

**T.C.  
TURKISH GERMAN UNIVERSITY  
INSTITUTE OF SOCIAL SCIENCES  
EUROPEAN AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS**

**POLITICAL NARRATIVE OF AN ALARMING  
ECONOMY  
THE CASE OF TURKEY**

**MASTER'S THESIS**

**Ufuk OLGUN**

**ADVISOR  
Prof. Dr. Kai OPPERMANN**

**ISTANBUL, September 2021**

**T.C.  
TURKISH GERMAN UNIVERSITY  
INSTITUTE OF SOCIAL SCIENCES  
EUROPEAN AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS**

**POLITICAL NARRATIVE OF AN ALARMING  
ECONOMY  
THE CASE OF TURKEY**

**MASTER'S THESIS**

**Ufuk OLGUN**

**Student No: 178101011 - ORCID ID: 0000-0001-8633-8106**

Date of Submission: 24 August 2021

Date of Defence: ..... 2021

Advisor: Prof. Dr. Kai Oppermann .....

Jury members: ..... .....

Doç. Dr. Enes Bayraklı .....

Alternative Juror: ..... .....

**ISTANBUL, September 2021**

**T.C.  
TURKISH GERMAN UNIVERSITY  
INSTITUTE OF SOCIAL SCIENCES  
EUROPEAN AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS**

**POLITICAL NARRATIVE OF AN ALARMING  
ECONOMY  
THE CASE OF TURKEY**

**MASTER'S THESIS**

**Ufuk OLGUN**

**178101011**

**ADVISOR**

**Prof. Dr. Kai OPPERMANN**

**ISTANBUL, September 2021**

# CONTENTS

## PAGE NO

CONTENTS.....	i
ABSTRACT [TURKISH].....	iii
ABSTRACT [ENGLISH].....	iv
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS.....	v
LIST OF FIGURES.....	vi
LIST OF TABLES.....	vi
1. INTRODUCTION.....	1
2. THEORY AND METHOD OF ANALYSIS.....	6
3. NARRATIVE ANALYSIS.....	10
3.1. A Conjoint Narrative Analysis.....	11
3.2. Characters .....	16
3.3. Setting.....	17
3.4. Plot.....	17
3.5. Resolution.....	17
3.6. Data Selection, Categorization of Political Groups and Limits.....	18
4. ANALYSIS.....	19
4.1. Characters.....	19
4.2. Setting.....	25
4.3. Plot.....	30
4.4. Resolution.....	37
4.5. The EU Radar.....	39
4.6. The Narrativity Factors.....	41
5. CONCLUSION.....	44

<b>CHRONOLOGY.....</b>	<b>47</b>
<b>LIST OF REFERENCES.....</b>	<b>50</b>
<b>LIST OF FIGURES.....</b>	<b>53</b>
<b>LIST OF TABLES.....</b>	<b>54</b>
<b>CURRICULUM VITAE [CV] .....</b>	<b>55</b>

# **ABSTRACT**

## **POLITICAL NARRATIVE OF AN ALARMING ECONOMY THE CASE OF TURKEY**

The thesis studies narrative contestation between the AKP and the Opposition, over the Turkish Currency and Debt Crisis of 2018. The study applies a unique model of narrative analysis it developed specifically for the case it investigates. On 24 June, Turkish voters elected the AKP narrative blaming foreign powers as the persuasive one. The opposition continued to hold the AKP rule responsible for the downturn during the second half of the year.

The thesis reveals similar and different discursive instruments in both narratives first. Then it examines outcomes by categorization of key compounds. It identifies particular narrativity factors that raised the AKP's persuasive power and led the opposite curve for the Opposition. The research discusses general outcomes of the contest in the scope of EU affairs in the last chapter.

**Key Words:** Turkish currency and debt crisis of 2018, economic policy failure, ransom thesis, primacy of policies, foreign powers, the EU, Turkey

**Date:** 2021, August

## ÖZET

### TELAŞLANDIRAN BİR EKONOMİNİN SİYASİ ANLATISI TÜRKİYE ÖRNEĞİ

Türkiye'nin 2018'de yaşadığı döviz ve borç krizi ekseninde AKP ile Muhalefet arasında görülen anlatsal çekişmeyi inceleyen bu çalışma, ele aldığı örnek için geliştirilmiş eşsiz bir anlatı çözümleme modeli uyguluyor. Türk seçmenlerinin çoğunluğu 24 Haziran'da yabancı güçleri suçlayan AKP açıklamasını daha ikna edici bulduğunu gösterdi. Ancak muhalefet yılın ikinci yarısı boyunca yaşanan gerilemeden AKP iktidarını sorumlu tutmaya devam etti.

Tez, öncelikle her iki anlatıdaki benzer ve farklı söylemsel araçları ortaya çıkarıyor. Ardından, anlatıyı önemli bileşenlerine ayırıp ilk aşamada elde ettiği sonuçlar ile birlikte ilk aşamada bulunduğu söylem araçlarıyla inceliyor. Araştırma, AKP'nin ikna gücünü artıran ve Muhalefet için tam tersi sonuçlar doğuran belirli anlatı faktörlerini ortaya çıkarıyor. Araştırma, yarışmanın genel sonuçlarını AB ilişkileri kapsamında tartışıyor.

**Anahtar Kelimeler:** 2018 Türkiye döviz ve borç krizi, ekonomi politikası başarısızlığı, fidye tezi, politikaların önceliği, dış güçler, AB, Türkiye

**Tarih:** 2021, Ağustos

## **LIST OF ABBREVIATION**

- AKP: Justice and Development Party
- BBP: The Great Union Party
- CHP: The Republican People's Party
- DAESH: An extremist religious terror organization calling itself as Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant
- DP: Democrat Party
- EC: European Commission
- EEC: European Economic
- EP: European Parliament
- EUA: European Union Allowance
- FETÖ: Terrorist Organization led by Fettullah Gulen
- HDP: The Peoples' Democratic Party
- HSYK: Supreme Board of Judges and Prosecutors
- IMF: International Monetary Fund
- IR : International Relations
- IYI: The Good Party
- MHP: The Nationalist Movement Party
- SP: The Felicity Party
- PA: The People's Alliance
- NA: The Nation Alliance
- TGNA: Turkish Grand National Assembly



- TCMB: Central Bank of Turkish Republic
- The EU: The European Union
- TRY: Turkish Lira
- USD: Dollar

# 1. INTRODUCTION

The controversial constitutional referendum in Turkey was held on the 16th of April in 2017, proposing to abolish the conventional parliamentary system and the office of Prime Minister. The public was called to transfer the premiership authorities of Turkey to an executive president and the ministers he will appoint. The transformation of organizational infrastructure in the state apparatus has been intensely criticized both by the domestic and international oppositions such as the CHP and the EU. The criticism was mainly directed to the high risk premium of unification in state powers. The constitutional amendments were adopted after the 2017 referendum as YES bloc won and Turkey was to hold the presidential and parliamentary elections together in the next year.

The new system limited political parties in nomination of candidates for the Presidential race with the obligation of holding a political group [requires at least twenty deputies' memberships] in the Turkish Grand National Assembly (TGNA). In the new electoral system, candidates from outside of the Assembly should have 100.000 signatures from legal citizens to be a nominee for the top chair of the country. If none of the candidates reaches 50%+1 in the first round of the presidential election, the second round will take place in-between the two most voted presidential nominations. The one getting the highest number of votes at the latter round has the Presidency seat for the next five years. The constitutional updates also limited the presidents of the new era to hold the authority for more than two times.

