Iranian Relations: When Opposites Attract. *Turkish Policy Quarterly*, 7,2 Retrieved October 7, 2018 from https://www.esiweb.org/pdf/esi_turkey_tpq_vol7_no2_dmc.pdf

operations⁵⁴. The second phase is the normalization of Iran's nuclear program testing ground and its relation with Turkey. Behind closed doors, nuclear development is a long term dispute. Iran's nuclear development is also another strategic issue. The International Atomic Energy Agency stated that Iran improved their knowledge and technology in order to properly handle nuclear weapons. Iranian nuclear programs may pose a threat to normalization trends and relations with Turkey. Thus, Turkey used a diplomatic solution in case global security issues were to occur. Meanwhile, the Obama administration highlighted a great diplomatic campaign sanction on Iran. Former Foreign Minister, Ali Babacan, stated that dialogue and diplomacy is the way for dealing with Iranian nuclear programs rather than imposing sanctions⁵⁵. Regarding these strategies, Turkey offered a nuclear fuel swap agreement in May of 2010 to the UN Security Council intended on building trust and confidence⁵⁶. Iran reluctantly supported Turkey as a regional power and accepted the mediator role of Turkey in the UN Security Council regarding nuclear development cases⁵⁷. However, the deal was dissolved by the U.S. but a set of sanctions has been established by the UNSC, resolution 1929, and was voted on in June of 2010. The Turkish-Brazilian proposal failed because both countries overestimated Russia's and China's positions. They voted with the West regarding 1929 UNSC⁵⁸. Turkey officially accepted early warning radar systems in NATO's framework missile defense in September of 2011⁵⁹. It likely signaled

⁵⁴ Karacasulu, N., & Aşkar K., İ. (2011). Iran-Turkey Relations in the 2000s: Pragmatic Rapprochement. *Pragmatic Rapprochement.Ege Academic Review*.11 1, 111-119. Retrieved October 7, 2018 from doi: 10.21121/eab.2011119592

⁵⁵ Larrabee, F., & Nader, A. (2013). Nuclear Issue. In *Turkish-Iranian Relations in a Changing Middle East* (pp.23-30). RAND Corporation. Retrieved from <http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7249/j.ctt4cgdbg.8>

⁵⁶ Karacasulu, N., & Aşkar K., İ. (2011). Iran-Turkey Relations in the 2000s: Pragmatic Rapprochement. *Pragmatic Rapprochement.Ege Academic Review*.11 (1), 111-119. Retrieved October 7, 2018 from doi: 10.21121/eab.2011119592

⁵⁷ Hentov, E. (2011) Turkey's global strategy: Turkey and Iran. IDEAS reports - special reports, Kitchen, Nicholas (ed.) SR007. LSE IDEAS, London School of Economics and Political Science, London, UK. Retrieved October 7, 2018 from [http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/43501/1/Turkey's%20Global%20Strategy_Turkey%20and%20Iran\(Isero\).pdf](http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/43501/1/Turkey's%20Global%20Strategy_Turkey%20and%20Iran(Isero).pdf)

⁵⁸ Metais, R.(2013, April).Can Emerging Powers call the Shots? Brazil, Turkey and alternative Approaches towards Iran. Conference on EU & the Emerging Powers, TOTAL Chair of EU Foreign Policy, College of Europe European Parliament, Brussels. Retrieved October 7, 2018 from http://www.usaintlouis.be/fr/pdf/IEE/Brochures/paper_metais.pdf

⁵⁹ Ergun, D., Dessi, A., Lindgaard, J., T Ala'Aldeen, D., Palani, K.(2018).The Role of the Middle East in the EU-Turkey Security Relationship: Key Drivers and Future Scenarios. *FEUTURE Online Paper No. 20* Retrieved March 7, 2019 from http://www.iai.it/sites/default/files/feuture_op_20.pdf

traditional Turkish security perceptions towards Iran, and expanded distinction from Iran, especially recent years⁶⁰. To illustrate, the ideological division between Turkey and Iran in the Syrian Civil War resulted in setting up a patriot missile system in Turkey and it was criticized by an Iranian army chief in 2012⁶¹. In recent years, peace talks have been sponsored by Turkey, Iran, and Russia in Geneva and Asthana⁶². They have tried agreed on no military solution for the Syrian conflict

The Iranian policy in Yemen and Iraq was condemned by President Erdogan and he accused them of monopolizing the region⁶³.

In terms of economy, Turkish-Iranian economic cooperation a significantly expanded in the past ten years. Two states mainly benefited border trade, Turkey is fifth largest trading partner of Iran border trade exceeded \$10 billion in 2008⁶⁴. US and EU economic sanction towards Iran leads expanding its economic ties with Turkey. In recent years, Turkey is ignore US concern and has implement a more independent foreign policy in the Middle East. Assisting US invasion of Iraq in 2003, willingness break off relations with Israel is prove of refusal to cooperate US. On the other hand unstable regional dynamics show Turkey is US still a valuable partner for other regional issues. Conflict in Syria, latest condition of Iraq brought the U.S. and Turkey in common ground. To illustrate, in 2007, the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) agreement was signed by Turkey and Iran in order to transport 30

⁶⁰ Sinkaya, B. (2012). Rationalization of Turkey-Iran relations: Prospects and Limits. *Insight Turkey*. 14, 2, 137-156 Retrieved March 7, 2019 from https://www.researchgate.net/publication/289986418_Rationalization_of_Turkey-Iran_relations_Prospects_and_limits

⁶¹ Iran warns Turkey not to deploy Patriot missiles (2012, November 24). *Hürriyet Daily News*. Retrieved March 7, 2019 from <http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/iran-warns-turkey-not-to-deploy-patriot-missiles-35384>

⁶² Kenny, P. (2019, October 30). Turkey, Russia, Iran issue joint statement on Syria. *Anadolu Agency*. Retrieved November 7 2019 from <https://www.aa.com.tr/en/world/turkey-russia-iran-issue-joint-statement-on-syria/1630216>

⁶³ Shine, S., Lindenstrauss G. (2016 July 31). The Failed Coup Attempt in Turkey: A Boost for Iran-Turkey Relations. *INSS Insight No. 839* Retrieved March 7, 2019 from <http://www.inss.org.il/publication/the-failed-coup-attempt-in-turkey-a-boost-for-iran-turkey-relations/>

⁶⁴ Ehteshami, A., Elik, S. (2011). Turkey's Growing Relations with Iran and Arab Middle East. *Turkish Studies*, 12:4, 643-662, Retrieved March 7, 2019 from DOI: 10.1080/14683849.2011.624322

billion cubic meters of Iranian and Turkish natural gas to Europe⁶⁵. Also, the Turkish Petroleum Corporation received a license from Iran to explore three sections of the South Pars gas field. However, this project is hold so far by Turkey's state-run oil company, TPAO due to economic sanction. Turkish oil companies decided to reduce their oil purchases from Iran in march 2012. installation of NATO anti-missile systems on Turkish has been criticized by Iran. As Conclusion, Turkey insist to unilateral relation Iran balancing act with Turkish government to continue its balancing act between Iran and the United States due to economic, security and trade interests.

1.1.4. Turkey's Security Policy in the Civil War in Syria

The geopolitical position of a country may provide an evolution of different strategies. A new Turkish foreign strategy was drawn by Davutoglu, the Strategic Depth doctrine. The significance and implications of the Strategic Depth doctrine may be seen in relations with Syria. In this part, the relationship between Turkey and Syria will be analyzed in two categories, which are: 1) zero problem policy and 2) regime change policy.

The evolution of Turkey's "zero problems" policy towards Syria is like an open door for a trade basis as Turkey has had an increasingly proactive foreign policy with its neighbors in the Middle East. The cooperation signs start with official meetings held by leaders of both countries. An official visit was made by the Turkish Prime Minister and the President of Syria in 2004 and it highlighted willingness of cooperation in various fields in 2004⁶⁶. Endorsement from Turkey—a border and trade regulated path in order to significantly improve relations with Syria was opened. A bilateral free trade agreement was entered in January of 2007 and Turkey's Foreign Minister and Syrian's Foreign Minister, Walid Muallem, signed a visa liberation agreement which terminated visa requirements in

⁶⁵ Kalehsar, O. (2015). Energy Factor in Iran –Turkey Relations. *Energy & Environment*, 26(5), 777-787. Retrieved November 11, 2017 from www.jstor.org/stable/90006269

⁶⁶ Han, D., A., & Omurcan E., & Senol, O. (2016). Turkey's Foreign Policy and the Middle East Under AKP Rule (2002-2012). *Zeszyty Naukowe Uczelni Vistula*, 48(3). 5-24. Retrieved October 7, 2018 from <http://cejsh.icm.edu.pl/cejsh/element/bwmeta1.element.desklight-f6268d19-d83f-4126-ad53-52dbfb0fd710>

September of 2009⁶⁷. Turkey used diplomatic tools in order to engage a mediator role between Syria and Israel⁶⁸. The effective mediation areas were withdrawing support of terrorist organizations such as Hezbollah and Hamas, border issues, and security issues between Israel and Syria. Aside from the economic and visa cooperation, a spill-over effect was made in the relationship between both countries. The possibility of collective military exercises were discussed between both countries.

Meanwhile, both countries committed collective military exercises that lasted three days and on the same day, they signed a military cooperation in bases of their defense industries in April of 2009⁶⁹. Both countries expanded the highest levels of strategic cooperation, however, it only lasted till the Syrian Civil War began in 2011. The Arab Spring had spill-over effects and gave opportunities to protesters in Syria. The Syrian government was violent in its response to the demonstrations. Turkey used diplomatic tools in the beginning of the Syrian Civil War and advised President Bashar al-Assad for political reform⁷⁰. Nevertheless, there was no response led by the Syrian government to decrease the social tensions inside the country. As a consequence, the Turkish embassy in Damascus was closed in March of 2011⁷¹ However, the Consulate in Aleppo remained open⁷². The diplomatic movement yielded no result and the conflict has still not ended. What was once a positive relationship between the two countries, has now turned negative. As a result of changed communication,

⁶⁷ D'Alema, F. (2017). The Evolution of Turkey's Syria Policy. *IAI Working Papers*. 17,28. Roma: IAI Istituto Affari Internazionali. Retrieved October 7, 2018 from Doi : 978-88-9368-057-8

⁶⁸ Brandenburg, R. (2019). Turkey's Israel-Syria Mediator Role. *Center for Security Studies*. Retrieved October 7, 2019 from <https://css.ethz.ch/en/services/digital-library/articles/article.html/88507/pdf>

⁶⁹ Han, D., A., Omurcan E., Senol, O. (2016). Turkey's Foreign Policy and the Middle East Under AKP Rule (2002-2012). *Zeszyty Naukowe Uczelni Vistula*, 48(3), 5-24. Retrieved October 7, 2018 from <http://cejsh.icm.edu.pl/cejsh/element/bwmeta1.element.desklight-f6268d19-d83f-4126-ad53-52dbfb0fd710>

⁷⁰ Hameed, A., A., M., & Mostafa, H., M., M. (2018). Turkish Foreign Policy Towards Syria Since 2002. *Asian Social Science*, 14(2), 57-68. Retrieved October 7, 2018 from Doi: 10.5539/ass.v14n2p57.

⁷¹ Balci, B. (2012). Turkey's Relations with the Syrian Opposition. *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace*. Retrieved October 7, 2018 from <https://carnegieendowment.org/2012/04/13/turkey-s-relations-with-syrian-opposition-pub-47841>

⁷² Syria: Turkey delivers 'strong political message' as it closes Damascus embassy. (2012 March 26). *The Telegraph*. Retrieved October 7, 2018 from <https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/syria/9166617/Syria-Turkey-delivers-strong-political-message-as-it-closes-Damascus-embassy..html>

Turkey supported opposition forces in Syria and was asking for the Syrian President to step down from office⁷³. However, the Syrian regime was approved by the U.S. Besides, Turkey started to build camps for refugees and hosted a military representative that was later called the “Free Syrian Army” for the fight against the current Syrian regime. Turkey also continued to support the National Coalition of Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces and held a meeting in Antalya in May of 2011⁷⁴. In addition, Turkey created the international coalition for the needs of Syrian people. The events and results of the Syrian Civil War were informed to the Security Council since it caused a possible threat to Turkey. While a free safe zone was being discussed, Syrian missiles hit a Turkish F-4 fighter and NATO condemned it in June of 2012⁷⁵. It was followed by other tragic events one after another: Reyhanli, Hatay Cilvegözü, and Bab al- Hawa. Foreign Minister Davutoglu held a meeting with the Secretary General of the Arab League in October of 2012⁷⁶. Turkey attended the Geneva Conference in January of 2014 as a result of the conferences, the chemical agreement signed by Russia and the U.S. was assigned to Turkey in order to stop the opportunity for a military strike against Al-Assad⁷⁷. Meanwhile the Turkish Parliament ratified a military operation outside the borders if warranted. Since 2014, the United State also called for international cooperation against ISIS Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and for Turkey to participate in this coalition force and to open a base for some coalition strikes. The participation of the international coalition of Turkey started peace talks with the Kurds and this raised important questions for the upcoming elections . Turkey began to help the Kurds fight against Islamist groups, distribute aid, and led Kurdish Peshmerga to Northern Iraq and across the Turkish

⁷³ Szymański, A. (2017). Turkish Policy Towards War in Syria. *Teka Kom. Politol. Stos. Międzynar.* – OL PAN, 12(1), . 63–84. Retrieved October 7, 2018 from Doi : <http://dx.doi.org/10.17951/teka.2017.12.1.63>

⁷⁴ Hassan, H.(2013). How the Muslim Brotherhood Hijacked Syria’s Revolution. *Foreign Policy.* . Retrieved January 15, 2019 from <https://foreignpolicy.com/2013/03/13/how-the-muslim-brotherhood-hijacked-syrias-revolution/>

⁷⁵ Borger, J., Chulov, M., Elder, M.,(2002, June 26). Syria Shot at Second Turkish Jet, Ankara Claims. *The Guardian* . Retrieved January 15, 2019 from <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/jun/25/syria-shooting-second-turkish-plane-claim>

⁷⁶ Oers, V. R.(2012, October 15). Syria: UN-Arab League envoy calls for ceasefire during upcoming Islamic holiday *UN News Retrieved January 15, 2019* <https://news.un.org/en/story/2012/10/423542-syria-un-arab-league-envoy-calls-ceasefire-during-upcoming-islamic-holiday>

⁷⁷ Szymański, A.(2017). Turkish Policy Towards War in Syria. *Teka Kom. Politol. Stos. Międzynar.* – OL PAN, 12,1, 63–84. Retrieved October 7, 2018 from Doi : <http://dx.doi.org/10.17951/teka.2017.12.1.63>

region⁷⁸. The circumstances changed during the second half of 2015 and Turkey labeled the PYD and the YPG, PKK and ISIS as terrorist groups. The first bomb was dropped in Suruç in July of 2015, then in Ankara in October of 2015, and following which in Istanbul in January, March, and June of 2016⁷⁹. The attacks were led by people who were connected to ISIS. Turkey began to arrest people for being associated with ISIS and attempted to take more areas occupied by Syrian Kurdish forces (within the Syrian Democratic Forces)⁸⁰. The Turkish military intervened in Syria on August 24th, 2016 in an operation called Operation Euphrates Shield⁸¹. Turkey's aim was to avoid having the Syrian Kurdish forces build a pathway and creating a safe zone in the northern part of Syria. The establishment of a no-fly zone or safe haven was insisted on by Turkey it was also discussed in refugee deals by EU officials as well⁸².

