Kellermann, KerstenNuroğlu, Elif2025-02-202025-02-202024978-363190582-1978-363190581-4https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12846/1795This chapter examines the use of size ceilings for banks as a regulatory tool to enhance the effectiveness of the too big to fail (TBTF) regime. It introduces the concept of systemically important banks (SIBs) and explores the essential features of TBTF regime. The chapter argues that the optimal size of a bank from a business perspective may differ from its socially optimal size. Furthermore, it is argued that due to the challenge posed by a potential bailout, there is a legitimate public interest in the home country of a SIB to prevent the bank from growing beyond a socially acceptable and sustainable size. The chapter also provides a brief discussion of recent events in Switzerland related to the Credit Suisse crisis, where the effectiveness of the TBTF legislation was called into question. © 2023 Peter Lang Group AG, Lausanne. All rights reserved.eninfo:eu-repo/semantics/closedAccessBank regulationSystemically important banksTBTF regimeToo big to failToo big to saveBook Part1471652-s2.0-85189228241