The historical record was broken by the Democrat Party's (DP) in 1954 election with the highest percentage of votes in general elections at 52%. Although the AKP really got close several times to rename the record holder information in the recent elections, there appeared an 'exigency' for establishing alliances to claim victory at the first round. The 50%+1 was the utmost novelty in Turkish politics, mostly evolving around the party centricity rather than alliances. The AKP led People's Alliance (the PA) was established in February 2018 with the MHP and the BBP [Two National Wing Parties], and CHP led Nation's Alliance (the NA) was formed against it in May of the same year together with IYI Parti, the SP and the DP, but the SP leaves the alliance soon after the elections.

In June 2018, general and presidential elections to execute a regime change creating controversies at all levels of politics were held. In 2018, before the elections, Turkey was facing macroeconomic troubles indicating the fragile formation of financial sustainabilities the country possesses. TRY's devaluation accelerated, high interest rates were at the financing operations, and lack of capital in a serious measure. The country's almost cronic financial conditions such as low saving rates or budget imbalance deriving from its energy bill relapsed and dragged Turkey to suffer in economic terms. For a sustainable public and private investment scheme across the country, foreign investment is often required. The combination of such fragile dynamics shapes the Turkish economy and the financial well being of the country depends on its relations with capital-rich countries. The elections and the campaign, thus, took place under this atmosphere in which politicians brought the economic downturn in front of the public to explain or criticize the economic policies as 'success' or 'failure' to win the elections. The PA narrative and the NA narrative on

economic policy success and failure have been clashing during the electoral period. The PA explained the Turkish currency and debt crisis of 2018 to the public during the campaigns as economic attacks by ‘foreign powers’ and advocated that the government has implemented a successful security policy that caused a ransom in the economy. The NA front, on the contrary, addressed the AKP government as directly responsible for the economic policy failure. The electoral race ended on 24<sup>th</sup> of June, with the AKP led alliance's victory for presidency and the majority of the seats in Turkish Grand National Assembly (TGNA). However, the narrative clash between two alliances did not end up with the election results and moved into TGNA and it continued until the end of the year. This thesis, therefore, traces the discursive debate between the PA and the NA fronts in TGNA during 2018 and applies a hybrid model of narrative analysis to the minutes of this year. As the first level of its analysis, the study focuses on the domestic parliamentary discussions in TGNA and it formulates a model of narrative analysis improved for this case, particularly.

The hybrid model this thesis introduces is a unique narrative analysis that adopts and improves Oppermann and Spencer (2015) approach utilized in deconstruction of US Congress discussions over Iranian Nuclear Deal, the theory of strategic narratives by Roselle et al (2013)[1] and the extension of Green and Brock's (2002) Transportation Imagery Model by Kinnebrock and Blandzic (2011) that widens the theory with narrativity concept (see Coste, 1989; Prince, 1982; Ryan, 1992). Thereby, the paper enriches three different scholarships. The first, the thesis adds a rare case study to policy success and failure studies in Public Policy and IR fields by the improvement of Oppermann and Spencer's model together with the other studies. It agrees that the success and failure in policies are depending on some factors

in the narratives rather than seeing success or failure as measurable policy outcomes (see Marsh and McConnell, 2010a). Although the study develops a constructivist approximation rather than a general applicability while studying the case, it does not follow the pure relativist tradition. Rather, it rejects labelling the audience as the sole narrative element in defining/judging policy outcomes as successes or failures. It improves the model of Oppermann and Spencer's model by studying a case that contains the audience [Turkish voters] actively in influencing the judgement for success or failure in economic policies. The impact of the audience is observable and measurable by the elections and the elections lead the political rivals to generate more strategic narratives than most of the other periods. Hence, the thesis combines the strategic narrative theory by Roselle et al. (2013) and integrates it in the former model. It argues that the narrators may represent a hierarchy between different policy fields to the audience that defines the primacies for the survival of states. Therefore, no more "vital" policy success may require a lesser significant policy failure trivialized. The thesis does not claim neither an accuracy or factuality to prioritize policy fields in this case, nor it rejects that there may be more crucial policy fields than some others. However, it studies discursive constituents that were operationalized in order to gain dominance over the other in the narrative contestation over the Turkish economic downturn of 2018 at TGNA. Thus, the deconstruction includes the resolution element as one of the key components that is different from Oppermann and Spencer. The second contribution of the thesis is improving cooperation between Communication, Psychology and IR. It develops an interdisciplinary narrative approach by examination of narrativity. The model offered by Kinnebrock and Blandzic (2011) provides to trace the narrativity factors, experience of reception, processing and

consequences of the narratives. The thesis operationalizes the model in order to explain the elections and dominance of one narrative over the opposing one both in the elections period and after it. The study widens the strategic narrative theory by providing an alternative model for the narrativity that provides a specific model to trace the persuasion weight in terms of strategic formation of the narratives (see Roselle et al. 2013)

The first phase of the analysis divides the narratives and counter narratives into four primary constituents as (1) *Character*, the element gathers up and examines the key agents involved in the story; (2) *Setting*, the component includes the system and environment that the action takes the place; (3) *Plot*, the causal and temporal preferences of the narrative formed with; (4) *Resolution*, the element provides the narrative to contain a goal/purpose, the strategies used, reception by the audience and perception. In the second phase of the analysis, story, discourse and structure levels [Triad] of narrativity are analyzed in an investigation of deconstructed narrative constituents in the first phase of the hybrid model (see Kinnerbrock and Blandzic, 2011)

The concentration of this study is prominently in the year 2018. There are two reasons to focus on 2018 in this study: (1) The currency and debt crisis started in this year; (2) Presidential election for shifting towards the new governmental system completely was held in 2018. The thesis answers the following questions: (1) How the dominant narrative gains the empery over the other? (2) What kind of strategic narratives were formed? (3) How did the contest change Turkish-EU relations?

## 2. THE CONSTRUCTIVIST THEORY

In IR, rationalists grade scientific credibility of a research due to its methodology's general use. The higher number of cases eligible to apply the methodological framework, the more credible the study gets in science to the most rational accounts. Kenneth Waltz, one of the most famous rationalists in the field of IR, gained his fame after upgrading the realist theory in the way it resembles rational accounts in economics. Despite the rational actor and choice notions' integration to realism, his theory is widely known 'neorealism'. The approach he improves excludes 'albeit persuasive' explanations of IR phenomena based on human nature. With the removal of 'unprovable' arguments rooting from unpredictable human nature, the new theory was only around an international system, being ruled by anarchy and he often calls this system as 'structure'(Waltz, 1979, p.37-38) .

Waltz, indeed, started a new period for IR by excluding philosophical methodologies constructed from political theory. He employed social scientific methods of analysis to the field and enabled a wider perspective to world politics. However, the Waltzian method of analysis views the variables such as power possessed by the states or international anarchy in a quantifiable nature. There is no contradiction for the definition of those mentioned above since his preference for the *anarchical* international system is to call it structure. He forms the presence of an international system governed by anarchy, and he operationalizes measurable components with technical knowledge. In other words, the Waltzian theory of IR limits its approach to unquantifiable, not empirical or immeasurable variables. Most

rationalists prefer studying this kind of data sets rather than data types requiring another methodology rather than statistics, more specifically General Law of probability. The scientific appreciation by the rationalists only appears for these studies and this is nothing but denial reality as it is. The duality consists of a material/physical layer and a social layer that has been fabricated by mankind for material mobility in social life. The interwoven both layers that are observable by humans called 'reality'. Preferring 'specific' data and including variables exclusively to the IR studies explain a 'specific' portion of any phenomenon aimed to be explained. Pure rationalists even accuse some rationalist minorities in IR by blaming them for having 'thick rational accounts', referring to the assumptions on beliefs and preferences of agents (see Satz & Freejohn 1994).