In the second half of 2015, Russia was involved in the Syrian Civil War as well as with Syrian opposition forces⁸³. They were against ISIS and wanted to show the support for the Syrian regime—but this made things more chaotic. Russian aircrafts flew over the Turkish-Syrian border frequently and a Su-24 was shot down by the Turkish Air Force although they warned of its airspace being violated in November of 2015⁸⁴. It not only made Turkish-Russian

⁷⁸ Chulov, M., Letsch, C., Hawramy, F.(2014, October 24). Turkey to allow Kurdish peshmerga across its territory to fight in Kobani. *The Guardian* . Retrieved January 15, 2019 from

<https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/oct/20/turkey-allows-peshmerga-forces-to-travel-to-kobani>

⁷⁹ Kirby, P.(2017, January, 5). Turkey Violence: How dangerous is Turkey's Instability? *BBC News*. Retrieved January 15, 2019 from <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-34503388>

⁸⁰ Szymański, A.(2017). Turkish Policy Towards War in Syria. *Teka Kom. Politol. Stos. Międzynar. – OL PAN*, 12(1), 63–84. Retrieved October 7, 2018 from Doi : <http://dx.doi.org/10.17951/teka.2017.12.1.63>

⁸¹ Ozcelik, N. & Seren, M. & Yeşiltaş, M.(2017). Operation Euphrates Shield Implementation and Lessons Learned. Foundation for Political, Economic and Social Research , Report . Retrieved October 7, 2018 from https://setav.org/en/assets/uploads/2017/11/R97_Euphrates.pdf

⁸² Elitok, P. S.(2019). Three Years on: An Evaluation of the EU-Turkey Refugee Deal. *MiReKoc Working Papers*. Retrieved 15 October 2019 from https://mirekoc.ku.edu.tr/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/Mirekoc_Elitok_2019_Report_ThreeYearsOn-AnEvaluationOfTheEU-TurkeyRefugeeDeal.pdf

⁸³ Stephan, H.(2019, February,11). The Syrian Civil War is Russia's Problem Now. *World Politics Review*. Retrieved 15 October 2019 from <https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/insights/25712/the-syrian-civil-war-is-russia-s-problem-now>

⁸⁴ Turkey's Downing of Russian Warplane - What We Know(2015, December 1). *BBC News* Retrieved 15 October 2019 from <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-34912581>

relations tenser, but it also strained the NATO-Russia relationship⁸⁵. After Erdoğan composed a letter where he shared his regrets about shooting down the Russian aircraft, relations improved. In the case of Syrian refugees, Turkey had an open door policy and more than 2.8 million refugees registered to take shelter in Turkey in June of 2016⁸⁶. Outside of camps, Syrians had security, social, economic, cultural and personal problems. Turkey adopted regulations for improving the conditions of people coming from Syria, such as access to health care, education, and access to the Turkish labor market. Deals with the EU and Turkish regulations partially solved the problems of the refugees. Recently, Turkish-Syrian relations are still problematic due to the current Syrian opposition insisting on its inflexible position in the Syrian government. Turkey has adopted a more active stance on its policy in terms of its relations with Syria.

1.1.5. The Arab Revolution and Turkey's Strategies

Lack of legitimacy and corruption in institutions are key problems in the Middle East and in North Africa. Arab countries such as Iraq, Syria, Tunisia, Libya, and Egypt were under the authorization of Western powers during World War I⁸⁷. Aside from that, they were dealing with the decolonization process while the rest of the world was trying to establish democratic systems after WWII. Unfortunately, there were no changes in Middle Eastern and North African history during the Cold War. After the Cold War, Eastern European and East Asian states were democratizing its systems, but the Middle East was stable due to its oil supplies and Israeli security forces; they were under the status quo "Pro-western monarchic ruler." Protests and revolutions are easier handle in democratic systems. People are ready for insisting on justice against corrupt regimes while facing lack of legitimacy. Thus, with the

⁸⁵ Szymański, A.(2017). Turkish Policy Towards War in Syria. *Teka Kom. Politol. Stos. Międzynar.* – OL PAN, 12(1), 63–84. Retrieved October 7, 2018 from Doi : <http://dx.doi.org/10.17951/teka.2017.12.1.63>

⁸⁶ Sullivan, D., Leghtas, I.(2016). Lack of Durable of Solutions for Non-Syrian Refugees in Turkey. *Refugees International Field Report*. Retrieved 15 October 2019
<https://www.asylumineurope.org/sites/default/files/resources/2016.2.8turkey.pdf>

⁸⁷ Aras, B., & Akarçesme, S. (2011). Turkey and the Arab spring. *International Journal*, 67(1), 39-51. Retrieved November 25, 2018 from <http://www.jstor.org/stable/23265964>

help of social media which mobilized the people, the countries that were involved in the Arab Spring helped to organize civilians to raise their voices to put an end to “archaic regimes.” In most of these Arab countries, protests and revolutions started with Tunisia and spread to Egypt, then to Libya, and recently to Syria. People highlight the importance of individuals—not only as members of some family or tribe—as consequences for the uprisings in the Arab Spring. People show authoritarian regimes how they care about its future and the rest of the world. During the process of the Arab revolutions, long lasting regimes fell apart. As a result of these developments, Turkey’s foreign policy changed towards these concerning states⁸⁸.

1.1.6. Turkey’s Expansion Policy Towards Libya

Under the Justice and Development Party government, Turkey has established good political, economic, and cultural relations with Libya, especially in the post-Gaddafi period. Economic partnership is at the top of the agenda of both states and thus an agreement on visa exemption and cooperation in agriculture and banking was signed by Prime Minister Erdogan in November of 2009⁸⁹. Infrastructure, education, banking, transportation superstructure projects are handled by Turkish companies, 25,000 Turkish citizens were employed in 2010⁹⁰. However, with the revolution against the regime of Muammar Gaddafi, Turkey was pushed to set new security strategies due to threats and challenges in its surroundings. As such, Turkey focused more of its attention towards the ongoing conflict in Libya. Ahmet Necdet Sezer, former President of Turkey, was opposed to participation in the UN’s peacekeeping force decision and he stated that “it’s not Turkey’s responsibility to protect others” in regards to national interests on the contrary, the Prime Minister of Turkey at the time, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, ratified the UN decision and argued that Turkey could not

⁸⁸ Lindenstrauß, G. (2012, March). Turkey and the Arab Spring: Embracing People's Power. *Paper Presented at EuroMeSCo Annual Conference A New Mediterranean Political Landscape? The Arab Spring and Euro Mediterranean Relations*. Barcelona, Spain. Retrieved November 25, 2018 from https://www.researchgate.net/publication/324416230_Turkey_and_the_Arab_Spring_Embracing_People's_Power

⁸⁹ Bağcı, H., Erdurmaz, S.(2017). Libya and Turkey’s Expansion Policy in Africa. *JANUS.NET e-journal of International Relations*, 8,2, Retrieved November 25, 2018 from <https://doi.org/10.26619/1647-7251.8.2.4>

⁹⁰ Polat, F.(2019, August 30). The Trajectory of Turkey-Libya Relations. *TRT World*. Retrieved November 25, 2019 from <https://www.trtworld.com/opinion/the-trajectory-of-turkey-libya-relations-29413>

afford to be a “mere bystander” when it came to participation in the peacekeeping force—this was a way of defending Turkish national interests⁹¹. The dispute between Erdogan and Sezer emphasized a remarkable departure of Turkish foreign policy. In regards to Libya, as of February 2011, Turkey was opposed to any international actions towards Libya due to bilateral business contracts between Turkey and Libya. However, humanitarian intervention was led by the Security Council’s resolution in order to establish a no-fly zone with the consent of the Arab League, and Turkey supported this⁹². Turkey conducted an operation to remove its citizens from Libya and sent naval ships to enforce the no-fly zone in Libya⁹³. In the aftermath of the revolution, the lack of security and political instability in the country have influenced relations with Turkey. Turkey signed an agreement based on promoting stability and economic development in Libya in a meeting held in Rome called “Joint Communique of the Ministerial Meeting for Libya” on December 13, 2015⁹⁴. Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu tried to restore relations with Libya, stating a readiness to reopen an embassy there⁹⁵. The Government of National Accord (GNA), supported by the UN and the West, is also supported by Turkey to fight terrorism and extreme Islamist groups. Hence, Turkey’s efforts to provide stability while acting together with the UN is a remarkable departure in Turkish foreign policy towards the GNA. The aim of Turkey is to improve mutual relations with Libya by giving full support to the GNA in order to gain the Libyan people’s support again.

⁹¹ Rabasa, A., Larrabee, S. F. (2008). The AKP’s Foreign Policy. Rabasa, A., & Larrabee, S. F. The Rise of Political Islam in Turkey. 75-90. Santa Monica, CA : RAND Corporation. 2008. Retrieved October 7, 2018 from https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2008/RAND_MG726.pdf

⁹² Head, J.(2011, March 25). Libya: Turkey's troubles with Nato and no-fly zone. *BBC News*. Retrieved October 7, 2018 from <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-12864742>

⁹³ Lindenstrauss, G. (2012, March). Turkey and the Arab Spring: Embracing People's Power. *Paper Presented at EuroMeSCo Annual Conference A New Mediterranean Political Landscape? The Arab Spring and Euro Mediterranean Relations*. Barcelona, Spain. Retrieved November 25, 2018 from https://www.researchgate.net/publication/324416230_Turkey_and_the_Arab_Spring_Embracing_People's_Power

⁹⁴ Ministerial Meeting for Libya .(2015, December 14). Joint Communique, Relief Web Retrieved November 25, 2018 from <https://reliefweb.int/report/libya/ministerial-meeting-libya-december-13-2015-rome-italy-joint-communique>

⁹⁵ Turkey Reopens Embassy in Libyan Capital.(2017, January , 30). *Hurriyet Daily News*. Retrieved Dec. 26, 2018 from <http://www.hurriyetcailynews.com/turkey-reopens-embassy-in-libyan-capital--109124>

1.1.7. Turkey's Regional Foreign Policy Towards Egypt

The strategy of changing the dynamics of regional security challenges is a remarkable departure in Turkish foreign policy. However, A unique future awaited Egypt; the mass protests might have started because of the abuse of human rights, the abuse of minorities, and the handling of the Israeli-Palestinian crisis⁹⁶. It ended following Egypt's President Mohamed Morsi stepping down and Turkey supported this. The Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) was the defender of revolutions and the transitional period in Egypt⁹⁷. SCAF led parliamentary elections in 2011-2012, where the Islamist Muslim Brotherhood's Freedom and Justice Party and Salafist al-Nour party were victorious⁹⁸. However, SCAF changed the military's leadership to General Abdul Fattah al-Sisi. Former Turkish Prime Minister, Erdoğan, continued to have Morsi return to power in the following years. Oktav states that Turkey was trying an alliances administration with Egypt's President Mohamed Morsi in regional issues, such as the Syrian conflict and Palestinian-Israeli conflict. Turkey is more likely to expand and support its political and economic relationship with Egypt. Turkey insisted to continue trade relations with Egypt after Morsi stepped down however, the trade base relationship was negatively affected⁹⁹. Turkey might assist the countries in transition following the Arab Spring and its role in the region and international system.

Turkey has increasingly proactive foreign policy with its neighbors in the Middle East. Turkey's foreign policy has shifted in expending effort to export values to its neighbors that are ready to share in this regard. This approach and the Ottoman legacy help Turkey establish stronger ties with regional countries. Turkey has been exporting value-oriented policies in the region, referred to as "the Turkish Model." This concept mainly comprises Islam, market economy, and democracy, though each element in this mix is debated. This

⁹⁶ Bakr, N.(2013). The Egyptian Revolution. Calleya, S. Wohlfeld, M. ed. *Change and Opportunities in the Emerging Mediterranean* 57-81. November 25, 2018 from

https://www.um.edu.mt/data/assets/pdf_file/0004/150394/Chapter_4_-_Noha_Bakr.pdf

⁹⁷ Arab uprising: Country by Country – Egypt (2013). *BBC News*. Retrieved December. 26, 2018 from

<https://www.bbc.com/news/world-12482291>

⁹⁸ Egypt Elections Roundup(2012, April 2).*Australian Government Refugee Review Tribunal*. Retrieved Dec.

26, 2018 from <https://www.refworld.org/pdfid/51f6213c4.pdf>

⁹⁹ Oktav, Özden Z.(2016). The Arab Spring and Its Impact on Turkey-GCC States Partnership.*Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi Dergisi*, 1/1 Retrieved Dec. 26, 2018 from <http://dergipark.gov.tr/download/article-file/297139>

concept has been used over the years by different people. There is also debate regarding whether the Turkish model is applicable in Arab countries or not. Erdogan an interview with TIME Magazine, he express: “We are not intentionally trying to export a regime – we couldn’t care less. But if they want our help, we’ll provide any assistance they need. But we do not have a mentality of exporting our system”¹⁰⁰ Secondly, a relative decline of Turkey’s democratic principles is major concern of West due to its tendency towards autocratic. Questions of Minority rights and arrested journalists recently are main concern of members of EU states raise criticism towards Turkey’s tendency. However, zero problem theme is the idea Turkey expand present its activities in order to be an influential regional power. High level dialogue is followed by Turkey among regional states to be more effective as regional power. In light of this dialogue Turkey arrange strategic cooperation council which chaired by minister or head of states with such as Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, Russia, Greece, and Azerbaijan . Turkey has tried to set up economic interdependency with surrounded states in the region before Arab Spring. Turkey has tried to comprise free trade zone between Turkey, Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, and Jordan . In light of energy market, pipeline projects has been consider as tool maintain interdependence with Iraq and Egypt.

Exporting the idea of equal security for all region states is another mechanism of regional security complex theory. Major security problems cannot be resolved apart from national security¹⁰¹ Geographically, states regional security is interlink with groupings states which are existed in the same region. Therefore, conflict in one state can spillover effect to another which regional power may seek to find way stabilize conflicts in order to keep safety of region. Regional, interregional and global level interactions patterns is used process of

¹⁰⁰10 Questions for Recep Tayyip Erdogan. (2011, October 10). *Time Magazine*. Retrieved Dec. 26, 2018 from <http://content.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,2095568,00.html>

¹⁰¹ Buzan, B., Wæver, O., de Wilde, J.(1998). *A new Framework Analysis*. Lynne Rienner Publisher. Retrieved October 12, 2017 from https://books.google.com.tr/books?hl=tr&lr=&id=j4BGr-Elsp8C&oi=fnd&pg=PP9&dq=Security:+A+New+Framework+for+Analysis+-+Barry+Buzan,+Waever+%26+De+Wilde,+1998,&ots=bOtdo01t-7&sig=OarbvXQ2uC35skrKluTVcHi9bec&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q=Security%3A%20A%20New%20Framew%20for%20Analysis%20-%20Barry%20Buzan%2C%20Waever%20%26%20De%20Wilde%2C%201998%2C&f=false

security interdependence¹⁰² Turkey was side of peaceful transitions towards the revolutions during the Arab Spring. Turkey has supported politically and economically revolutions and new regime in Tunisia. Turkey has provide loans over 10 year periods repayable in order to rebuild Tunisia support stability in the country . Turkey's doubtful reactions towards the Libyan Revolution, and unpredictable result of conflict in the country trigger international solution which resolution of Security Council end up with NATO military intervention .

Turkey position in frame of Yemen transition was unclear. Turkey has lead humanitarian aid which help Yemen rebuild its institutions and ensure stability inside country. Turkey has chosen to be side of Saudi-led mission .

The Turkish government has been a supporter of the Muslim Brotherhood and the Mohamed Morsi regime in Egypt. Turkey has promoted itself as a protector of regional stability in efforts to rebuild relationships with the United States and the European Union. Thus, Turkey has held high-level meetings and talks to increase political, economic, and political ties. However, dismiss of the Muslim Brotherhood regime in Egypt on 30 June 2013, Turkey refused to legitimacy of new regime and normalized relation with Turkish-Egyptian¹⁰³ . Turkey has tried to keep a low profile beginning of the Arab Revolutions in light of problem-solving in relation to zero-problem theory. However, transformations of those states Turkey has tried to follow good neighbor policy and the principles of freedom, justice in based on their foreign policy strategies to supplement in strategies as regional power.

1.2.A New Challenge : Regional Power Shifting Regional Order

Turkey's foreign policy strategies with its neighbors have been reshaped by recent developments. The transformation of Turkey's foreign policy had already started in terms of former Minister of Foreign Affairs Ismail Cem (1997-2002) and it has been enhanced by

¹⁰² Buzan, B., & Wæver, O. (2003). *Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security* (Cambridge Studies in International Relations). *Cambridge: Cambridge University Press*. Retrieved October 12, 2017 from doi:10.1017/CBO9780511491252

¹⁰³ Eraltmac, O. Aslan, H. A. Senol, O. (2016). Turkish Foreign Policy in the Middle East After Arab Spring. *The Central European Journal of Social Sciences and Humanities*. Retrieved November 17, 2017 from <http://cejsh.icm.edu.pl/cejsh/element/bwmeta1.element.desklight-f6268d19-d83f-4126-ad53-52dbfb0fd710>

current government strategies¹⁰⁴. In light of this, new strategies were designed by former Minister of Foreign Affairs Davutoglu. The US invasion of Iraq and the weakening of Arab nationalism in the region would trigger a shift in power in the region by non-Arab states such as Turkey, Iran, and Israel. The Bush administration's failing role as a mediator in the Middle East opened a vacuum of power for Turkey and others to fill¹⁰⁵. Hence, Turkey has been eager to enhance its relations with its Middle Eastern neighbors in order to be perceived as a regional power. It tries to maintain its mediating role, unify security within the region, and settle disputes between states and non-state actors as the objectives of Turkish foreign policy for attaining status as a regional power. Turkey's reaction to the war in Lebanon during the fall of 2006 is a good example of the country's willingness to play an active role in the Middle East as a mediator. Turkey sent 1,000 troops to participate in the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL II) under the Justice and Development Party government's administration¹⁰⁶. This showed movement from traditional foreign policy to a new dynamism of Turkish foreign policy.

It is aimed to improve relations with immediate Middle Eastern neighbors in order to stay one step ahead of regional rivals such as Iran. Turkey also enhanced its relations with Saudi Arabia in order to curb Iran's rising power and its involvement in the peace process for Arab-Israeli relations. Turkey also improved ties with key states such as Egypt in order to increase the recognition of its leadership. Enhanced relations with Middle Eastern neighbors required wide and deep participation in regional peace efforts in order to stabilize the border. Turkey's mediator role is a leading strategy of attaining regional power. To illustrate, Turkey's constant support for a peaceful Iranian nuclear program allows it to act as a mediator with the West. Turkey tries to host international talks about nuclear programs as well as a NATO member country and maintain its role in the region, which is deeply divided in opinions regarding nuclear programs. Turkey's mediator role was limited and it was up to Iran and the

¹⁰⁴ Perthes, V. (2010). Turkey's Role in the Middle East: An Outsider's Perspective. *Insight Turkey*, 12(4), 1-8. Retrieved Dec. 26, 2018 from www.jstor.org/stable/26331494

¹⁰⁵ Bechev, D.(2011). Turkey's rise as a regional power. *European View*. 10:173–179. Retrieved Dec. 26, 2018 from DOI 10.1007/s12290-011-0184-0

¹⁰⁶ Rabasa, A., Larrabee, S. F. (2008). The AKP's Foreign Policy. Rabasa, A., & Larrabee, S. F. The Rise of Political Islam in Turkey. 75-90. Santa Monica, CA : RAND Corporation. 2008. Retrieved October 7, 2018 from https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2008/RAND_MG726.pdf

USA, France, Russia, and the International Atomic Energy Agency to implementation of their decisions. This crisis ended up with the application of sanctions to Iran by a UN Security Council resolution.

Turkey has not only worked to directly improve its relations with its Middle Eastern neighbors, but also with other states as well. Turkey has tried to improve its poor relationships with neighboring countries, especially Armenia, in terms of perceived power as recognized by its neighbors across the region. Hence, Turkey has made an effort to normalize relations with Armenia. One tool that Turkey has used to begin bilateral talks is football diplomacy. However, Turkey could not maintain positive relations with Armenia due to historical challenges between the states. In addition, Turkey has hosted leaders such as the President of Afghanistan, Hamid Karzai, and the Pakistani Prime Minister, Yousuf Raza Gilani, in Istanbul¹⁰⁷. Doing so has facilitated the maintenance of stability in the region since 2008. With such diplomatic activism, Turkey won a non-permanent seat on the UN Security Council in 2009-2010¹⁰⁸. Turkey has been using the strategy of “diplomacy as a first approach” in terms of its foreign policy and taking an effective role at a regional level.

Turkey improve its prestige with active roles in the United Nations (UN), the Council of Europe (CoE), NATO, and the European Union (EU). Turkey has tried to use diplomatic platforms to attain regional power. Hence, Turkey proposed the creation of the Caucasus Stability and Cooperation Platform for cooperating in areas of security, economics, and politics¹⁰⁹. Turkey, as a founding member of the CoE and with the 2010–2011 Chairmanship of the Committee of Ministers, started to promote human rights, norms, and values in the democratic processes of North Africa and the Middle East¹¹⁰. Liberal democratic reforms in

¹⁰⁷ Turkey Hosts Meeting of Pakistan, Afghanistan Leaders in Istanbul(2008). *Hürriyet*. Retrieved February 17, 2018, from <http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/turkey-hosts-meeting-of-pakistan-afghanistan-leaders-in-istanbul-10246962>

¹⁰⁸ Turkish Officials Hail Turkey's United Nations Security Council Seat. *Hürriyet*. Retrieved February 17, 2018, from <http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/gundem/turkish-officials-hail-turkeys-united-nations-security-council-seat-10150122>

¹⁰⁹ Akçakoca, A. (2009). Turkish foreign policy – between East and West? By Amanda Akçakoca. European Policy Center, Retrieved February 17, 2018, from https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/106669/09_10_Turkish%20foreign%20policy.pdf

¹¹⁰Rumelili, B. & Suleymanoglu-Kurum, S. (2017). Brand Turkey: Liminal Identity and its Limits, *Geopolitics*, 22:3, 549-570, Retrieved Dec. 26, 2018 from DOI: 10.1080/14650045.2016.1270269

domestic policies helped Turkey's brand and values promotion in the Middle East. Turkey's strategy to define itself with a dual identity as a Muslim nation that is democratic and secular, holding both the Ottoman legacy and the EU accession process, added reliability to the Turkish foreign policy in the Middle East. Turkey foreign policy has carried a dilemma in highlighting or de-highlighting Western norms of Turkish identity. It defines itself as a regional player that would like to reduce the influence of Western power while still caring some Western aspects¹¹¹.

With regards to Turkey's limitations, unifying security in the region is not a security guarantee. None of the European states or Turkey can provide any guarantee for states such as Syria, Iraq, or Israel. However, the USA can. Hence, Turkey needs to build strong alliances not only with regional states but also with the USA, as this is necessary for Turkey in order to be perceived as a regional power. Another limitation of Turkey in attaining regional power is that other regional powers may not be positive about Turkey's new role. Turkey defines itself as a major regional power with other regional rivals like Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Egypt. States like Iran do not necessarily desire Turkey's mediator role with the USA, or its influence on conflicts in Iraq and Arab states. Although Turkey's credibility increased with the country's non-military intervention during the US invasion of Iraq, Arab states do not necessarily want Turkish involvement in Arab affairs, such as the conflict between Iraq and Syria¹¹². Turkey's engagement with a new political vision and security and stability in the Middle East would trigger Turkey to seek a more independent regional foreign policy from the USA and EU in the Middle East. As a Muslim nation with liberal and democratic values, it may inspire Arab countries as a role model¹¹³. Turkey's global reputation became positive among Middle Eastern countries. One of the leading Turkish think tanks, the Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation (Turkish: TESEV), conducted a survey to gauge people's perceptions of Turkey in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). TESEV used

¹¹¹Kraidy M.M. & Al-Ghazzi, O. (2013) Neo-Ottoman Cool: Turkish Popular Culture in the Arab Public Sphere, *Popular Communication* 11:1, 17–29 <https://doi.org/10.1080/15405702.2013.747940>

¹¹² Altunışık, B.M.(2008). The Possibilities and Limits of Turkey's Soft Power in the Middle East. *Insight Turkey* 10,2, 41-54 Retrieved February 17, 2018, from <https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/6940/9f12b0c8194b251da5c300d557a5f83bb95c.pdf>

¹¹³ Atasoy, S.(2011). The Turkish Example: A Model for Change In the Middle East? *Middle East Policy Council*, 18:3 Retrieved February 17, 2018, from <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-4967.2011.00500.x>

public opinion polls to gauge negative and positive public perceptions of Turkey. Opinion polls conducted in 16 countries in MENA gauged whether Turkey could be a model for all Middle Eastern countries also positive views of Turkey were reported by 78 percent in 2011¹¹⁴. As of 2012, the survey voters displaying positive perceptions had declined to 69 percent, and the view that Turkey might be able to act as a model for the Middle East declined from 61 to 53 percent¹¹⁵. On the basis of the 2011 results, Turkey clearly displayed a better position among its Middle Eastern neighbors.

Perceptions of great powers are also discussed in terms of Turkey's reengagement as a regional power in the Middle East. Turkey's role in securing democratic transition in countries such as Egypt and Tunisia was appreciated by the Obama administration. Turkey's close ties with the authoritarian regimes in Libya, Iran, and Syria, however, increased tension with the USA. In addition, the USA and EU no longer support Turkey's regional objectives in the Arab world¹¹⁶.

Nevertheless, in terms of direct benefits, the EU largely supports Turkey's engagement in the Middle East. The EU is more in favor of Turkey than the USA is in the case of conflict resolution with difficult actors such as Hamas and Hezbollah.

The evolution of Turkish reengagement has clearly declined since 2013. Turkey's authoritarian tendencies in domestic policy are among the leading factors in the decline of Turkey's image. Protestors in Gezi Park in June 2013 and imprisoned politicians, journalists, and activists have affected Turkey's Middle East policy, as well as affecting Turkey's image and reliable position in international perception¹¹⁷. Turkey only received 60 votes in favor of

¹¹⁴ Dal, E. P. (2016). Conceptualising and Testing the Emerging Regional Power of Turkey In The Shifting International Order. *Third World Quarterly*, DOI: 10.1080/01436597.2016.1142367

¹¹⁵ Bilici, A.(2012, November, 11). Is Turkey's Image Declining in the Middle East. *Al Arabiya English*. Retrieved February 17, 2019, from <http://english.alarabiya.net/en/business/2012/11/11/Is-Turkeys-image-declining-in-the-Middle-East.html>

¹¹⁶ Habibi, N.& Walker, W.W.(2011). What Is Driving Turkey's Reengagement with the Arab World? *Crown Center for Middle East Studies*. 49. Retrieved February 17, 2019, from <https://www.brandeis.edu/crown/publications/middle-east-briefs/pdfs/1-100/meb49.pdf>

¹¹⁷ Talbot, V., Magri, P.(2015). The Uncertain Path of the New Turkey. *Istituto per gli Studi di Politica Internazionale*. http://home.ku.edu.tr/~musomer/research_files/Somer,%20ISPI%20Turchia%202015.pdf

its temporary membership in the United Nations Security Council in 2014¹¹⁸. Turkey's promotion of itself as holding both Western and Eastern values becomes a problematic issue for branding in the Middle East in the domestic context. Hence, broader discourses on nation-branding strategies must highlight whether it is either Western or Eastern¹¹⁹. Consequently, Turkey's regional foreign policies highlight the importance of external and internal factors in decision-making processes.

1.3. EMPLOYMENT OF MILITARY POWER BY TURKEY AS REGIONAL FOREIGN POLICY INSTRUMENTS

1.3.1. Turkey's Own Military Capacity in the Middle East

The Republic of Turkey was established under a secular political structure within Kemalist principles. To a great extent, Turkey's security activity is linked to its geographic position and to Western security. Efficiency and effectiveness are highly demanded from Turkey's security policy. Turkey has enhanced its security policies and its capacity for military resources, in order to minimize threat and maximize economic relations with the Middle East. Great peace and stability are not only Turkey's regional policies, but also a great interest for Turkey's Western allies¹²⁰. The defense industry is one of the leading factors which have shaped Turkish defense strategies and security policies. The geopolitical and geostrategic position of a country is a special dynamic which influences a country's security policies. The role of the military, with regards to the defense industry base, is mostly sustained by the states. Supplying state armed forces may likely contribute to the status of becoming a regional power. The amount of military equipment such as smart weapons, warships, submarines, armed forces, and aircrafts are all meant to achieve strategic military operations in regional and international areas. As such, research and development in new military technology is

¹¹⁸ Balbay, M. (2014, October, 20) Değerli Yalnızlığımızın Değerli Yenilgisi, *Cumhuriyet*, Retrieved December 26, 2018 from

http://www.cumhuriyet.com.tr/koseyazisi/132179/Degerli_Yalnizligimizin_Degerli_Yenilgisi_.html

¹¹⁹ Rumelili, B. & Suleymanoglu-Kurum, S. (2017). Brand Turkey: Liminal Identity and its Limits, *Geopolitics*, 22:3, 549-570, Retrieved February 17, 2019, from DOI: 10.1080/14650045.2016.1270269

¹²⁰ Karaosmanoğlu, A. (2000). The Evolution of the National Security Culture and the Military in Turkey. *Journal of International Affairs*, 54(1), 199-216. Retrieved February 17, 2019, from <http://www.jstor.org/stable/24357696>

highly sought after. Most of a given company's service in this sector has increased in order to employ, repair, maintain training services, and modernization of military equipment¹²¹. Therefore, behind state support, the Turkish defense industry has equipment such as satellites, aircrafts, stealth technology, aerial refueling capabilities, cyber warfare, and national military capacities all aimed at being a regional power in the Middle East¹²². In light of the above, 435 personnel are given data which make Turkey the second largest in NATO and the ninth largest armed force in the world¹²³. It contains 14 submarines, 352 combat capable aircrafts, two 504 Main Battle Tanks, and 19 principal surface combatants such as defense products¹²⁴.

The regional existence of Turkish movies, companies, citizens, and bureaucratic products all need to contribute to long distance power projects. In the context the bureaucratic activity is unplanned, consider the operations to take it back from its citizens; in Libya in 2011 and the humanitarian intervention sent to Gaza¹²⁵. In this context, political military cooperation between the states is illustrated. Turkey's commercial activity has expanded towards Africa, the Caucasus, Central and South Asia, and the Middle East. Especially, defense products have been imported by Pakistan, Malaysia, Iraq, and Georgia.

1.3.2. Turkey's Ways to Sustain Self-Sufficiency in the International Arms Market

The Turkish defense industry has made several achievements with new developments in the last decade. The compelling reason for active development in the defense industry has both external and internal impacts on the global market. Following its membership with NATO,

¹²¹ Wiśniewski, R. (2015). Military-Industrial Aspects of Turkish Defence Policy. *Rocznik Integracji Europejskiej* 9/2015. 215-228. Retrieved February 17, 2019 Doi: 10.14746/rie.2015.9.14.

¹²² Baltos, G. C., Vidakis, I. G., & Balodis, J. (2017). Turkey's Ambitions to Emerge as a Regional Power: Example or Counter-Example for Potential Aspiring Competitors, *Academic Journal of Interdisciplinary Studies*, 6(3), 33-46. Retrieved February 17, 2019 from doi: <https://doi.org/10.1515/ajis-2017-0019>

¹²³ 1.Duffin, E.(2019). Number of Military Personnel in NATO Countries 2019. *Statista*. Retrieved October 17, 2019 <https://www.statista.com/statistics/584286/number-of-military-personnel-in-nato-countries/>

¹²⁴ (2014) Chapter Ten: Country comparisons - commitments, force levels and economics, *The Military Balance*, 114:1, 471-492, Retrieved February 17, 2019 DOI: 10.1080/04597222.2014.871887

¹²⁵ Wiśniewski, R. (2015). Military-Industrial Aspects of Turkish defence Policy. *Rocznik Integracji Europejskiej* 9/2015. 215-228. Retrieved February 17, 2019 from Doi: 10.14746/rie.2015.9.14.

Turkey integrated national defense security systems according to its guidelines. The Turkish army, navy, and air force are heavily composed of U.S. software and hardware. However, the first effort in the concept of self-sufficiency in armaments, was following the Cyprus Operation in 1974—due to the U.S. arms embargo¹²⁶. The Turkish defense industry heavily depended on the U.S. to supply its equipment. In this period, Askeri Elektronik Sanayii Anonim Sirketi (ASELSAN), Turk Ucak Sanayii (TUSAS), Turk Silahlı Kuvvetleri'ni Guclendirme Vakfi (TSKGV), and the Turkish Armed Forces Foundation were established in order to achieve self-sufficiency in a military capacity. With the lack of know-how in the defense industry, qualified expertise led imports substitution policies in the defense sector. Local contractors and their international partners were merged including FMC Nurol Savunma Sanayii (FNSS), MIKES, TUSAS, and Turkish Aircraft Industries (TAI). On the other hand, this has increased dependency on importing supply goods in the defense industry. During the Cold and Post-Cold War era, Turkey's strategy may have threatened analyzing or the notion of warfighting and actively changing the security environment. Frequently changing the security environment may lead to requirements for policy making in defense areas. Creating new programs in defense hardware might exceed programs by approximately 10-20 years. To illustrate, within the Peace Eagle project, is an airborne early warning and control (AEW&C) aircraft ordered by Turkish Air Force from the Boeing Co. The four aircraft project was introduced in 1996 and first flight test ended in 2007 it followed also all aircrafts in the Peace Eagle project could have operational capacities in 2016¹²⁷. It was followed by the TAI subcontract of this project in order to acquire aircraft modification and parts control. The second aircraft was delivered to the Turkish Air Force on May 2nd, 2014 and the third aircraft was delivered on September 9th, 2014 and in total, four service possessions took place in 2015¹²⁸. However, due to significant delays and a self-sufficiency

¹²⁶ Karagöz, M.(2005). US Arms Embargo against Turkey - after 30 Years An Institutional Approach towards US Policy Making. *Dergi Park*. Retrieved February 17, 2019 from <https://dergipark.org.tr/en/download/article-file/816635>

¹²⁷ Mevlutoglu, A. (2017) Commentary on Assessing the Turkish Defense Industry: Structural Issues and Major Challenges, *Defence Studies*, 17:3, 282-294, Retrieved 26 April 2018 from DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1080/14702436.2017.1349534>

¹²⁸ Boeing 737 Peace Eagle(2017, July, 7). Boeing 737 Peace Eagle. Military Factory. Retrieved June 18, 2018 from https://www.militaryfactory.com/aircraft/detail.asp?aircraft_id=1222

policy in military hardware, Turkey had to produce its own systems in the defense sector. The import and export rates are significant for Turkey to position itself to compete in the international arms sector. The rates are based on the SIPRI arms transfer data base, and the export rates are published by the Turkish Defense and Aerospace Industry Manufacturers Association during the period of 2003-2013. Turkey's worth for exporting arms and military equipment is around \$560 million (by TIV value) in relation to its four biggest buyers: Pakistan (ca. 27% of total exports value), Malaysia (ca. 16%), Iraq (ca. 12%), and Georgia (10%)¹²⁹. The division of export goods are weapons, armored vehicles, and artillery. As can be seen, the position of the Turkish defense companies are considerably important. Aselsan is ranked as the 57th biggest company by Defense News out of 100 defense companies in the world, with a revenue of approximately over \$ 1.195 billion¹³⁰. Aselsan is mainly focused on communication equipment, defense military materials, and fire and air defense systems and it was founded in 1975 by the Land Forces Foundation. Aselsan has positioned itself as one of the leading supplier companies in the areas of defense and electronic communication devices and systems throughout the years. It seeks for new market maintenance activities in joint defense projects. Thus, Aselsan's presence in the Middle East opened up with Jordanian King Abdullah II's Design and Development Bureau, in order to reach other MENA markets in 2014¹³¹. It was followed by a branch in Kazakhstan in order to fulfill the supply needs of Kazakhstan's armed forces. It also has close ties with the Azeri defense industry to fulfill the needs of Azerbaijan's armed forces.