One could define the rationalist critique of IR as nothing but adaptation of 'Rational Choice Theory' of economics advocating rational acts of rational actors for profit maximization. The rationalist accounts in IR, particularly the 'thin' ones, tend to problematize IR concerning phenomena by trimming them until they fit into a scientifically credible formulation. For instance, strategies of international actors will appear as rational choices or plans rather than an irrational decision made by them. To rationalize the decision made, the irrationality of human nature is trimmed until the decision maker is only a power distribution player whose only motivation is to maximize the power he holds. The constructivist critique considers strategies to be formed through social interactions (see Reus-Smith, 2004). Economy consists of materials with a certain value or function and measuring the volume and the weight of these materials may trivialise socio-cultural interactions establishing and improving economic activities like trade or material mobilization for swaps such as



exchange markets. The continuity of social interactions goes on to produce economic fabric, for instance, the European carbon market formed and operationalized recently for trading a contract called EUA, and it is a financial instrument enabling participants to gain by its trade in EU's ETS while reduce carbon emissions due to the volatility in its prices for the industries obliged to submit EUAs equals to their emissions tonnage. A gold nugget being bought, sold or lessened for another purpose and all these actions take place in a socially constructed place called market.

A constructivist perception of IR, on the other hand, "makes claims about the nature of social life and social change" (Finnemore&Sikkink, 2001, p. 393). Constructivist theory takes social reality into account in the studies of IR and defines it as a constructed layer and it considers knowledge to be a social product. The thesis agrees on epistemological and ontological definitions of knowledge and reality referring to both as mutually constitutive (Pouliot, 2007, p. 361).

Constructivism is inclusive of 'human consciousness and its role in international life' (Ruggie 1998, p. 856). It focuses not only on the analysis of rationalist-favored variables and data, but also explores nonmaterial layers of reality by studying them via specific methods which are as scientifically credible as the ones explained above. The constructivist approach views a 'collectively held or intersubjective ideas and understanding on social life' (Finnemore&Sikkink, 2001, p. 393) to explain the specific role played by non material reality such as ideas and identities. Finnemore and Sikkink (2001) describes social interactions constructing ideational beings rather than the material layer of reality. Intersubjectivity and a shared collective understanding of the ideational factors forms the identities and interests of the international actors. Thus, constructivism is a 'theoretically informed

approach to the study of IR' (Ruggie, 1998, p. 880) and unlike neorealism or other IR theories, it is not 'a substantive theory of politics' (Adler, 1997, p.323). The ones that are substantive theory of politics, such as neorealism, are almost obsessed to explain how behavior of agent generates outcome (Wendt, 1992, p. 391; see also Wendt, 1999). The constructivist critique implies a 'sociological perspective on the world politics formed by both normative and material constituents like the role of an individual identity in interests and action' (Price & Reus-Smit, 1998, p. 259).

The criticism done above highlights the constructivist theory adopted throughout this study, observation of social-material, their interactions with each other or within, constructions etc. The theory does not exclude measurable variable and quantifiable data analysis. The same distance is set throughout the study towards pure relativist accounts of IR. and any other limiting theory. Finally, although it is an unintended outcome, the study may also be viewed an assessment for constructivist theory's validity.

### **3. NARRATIVE ANALYSIS**

The narrative indicates a particular type of discourse with a preferred sequence of events based on causal and temporal choices in a single meaningful leitmotif (see Ricoeur, 1984). Narrators decide the above-mentioned preferences, and changes in those compounds and other assets may bear two or more completely different stories on the same occurrence and may lead discursive debates over those contradictions such as the downturn of 2018. Narratives also function as a tool to achieve intentions (see Ringmar, 1996) or expectations. A subfield of literary studies, narratology, traces definitive categories by revealing key distinctive specifications of narratological elements. The study of narratology deconstructs texts aiming to make precise interpretations and many different narrative analysis, categories or types have been used in different disciplines.

Politicians, international actors are narrators by profession and a successful one influences reactions of others ongoing events (see Freedman, 2006).

There is not a unified method for narrative analysis and this leads many researchers to use the least contradictory narrative deconstruction models. However, untied bonds between compounds of different narratives cannot produce the same validity for each narrative. It is completely unique in structure, process, formation, etc. Untied bonds between narrative compounds may provide limited information, but this may be used for more and enables investigation to go further. IR improves narratological analysis for the study of realized narratives such as parliamentary discussions or an international actors account on climate change. Although realized

narratives are studied by IR and many other disciplines, what is really interesting is that our fictive ability provides scientific activity and outcomes.

The paper optimizes the narrative analysis to reveal socio-cultural elements, historical patterns, religious symbols and other related forms from contesting narratives over the issue. An absolute external validity is not the motivation behind the study's scientific search, rather it aims to build the most possible proximity in explaining its case. approximation towards explanation of a social phenomenon.

The paper conducts its research by the analysis of all parliamentary minutes recorded in 2018 at TGNA. Case studies need broader information whether it is single or not (Bennett, Elman, 2009, p.505-506).

### **3.1. A Conjoint Narrative Analysis**

In the *Narrating Success and Failure: Congressional Debates on the 'Iran Nuclear Deal'* (2018), Oppermann and Spencer introduce a general model of narrative analysis. Narratological distinctive categories shown as Setting, Characterization and Emplotment. The analysis defines four discursive instruments under each compound related to them. The paper has used software and visualization of the narrative elements and discursive instruments are almost at the same level. The paper indicates structural similarities as a possibility in discursive debates on policy success and failure.

They argue that policy successes and failures are socially constructed. Narrative contestation over failures or successes in policies may cause discursive struggles between structurally resembling narratives that hold different contents (p. 269). Authors study a single case about the Iranian nuclear deal and above-mentioned

narrative data contains the discussions in the US Congress. Distribution of discursive instruments allows software to show structural resemblance between failure and success narratives. as they differ in content.

In the article, the authors explain that an audience-based approach shows the failure narrative as dominant due to the pre-existing Iran notion among the US citizens that is highly negative (p.287). The Iranian Nuclear Deal the discursive debate over foreign policy success and failure. The paper similarly analyzes the discussion in the Congress and can exclude the audience because it could prevent the study from a prejudice based dominant narrative detection. In the case of the Turkish currency and debt crisis of 2018, the contest at TGNA is not about success or failure in the same policy field. The ongoing financial situation of the Turkish Economy is considered by the opposition as an economic policy failure while the ruling political actors explain it as the result of foreign powers' intervention. This extends the discussions with the inclusion of the security and foreign policy fields in addition to the economic policy. In order to discuss success and failure, the deputies often use the term 'foreign powers', therefore, the discursive battle moves around a specific discourse that blames foreign powers for the economic downturn as well as the paper to utilize the same cognitive shortcuts. The first phase of the analysis hermeneutic means of order utilized by the authors to deconstruct the narrative compounds and key discursive instruments throughout discussions.

The PA narrative forces the downturn by a discursive effort which promotes higher priorities of the country. The NA, directly shows President Erdoğan as the responsible decision maker due to the long rule of the state. Miskimmon (2013) suggests that communicative utilization allows narratives to be in the form of

representations of identities. In this manner, narratives construct the narrators' behaviors. Miskimmon, O'Loughlin, and Roselle's strategic narrative theory list narrative elements as (1) *Characters*: Actors or agents, (2) *Setting*: environment, space, scene (3) *Conflict*: action or act, (4) *Tool*: behavior, agency (5) *Resolution*: goal, purpose (Miskimmon et al., 2018, p. 7). The authors mention three different types for the strategic narratives as (1) *System narrative*: describing "how the world is structured, who the players are, and how the system works", (2) *Identity narratives*: describing the actor, his/her values and goals, (3) *Policy or Issue narratives*: describing the reason(s) of a policy in practical and normative determination as well as the map of policy implementation (Miskimmon et al., 2018, p. 8). The strategic narrative theory also takes part both by the strategic narrative types it defines in the second phase of the conjoint narrative analysis of this study.