TAIs ranked as 72nd out of 100 defense companies by Defense News and its revenue is approximately \$886 million¹³². TAI merged with the Turkish Aircraft Industries Corporation

¹²⁹ Wiśniewski, R. (2015). Military-Industrial aspects of Turkish defence policy. *Rocznik Integracji Europejskiej* 9/2015. 215-228. Retrieved February 17, 2019 from Doi: 10.14746/rie.2015.9.14.

¹³⁰ Roketsan Climbs up "Top 100" Defense Industry Companies List Following Aselsan and TAI(2017, September 12-15). *Defence Turkey*, 11(77). Retrieved February 17, 2019 <https://www.defenceturkey.com/en/content/roketsan-climbs-up-top-100-defense-industry-companies-list-following-aselsan-and-tai-2803>

¹³¹ King inaugurates KADDB joint venture with Turkish company.(2014, December, 16). *The Jordan Times*. Retrieved November 16, 2018 from <http://www.jordantimes.com/news/local/king-inaugurates-kaddd-joint-venture-turkish-company>

¹³² Roketsan Climbs up "Top 100" Defense Industry Companies List Following Aselsan and TAI(2017, September 12-15). *Defence Turkey*, 11(77). Retrieved February 17, 2019

(TUSAS) in 2005 and a joint plant with U.S. companies was established in 1984, until it recently started its own company. TAI's main area of activities includes license manufacturing for F-16 fighters¹³³. In addition, TAI produces HURKUS, which is a training aircraft, and was also fully developed by Turkey GOKTURK-2. Moreover, the first Turkish military intelligence satellite was developed by TAI¹³⁴. It also produced 308 aircrafts and 262 of them belong to Turkey, while 46 belong to Egypt. It is also focuses on developing future fighter aircrafts for the Turkish Armed Forces. TAI and Aselsan have tried to diminish the demand of import supplies for national arm forces equipment. However, Turkey's imports are worth \$1.2 billion (by Stockholm International Peace Research Institute) from its four biggest suppliers: the India, China, Spain and France¹³⁵. The division of goods include ships and aircrafts. In light of the import rates, it shows that Turkey is dependent on foreign equipment. Providing the results of import and export balance by SIPRI's TIV calculation deficit, it is \$6.9 billion and this only highlights the transfers of military resources¹³⁶. Aircrafts and ships are considered as highly valued products the international arms market. While Turkey exports mostly less complex systems, such as vehicles devices that are easier to produce. During the years of 2004-2018, the Turkish import findings illustrate that 60% of supplies were shared by the U.S.¹³⁷. Thus, the dependence of the Turkish defense industry on Western supplies and new competitors in the arms market led Turkey to seek for new and potential customers in Asia, the Middle East, and the Caucasus. This way, partners from Asia, the Middle East, and the Caucasus can be more considerable when buying full systems and

<https://www.defenceturkey.com/en/content/roketsan-climbs-up-top-100-defense-industry-companies-list-following-aselsan-and-tai-2803>

¹³³ Sünnetçi, İ.(2018). A Closer Look at the Turkish Defence Industry's Fixed Wing Air Platforms Sector. *Defence Turkey* 84,12. Retrieved February 17, 2019 <https://www.defenceturkey.com/en/content/a-closer-look-at-the-turkish-defence-industry-s-fixed-wing-air-platforms-sector-3122>

¹³⁴ Turkey's New Intelligence Satellite Göktürk-1 Goes Into Orbit. (2016 December, 05). *Daily Sabah*. Retrieved February 17, 2019 from <https://www.dailysabah.com/technology/2016/12/05/turkeys-new-intelligence-satellite-gokturk-1-goes-into-orbit>

¹³⁵ Turkey Joins World's Top Five Weapons Importers.(2013, March 18).*Hürriyet Daily News*. Retrieved February 17, 2019 from <http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkey-joins-worlds-top-five-weapons-importers-43160>

¹³⁶ Wiśniewski, R. (2015). Military-Industrial Aspects of Turkish Defence Policy. *Rocznik Integracji Europejskiej* 9/2015. 215-228. Retrieved February 17, 2019 Doi: 10.14746/rie.2015.9.14.

¹³⁷ Turkey: Which Countries Export Arms to Turkey?(2019, October 23). *BBC News*. Retrieved November 17, 2019 from <https://www.bbc.com/news/50125405>

increasing revenue of export. With the help of both leading companies Aselsan and Tai, taking the rights of production licenses and developing simple products will allow for the production of complex engineering capacity goods and own their own defense industry. They are not only exclusive suppliers of Turkish arms forces, but they also cooperate in joint defense projects, which makes it more likely to have active players in the global arms market. The most important inventory future of the Turkish Armed Forces is manufacturing highly advanced technology and highly valued goods for high returns and being a leading defense country. Military capacity with land, naval and air branches are very important tools for regional powers gathering support of surrounded states for its image. As Buzan and Waver state that Security Interdependency in region trigger Turkey ability providing security for itself and for its region with its military capacity. Hence, Turkey has invest to increase efficiency of its military meantime expanding its soft power. It has started to modernization its equipment in order to increase efficiency in the region. While modernization of its military system has tried to involve defense industry as globally. The last quarter of twenty century the reform process of Turkish defense has been launched. The structure is unique compared to other countries in its region. The aim is to reach self-sufficiency in arms and defense industry however the obstacle is followed. The lack of an efficient arm technology is an obstacle to implement sustainable policy-making in the defense industry. Heavily dependency on foreign technology is short development defense industry phase. Import substitution policies is contrary to achieving aim of defense self-sufficiency. To illustrate, The Firtina (self-propelled howitzer) was selected by Azerbaijan to be imported. However, this self-propelled howitzer manufactured by Turkey was planned to be exported to Azerbaijan prohibit by Germany causes license of the engine is imported from Germany¹³⁸. It is remarkable breakthrough Turkish defense sector. R&D and innovation capacity of the Turkish defense industry mainly on the requirements of self-sufficiency policy in order to be efficient regional power. The capacity and potential of the Turkish defense industry may increase producing own sufficient results on subsystems, equipment, and technologies.

¹³⁸ Mevlutoglu, A. (2017) Commentary on Assessing the Turkish Defense Industry: Structural Issues and Major Challenges, *Defence Studies*, 17:3, 282-294, Retrieved 26 April 2018 from DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1080/14702436.2017.1349534>

Ongoing battle in Syria has demonstrate that inefficacy of Turkey military power in regional level especially control of its regional airspace. Turkish foreign policy official states that a Russian warplane is violated Turkish air space days after Russian military intervention to Syria¹³⁹. The strategic alliances with NATO help to Turkey held emergency meeting with the member's states in Brussels. However, as regional power Turkey may improve it military power such offence against its national security and stability of region. Furthermore, Turkish National Intelligence bodies has been reconstituted in order to ensure regional security. The National Intelligence Organization (Milli Istihbarat Teşkilatı –MIT) has been working to ensure as only national security of Turkey. However, Turkey introduced MIT model of international operation for the Turkish military in abroad. It was attempts persuade surrounded actively support Turkey is formed regional security complex .In conclusion, Lack of military equipment such as air space control , dependency of foreign military technology is a major challenges of Turkish military power as to be acceptance of regional power by the regional states.

1.3.3. The National Intelligence Agency's Contribution to Foreign Policies

The National Intelligence Organization (Milli Istihbarat Teşkilatı–MIT) and other intelligence bodies determine suitable intelligence collection requirements and distribute analytical products, collect information, and distribute intelligence activities. The stage where information is collected provides opportunities for public and national security. Hence the act of MIT might be capable of influencing policies of neighborhoods —which is along with Turkey's regional policy. The Secret Service collects various information from sources such as newspapers, magazines, radio broadcasts, television shows, websites, and all open sources in response to information activity. Thus, collecting an appropriate information in areas of energy and security from Balkans to have great impacts on Turkey's regional power policies. In addition, all pieces of information might be valuable to each report, which underlines a high priority to foreign state and security policies. It might underline a possible

¹³⁹Shaheen K.(2015, October 6). Nato Condemns Russia Over violations of Turkey's Airspace .*The Guardian*. Retrieved from <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/oct/05/turkey-says-russian-warplane-violated-airspace>

international influence on the world stage. Taking a seat at the UN Security Council during the years of 2009-2010 is illustrated¹⁴⁰. MIT supported the international operation for the Turkish military abroad. The Intelligence Agency has not only authorized the access of data, which includes the records of public and private institutions, but also in conducting an operation abroad with new laws¹⁴¹. Turkey has expanded MIT power to get operational power abroad, in order to track and neutralize threats. Turkey primarily puts the intelligence agency in a more effective role in foreign countries in order to precisely highlight national and regional security. However, the Intelligence Agency is immune from prosecution for violations of law, and is highly criticized by the leader of the Republican People's Party, Kemal Kilicdaroglu, who states that "law has effectively turned Turkey into an intelligence state"¹⁴² Fundamental changes have been put into law and criticized not only by leaders, but it is followed by criticism from human rights groups. A reform in the law and power from national intelligence agencies may create more opportunities for the Turkish state to highlight its stability in regions within regional power status. Similarly, the national intelligence agency may try to guarantee regional stability and national security¹⁴³.

2. RUSSIA'S REGIONAL FOREIGN POLICY STRATEGIES

2.1. A BRIEF HISTORY OF AN ACTIVE ROLE OF SOVIET UNION IN MIDDLE EAST

A number of characteristics of regional power are discussed throughout the introduction of this thesis. Characteristics of regional power may be particularly useful in the analysis of Russian regional foreign policy formulation. The evolution of the Soviet Union's decision-making processes for foreign policy strategies is essential to give an alternative explanation of current Russian interests and strategies in the Middle East. The main characteristics of the

¹⁴⁰ Lefebvre, S. (2005). Turkey's Intelligence Community in Changing Times. *International Journal*, 61(1), 105-124. Retrieved 26 April 2018 from doi:10.2307/40204131

¹⁴¹ Turkey Expands Secret Service Powers(2014). *BBC*. Retrived 26 April 2018 from <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-27172043>

¹⁴² Turkey Expands Secret Service; New Law Passed (2014). *Project on Middle East Policy* Retrived 26 April 2014 from https://pomed.org/avada_portfolio/turkey-expands-secret-service-new-law-passed/?print=print

¹⁴³ Lefebvre, S. (2005). Turkey's Intelligence Community in Changing Times. *International Journal*, 61(1), 105-124. Retrieved 26 April 2014 from doi:10.2307/40204131

foreign policy of the USSR were centralism and authoritarianism, which were also seen in Tsarist Russia and are still present in the Russian Federation today.¹⁴⁴ Individual rights and freedoms were contested issues in the Russian Empire, paving the way to civil war. The October Revolution of 1917 started with a revolutionary manifesto against the ruling class, which had supported the Tsarist regime.¹⁴⁵ Vladimir Lenin took power as a result of the revolution and signed the Treaty on the Creation of the Soviet Union in 1922 among Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Transcaucasia (modern-day Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan), forming the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR).¹⁴⁶ During the Lenin period, relations with the Middle East were neutral. In the Stalin period, relations froze due to political problems and war in Europe and the Far East. However, Khrushchev opened a new period for the USSR's political and military presence in the region.¹⁴⁷ The USSR and its East European allies supported the Arab people in their transition to national, economic, and social liberation¹⁴⁸. Gorbachev also brought a new light to the Soviet Union's image and its influence in the Middle East. His policies towards Middle Eastern states moved beyond traditional radical Arab allies and sought better relations with the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states and Iran and Palestine. However, the Arab states blamed insufficient Soviet support for their defeat by Israel in the October War of 1973.¹⁴⁹ That reduced the Soviet influence in Arab states. Many Arab governments thought that the Soviets had no influence over Israel but America did. Therefore, they sought cooperation with the USA in order to find a solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict. However, the Soviet presence gained

¹⁴⁴ Garcia, H.M.A.(2018). Evolution of Russian Foreign Policy and the Middle East. *Janus.net* 9,1,103-121. Retrieved 26 April 2019 from DOI: 10.26619/1647-7251.9.1.7

¹⁴⁵ Figes, O.(2017). From Tsar to U.S.S.R.: Russia's Chaotic Year of Revolution. *National Geographic*. Retrieved 26 April 2014 from <https://www.nationalgeographic.com/history/magazine/2017/09-10/russian-revolution-history-lenin/>

¹⁴⁶ Soviet Union(2019, October 11). *History*. Retrieved 28 October 2018 from <https://www.history.com/topics/russia/history-of-the-soviet-union>

¹⁴⁷ Nicolai N. Petro & Alvm Z. Rubinstein(1997). Russian Foreign Policy from Empire to Nation State.*New York: Longman*, see also A. Potserebov, On Russian-Egyptian Relations, *International Affairs*.43, 3, 2048

¹⁴⁸ Kreutz, A. (2002). The Geopolitics of Post- Soviet Russia and the Middle East. *Arab Studies Quarterly*, 24(1), 49-61. Retrieved 28 October 2018www.jstor.org/stable/41858403

¹⁴⁹ Katz, N. M.(1988).Soviet Policy in the Middle East. *International Affairs Consultant*. Retrieved October 28, 2018 from <https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/6060/85b271b3ef0978d048ae59877fbf05ba6bda.pdf>

importance again in the late 1970s. The Camp David Accords, led by the USA, stabilized relations between Egypt and Israel and formally recognized Israel's right to be present in the region¹⁵⁰.