In the third phase of the thesis, a very neat work put to model which narrativity factors lead what kind of experience during the reception, and conclusion in the different types of the process in thinking. Due to the cognitive background of the study by Kinnebrock & Bilandzic, the paper adopts the model in the third cluster of the studies. Model formed from the Transportation Imagery Model by Green and Brock (2002), and integrated many of the narrativity prominent concepts defined by Coste, 1989, Prince, 1982 and Ryan, 1992. The model refers to three levels of narrativity as *story*, *structure*, and *discourse* taken from Martinez and Scheffel (2003). At each level, *narrativity factor* and *experience of reception* are mutually set while *processing* is a subcategory of *story* and *consequences* for *structure* and *discourse*. The paper systemizes the increase of narrativity following the utilization of certain factors. The story is the narrativity level is where the events are set in a particular chronological

order and the causal relation between the events are described as “a reasoned and coherent unit” (Green and Brock, 2002, p.5). The discourse level of narrativity is the stage of presentation, the sequence of events may differ from the chronological setup according to the “specific modes” (Green and Brock, 2002, p.5). The structure level of narrativity builds a network between the first two levels where “plots, characters, and settings are mostly based on established narrative. In the following table, the authors list all the three levels with their sub categories as:

<b>Story</b>		
<i>narrativity factor</i>	<i>experience of reception</i>	<i>Processing</i>
lasting consequences singularity conflict factuality specificity	attribution of relevance	intense processing
multiplicity of possible storylines	uncertainty, curiosity, suspense	
transactiveness	close perception of events	
transitivity development of characters changing relationships	(emotional) responses to characters (empathy, parasocial interaction, identification)	uncritical processing
coherent word/ profound causality	plausibility, (perceived) realism	
<b>Structure</b>		
<i>narrativity factors</i>	<i>experience of reception</i>	<i>Consequences</i>
autonomous unit/ clear structure	intuitive understanding	uncritical processing
narrative schemata/ genre typicality	accordance with expectations	intense processing
affective structure	suspense, surprise, curiosity	intense processing
<b>Discourse</b>		
<i>narrativity factors</i>	<i>experience of reception</i>	<i>Consequences</i>
dramatic mode	(perceived) closeness	intense processing
craftsmanship	undisturbed processing	uncritical and intense processing

**Table 1.** Triad of Narrativity, from Kinnebrock & Bilandzic’s study

The thesis examines how the Turkish economic downturn in 2018 was told by two alliances namely the People’s Alliance and the National Alliance. In Oppermann and Spencer’s case, the contestation over the Iranian Nuclear Deal in search of policy success or failure. In the case of the Turkish economic downturn of 2018, the audience-based approach shall be taken into consideration due to the purpose of strategic narrative formation. In this thesis, *persuasion* of the audience is the key to

the formation of contesting narratives of both parties due to the incoming elections. Therefore, this thesis implies a model that differs from Oppermann and Spencer's model by taking 'the audience' to the center of the narrative formation and it combines the strategic narrative theory by Miskimmon and O'Loughin to reveal how the dominant narrative is determined. The model offered by the authors has powerful and weak aspects in explaining the discursive contestation around the Turkish economic downturn of 2018. The powerful side of the strategic narrative theory in the analysis of this case is the process described within three phases that enables to reveal the narrative strategies both in the narratives and counter-narratives throughout the contestation. The elections [general and Presidential in 2018] require the actors to form their narratives within certain strategies to win the elections. Since the three studies this paper discussed above lacks adequacy in explaining the specific case chosen for the research, it utilizes narrative analysis by focusing on the emergence of the narratives and counter-narratives in the Turkish Grand National Assembly between the People's Alliance and the National Alliance. Then, the study examines those narratives by revealing the narrative elements of policy success and failure listed above. The paper also brings the narrativity factors of those competing narratives between both parties to explain the dominance of one over the other. For that, the thesis traces the narrative elements within the text for each party and interprets them from a constructivist point of view. The study theorizes its methodology for the narrative analysis of the Turkish currency and debt crisis in 2018 by combining the policy success and failure argument by Oppermann and Spencer (2015), the strategic narrative theory by Miskimmon et al (2018), and the model of narrativity by Kinnebrock and Bilandzic (2011). The thesis traces four narrative elements as



- (1) *Characters*: political narrators, (2) *Setting*: the environment narrative takes place, (3) *Plot*: the causal and temporal ties between all narrative components, (4) *Resolution*: the goal of the strategic narrative formation.



**Figure 1.** Components of a narrative.

### **3.2. Characters**

The thesis deconstructs narratives and counter-narratives around the Turkish economic downturn of 2018 by analyzing ‘Characters’ as the first element. The decision-makers and their opponents' nicknames, personal traits, motives, behavior, their position in the relationship with each other, and the process of policy decision-making (Oppermann & Spencer, 2015, p.275) are analyzed in this dimension of the narratives and counter-narratives.

### **3.3. Setting**

The second element of narratives analyzed in this study is Setting referring to the stage where the narrative takes place and interacts with the counter-narrative. In this dimension of narrative, the risks/gains, alternatives available, suitability, and historical analogies within the narratives (Oppermann & Spencer, 2015, p.274)

### **3.4. Plot**

The third dimension of the narrative is about the preferences of the narrator in ordering the sequence of episodes in time and space. In short, it is how he/she presents the story. This narrative component includes ‘out of ordinary’ labels of the policies [both negative or positive], the accuracy of the policies in meeting their targets, [highly] negative or positive consequences, and attribution of responsibility (Oppermann & Spencer, 2015, p.275-276). This dimension also includes the narrativity model offered by Kinnebrock & Bilandzic as it adopts the narrative persuasion approach of the authors.

### **3.5. Resolution**

The fourth narrative component is adopted from Miskimmon et al’s strategic narrative theory that includes several sub-elements such as goal/purpose and the audience. The study traces the dominant narrative in the discursive contestation over the Turkish economic downturn of 2018, and this element provides a more comprehensive perception of how one narrative becomes as such over the other.

### 3.6. Data Selection, Categorization of Political Groups and Limits

The parliamentary minutes of the TGNA during 2018 has been selected as the data of this study for several reasons. First, Turkish governmental system change took place in the second half of 2018 after the presidential and general election were held on 24 June 2018. The second, currency and debt crisis took place at the beginning of the year and in campaignings and in the parliament, Turkish politicians told the different stories of the economic ongoings. Third, TGNA worked almost six more months after the elections that enables the study to compare the narratives in the pre-election period and post-election period.