In the Gorbachev era, Soviet ties with the Gulf and the Middle East were strengthened. Jordan and Kuwait announced that they would purchase arms from the Soviet Union rather than the USA because the US Congress had feared that such arms would be used against Israel¹⁵¹. The active role of the Soviet Union helped bring peace to the Gulf and the Middle East. It was said that the war between Iran and Iraq only served the interests of the USA and diverted attention from Israel. The Soviet Union convinced both sides to seek a solution in the Arab-Israeli conflict and was involved in peace-talk processes. However, the collapse of the USSR weakened the Russian position in the Middle East. Dissolution of the Soviet Union may reevaluate the Russian Federation's positions in the international system through adopting a new foreign policy concept. Especially during the Medvedev term, priority was given to promote cooperation or activation in international organization as a foreign policy concept. Russia was expected to seek consolidation in its position in the international system, through exporting norms, values, and ideas. In this light, Russia aimed to be appealing to other states and to have a wider influence on international systems. Russia tried to establish strong diplomatic relationships within the region. Domestic policy has greatly affected Russian foreign policy strategies. However, Putin made numbers in marketing reforms to able to reach sustainable growth in the economy, and this helped with rising energy prices and marketing reforms and as result of this, Russian GDP was higher than the Netherlands and third of that of China¹⁵². Interestingly, this took place in Putin's first term and five years later, the period of energy-based economic expansion was observed. Therefore, Putin perceived a high degree of autonomy in foreign policy during his first term due to the success in the early 2002 election. He gained a wider influence in the media and

¹⁵⁰ Accords, D.C.(2019,November, 14). Peace in the Middle East. *History*. Retrieved October 28, 2018 from <https://www.history.com/topics/middle-east/camp-david-accords>

¹⁵¹ Katz, N.M.(1988). Soviet Policy in the Middle East. *Research Library Core*. (87)526,57 Retrieved 28 October 2018 from <https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/6060/85b271b3ef0978d048ae59877fbf05ba6bda.pdf>

¹⁵² Macfarlane, S.N.(2006). The 'R' in BRICs: is Russia An Emerging Power. *International Affairs*, (82) 1, 1 41–57. Retrieved 28 October 2018 from <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2346.2006.00514.x>

also gained agreement among economic elites. In this framework, Russian foreign policy was clear; recognition of weakness over internal affairs and international great powers such as the U.S. However, Russia is not the only regional country which is not happy about the current power order in the international system—so is China, and it may prefer multipolar world order¹⁵³. In the Tsygankov article, Stephen Kotkin (2009) also points out that China became a super power but acted like regional power, whereas Russia is a regional power and frequently acted like a superpower¹⁵⁴. However, Russia had to gain its status of great power in order to secure its border in Eurasia. The influence of China and the Western world may be considered in posing a huge challenge for Russia. Russia developed comparative advantages, such as military power, energy, and member status of international organizations, in order to gain power. Therefore, Russia claimed that they were ready for common action not only at a regional level, but also at a global level, in order to maintain security. Nevertheless, in 2008, Medvedev formulated new principles as foreign policies which included: friendly relationships with all states, priority of international law, support of the multipolar world, region of “privilege interest”, and protecting Russian interests elsewhere¹⁵⁵. In order to maintain the above principles and Russia’s status as a great power, international organizations played an important role in the aim of the multipolar world. The Russian Federation is one of the permanent members of United Nations Security Council which has the veto right. Russia has been using the veto right in aim of sanctions, such as the genocide in Darfur, North Korea’s nuclear programs, and Iran’s nuclear programs—in terms of playing an active role in the region. At the end of 2008, the U.S. brought the leaders of the 20 most economically important countries at the G20 summit, to talk about the matter of the global financial crisis¹⁵⁶. This way, the aim for the G20 was to institutionalize and enhance

¹⁵³ Turner, S. (2009). Russia, China and A Multipolar World Order: The Danger in the Undefined. *Asian Perspective*, 33(1), 159-184. Retrieved October 28, 2018 from www.jstor.org/stable/42704667

¹⁵⁴ Tsygankov, P.A.(2010). Russia’s Power and Alliances in the 21st Century. *POLITICS*,VOL 30(S1), 43–51. October 28, 2018 from <https://www.risingpowersinitiative.org/wp-content/uploads/Russias-Power-and-Alliances-in-the-21st-Century.pdf>

¹⁵⁵ Oldberg, I(2010). Russia’s Great Power Strategy under Putin and Medvedev. *Swedish Institute of International Affairs*, 82(1),41-57. Retrieved March 3, 2018, from <https://www.ui.se/globalassets/ui.se-eng/publications/ui-publications/russias-great-power-strategy-under-putin-and-medvedev-min.pdf>

¹⁵⁶Chaulia,S. S.(2018, November, 29). G20 Rose to Prominence In Response to 2008 Financial Crisis, It Needs Similar Reinvention Today. *The Times of India*. Retrieved October 28, 2018 from

the interaction with these 20 countries with the most important economies. However, Russia had some underlying importance for the G8 and G20 summits. In this manner, it was foreseen by Russia that opportunity cited crisis for the reason of the “unipolar economic model” and proposed with China, a new global financial system. It was based on a currency basket which included the Russian ruble, with a supra-national reserve currency, which aimed to weaken the position of the U.S. dollar¹⁵⁷. Nevertheless, most of the states have large reserves of dollars, so this proposal was taking fewer considerations by other states. Moreover, Russia is a distant member of European organizations, whereas it is a member of a number of organizations such the Council of Baltic States, the Arctic Council, and the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC) where they help solve regional cases. Conversely, Russia has no close relationships with European organizations, whereas it is more active with Asian organizations. Since 1998, Russia has been one of the member states in the Asian-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), an observer state in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and because of its Muslim minorities, and it became an observer state to the Organization of the Islamic Conference (2005)¹⁵⁸. Russia has also involved itself in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict solution and Iran nuclear programs case forums. However, Russian contributions to these forums may be smaller than the U.S. contributions to these forums. Russian activity is present in Asian institutions due to concern of security and regional issues. Russia is one of the equal members of most of the organizations mentioned above and no biding decisions can be taken. To illustrate, Russia has influenced the UN Security Council with the help of its veto right. Russia attempts to create new global financial systems, a new security system in Europe, and handicaps in NATO as a sign of minor gains of success. Since the 1990s, Russian activity in international organizations doesn't only give acceptance and reputation globally and regionally, but it also give its strength of position as a great power. With contributions of vast numbers of international organizations, Russia aims

<https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/blogs/toi-edit-page/g20-rose-to-prominence-in-response-to-2008-financial-crisis-it-needs-similar-reinvention-today/>

¹⁵⁷ Åslund, A.(2009, September 23). The Ruble as a Global Reserve Currency? No! *Peterson Institute for International Economics*. Retrieved October 28, 2018 from <https://www.piie.com/commentary/oped/ruble-global-reserve-currency-no>

¹⁵⁸Russia(2018).*Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation*. Retrieved September 18 2018 from <https://www.apec.org/About-Us/About-APEC/Member-Economies>

to balance each other out—but Russia was not successful. During the presidency of George W. Bush, the U.S. and Russia had frosty relations due to the war in Iraq and the enlargement of NATO. On the other hand, during the presidency of Barack Obama, Russia wanted to balance the relationship again. Oldberg also state that Medvedev highlighted the importance of equality and mutual benefits before their first summit in April 2009. He also mentioned how the vast numbers of the state have “extraordinary obligations in world affairs” and in the stability of global developments and nuclear security. A nuclear arms reduction treaty was signed by the U.S. and Russia and came into effect on February 5, 2011¹⁵⁹. In such equal contributions, the U.S. helped Russia to rise above other regional powers in some respect¹⁶⁰.

2.1.1. Russia in the Middle East: Foreign Relations in Transition

Russia has effectively been interested with being a leading actor in the Middle East. The foreign and security policy strategy toward this region is likely to be a political influence in the Middle East. Trenin (2016) maintained that departure from the Middle East under the Presidency of Mikhail Gorbachev, which was beginning of first Gulf War, resulted in the Soviet Union’s superpower status apparently being diminished. Conversely from the Soviet Union, under the Presidency of Vladimir Putin, Russia has diplomatically very active strategies which have been followed in order to reemerge in its position as a great power. Since 2007, Russia understandably expanded its demonstration of power and influence in the Middle East region. It is followed by placing official visits to Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Jordan after attending the Security Policy Conference in Munich on February 11, 2007¹⁶¹. During

¹⁵⁹ Oldberg, I.(2010). Russia’s Great Power Strategy under Putin and Medvedev. Swedish Institute of International Affairs, 82(1),41-57. Retrieved March 3, 2018, from <https://www.ui.se/globalassets/ui.se-eng/publications/ui-publications/russias-great-power-strategy-under-putin-and-medvedev-min.pdf>

¹⁶⁰ New START Treaty. *US Department of State* Retrived September 18 2018 from <https://www.state.gov/t/avc/newstart/index.htm>

¹⁶¹ Zhao, W. (2008). Change of Russia’s Middle East Strategy and Its Influence on Russia-US Relations, *Journal of Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies (in Asia)*, 2:2, 47-61, Retrieved October 28, 2018 from DOI: 10.1080/19370679.2008.12023116

the Cold War, The Soviet Union and U.S. had to compete with each other for the Middle East region. The Soviet Union had historical experience with the states in Middle East. Various Arab states like Algeria, Egypt, Syria, Libya, Iraq, and Yemen were customers and quasi allies of the Soviet Union during the Cold War, and also supported forming the state of Israel¹⁶². However, the Soviet Union was disappointed after that and returned to support the Palestine Liberation Organization and Arab rivalry of Israel. Contrary to the Cold War, Russia expanded its influence in the Middle East after dissolution of the Soviet Union. Today, Russia highlighted their policies as mostly geopolitical. The foreign and security policies pillars may be summarized under the Putin administration, which included: encouragement of friendly regimes, constructing geopolitical alliances with them, constructing a Russian military existence in and surrounding the region, enhancing nuclear existence in the region's weapons, oil, gas, food, and other sectors. The list goes on to also include: attracting potential investment into Russia, especially countries from the Persian Gulf, protecting energy prices within coordination with the pillar oil and gas producers in the Gulf, and decreasing radical and extreme Islamists (or otherwise it may spillover into a post-Soviet neighborhood and create Muslim extremism there.) In addition to that, Russia insisted on solving the problem, which was crisis and conflict in the Middle East, by no means of use of force in order to establish stability in the Middle East. However, it may continue peace, friendly alliances, and diplomacy for settling conflicts in the Middle East. Under these principals, which are mentioned above as the foreign and security policies of Russia, the relationships with the surrounding states have been illustrated.

2.1.2. Russia's Diplomatic Engagement in Iran

The relation between Russia and Iran has never been stable; it is too complex. In Soviet times, arms were sold to Tehran following the Iran-Iraq war from 1980-1988¹⁶³. Iran and Russia agreed to build a nuclear plant in Tehran and at Bushehr following Russia's wars against the

¹⁶² Trenin, D.(2016). Russia in the Middle East: Moscow's Objectives, Priorities and Policy Drives. *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace*. Retrieved October 28, 2018 from <https://www.mtroval.ca/library/files/citation/apa.pdf>

¹⁶³ Freedman, R. O. (2018). From Khrushchev and Brezhnev to Putin: Has Moscow's Policy in the Middle East Come Full Circle? *Contemporary Review of the Middle East*, 5(2), 102. Retrieved October 28, 2018 from <http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=edo&AN=ejs45368172&site=eds-live>

Muslim Chechens. However Russia, under administration of Gore–Chernomyrdin signed an agreement which ended all arms shipments to Iran in 1999 and didn't renew any arm agreements after that. However, during the Putin administration, things had changed and he agreed to sign a new addition in arms sales agreements with Tehran .

The Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant was developed as a vital part of the nuclear cooperation agreement between Russia and Iran. Russia and Iran stated that the nuclear program cooperation was meant for a peaceful purpose: the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Treaty (NPT) and to open way to any inspections from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Siemens had built two 1,240 MW power reactors but after the Iraq-Iran war, diplomatic pressure from the U.S. and Iran revolution were the main reasons for the end to nuclear activities in the region. Zarubezhatomenergostroi and the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) were signed in 2002 and the agreement was to deliver the end of the Bushehr NPP, and the training 20-30 Iranian scientists in nuclear science. Iranian-Russian nuclear cooperation followed via assistance from the IAEA. The IAEA released a report 2003 that stated Iran's nuclear program was capable of uranium enrichment as well it being unable to fulfill its obligations under a 1974 safeguards agreement. Consequently, the U.S. had been tried trying to convince Russia to end the nuclear corporation with Iran. However, the U.S. failed to win Russia's support in UNSC in 2005. In the end, Russia agreed to UNSC's measures in the case that Iran was not complying with nuclear enrichment plutonium processing for producing nuclear weapons. As a consequence to disobeying, the UNSC put an embargo on Iran which kept it away from moving goods and services which had contributed to Iranian efforts in uranium enrichment¹⁶⁴. This was called The UNSC Resolution 1737 and it was adopted on December 23, 2006¹⁶⁵. Subsequently, Resolution 1747 was adopted on March 24, 2007, and Resolution 1803 was passed on March 3, 2008¹⁶⁶.

¹⁶⁴ Paulraj, N. (2016). The JCPOA and Changing Dimensions of the Russia–Iran Relations. *Contemporary Review of the Middle East*, 3(1), 95. Retrieved October 28, 2018 from <http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=edo&AN=ejs38653026&site=eds-live>

¹⁶⁵ *Security Council Tightens Restrictions on Iran's Proliferations-Sensitive Nuclear Activities, Increases Vigilance Over Iranian Banks, Has States Inspect Cargo.* (2008, March, 3). [Press release]. Retrieved October 28, 2018 from <https://www.un.org/press/en/2008/sc9268.doc.htm>

¹⁶⁶ Davenport, K.(2017). UN Security Council Resolutions on Iran. *Arms Control Association*. October 28, 2018 from <https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/Security-Council-Resolutions-on-Iran#res1803>

To illustrate, Iran voted against St. Petersburg in favor of Doha as the location of the executive office and secretariat of the Gas Exporting Countries Forum (GECF) in December 2008¹⁶⁷. A few years after that controversial event, President Vladimir Putin met with Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit in Shanghai on 7 June 2012¹⁶⁸. Putin mention that Russia sought to deepen relations with Tehran. Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov stated that Iran is “a natural ally” for avoiding religious extremism in the Middle East in September 2014¹⁶⁹. After the Arab Spring, Russia’s tensions with the USA and its disputes with the EU over Ukraine led Russia to further seek to secure its relationship and dialogue with Iran. During the nuclear crisis, Russia hoped that reaching a nuclear agreement would eliminate sanctions so that the CIS would not be treated as peripheral; however, economics sanctions occurred Nevertheless, light water reactors were an exception of this resolution for the Russian building project in Bushehr¹⁷⁰ P5+1 (including Russia) made an offer in regards to the Iranian nuclear program, which was inspected by IAEA; this offer allowed Iran’s low enriched uranium (LEU) into Russia and France in 2009¹⁷¹. However, this proposal was refused by Iran and it opened new sanctions against Iran. The first world nuclear fuel bank of LEU, was set up by Russia Russia’s MinAtom IAEA in Russia, in March of 2010¹⁷². It most likely possessed the leading role of Russia’s nuclear power sector thus Russia offered removal of the sanctions against Iran. Following which, Iran refused Russian trust proposal and Turkey and Brazil jointly signed

¹⁶⁷ Kozhanov , N. & Dutkiewicz, P. (2016). Civil War in Syria and the Evolution of Russian – Iranian Relations. *Emirates Policy Center*. Retrieved October 28, 2018 from http://epc.ae/sites/default/files/2016-09/Reserach%20Paper--Civil%20War%20in%20Syria_0.pdf

¹⁶⁸ *Press Communiqué of the Meeting of the Council of The Heads of the Member States of The Shanghai Cooperation Organization*.(2012, June, 7). [Press release]. Retrieved October 28, 2018 from https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/2649_665393/t939161.shtml

¹⁶⁹ Kozhanov, N.(2015). Are the Russians and Iranians Friends? Retrieved October 28, 2018 from <http://www.faiobserver.com/region/europe/are-the-russians-and-iranians-friends-12812/>

¹⁷⁰ IAEA Annual Report.(2009). Retrieved October 28, 2018 from https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/publications/reports/2009/anrep2009_full.pdf

¹⁷¹ Davenport, K.(2017). UN Security Council Resolutions on Iran. *Arms Control Association*. Retrieved October 28, 2018 from October 28, 2018 from <https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/Security-Council-Resolutions-on-Iran#res1803>

¹⁷² Solash, R.(2010, March 30). Russia, IAEA Agree To Establish World's First Nuclear Fuel Bank. *Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty*. Retrieved October 28, 2018 from <https://www.rferl.org/a/Russia-IAEA-Agree-To-Establish-Worlds-First-Nuclear-Fuel-Bank/1997174.html>

the agreement “export LEU waste to Turkey for Consignment Storage for nuclear fuel afterwards” in May of 2010¹⁷³. (The JCPOA and Changing Dimensions of the Russia–Iran Relations). Russia has supported the UNSC resolution vote for several sanctions, benefiting from the Obama administration’s various privileges. Russia asked the U.S. in 1999 to remove sanctions against Russian companies’ arms export and Russia’s sale of S-300 anti-aircraft missiles to Iran as an exchange of UNSC resolution. Russia is reluctant to see new members in the energy industry and its geostrategic goal has limited influence developments in the Middle East. Thus, Russia supported the last round of UNSC sanctions after discovering the secret uranium enrichment facility near Qom. However, Russia made sure to vote together with other members of the Security Council on Resolution 1929 in June of 2010 so no harm would befall the future economic cooperation with Tehran. The Russian-Iranian nuclear cooperation took the opposition of international community. Cooperation on military technology, the Arab Spring, and the Syrian Civil War might be reasons that intensified the Iranian-Russian relationship¹⁷⁴. Russia highlighted an intermediary role between Iran and the rest of the world

The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCOPA) was finalized June 2015 and gained both the international community, and Iran. First, sanctions were removed and highlighted a peaceful Iran nuclear program. In addition, Russia had played important role in the JCOPA negotiations. Consequently, the geopolitical location of Iran put a further strain on Russian-Iranian cooperation, in order to maintain their mutual interest in the region.

2.1.3. Russia’s Security Policy in the Civil War in Syria

Russian Foreign policy identity has caused a major concern in the Middle East security region. Especially under Vladimir Putin leadership Russian foreign policy turn building up good relation with influence countries such as Syria in the world. The geographic proximity

¹⁷³ Iran, Turkey and Brazil declaration(2010, May, 18).*Aljazeera News*. Retrieved October 28, 2018 from <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2010/05/201051795513637980.html>

¹⁷⁴ Rodkiewicz, W.(2017). Russia’s Middle Eastern Policy Regional Ambitions, Global Objectives. *Ośrodek Studiów Wschodnich im. Marka Karpia. Centre for Eastern Studies*. Retrieved October 28, 2018 from https://www.osw.waw.pl/sites/default/files/studies_71_russias_middle_eastern_policy_net.pdf

of Caucasus and Middle East sustain determine Russia's policy towards Syria. The Arab spring was spillover effect on Syria. The conflict inside trigger terrorism and civil war was started was on 15 March 2011¹⁷⁵. Russia is one of great ally of Syria during the civil war which is still running because Russia has determined to fight against international terrorism and ISIS. Russian foreign policy positions has there vital pillars war against ISIS, protect legitimate government and holding Syria strategically in examination Syrian civil war.

Fighting international terrorism has been linked with Russian national security causes across the Russian North Caucasus variety of fighters have joined the ranks of IS in Syria¹⁷⁶. Anti-Terrorism policy of Russia is national interest that protecting Russia from overseas terrorist attack. Dmitry Medvedev state that in recent years several thousand fighters from Russian and Central Asia are joining fight in Syria an interview with Time Magazine Rush¹⁷⁷. He also add that up to 7,000 people from ex-Soviet Union states and Russia were joining IS aiming of fighting in the Middle East and organization which is banned in Russia. An interview with Handelsblatt (the leading financial daily of Germany) Prime Minister of Medvedev states that these fighters come back to Russia and brainwashed would like to repeat what they have done in North Caucasus to other Russian cities¹⁷⁸. Andrei Przhezdovsky, an advisor to the chair of Russian national Anti-Terrorism Committee has proved this speech of Medvedev. He told journalist " law enforcement had caught 832 Russian militants, including 22 recruiters, returning from overseas, and had stopped more than 100 citizens from leaving the country to fight for the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria"

¹⁷⁵ Rahaman, S. (2016). Syrian Civil War: A Historical Study from the Russian Perspectives. 3. 7-13. Retrieved October 28, 2018 from <http://dx.doi.org/10.20431/2349-0381.0310002>.

¹⁷⁶ Haugevik, K. & Wilhelmsen, J. (2016). Strategic Cooperation Against Terrorism 2.0? Collaborating with Adversaries. *Norwegian Institute of International Affairs Policy Brief*, 38. Retrived November 11 2017 from https://nupi.brage.unit.no/nupi-xmlui/bitstream/handle/11250/2428291/NUPI_Policy_Brief_38_16_Kristin_Haugevik_Julie_Wilhelmsen.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y

¹⁷⁷ The Russian Government(2016). *Dmitry Medvedev Has Given An Interview to Time Magazine Correspondent Simon Shuster following the Munich Security Conference*. Retrieved October 28, 2018 from <http://government.ru/en/news/21790/>

¹⁷⁸ The Russian Government(2016). *Ahead of the Munich Security Conference, the Prime Minister answered questions from Editor-in-Chief Sven Afhüppe and international correspondent Mathias Bruggmann Dmitry Medvedev interview with Handelsblatt*, Retrieved October 28, 2018 from <http://government.ru/en/news/21765/>

according to the TASS news agency¹⁷⁹. On June 23, 2015 ISIS spokesperson Abu Muhammad al-Adnan announced states that creation of new government in the Russian north Caucasus arena¹⁸⁰. In basis of these information's and an official invitation from Syrian representatives Russia has launched military intervention 30 September 2015¹⁸¹. Despite fact intervention, Russia was support UNSC Resolution 2118 in 2013 which scheduled destruction of Syrian's chemical weapons and facilities.

Protect legitimate government; Russian foreign-policy discourse is Bashar Al-Assad who is elected in presidential election by great majority of Syrian people. He received he got highest votes from the Syrian people however, Western states claim that the election was unfair¹⁸². Russia did not take a count these statements and Russia militarily involve to Syria in 2015 in favor of legitimate government¹⁸³. Minister Dmitry Medvedevs state that it is legal bases requested by president al-Assad an interview with Euro news TV and he said that there is no other legitimate authority in Syria apart from Assad¹⁸⁴. Russia uses diplomatic tools to mediate between the Kurds, Damascus, and Ankara. Since 2017 Russia has been sponsoring the so-called Astana Process in order to bring Turkey, Iran, and various groups in Syria together to discuss the situation in northeastern Syria. The three leaders agreed about the territorial integrity and political unity of Syria¹⁸⁵ Russia also invited Lebanon and Iraq

¹⁷⁹ Moscow Says It Thwarted IS Terror Attacks in Russia(2016, January 29). *The Moscow Times*, Retrieved October 28, 2018 from https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2016/01/29/moscow-says-it-thwarted-is-terror-attacks-in-russia-a51648?sm_auiVVFD1WjQnSPf33

¹⁸⁰ Gambhir, H.(2015). Isis Declared Governorate in Russia's North Caucasus Region. Retrieved October 28, 2018 from <http://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounders/isis-declares-governorate-russia%E2%80%99s-north-caucasus-region>

¹⁸¹ Włodkowska-Bagan, A. (2018). Syria in Russia's Foreign Policy in the 21st Century. Retrieved October 28, 2018 from <http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=edsbas&AN=edsbas.8982B6CF&site=eds-live>

¹⁸² Rahaman, S. (2016). Syrian Civil War: A Historical Study from the Russian Perspectives. 3. 7-13. Retrieved October 28, 2018 from <http://dx.doi.org/10.20431/2349-0381.0310002>

¹⁸³ Quinn, B. Russia's Military Action in Syria – Timeline.(2016, March 14). *The Guardian*. Retrieved February 22 2019 from <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/mar/14/russias-military-action-in-syria-timeline>

¹⁸⁴ The Russian Government. *Dmitry Medvedev interview with Euronews TV channel, Prime Minister spoke with Global Conversation presenter Isabelle Kumar on the sidelines of the Munich Security Conference*. Retrieved October 28, 2018 from <http://government.ru/en/news/21789/>

¹⁸⁵ Duran, B.(2019, September 21). Turkey, Russia and Iran Continue to Shape Syria's Future. *SETA*. Retrieved October 28, 2019 from <https://www.setav.org/en/turkey-russia-and-iran-continue-to-shape-syrias-future/>

as observer states to discuss the situation of refugees on August 1-2 , 2019¹⁸⁶. This resulted in a Russian-Syrian-Lebanese commitment to facilitate the return of displaced Syrians. Russian enhancing diplomatic cooperation with Syria's neighbors is a turning point for Russia's image as a power in the Middle East Recently, the role of Russia has been expanded. In a phone call between Trump and Erdogan on October 6, Trump agreed to withdraw US troops from the Turkish-Syrian border.¹⁸⁷. It is a critical point for Russian army taking advantage in their respective regions during the times of conflict and crisis in Syria.

The geo-political, economic and cultural existence of Russia is directly important holding Syria strategically. Regarding to Buzan and Waver security interdependence among groups of states are rely on Russian strategies with Syria. As Buzan and Waver states that security of each state is brought into operation with other states in the same region. Therefore Russia appears new foreign strategies which build up fastening relationship with strategically geostrategic countries in the Middle East which are Syria, Turkey, Israel, and Lebanon and West Iraq. Syria is pivotal county in the security chain in the Middle East as Henry Kissinger mentioned. President Vladimir Putin's strengthen Russia importance in the Middle East in the twenty – first century. If Russia is going to defeat rebellion group will be more powerful in the Middle East as regional power. Russian leadership might likely trigger a new polarization in security level in the region.

2.1.4. Russia and Israel : Major Powers Friendship Engagement

Russia and Israel has positioned itself depending on strategic priority in their foreign policies. The relations with surrounded states in Middle East and Global power has been diverge. Russia has close ties with Iran which view each other as direct regional rivals. On the other hand, Israel is pointing itself closely allied with US which has been reverse situation to Russia.

¹⁸⁶ Ramani, S.(2019, October 7). Russia's efforts to Expand the Astana Process in Syria. October 28, 2019 from <https://www.mei.edu/publications/russias-efforts-expand-astana-process-syria>

¹⁸⁷ Erlich, R.(2019, October 30). Russia Is the Only Winner in Syria. *Foreign Policy* Retrieved November 13, 2019 from <https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/10/30/russia-is-the-only-winner-in-syria/>

Despite those diverge alliances, both states Russia and Israel are willing to cooperate to stand up for its allies. They have cooperate various areas which are economy, technology and military. The close ties can be observe not only in governmental level but also be observe by society level. To illustrate, Over a million Russian speakers have immigrated from SU to Israel also over 550,000 Russian tourists have visited Israel in 2016¹⁸⁸. The Russian-Israeli relationship, based on logic of eager to continue bilateral cooperation, good chemistry with state leader, a common fear of regional and national security. Soviet Union under Stalin administration, it was one of the first country which recognize Jewish as a state after its interdependence declaration. During to Khrushchev term, the situation has been reversed both anti-Western and anti-Israeli. However, Moscow has maintain relations diplomatic with Israel in period of Cold War until Arab-Israeli War. SU was supporter of Palestinian because it didn't signal for destruction of Israel by certain Arab state Palestinian groups did at that time. Soviet-Israeli relations continue Russian Orthodox Church's representation in Jerusalem. Moscow has been focus on enhanced relations with anti-American regime such as Iran and Iraq was more crucial for Israel. Former Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon has expressed sympathy to Russian president after Putin came to power. Putin's re-intervention in Chechnya either criticized or standing silence by Western leaders however it is adore by Sharon. Following Russian president Putin has made first visit to Israel in 2005 and he states that security of Jewish state¹⁸⁹. There are other reasons why Israel valuable to Russia is because Russian arms sales to certain countries. Israeli technology is one of only sources Western military technology for Russia. Unlike Western governments Israel is not condemn Russia for annexation of Crimea however Russia vote in favor of a U.N. General Assembly resolution Russian annexation of Crimea¹⁹⁰ On a broader scale, Moscow uses Israel as a bridge to communicate with west also Israel sees Russia as tools to communicate unfriendly

¹⁸⁸ Katz, M. N.(2018). Russia and Israel: an improbable friendship. Popescu, N. and Secieru, S. Russia's Return To The Middle East Building Sandcastles?(pp 103-108). EU Institute for Security Studies and printed in Luxembourg by Imprimerie Centrale. Retrieved October 28, 2018 from https://www.iss.europa.eu/sites/default/files/EUISSFiles/CP_146.pdf

¹⁸⁹ Mark N. Katz.(2005). Putin's Pro-Israel Policy, Middle East Quarterly, 12, 1 (Winter 2005): 51-9, Retrieved October 28, 2018 from <https://www.meforum.org/articles/2005/putin-s-pro-israel-policy>

¹⁹⁰ Richman, J.(2018, December, 18). Israel Votes in Favor of UN resolution Censuring Russian Annexation of Crimea. *Jewish News Syndicate*. Retrieved February, 2019 from <https://www.jns.org/israel-votes-in-favor-of-un-resolution-censuring-russian-annexation-of-crimea/>

neighbors. State-to-state interrelation in the region is also mentioned as one of the criteria for regional security complex theory. Social cultural ties between both states is also another tools in their Foreign policy. First, Jewish community in Russia is a key goal of Israel maintain positive relations with Russia.

Russia and Israel also deepened their bilateral relations due to their similarities as multi-ethnic and multi-religious states. Social and cultural ties between these states are often stressed in the establishment of diplomatic and political relations. Russian-speaking Israelis had strategic importance for both states in deepening their socio-economic relations; for example, roughly 12 percent of Israel's total population speaks Russian as a first language.¹⁹¹

Second, historical connection to the Holy Land in Jerusalem. Due to birthplace of Christianity has become increasingly importance Putin's third term. To illustrate, St. Sergius convent house of Tsar's family, was given back Russian sovereignty in 2008. On bilateral economic relations between Russia and Israel has been enhanced in recent years. Trade between Russia and Israel almost tripled from 2000 to 2015. To illustrate, Israel exports 35 percent of agricultural products by Russia. Russia is one of the key supplier of Israel's crude oil. Tourism is also another aspect of economic relations Russia and Israel. Annually, eight or nine direct daily flight from Russia to Israel help 400,000 Russians visit Israel before 2014 this number has been reached 600,000¹⁹². Russian language and similarity in culture helps Russian tourists feel at home in Israel.

In the frame of military cooperation two countries are the least developed. A coordination between them can be observed after Russian intervention to Syria in 2015¹⁹³. Limited airspace trigger increase cooperation Russian air force command at Khmeimim in Syria and

¹⁹¹Tabarovsky, I.(2019, 4 April). Russian-Speaking Israelis Go to the Polls. *Wilson Center*. Retrieved October 28, 2018 from <https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/russian-speaking-israelis-go-to-the-polls>

¹⁹² Krasna, J.(2018). Moscow on the Mediterranean: Russia and Israel's Relationship. *Foreign Policy Research Institute*. Retrieved October 28, 2018 from <https://www.fpri.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/krasna2018.pdf>

¹⁹³ Quinn, B. Russia's Military Action in Syria – Timeline(2016, March 14). *The Guardian*. Retrieved February 22 2019 from <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/mar/14/russias-military-action-in-syria-timeline>

the Israel Air Force operations center in Tel Aviv. However there is no joint military activities or any training between two states militaries.

These states boosted their economic ties in the areas of nuclear technology (2013) and nanotechnology (2016).¹⁹⁴ Free trade negotiations were led by Russia as part of economic integration with Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Armenia, Belarus, and Israel in the Eurasian Economic Union. The cooperation between the states was followed by cooperation in advanced military technology and the energy sector. Since the Leviathan gas field was discovered off the Israeli coast in 2010, Russian firms have been trying to establish influence in the Israeli and EU energy markets. A cooperation agreement was established between the RUSNANO Nanotechnology Institute, Russia's Skolkovo Innovation Center, and Israeli firms and research institutes. Technological cooperation between the states was limited in order to maintain partnership. However, in the defense industry, two states made deal for Russian purchase of Israeli UAVs from the Israel Aerospace Industries in 2009¹⁹⁵. It was also follow second purchase of different type of UAVs \$400 million in 2010.¹⁹⁶ These drones was used in Russo-Georgian war in 2008 impressed by Russia. Russia was aiming to close technological gap which emerge in Russo-Georgian war. Russia planned to make another agreement between 2014&2015 however it is failed due to American sensitivities about the use of the drones¹⁹⁷. Russia could tolerate this causes instability in the Middle East and in frame of new strategical architecture encompass tradition American allies which is Iran. For many years Russia has been used strategic languages between triangle of Jerusalem and Moscow in subject of military and nuclear cases. Russia don't observe any positive relation between them its regional strategical aim is making a fast beneficial ties the two strongest

¹⁹⁴ Klein, M. & Averbukh, L.(2018) . Russia-Israel Relationship Transformed by Syria Conflict. *Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik*, 2018/C 37. Retrieved October 28, 2019 from https://www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/comments/2018C37_avk_kle.pdf

¹⁹⁵ Krasna, J.(2018). Moscow on the Mediterranean: Russia and Israel's Relationship. Foreign Policy Research Institute. Retrieved October 28, 2019 from <https://www.fpri.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/krasna2018.pdf> Accessed 22.02.2019

¹⁹⁶ Etsion, U.(2019, July, 18). Report: Syria Benefits From Israeli Drone Technology Sold to Russia. *Ynet news*. Retrieved September 22 2019 from <https://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-5553048,00.html>

¹⁹⁷ Sabak, J.(2017, April 21). Israeli Drones Will No Longer Be Manufactured in Russia. USA-imposed Embargo. *Defence24*. Retrieved April 17 2019 from <https://www.defence24.com/israeli-drones-will-no-longer-be-manufactured-in-russia-usa-imposed-embargo>

powers in the region. In light of UN Security Council and the P5+1 group Russia was commitment Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action's (JCPOA) withdrawal of US though. Israel was express its concern about arms sales to Iran and Syria causes the arms were reached by Hezbollah. Since beginning of Russia intervention to Syria in 2015 Israel was use Russia to warning to Iran. Jerusalem and Moscow mad high level contracts in order to show Iran Hezbollah was involved this conflict as long term interest of Moscow. This may help also Russia take attention of international criticism and pressure. Russia is unwillingly mediating between Iran and Israel though.