Term	Legislative Year	Number of Congress	Dates
26th	3rd	55 [46-100]	9 JAN-16 MAY 2018
27th	1st	10 [1-10]	7-25 JUL 2018
27th	2nd	41 [1-41]	1 OCT-31 DEC 2018

**Table 2.** The Data Set

<b>CODING TEXTS FROM THE DATA</b>		
<b>1<sup>st</sup> group</b>	Initials of Turkish Grand National Assembly in Turkish	<b>TBMM</b>
<b>2<sup>nd</sup> group</b>	Two Two Digit Numbers, set aside by ‘-’	<b>First</b> two digits to show <b>the legislative year</b> , <b>second</b> two digits to show <b>the number of the congress</b> the narrative streams.  <i>i.e.</i> ‘TBMM 26-38’: ‘26’ is the legislative year and ‘38’ is the number of the congress being held.
<b>3<sup>rd</sup> group</b>	The AKP; The CHP, The IYI, The SP, The HDP, The MHP, The BBP	Abbreviations of Turkish political parties [Turkish]
<b>4<sup>th</sup> group</b>	Turkish Words such as ‘Engin’ or ‘Yıldırım’.	The surnames of the speaking deputies

**Table 3.** The code arrangement for the data within the thesis

## 4. ANALYSIS

### 4.4. Characters

The first component of the narratives and counter-narratives in TGNA over the Turkish economic downturn of 2018 is the characters, referring to the actors [agents] involved. The discourses of both sides focus on the characterization of ‘Foreign Powers’ and the decision-maker in the economy that is President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. Since the term used, besides Donald Trump’s self-exposure, none of those powers revealed themselves nor the commentarians using the term gave a detailed identification. Rather, they labelled those powers through historical and religious analogies and other references.

In the TGNA, the parliamentarians often use formal language and avoid labeling nicknames about the main actors and key decision-makers of the economic policies such as President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. The opposition refers to President as ‘the President’ rather than his known nicknames such as ‘Leader of the Century’ [Asrın Lideri], Reis [Chief], Uzun Adam [the Long Man], etc. One of the first labels that “serves as a cognitive shortcut that activates knowledge about the personal characteristics” (Oppermann and Spencer, 2015, p.280) about Foreign Powers [that attack Turkish economy] is ‘Crusaders’ [Haçlılar] (TBMM 27-38, İYİ-Akkal) while the AKP narrative on the Turkish economic downturn of 2018 was being criticized. These types of analogies have also religious references due to the historical Christian-Islam warfare periods between 1096-1272 A.D. Although the analogy derives from a distant past, the term ‘Crusaders’ is often being used to describe a Christian-Western

standout against Turco-Islam interests or criticism towards criticism of Islamic institutions. Another analogy made in the description of Foreign Powers is ‘Interest Lobby’ (TBMM 27-30, SP-Karaduman; TBMM 27-36, CHP-Sayek Böke; TBMM 27-38, CHP-Ağbaba) or ‘Finance Lobby’ (TBMM 27-38, IYI-Akkal). The historical connection of ‘Interest Lobby’ or ‘Finance Lobby’ has two major traumatic experiences in Turkish collective memory. The first is A council called Düyûn-ı Umûmiyye-i Osmâniyye Administrative Council (Düyun-u Umumiye-i Osmaniye Varidat-ı Muhassasa İdaresi), the institution that supervised the internal and external debts of the Ottoman Empire between 1881-1923. The term ‘Düyûn-ı Umûmiye’ means ‘Debts of the Public’ and the institution was established during the reign of Abdulhamid II. It had a major in Ottoman economic life until the establishment of the Republic of Turkey. Between 1854-1874, the Ottoman empire made 15 separate foreign borrowings counted as much as 239 million Ottoman Liras, however, only 127 million Ottoman Liras were received. Most of these debts were taken as the struggling Ottoman economy was not sufficient to finance the wars taking place in this period, mostly against the Russian Empire. The council consisting of one member each representing the British, French, German, Austrian, Italian, Dutch, and Ottoman (for domestic debts) creditors to protect the interests of the creditors and to carry out the payment of debts within a plan. The presidency of the assembly belonged to the French and British representatives and the council managed most of the Ottoman tax revenues during its active periods such as rüsûm-ı sitte, Bulgarian tax, Cyprus island income surplus, Eastern Rumelia tax, customs revenues, dividend tax, and tömbeki. Additionally, the authority had the right to make *necessary* changes in the tobacco and salt monopolies and to manage them in a monopoly (see TDV. Küçük and Ertüzün,

1994). Although the institution was abolished by the establishment of the modern Turkish Republic in 1923, the last installment of debts remaining from the Ottoman Empire was paid in 1954, a century after the first debt was taken. This analogy is not only a reference to the historical background of Turkish collective memory but also a supplement to the religious reference on Christian League against Turks by the fact that of composition in Duyun-u Umumiye administration.

During the parliamentary discussion in 2018, the Foreign Power narrative has been criticized over this historical-religious analogy. The CHP, for instance, established a similitude between the AKP government and the Ottoman Empire in terms of debts and expenditures where the tendency of language use condemns the Ottoman Empire [so the AKP government(s) as well] as ‘lavish’.

*Let's come to the AKP period. What did you do with the 2 trillion 94 billion USD you spent? Have you invested? No. You built a palace with borrowed money as the Ottomans did, you spent a lot of money, you sold the gains of the republic one by one. (Applause from CHP desks) While forty-five production-oriented factories were opened between 1923-1939, we are now discussing whether factories were built in your period, so we are in an embarrassing situation. What else did you do? (TBMM 27-38, CHP-Emecan)*

The second analogy between ‘Interest Lobby’ or ‘Finance Lobby’ is about the stand-by deals with the IMF [most of these agreements contained a year-lasting pay-back durations], more prominently the one signed just before the AKP came to the power during the coalition government led by the DSP of Bülent Ecevit. In 1999, the financial and economic stress Turkey was suffering from such as high inflation,

interest rates, public debt, and devaluation, the IMF and Turkey has signed a stand-by deal worth 16,3 billion USD. There had been no decrease in the inflation rate after the agreed sum was received, Turkey requested an 8 billion USD additional fund, and then signed the 18th stand-by deal to receive 11,9 billion USD in February 2002 (see İnan). IMF, as it is agreed on principles of stand-by deals, was another authority to shape Turkish economic life after Duyun-u Umumiye. The AKP has been proudly and publicly underlining that the IMF debts were paid under its administration, even more, its administration lent funds to IMF. Against the criticism, the supporters of the ransom thesis promote independency in economic decision making and labeling Foreign Powers with the analogy of ‘pecking order’.

*So, is it not possible for politics to develop a common language against these foreign powers, foreign powers, those who try to make such a decision on Turkey's fate? Look, be sure, I think there is a weakness here: "My opponent's enemy is my friend." there is a cruel rule in politics...(TBMM 27-39, AKP-Bostancı)*

In the comparison of both parties, the AKP narrative recalls a more fresh memory that is about the IMF and its control over the Turkish economy whereas the opposing voice utilizes most of its references from a more distant past. Both parties highlight the negative aspects of these labels to serve “the purpose of casting the respective ‘Other’ in a negative light” (Oppermann and Spencer, 2015, p. 281)

Characters within the narratives are “associated with characteristics, interests, and behavior”. (Roselle et al, 2013, p. 75) In TGNA discussions during 2018 over the Foreign Powers narrative, personal traits and behavior are other discursive tools for both parties during the narrative contestation. During the discursive debate in 2018,

the center of the characterization debate is about the AKP rule under President Erdoğan on the economic administration of Turkey. The NA side, the Foreign Power narrative is criticized by condemning President Erdoğan's AKP government(s) for being 'unskillfully and 'irresponsible' (TBMM 27-33, CHP-Altay) in terms of managing the country's economy, "Make all kinds of mistakes, after that, -Wow, foreign powers!" (TBMM 27-29, CHP-Sertel). On the contrary, the PA's stand-point is that the government and President Erdoğan had been 'enduring' against the assailants' attacks.

*They tried to crash our economy with their midnight operations, and by Allah's leave, we are on the way to overcoming this attack. (TBMM 27-1, AKP-Erdoğan)*

The PA narrative on the issue also drives 'strength' for the AKP government(s) forward by addressing the developments in the Turkish defense industry that enables to 'give the show away' (TBMM 27-30, AKP-M.Erdoğan) on each foreign practice deceit targeting Turkey.