Russia has always been interested Palestinian issues thus it is member of Quartet on the Middle East mediating Israeli-Palestinian peace process. Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov declared that they are willing to encourage both side possibility to direct dialogue however, it was rejected by Netanyahu, Mahmoud Abbas is agreed though¹⁹⁸. Russian Recognition of West Jerusalem as capital of Israel April 6, 2017 without hurting Palestine and Arab sensitives hopes to be acceptable as mediator¹⁹⁹. Currently, Russia comprise between Hamas and Fatah Ruling Party developments in the Palestine cause. Thus, Abbas head of Fatah Ruling Party is visited in order to convince Russia enhance mediator role in the Palestine issue as a result of US no filling mediator role. It is also followed Moscow visit of a Hamas delegation led by Mousa Abu Marzouk discus Russian role in the region and of reconciliation.

In frame of Israel and Russia bilateral relation is positive especially the areas of shared interest. Both side has known where their boundaries is started. Although the relations are well between both sides, Israel primary strategic partner is US no room for replacing them. Economic strategies of Russia are considerable tools enhance their influence into Arab world such as arms sales and nuclear assistance. Russian economic transactions towards pro-Western Arab states is grown recently. Russia is also prevent influence of Turkey and Iran

¹⁹⁸ Amer, A. (2018 April 17). Russia Seeks to Extend Role In Mideast Peace Beyond Syria, Al-Monitor, Retrieved October 28, 2018 from <https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/fr/originals/2018/04/expectations-over-growing-role-russia-mideast-peace-process.html>

¹⁹⁹ Krasna, J. (2018). Moscow on the Mediterranean: Russia and Israel's Relationship. *Foreign Policy Research Institute*. Retrieved October 28, 2019 from <https://www.fpri.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/krasna2018.pdf>

former Soviet states and Russia. Thus, they have developed method of containment as foreign policy strategies.

In conclusion, Russia has seek stability in the region as maintain its role of regional power. Basic dynamics of their policy preferences avoid instability spreading from Syria towards Israel and Jordan as Buzan and Waever explain security interdependence among groups of states existing in the same geographical area. Russia and Syria has seek stabilize strategies in case of Syrian conflict especially concerning security interdependence. Policy preferences many regional issues is to be characterized for a better cooperation in variety of fields among Russia and Israel in the same geographical area.

2.2. EMPLOYMENT OF MILITARY POWER BY RUSSIA AS FOREIGN POLICY INSTRUMENTS

Russia has applied a vast number of military and security strategies. Russian foreign policy under the presidency of Dmitry Medvedev frequently emphasized peaceful solutions and methods of communicating as its goals. Especially after the war in Georgia, Russia guaranteed peace and would never turn to war as a solution again—unless used in the case of self-defense or authorized by the UN. Medvedev also stated that Russia would not be involved in any arms race and would prevent the spread of nuclear weapons or technology in arms reduction. Another military concept is that if the partners are not ready to cooperate, then Russia may act independently in light of international law. Russia signed a deal with Poland regarding U.S. missiles during and after the war with Georgia in 2008 (with respect to enhance its relationships with Cuba, Libya, and Venezuela.). Russia also expanded access of ports in Syria. Russia was strengthening its friendship with the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). However, Russia may likely keep its military bases for arms, air force, and naval units in all CIS—apart from Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan. To illustrate, Russia decided broaden its air defense forces of the Republic of Belarus in 2008 with regards

to U.S. missiles in Poland²⁰⁰. In Kyrgyzstan, Russia's new air base establishment was allowed by the U.S. due to support in 2001 in Afghanistan. Since then, Russia has tried to dismiss the U.S. base and in 2009, they were successful in at least some respects by using economic sanctions and incentives²⁰¹. A major naval base in Sevastopol is one of the most significant bases for Russia in Black Sea Region, due to its major naval exercises carried out by the Russian Navy. It is allowed part of the port in the peninsula for 20 years with five years prolongation pertaining to an agreement between the two countries. It was planned to move the base to Novorossiysk, however these attempts were put on hold due to the cost of transportation. The reasons which are mentioned above led Ukrainian President, Yushchenko, to seek for NATO membership to stop these attempts from Russia. While Ukrainian membership was being discussed in NATO, there was a demonstration from the Russian population in Sevastopol and naval personnel support from Russia²⁰². President Yanukovich came to power and made a new lease agreement which stated: Russian base rent spans 25 years and as exchange made to them—10 years-worth of discount is given to them in gas prices. Russia sustains four military bases in Georgia and has promised the OSCE to evacuate those bases. However, the war between Russia and Georgia appeared when the last one in Batumi was removed in 2008. As a result of the war, Russia recognized Abkhazia and South Ossetia as independent states and stationed 7,600 troops to build a new base in Abkhazia²⁰³. This way, Russia was able to make Georgia's NATO/EU membership complicated and created a major threat to Georgia. Therefore, Russia frequently used this base for its military exercises and activities as a physical force against CIS states.

²⁰⁰ Sacko, D(2008). Russia's Role in the Emerging Eurasian Security Environment. *United States Air Force Institute For National Security Studies Research Paper*
Retrieved March 3, 2018, from https://www.usafa.edu/app/uploads/10_RUSSIAS-ROLE-IN-THE-EMERGING-EURASIAN-SECURITY-ENVIRONMENT.pdf

²⁰¹ Oldberg, I(2010). Russia's Great Power Strategy under Putin and Medvedev. *Swedish Institute of International Affairs*, 82(1),41-57. Retrieved March 3, 2018, from <https://www.ui.se/globalassets/ui-se-eng/publications/ui-publications/russias-great-power-strategy-under-putin-and-medvedev-min.pdf>

²⁰²Kuzio, T(2010). The Crimea:Europe's Next Flashpoint? *The Jamestown Foundation*. Retrieved March 3, 2018, from http://www.taraskuzio.com/Nation%20and%20State%20Building_files/CrimeaFlashpoint.pdf

²⁰³Dyomkin, D.(2009, February, 9) Breakaway Abkhazia to Host Russian Bases. *Reuters*. March 3, 2018, from <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-georgia-russia-bases-sb/breakaway-abkhazia-to-host-russian-bases-idUSTRE51534U20090206>

After the war with Russia, Georgia received humanitarian aid from NATO and the U.S. In response to this, Russia sent warships and aircrafts to the Caribbean Sea. It was a signal to the U.S. to avoid Russia's anticipated zone of control in the Black Sea Region. In addition, a natural gas pipeline in the Baltic Sea was connected to Russia and Europe. Russia has been using its navy to secure the Nord Stream pipeline against any terrorist attacks. As a result, Russian leaders discussed new responsibilities for the Baltic fleet. Similarly, Medvedev deployed Iskander missiles to Kaliningrad as a response to the missile bases in Poland and Lithuania—where the U.S. planned forces in the Baltic Region²⁰⁴. The author went on to indicate Russian security exercises over CIS as “peace-creation” in the fight against terrorism. Oldberg (2015) presents the idea that Russia does not accept peace keeping missions when armies are deployed and sanctions are applied; the principle of impartiality is broken. In 2008, the Georgian NATO membership was on the agenda, and how military accidents occurred so frequently²⁰⁵. When Georgia attacked the capital of South Ossetia in August, Russia occupied a part of Georgia as a response. A number of armed soldiers attacked the Georgian navy from Abkhazia with the Black Sea Fleet. In addition, Russia bombed Georgian towns and waged cyber-attacks. Russia blamed the U.S. in supporting the Georgian attacks and emphasized defeating the Georgian military and NATO oriented President of Georgia, Mikheil Saakashvili. French leadership of the EU was intervening to bring an end to the war. Russia was convinced to hold a ceasefire and departed from Georgia in October, but not in the earliest time as complied. The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe and the European Union observer involved. However, they did not accept entry to South Ossetia and Abkhazia unless their status were of sovereign states. As a consequence, the Russian peacekeeping statue completely changed permanent military bases south of the Caucasus. Putin explained Russia's position as a promise to assure security in the region and to prevent concealed weapons in Georgia. Oldberg stated that Russia was

²⁰⁴Stubbs, J. & Osborn, A.(2018). Russia Deploys Iskander Nuclear-Capable Missiles to Kaliningrad: RIA. *Reuters* . Retrieved October 28, 2019 from <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-russia-nato-missiles/russia-deploys-iskander-nuclear-capable-missiles-to-kaliningrad-ria-idUSKBN1FP21Y>

²⁰⁵ Oldberg, I(2010). Russia's Great Power Strategy under Putin and Medvedev. *Swedish Institute of International Affairs*, 82(1),41-57. Retrieved March 3, 2018, from <https://www.ui.se/globalassets/ui.se-eng/publications/ui-publications/russias-great-power-strategy-under-putin-and-medvedev-min.pdf>

always doubtful of Western aid to Georgia and highly opposed NATO activities in Georgia of May of 2009.

The Oldberg went on to indicate that Medvedev was appointed due to changes in provision of conditions, which allowed him to send an army abroad with the aim of protecting the rights of Russian citizens. He also confessed that the Georgian invasion was not legal. Russian territory was not under threat and no treaty was necessary to assist South Ossetia; forcible measurement were applied by the Federation Council. Therefore, Russia's short-lived victory in war enhanced its military position and had a negative image—in other words, it lost its credibility. As a result of this, Russia did not send any troops to ethnic conflicts in southern Kyrgyzstan in June of 2010, although it was requested by the government. A less intervening policy is followed by Russia as a policy of relations with the CIS.

2.2.1. Russia's Self Sufficiency in the Defense & Energy Industry

A strong military is essential to a state's ability to plan power on regional and an international level. Russia is stress reform to modernize its armed forces, especially launched in 2008 Vladimir Putin's second term. His aim was while reforming arm forces decrease corruption in the military, increase military ability to attend more regional conflict. It is political debate in Russia, own military operations and experience proven that armed forces should modernize and restructuring its armed. The technology is used legacy of the Soviet Union, insufficient to compete with NATO and US. The year of 2008, Georgian war was experience for Russia equipment and training of army should be reconsidered. Hence, Russia reduce under 1.2 million to 1 million the total size of the armed forces and no fund to military officers, has increase its military budget in defense industry²⁰⁶. Thus, weapons, new planes, helicopters, ships, missiles, and submarines for the Ground Forces, Air Force, Navy, and arms of service has planned to modernized. Initially, Russia has invested USD 730 billion

²⁰⁶ Nichol, J.(2017). Russian Military Reform and Defense Policy. *Congressional Research Service Report for Congress. Retrieved from Research Gate* . Retrieved October 28, 2018 from https://www.researchgate.net/publication/292200003_Russian_military_reform_and_defense_policy

improving high technology equipment from 2011 to 2020²⁰⁷. Defense minister of Russia Anatoliy Serdyukov states that concern about Organizational structure, personnel, and weapons upgrades. Heavy transport aircraft, 12 per cent of which jet fighters the fleet are replaced each four and five years in light current military modernization. Strategic Rocket Forces, Airborne Troops, brigades of Special Forces subordinated by the president. They have planned defense industries to obtain a new array of weaponry over the next 10 years. Aerospace Defense Forces, Cyber-Warfare Command is strategically important to control its regional states and influence surrounded states in order to solve conflict and protect its regional borders to be perceived as a regional power. In the framework of modernization, deploy of advance military equipment to its borders Russia is ability to win regional rivalries with using its military capacity. In addition to this, Russian active military personnel is ranked 5th largest armies in the world based on Statista List²⁰⁸ In last decade's global weapons exports, Russia is ranked second arms exporter after the US. Russian Defense Ministry's Federal Service for Military-Technical Cooperation (FSVTS), state that arms export number 2010 to \$10 billion; as well as Russia received \$48 billion in future orders²⁰⁹. During the 2000-2010, Russian arms has been exported China, India, Algeria, Venezuela, Iran, Vietnam, Malaysia, and Yemen and Soviet era weaponry and services upgraded. Recently, decline of arms export to several customer can be observed in global market such as combat fighter aircraft, battle tanks, and other major weaponry. Reduction of Quality of Russian weapons and spare parts leads Russia cooperate with Rosoboroneksport into Rostekhnologii. Rosoboroneksport is also signed export agreement with U.S. Department of Defense in order to deliver 21 Mi-17 helicopters in 2011-2012 to Afghanistan for usage of Afghan Army²¹⁰. In addition Russia is a leader in air defense sector information technology,

²⁰⁷ Radin et al.(2019). The Future of Russian Military. *RAND Corporation. Santa Monica, California*. Retrieved October 17, 2019 from

https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR3000/RR3099/RAND_RR3099.pdf

²⁰⁸ Duffin, E.(2019). Number of military personnel in NATO Countries 2019. Statista. Retrieved October 17, 2019 <https://www.statista.com/statistics/584286/number-of-military-personnel-in-nato-countries/>

²⁰⁹ Grätz, J (2014). Russia's Military Reform: Progress and Hurdles : Progress and Hurdles. *Center for Security Studies (CSS), ETH Zurich*. Retrieved October 28, 2018 from <https://css.ethz.ch/content/dam/ethz/special-interest/gess/cis/center-for-securities-studies/pdfs/CSSAnalyse152-EN.pdf>

²¹⁰ Nichol, J.(2017). Russian Military Reform and Defense Policy. Congressional Research Service Report for Congress . Retrieved from Research Gate :

while imported radar technology, and high-precision weapons systems. Nevertheless, Russia still lacks the know-how for producing helicopters and aircraft as well as rockets. Hence it is still bound to Ukraine in order to produce some part of producing helicopters and aircraft as well as rockets. Import substitutes is also another problem of Russia lead significant difficulties and delays to country. Russian power in military defense industry is enhanced its relation with Middle Eastern states. Weapons sales and investment military are being discuss with Qatari Emir Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani and Russia since 2016²¹¹. According to Chatham House, Russia's weapons exports distributed by Syria, Egypt 1.4%, Yemen 1.2%, Algeria 9.1%, Iran 2%,⁴⁷ the UAE 0.7%. in period from 2000 to 2016²¹². Furthermore, Russia enhanced economic ties with Gulf countries, like Qatar and Saudi Arabia especially in the defense sector. Russia has also significant role leading energy sector in the Middle East.

AS an oil producer of Russia is largely exported to oil Israel (US\$0.6 billion), Morocco (US\$0.6 billion) and Egypt in the Middle East US\$0.4 billion)²¹³.

Russia is also playing significant role OPEC+ agreements in order to decide to sale the lowest cost of oil for oil-dependent economies. Qatar, is largest investor of Russia's energy sector Glencore and Qatar paying \$11.3bn for the stake in Rosneft largest privatization deal²¹⁴. Nuclear energy is also another tools of Russia foreign policy economic cooperation and therefore also closer political ties with Middle Eastern countries. Rosatom (state own company) is one of the leading providing company completed Bushehr in Iran only nuclear power plant. Construction of the Akkuyu plant has been started in Turkey is planned for

https://www.researchgate.net/publication/292200003_Russian_military_reform_and_defense_policy

²¹¹ Russell, M(2017) Russia in the Middle East From Sidelines to Centre Stage. Brief for *European Parliamentary Research Service*. Retrieved October 28, 2018 from [https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2018/630293/EPRS_BRI\(2018\)630293_EN.pdf](https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2018/630293/EPRS_BRI(2018)630293_EN.pdf)

²¹² Facon, I.(2007). Russia's Quest for Influence in North Africa and the Middle East. Fondation pour la Recherchestrategie. Retrieved October 28, 2018 from <https://www.frstrategie.org/sites/default/files/documents/programmes/observatoire-du-monde-arabo-musulman-et-du-sahel/publications/en/8.pdf>

²¹³ Russell, M(2017) Russia in the Middle East From Sidelines to Centre Stage. Brief for *European Parliamentary Research Service*. Retrieved October 28, 2018 from [https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2018/630293/EPRS_BRI\(2018\)630293_EN.pdf](https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2018/630293/EPRS_BRI(2018)630293_EN.pdf)

²¹⁴ Glencore and Qatar Buy \$11.3bn Stake in Russia's Largest Oil Company. *BBC News*. Retrieved October 28, 2018 from <https://www.bbc.com/news/business-38245065>

finalized 2025²¹⁵. While Saudi Arabia is considering joint action with Rosatom building nuclear power plants United Arab Emirates choose a non-Russian-built plant. Russia's foreign policy goals in parallel with political-military strategies of country. Autonomous of energy and defense sector is bringing regional dominance, including responding to stability, securing peace and closer ties in the two Middle East countries.