Another discursive tool that is described in Oppermann and Spencer's study is 'characterization by association'(Oppermann and Spencer, 2015, p.282). According to Roselle et al. (2013), political leaders has to project their strategic narratives, and "they must be able to find coherence between their system, national and issue narrative and publicly expose the inconsistencies across their opponents' narrative levels (Roselle et al, 2013, p.80). In TGNA during 2018 discussions, both sides had utilized this discursive instrument to evoke the Turkish people to side with their own Foreign Power narrative. On one side, the AKP rule has been criticized by the NA, via addressing those who 'distrain on' people's and state's properties getting 'richer while



the ‘producers’, ‘laborers’ and ‘farmers’ had gotten poorer during the AKP rule (TBMM 27-38, CHP-Ağbaba). On the contrary, the PA narrative employed this discursive tool of calling ‘national solidarity to overcome Foreign Powers’ attack on the economy.

*We know that there have been some global problems [from global/foreign origins] in our economy lately. Our country has faced similar problems in the past and managed to overcome them. This time, I believe that we will overcome these and similar problems in a short time with national solidarity. Our ‘Supreme’ Assembly will also fulfill its duty in this regard in the best way and will continue to support the executive in line with the rights and interests of our nation. (TBMM 27-1, AKP-Yıldırım)*

One of the most intense elements had been utilized by both the PA and the NA side to gain dominance over each other’s narratives is the process of decision making. According to Roselle et al. (2013), “expectations of likely behavior and outcomes can be generated, expectations that may feed into decision-making and the expression of support for certain courses of action.”. The NA underlines the tendency of Turkish political improvements towards autocratization as well as remarking the side effects of the long-lasting state of emergency on the decision making process in Turkey by addressing “[even] the referendum [of 2017] has been held during the state of emergency” (TBMM 26-87, HDP-Bilgen).

*It tears my heart apart! This nation is a democracy-loving nation, a nation that has repulsed all blows. Now there is someone in the middle who wants to abolish*

*democracy again. Whoever says "Let's go to the street.", calls them "terrorist" or "separatist". (TBMM 27-33, CHP-Altay)*

From the contrasting position, the PA draws attention to “the authority given by the [Turkish] nation” to the government that obliges the government to be held by the nation as accountable (TBMM 27-1, AKP-Erdoğan).

*We are already handling the presidential decree and decision level, but some issues require legal regulation. As you know, in the new administrative system, the President does not have the opportunity to present a bill or bill to the Parliament other than the budget. Laws can only come to the agenda of the Parliament with your proposal. (TBMM 27-1, AKP-Erdoğan).*

Moreover, the PA also addresses the continuity in the authorization of TGNA and its deputies in proposing bills and underlines the significance of enacting the law.

#### **4.5. Setting**

The narrative and counter-narrative over the Turkish economic downturn of 2018 grounds their arguments in contrasting poles in terms of risk and gain. As the Presidential and general elections held in the mid-year of 2018, the NA and PA narratives and counter-narratives on the Turkish currency and debt crisis argue the ransom thesis from the standpoint of these polarized views. On the one side, the NA narrative calls the Turkish economic downturn of 2018 a ‘crisis’ (TBMM 27-6, CHP-Şener, TBMM 27-36, IYI-Tatlıoğlu; TBMM 27-38, IYI-Sıdali) and remarks on the

Foreign Power narrative as a result of not being able to read the world balances correctly' and not taking 'the right measures'(TBMM 27-38, IYI-Sıdalı). The NA position by utilization risk element of the narrative contestation blames the AKP rule [more widely the PA] for 'hiding the economic crisis and warns the audience for the recurrence of the downturn by that (TBMM 27-36, IYI-Tatlıoğlu). The NA also blames the AKP government(s) for raising the risk premium of Turkey because of the careless management Turkish economy (TBMM 27-36, CHP-Karabıyık). In contrast to the NA argument of risk, the PA narrative promotes 'the new economic administration' as 'has been taking the [necessary precautions or] responsibility. Moreover, it denies the 'crisis' term and rather calls the ongoing process as 'tried to evolve into a crisis'.

*The economic distress experienced since the beginning of 2018 has grown with the intervention of some foreign powers and a difficult process has begun for our people living in the country. Along with this process, the newly formed economy management tried to do its part to overcome the difficulties that were tried to evolve into a crisis by making some economic decisions as of July. Although we agree with many of these decisions, we will continue to advise the current Government on what we see as missing and what needs to be done to overcome the economic difficulties experienced. (TBMM 27-27, MHP-Yılmaz).*

The PA also describes the process as an episode of foreign intervention starting from Gezi Events in 2013, 17-25 December Events, 15 July Examination Attack

[Gülenist Coup Attempt], and lastly an intervention to prevent Turkey to emerge [grow]; and despite all these attacks, ‘Turkey will win’ (TBMM 27-6, AKP-Özkan).


Another discursive component that is frequently utilized by both sides is the alternatives to the ransom thesis. There is an absolute dispute in-between the sides on the alternatives to the ransom thesis. As the NA side does not accept the ransom thesis, it proposes the alternatives such as ‘act of structural measures, return to the democracy, caring about merit and switch to the production-oriented economic model’(TBMM 27-2, CHP-Emecan). The NA argument that enhances the alternatives to the ransom thesis should have never been an issue if the AKP government(s) could have run the economy by closing it to external interventions.

*Well, then, for sixteen years, if you had managed the economy well and protected it from external risks, if you had created a strong economy, those external waves would have been raging then, but you could not do this, you made it open to more risks every day, you increased the country's risk premium.(TBMM 27-36, CHP-Karabıyık)*

On the contrary, the PA argument is about being obliged to face’ some of the geopolitical and geostrategic difficulties, and it gives reference to Ibn-Khaldun's famous quote ‘Geography is destiny’ (TBMM 27-1; AKP-Yıldırım).

The third discursive tool of setting in the Foreign power narrative and counter-narrative is the representation of the Turkish economic downturn of 2018. Until the elections (24th of June), the discursive debate in TGNA is noteworthy rare.

**Graph 1.** Chronological distributon of Foreign Power narrative in 2018 at TGNA per party



Graph 1 illustrates the scarcity of Foreign Powers narrative mentions in 2018 during the discussions at TGNA. The race for the Presidential and general elections in June 2018 had shifted the discussions outside of the TGNA, within the campaign speeches or speeches made in the media. Another reason for this distribution portray is that the Turkish Lira devaluation has been a hotter topic for both politicians and the public after the Trump’s tweet announcing doubling tariffs on Turkish steel imports in August. Thus, before these two turning points in the year 2018, the non-allied opposition (the HDP) criticizes the AKP government for the ransom thesis for non-economic issues (TBMM 26-87 and TBMM 27-9, HDP-Bilgen). After the two sequences take place, the representation of the narrative and counter-narrative comes with economic ‘dependence’ and ‘independence’ discussion. The NA position argues that the AKP government(s) had created ‘a dependent economy [to Foreign Powers]’ and ‘a debt order’ for the Turkish economy so far (TBMM 27-36, CHP-Sayek Böke). On the contrary, the PA argues that the AKP government(s) have an approach to decrease the level of foreign intervention in Turkish politics.

*No state allows the violation of public order. Legitimate, democratic, and permitted demonstrations are always possible, but the attitudes and behaviors of those who unite their ambitions with unofficial, illegitimate imperialist ambitions and foreign powers can never be seen as legitimate. That was the approach of the AK Party government that day. (TBMM 27-38, AKP-Akbařođlu)*

The last setting discursive tool this thesis reveals by deconstructing narratives and counter-narratives around the Turkish economic downturn of 2018 is the historical setting of the policy context. The two of the analogies have been described earlier in the Character section of this paper as Duyun-u Umumiye and the IMF for the description of Foreign Powers. The NA's argument is based on the Ottoman economic policy failures in terms of foreign debts. Some of the palaces built during the ending period of the Ottoman Empire such as Dolmabahçe Palace (1843-1856) that had been financed by some of the foreign debts taken from Great Britain and France. The NA establishes an analogy between the Presidential Residence [a.k.a. Aksaray/White-Palace] that had cost 1,37 billion TRY in 2014 according to Mehmet řimřek of the AKP and other Presidential residences that are often called as 'palace' such as Marmaris Palace (TBMM 27-29, CHP-Kayıřođlu).

*No. You built a palace with borrowed money as the Ottomans did, you spent a lot of money, you sold the gains of the republic one by one. (TBMM 27-38, CHP-Emecan)*

On the contrary, the PA argues that Foreign Powers attack creates ‘matter of survival for Turkey, an analogy that refers to the Turkish Independence War (1919-1922) which has widely associated with ‘Liberty or Death!’ quote of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk.

*Despite all the evil and all the developments regarding our national survival in recent years, “There is no survival problem.” those who can say, those who underestimate the problem of survival, or even make fun of them; there are those who criticize the discourse of “Foreign Powers” and those who say that there is no operation of foreign powers. There is no need to consider them at all. (TBMM 27-39, MHP-Kalaycı)*

#### **4.6. Plot**

The following dimension of the discursive contestation between the NA and the PA over the Turkish economic downturn of 2018 is moving around the ‘extraordinary’ label of the issue. On the one side of the debate, the PA stands forward on the ransom thesis by labeling it as such for ‘national survival’ (TBMM 27-39, MHP-Kalaycı). On the other side, the NA argues that the explanation of the Turkish economic downturn of 2018 ignores the existing economic and financial problems such as the devaluation of TRY and unemployment. The NA argument also describes the ‘extraordinary’ status of the issue by labeling it as ‘an economic and structural crisis’.

*Mr. Albayrak's attempts to direct and shape the macroeconomy through extra-budgetary operations through the Wealth Fund and Yatırım Kredi Bankası are another sign of the elimination of the Turkish Grand National Assembly. The Minister states that as a result of the attacks against the Turkish economy and the Turkish lira, the country's risk premium has increased. Is such an explanation possible? He does not talk about inflation, unemployment, high cost of living, high interest rates, devaluation, or recession. It should be said openly: We could not manage the Republic of Turkey in every sense, we faltered. This economic crisis, on the face of it, is a crisis and a structural crisis. This is what they cannot admit. They throw the ball to external forces, external forces will always be. The economy will certainly not benefit from the Teflon policy. (TBMM 27-29, IYI-Çelik)*

The second discursive tool utilized by the sides during the discussions in TGNA is 'meeting or not meeting the policy objectives. The discussion moves around whether the Turkish economic downturn is a ransom for success in a more vital security issue, for a foreign policy success or it an economic [and foreign] policy failure. In other words, while the NA criticizes the AKP government(s)' economy policies as labelling them 'labelingthat means not meeting their objectives, the PA argues that the primacy of the security and foreign policies had met their objectives by paying the ransom that is the Turkish economic downturn of 2018. The NA argues that the Turkish currency and debt crisis of 2018 is caused by the 'undemocratization/autocratization of the AKP government, and 'being dragged on the Middle East Swamp' (TBMM 27-38 IYI-Akkal). Therefore, whether it is caused by the Foreign Powers' attack or it is the bad economic management (TBMM 27-36,



CHP-Karabıyık), the NA tells the story of the Turkish economic downturn of 2018 as a failure (TBMM 26-54, CHP-Engin).

*“Why are we applying such an economic policy based on the foreign deficit, imports, and consumption?” Even a member of parliament does not ask about it, does not question it. Nobody asks, “Why do we look into the palms of foreigners with a current account deficit of 30-40 billion USD every year?”. The USD exceeded the limit of 5,30 TRY, the EUR exceeded 6,00 TRY. The cost of resources in banks increased. Long-term bond yields have reached incredible figures. Banks give interest over 22% on deposits for up to six months. What is the result of high interest rates and the end of investments at the point we have arrived at? High inflation, heavy debt burden, record current account deficit, half It is the result of foreign capital inflows that have decreased by half, alienation from the rule of law, and drifting in the Middle East swamp due to the sectarian policies of the authoritarian mentality. And despite these interest rates, the currency does not stand still. Our inflation is at 25 percent. Records are being broken in cost and core inflation. Despite all this, you still continue to search for how to grow the economy with consumption. Don't you see that every time a problem arises, you resort to importing and shatter the domestic manufacturer? Then, “The enemy is outside.” You're deluding yourself by saying that.(TBMM, 27-38, IYI-Akkal)*

The third plot component discussed during 2018 in TGNA is the highest negative and positive consequences of the economic downturn. The PA argues that Turkish economy has been attacked by some external powers with the expectation of

geopolitical consequences and they claim that the Turkish currency and debt crisis of 2018 is an episode in an economic operation sequence against Turkey starting with the Gezi Events in 2013 (TBMM 27-28, AKP-Albayrak). The alliance claims that the government dealt with an ‘economic security threat’ rather than an economic failure (TBMM 27-39, MHP-Aksu). The PA side built their narrative strike on the issue of ‘economic independence’ as they describe their economic policies have been implemented so far always had another episode of those attacks. Moreover, the PA compares the economic fights against the interventions on the Turkish economy with Turkey’s fight against FETO, PKK and its Syrian branches and DAESH. The PA, hence, expects credit for standing still in preserving the aimed consequences of those plans happen and for keeping the Turkish economy independent.

*All financial and macroeconomic indicators were showing the best levels in Turkey's history. She [Turkey] was experiencing a more favorable period than ever for investment, for industrial breakthrough. She had a magnificent road ahead of her and big goals. What kind of developments took place within the last five years in Turkey as the framework of the plan initiated in those days? Gezi [Events], the 17-25 December Conspiracy<sup>1</sup>, the attacks that ended the solution process, the terrorist state that was wanted to be established right next to our border, DAESH that was produced to disturb the peace in the Middle East, dozens of betrayal attempts by FETO and July 15 [the Gulenist Coup Attempt in 2016]. By struggling with all these, we tried to save the freedom of this nation and the democracy of this country, and we worked much harder to make our economy strong and to get out of the processes unaffected. Here, to put this picture more clearly, these interest rates [weekly repo rate announcing by*

---

<sup>1</sup> 17-25 Aralık

*the Central Bank of Turkey, which started at 4.54%, almost doubled from 4.5% to 8.5% with the Gezi process, and rose to 11% with the 17-25 coup attempt<sup>2</sup> that came into play right after. While Turkey was fighting against 3 terrorist organizations on all fronts at the same time, it also ignited the fuse of its struggle for economic independence on all fronts. As AK PARTY governments, as the state of the Republic of Turkey, this struggle will continue and we will be the winner in this struggle one way or another, and our nation will win. (Applause from AK PARTY desks) (TBMM 27-28, AKP-Albayrak).*

The PA claims in TGNA debates on the issue that during the sixteen year long AKP governance, Turkey has become a greater political power in the international arena by the implementation of [successful] economic and social reforms [policies]. The People's Alliance also directly calls the current Turkish economy as a success because of the Foreign Powers attack.