2.2.2. Using A Diplomatic Platform : Russia's Foreign Policy Activities in International Organization

End of Cold War constituted area for regional power to appear as a key state significant role in regional and global governance. This follows regional powers creation of politics and economic stability in region and strengthen regional organization. However, Russian intervention's to Georgian Government and the South Ossetian and Abkhazian minorities conflict in August in 2008 was disappointed to among scholars in line of the rule of law and building a political stability²¹⁶. In addition to this, Russian use of force and intervention Eastern Europe in Crimea leads instability territories of a neighboring states. Sending troops to Georgia to avoid its membership in NATO is new aspects in relations with the West. It consequences changes in Russian foreign policy by a new phase of Middle East²¹⁷

After 2012, the Putin leadership came to power seeking positive image of Russia, joining the EEU, using soft power to create positive image surrounded states. Russia has aimed of peaceful and multilateral relations with its West and surrounded states. Hence, Russia keep actively significant efforts in building its role as a regional power, Russia's permanent membership of the UN Security Council is used to maintain its regional role. Russia has permanent seat with substantive veto power in UN Security Council. Hence, Russia is

²¹⁵ Russia Starts Building Turkey's First Nuclear Power Plant(2018, April, 03).World Nuclear News. Retrieved October 28, 2018 from <https://www.world-nuclear-news.org/NN-Russia-starts-building-Turkeys-first-nuclear-power-plant-03041801.html>

²¹⁶ Prys, M.(2010). The Variability of Regional Powers. *Paper Presented At The SGIR 7th Pan-European Conference on IR, Stockholm*. Retrieved October 28, 2018 from https://www.academia.edu/2977792/The_variability_of_regional_powers

²¹⁷ Garcia, H.(2018). Evolution of Russian Foreign Policy and Middle East. *Janus.net e-journal of International Relation* Retrieved October 28, 2018 from doi:10.26619/1647-7251.9.1.7

investing more effort in regional peace operations to maintain such a regional security complex. Russia is actively maintain its neutrality in Situation in the Middle East in UN Security Council sessions. To illustrate, Russia is voted negatively in UN Security Council with China case of Situation in the Middle East draft resolution S/2012/77 in session of 6711 February 4, 2012 Situation in the Middle East draft resolution S/2011/612 session of 6627, October 4, 2011²¹⁸.

Russia is recently strengthening its role as regional power with a promoting regional international organizations such as Collective Security Treaty Organization, Shanghai Cooperation Organization and, a Eurasian Union. Active participation of regional organization is important element of Russia's foreign policy. This has followed enhanced relation with Arabic states and it attempts by participating in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). In this framework, multilateral security organization is advice by Russia Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). SCO is an organization can bring all states under framework of regional integration challenge which a step to diminish to great power influence. Member states of SCO is also insist no military base of US in the region since Astana Summit in 2005. SCO is an organization which help Russia hold dominated position in terms of building political and security stability. This organization would help also Russia to avoid further NATO's eastward expansion. Russian observer statue of observer state status in the Organization for Islamic Cooperation is also another important tools enhanced process of Russian engagement in the Middle Eastern zone. In this context, active role in such international organization of Russia shows us Russia's desire for not only regional influence in Central Asia but also effectiveness of regional order in Middle East.

3. CONCLUSION

This thesis has tried to analyze the regional foreign policies of the Republic of Turkey and the Russian Federation for attaining regional power in consideration of the pillars of enhancing cooperative relations with neighboring states and using military power and diplomatic platforms to solve conflicts regarding peace and security within the region. Their

²¹⁸ Nikitin, A.(2012).Russia as a Permanent Member of the UN Security Council. *Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES) International Policy Analysis*. Retrieved October 28, 2018 from <https://library.fes.de/pdf-files/iez/09461.pdf>

relationships with nearby states such as Syria, Egypt, Iran, and Israel have been discussed in terms of the goal of obtaining regional power within socially and politically unstable regions. The analysis of the regional foreign policies of these two historically different countries allows some conclusions to be drawn. The driving forces for being a regional power for the Republic of Turkey and the Russian Federation are seen in the framework of the security dependence of other states in same region, as addressed by the regional security complex theory.

In order to reveal the first conclusion, that there is a common point for Turkey and Russia leading them to the same result of attracting regional states in the Middle East in the process of securitization, the regional security complex theory was explained. Although both states experienced significant changes in the region with the implementation of new aspects of their regional foreign policy, they could not expand their roles in solving security problems apart from one another.

As the second conclusion, Turkey's relations with states that are politically and socially stable or unstable in the Middle East were examined in light of Turkey's attempts to gain regional power. Efforts to reshape Turkey's relations with its neighbors under the Justice and Development Party government have had a strong impact on Turkey being the most important diplomatic actor in the region and have paved the way to attaining regional power. In the early years of the Justice and Development Party era, economic interaction with Iraq had a positive impact on the recognition of Turkish leadership and supported Turkish efforts to be involved in regional efforts for peace. However, political instability in Iraq and the Kurdish question meant that Turkey could not maintain its regional foreign policies, hence negatively impacting the acceptance of Turkey as a regional power in the Middle East. Another conclusion pertaining to Turkey's neighbors is that political instability has a strong and direct effect on the motivation of Turkey to play a regional role. Instability in Syria and Egypt due to political turnover changed the effective political leadership in the region. Turkey enhanced its relations with neighboring states via its "zero problems" foreign policies. In the earlier years of the Justice and Development Party era, economic transactions and visa liberalization agreements were made by Turkey and Syria. Turkey also made efforts

to serve as a mediator between Syria and Israel. However, Turkey's attempts to use diplomatic platforms for attaining regional power were generally limited and are still debatable in the short-term. A similar case was seen for Turkey's relations with Egypt. Political instability influenced those relations and ended the acceptance of Turkey as a regional power. The dynamics of political instability in these neighboring states negatively impacted Turkey's acceptance as a regional power.

The third conclusion is that participation in regional peace efforts in order to stabilize national borders is another specific characteristic of the regional foreign policy of Turkey to be perceived as a regional power. For example, Turkey sent 1,000 troops to participate in the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon. These strategies have not affected Turkey's regional power image in the long run in the international arena. Economic, political, and social efforts on their own do have noticeable impact on Turkey's actions as a regional power. Hence, Turkey also uses its military capacity in working to secure peace in the region more actively in order to solve conflicts and maintain regional stability. Turkey also intervened in Syria in the sense of maintaining borders in the region and respecting territorial integrity, in an effort for Turkey to act as a regional power in dealing with the Iranian nuclear program in the UN Security Council and using diplomatic platforms to become a regional power by serving as a mediating country to resolve the conflict and maintain its position in the region. Hosting regional leaders from Afghanistan and Pakistan allowed Turkey to maintain stability in the region since 2008; Turkey is certainly thus capable of attaining regional power. Humanitarian diplomacy, the principle of zero problems, and peace-keeping activities have been applied actively in Turkish foreign policy in order for Turkey to be perceived as a regional power. Ankara has been enhancing its relations with neighboring states on the principle of zero problems as a regional power. Sending troops to Libya in the framework of peacekeeping operations and taking a mediator role were big boosts for Turkey's regional role. However, the Arab Spring was a serious test for Turkey's regional power in the region as Turkey was unable to clearly take a side during the crisis. Turkey encountered difficulties in the recognition of its social and "zero problem" policies with other states in the region during the Arab Spring. Hence, Turkey is still struggling to restore its political and economic

relations with those states and is still pursuing foreign policy strategies to be perceived as a regional power by states in the area.

The fourth conclusion of this study is the self-sufficiency of the Turkish defense industry in order to be perceived as a regional power. In recent years, Turkey has tried to expand its position as a regional power in the Middle East. Turkey has tried to play an active role within the framework of expanding its position as a regional power amongst these Middle Eastern countries. Turkey particularly hopes to secure its position as an important business partner with those strategic states in the Middle East. Investment in national military capacity in terms of R&D and innovation in the Turkish defense industry is being used to improve the regional balance of power and protect the Turkish borders and its perception as a regional power. Self-sufficiency in the Turkish defense industry aims to solve regional conflicts and emphasize the autonomy of Turkey within the region. Ankara thus structures its economic position in the international defense market with the goal of being perceived as a regional power.

The Turkish defense industry had several achievements in terms of increasing its military power capacity to be perceived as a regional power. Turkey also cooperated in joint defense projects with other states in the Middle East. However, Turkish attempts to invest and produce military weapons or increase the number of active personnel in the military still heavily depend on imported raw materials in the arms sector. In order to compete in the international arms sector, Turkey seeks more investments in the Turkish defense industry. This dependence on imported raw materials has thus led to Turkey not being accepted as a regional power.

In Russia, likewise, a similar conclusion is reached in this study while analyzing the terminology of regional power. Russia has some similar features in terms of developing its political, economic, and social relations with regional countries in the Middle East. In recent years, Russia has expanded its position as a regional power in the Middle East rather than the CIS. The conflict in Crimea is likely an important point for Russia in turning its foreign policy towards the Middle Eastern countries. Thus, Russia has taken a strong position regarding the conflicts of regional states. It insisted on neutrality during the Arab Spring in

pursuit of peace in the region. Russia also played an active role within the framework of expanding its position as a regional power, especially in terms of stronger economic ties with the GCC and other major Middle Eastern states. After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Iran and Russia built close ties as economic and political partners. They enhanced their economic relations with purchases of military technology as well as military alliances in the conflicts in Syria and Iraq. Russia's intervention in the civil war in Syria has given new momentum to its status in the Middle East. Russia's military operations in Syria represent an opportunity to test its power in airstrikes and missile strikes on the battlefield. Russian troops participated in airstrikes and missile strikes against the opposition groups in the civil war in Syria. It finalizes with success of the Russian armed forces. Russia's achievements in the Middle East have recently gained it a position as a dominant player. As a result of success in diplomatic platform and battlefield Russian take over control over the Syria.

As a mediator between Israel and Palestine, Russia also received a boost regarding intervention in Syria as a regional power shaping its policies within a framework built on regional dynamics. For example, Russia was an eager mediator of the Israeli-Palestinian peace process in line with the goal of ensuring security within the region, making it more likely to be a regional power in the Middle East. However, that mediator role did not actually receive enough attention from states in the Middle East to impact the leadership position of Russia. Russia tried to maintain neutrality and keep an equal distance from all states in the region during the Arab Spring. This position of Russia differed from that of Turkey, which did not help its goal of being accepted as a regional power by Middle Eastern countries. In the case of using diplomatic platforms, Russia is quite active in efforts to become a regional power and maintain its position in the region. Russia has significant influence in shaping policies in the UN Security Council due to its permanent membership and its veto rights. Russia is more active in using diplomatic platforms and international organizations compared to Turkey, due to its permanent seat on the UN Security Council. While Moscow abstained from the vote on Resolution 1973 regarding Libya in 2011, in the case of Syria it supported the mediation mission of Kofi Annan in Damascus to maintain peace in the region. Russia used its veto power on 4 October 2011 and 4 February 2012 to avoid sanctions in the Libyan

and Syrian conflicts, with the further hope of preventing armed international interference in Syria like in Libya. Russia could not establish the regional power in the Middle East that it desired, and its emphasis on regional peacekeeping in the CIS area has also been actively debated. Russia's permanent seat in the UN is a major advantage in terms of its claims to the right of being a regional power. On the other hand, the dynamics of the political instability in the Middle Eastern states are complicated. Russia has the ability to maintain communications with relevant players in the region in failing states. Military force and political influence in Syria may be observed as signs of Russia maintaining its power. It has become a security manager in that country, which serves as a step towards restoring its image as a regional power. Its ability to autonomously shape strategies in the region in periods of instability has been clearly seen. Russia thus restored its image as a regional power by shaping strategies amidst instability in the region. As another conclusion of this work, Russia significantly increased its military capacity after 2008 under Defense Minister Anatoliy Serdyukov. The Russian defense industry largely depends on arms exports to the global market. Its military capabilities are more impressive today with the growing modernization of its weapons. Nevertheless, conventional military power and nuclear deterrence have not yet been central for Russian economic interdependence among its rivals and in state competition in the future. Russia plans to establish regional deterrence, humanitarian assistance, and partnership-building capacity. Russia uses military force as an instrument of its regional policy in order to be perceived as a regional power. However, interdependence on import subsidies results in a loss of the status of its defense industry.

Turkey and Russia both started to enhance their political, economic, and social relations with Middle Eastern states as a foreign policy tool with some success. Russia and Turkey explicitly reoriented their regional foreign policy priorities in order to show their desire to become regional powers as of 2007. Both countries have used democracy promotion, development of military capacity, and security policies to increase the acceptance of their regional power among the other states in the region. In addition, they were actively engaged in political, economic, social, and security policy activities that helped them pursue peace in the region. All of the policy activities explained in the previous chapters were undertaken to

achieve the final aim of becoming a regional power. Russia is historically the successor state of the Soviet Union and still carries its legacy. Turkey, meanwhile, is the successor state of the Ottoman Empire and the Ottoman legacy often steers Turkey's position in the region. These two historically different states began by shaping their regional foreign policies differently after the elections in 2007 and 2008. As successor states, they have established independent friendly relations among the regional countries. The changing character of Turkish regional foreign policies has been observed together with newly elected governments in the Middle East. At the same time, Russia started to gain power and become the most prominent actor in the region. Strategic and geopolitical factors led to the increase of Turkey and Russia's influence in the Middle East and led them to fill roles as regional powers. Improvement in the political and economic relations with neighboring states led to strategic cooperation in which active Turkish policies were observed with a long-term focus on the Middle East. Pursuing EU membership, neo-Ottomanism, and a pro-Western government image means that Turkey distinguishes itself from other regional rivals, which helps Turkey to be perceived as a regional power. Turkish efforts to use diplomatic platforms to take a mediator role, enhance relations with neighbors, and strengthen its military power are all traditionally welcomed among regional states. However, in recent years, due to the dynamics in the region, Turkey could not sustain its positive regional image and position. In the case of Russia, its generally successful foreign policy among regional states has still not had a positive impact on its image of regional power in the Middle East. However, Russia's permanent seat in the UN Security Council increases its influence as a key power broker in the international arena in securing peace. This may indeed be a reason for Russia to be the more likely successful regional power.

Nevertheless, the current conditions in Turkey and Russia, as addressed by Schirm and Schoeman, mean that both countries are unable to achieve their goal of being perceived as regional powers not only regionally but also globally. Still, Turkey and Russia are explicitly influencing regional policies as strong actors and they are able to impact the decision-making mechanisms shaping regional policies as effective regional powers.

Contrary to my findings, many other scholars have examined Russia and Turkey as regional powers. To illustrate, Russell examined the recent role of Russia in Syria and stated that Russia had boosted its role as a dominant player²¹⁹. Senkyr also stated that stronger economic and financial management will help Turkey gain a position as a regional power.²²⁰ Aksu stated that the social, economic, and political developments of the last decades have allowed Turkey to wield influence as a regional power²²¹. Sladden, Wasser, Connable, and Grand-Clement highlighted that Russia launched its participation in the civil war in Syria to rebuild its image as a great power in the Middle East²²².

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²¹⁹Russell, M. (2018). Russia in the Middle East From Sidelines to Centre Stage. *European Parliament Briefing*. Retrieved October 28, 2019 from [https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2018/630293/EPRS_BRI\(2018\)630293_EN.pdf](https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2018/630293/EPRS_BRI(2018)630293_EN.pdf)

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²²¹ Aksu, K. (2013). Turkey: A Regional Power in the Making. *Cambridge Scholars Publishing*. Retrieved October 28, 2019 from <https://www.cambridgescholars.com/download/sample/61345>

²²²Sladden, J., Wasser, B., Connable, B., Grand-Clement, S., (2017). Russian Strategy in the Middle East. *Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation*. Retrieved October 28, 2019 from https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/perspectives/PE200/PE236/RAND_PE236.pdf

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APPENDICES

Appendix 1: Outer Cover

Appendix 2: Side Edge of the Outer Cover

Appendix 3a: Inner Cover

Appendix 4: Table of Contents

Appendix 5: Abstract

Appendix 6: List of Abbreviation

Appendix 7: List of References

Appendix 8: Appendices & Curriculum Vitae

CURRICULUM VITAE

Personal Information:

Nationality: TC

Name-Surname: ZEYNEP CEREN GULDAL

Date of Birth: 26.11.1989

Education and Qualifications:

09/2007 – 02/2012: *ISIK UNIVERSITY*- B.Sc. in International Relations

04/2013-05/2013: *CHARLES UNIVERSITY*- Spring School - Department of International Relations

Scholarships :

March- September 2018 University of Cologne: Exchange Student - Master Research Scholarships

June 2017 : DAAD Study Trip Scholarship

Research Interests :

Critical Security Studies, European Politics, Turkish Politics, Civil-Military Relations, Political Parties

Employment History :

02.04.2019 - ongoing

TOTAL Petrochemicals & Refining SA/NV

Import Specialist

27.04.2015 – 05.03.2018

Asis Otomasyon Akaryakıt Sistemleri AS

International Operation Supervisor