*These sixteen years under AK PARTY governments have been a period for Turkey to grow, strengthen, attain a sustainable development structure and have a greater say on a global scale. With AK PARTY governments, Turkey has reached its true potential. He has undertaken numerous projects in all fields from transportation to health, from agriculture to commerce, from industry to R&D. Again, we have implemented many structural reforms [through policies] in both economic and social areas. Thus, Turkey has become an important actor in its region and in the global arena. Of course, it should not be forgotten: Despite what, these successes have been achieved? Despite the global financial crisis, despite the economic and political tutelage centers, despite the instability in our region, domestic and foreign*

---

<sup>2</sup> Sivil Darbe

*provocations, the 17-25 December judicial coup attempt, the treacherous coup attempt on 15 July and the recent attacks on exchange rates, these successes have been achieved. (TBMM 27-28, AKP-Elvan)*

The highly negative results of controversial ‘economic policy failure’ has been embedded by the NA into the counter-narrative of the PA’s Foreign Powers. The NA addresses ongoing the Turkish currency and debt crisis of 2018 may grow bigger if the PA side continue to explain the cause of the economic unrest as Foreign Powers narrative. The AKP government is accused by the NA deputies for not mentioning the ‘real’ causes for the unrest being experienced such as executing tax amnesties for big companies acting partisan for the ruling party of Turkey. The opposition claims that the currency and debt crisis has not ignited by some Foreign Powers, rather it is caused by numerous reasons such as the tax amnesties approved by TGNA where most of the seats held by the AKP in each election. The NA argues the impact on this the firms known for their close relations with the AKP elite. These amnesties, according to the NA arguement, were accepted in TGNA where the AKP held the majority of the seats after all the elections and executed by the AKP governments. The NA’s claim suggest that these amnesties, at total amount, should have provide the greater portions of the annual tax income of the state. Furthermore, the tax inequality that collects the majority of the taxes from lower income classes such as workers. The claim may define such highly negative consequences of the economic policy failure by the AKP government(s), will gradually raise the degree of the difficulty for lower income classes to sustain their basic needs and economic functions in the Turkish economy (TBMM 28-27, HDP-Temelli).

*Sir, they spoke as they get in here [TGNA]: "We will spread the tax to the base Well, the tax is already at the base, brother! You spread the income to the base and get some tax from the top. (Applause from the CHP ranks) There is no taxpayer upstairs, they are on easy street!<sup>3</sup> Well, tax; We're going to spread it out. Small business; tax, farmer; tax, pension; tax, newborn child; tax, from those who make billions - I emphasize - there is no tax for a penny from those who make billions. Oh, friends, for the love of Allah! Come on, we have power, you also have power. To the executive branch, friends, "When will you tax this rentier?" Why don't you ask a question? Why don't those who take billions pay taxes? (TBMM 27-28, CHP-Kılıçdaroğlu)*

The NA side points some financial institutions as another major reason for the Turkish economy to deal with a currency and debt crisis in 2018. The alliance advocates that rather than a Foreign Power runs operations to lead the fall of Turkey, some finance institutions those collect the interest payments from Turkish Treasury. The NA side employs the term 'Foreign Debts' as the name of the opponent position and call the Foreign Powers' attack as a conspiracy. The NA provides a data that shows the foreign debts have been increased as much as fourteenth times in the first 15 years of the AKP governments.

*When you look at the foreign debt, Turkey's foreign debt has increased 14 times in the fifteen years during your administration. The AKP is currently trying to close the debt gap by paying huge interests from the people's budget. Come and tell*

---

<sup>3</sup> The proverb has been used to replace a Turkish one that is 'Bir eli yağda, bir eli balda!' to define and individual or a group of people as they live their lives comfortably.

*the public about the financial institutions that you have enriched with interest payments for years, not foreign conspiracies. (TBMM 27-28, HDP-Temelli)*

#### **4.7. Resolution**

During the discussions, the PA and the NA narratives and counter-narratives have two different goals due to the Presidential and general elections held in the middle of the year, 24 June 2018. In the first half of the year, the discussions mostly take place outside of TGNA and the second half of the year, after the elections inside of TGNA. Therefore, the goal for the narratives and counter-narratives on the Turkish economic downturn of 2018 in TGNA is about winning the elections, but maintain the dominance [for the PA] or gaining it [for the NA]. The consequence of the elections on 24 June 2018 shows that the majority of the audience [52,59 of the Turkish voters] has supported the PA narrative on the Turkish currency and debt crisis of 2018.

The new governance model provides denser competencies to the president almost an absolute control of the Supreme Board of Judges and Prosecutors. The older name of the institution was HSYK and the referendum got the initial letter and word ‘Supreme’ [Yüksek] as the juridical supreme position ended. Until the referendum, member numbers were 22 at the Board, then it was 13 after. Additionally, 3 of them are directly appointed by the new regime’s powerful president. The discursive debate on the autocratization of Turkish politics has been a follow up after 2017 when the EU and Turkish narratives did not contest but nearly fought.

In the Presidential Election of June 24, 2018, in Turkey, the amendments were accepted on April 16, 2017, by the constitutional referendum. With the abolition of the Council of Ministers and the transfer of the executive body to the President, the country will technically transition from a parliamentary system to a presidential system. Accordingly, some of the powers that were under the responsibility of the former TGNA were either transferred to the executive branch or were abolished. Donald Trump's statement '*the US will impose large sanctions on Turkey*' for detaining Pastor Brunson was posted on Twitter in late July 2018<sup>[1]</sup>, right after Erdogan's victory in June 2018's presidential and general elections. Trump called Pastor Andrew Brunson 'a great Christian, family man and wonderful human being' who was arrested after the Gulenist Coup in 2016 over espionage accusations. As the Brunson was not released despite the threat, in early August 2018, another tweet by Trump executed and declared the details of these sanctions as doubling metal tariffs on Turkey.

In October 2019, Trump threatened Turkey one more time for Syrian Kurds by writing 'I will destroy and obliterate the Economy of Turkey (I've done before!)' again on Twitter. In his book, Narrative Economics, Robert J. Schiller, praises former US president as 'even a politician as skilled as Trump can control the progression of the narratives he created' ironically. Some papers in close relation with the AKP published this post titled 'Confession from Trump on Attacking Turkey!' As Schiller suggested, Donald Trump's narrative progressed and degraded the EU narrative in favor of the AKP claims. Trump's motivation to constitute such narratives during his four-year presidency, generally came after discrete disputes between the US and Turkey.

#### **4.8. The EU radar**

This section begins with the necessary historical knowledge about the AKP rule in Turkey between November 2002 until December 2018 and then continues with the deconstruction of narratives and counter narratives into their key constituents.

##### *3.5.1. The AKP emerges through proximation to the EU*

In 1999, as Turkey was granted candidacy for full membership to the EU, the relations gained much more significance in Turkish authorities. The first AKP government came to power alone in 2002. Therefore, the first AKP government, unlike its seven predecessors, could strongly promote the EU membership as an executive primacy. It improved Turkey's bilateral relations not only with the EU but also MEs for the next four years.

The talks on Turkish membership began by September 2005, but these talks ended as the EC suspended negotiations with the Turkish government for 35 -acquis communare- in November 2006. The EU preconditioned recognition of Southern Cyprus as the governor for all Cyprus territories. It also conditioned ignoring the Northern Turkish population. The nationwide great disappointment led Turkish politics deorbit itself gradually from the EU and its reforms.

The AKP has been ruling the Turkish economy and politics as well as dominant narratives in Turkish foreign policy since 2002, without any coalition periods. Despite the gradual divergence in the relations from 2006 onwards, the Gulenist coup attempt in 2016 became a cornerstone for the future of Turkey and the EU. As some Gulenists fled to Greece after failing, they were not given back to Turkey despite persisting requests. Moreover, the organizational structure of Gulenists has



been revealed and many generals, high-ranked soldiers, bureaucrats; even the military aide of the Turkish president were detained for the conspiracy against the Turkish democracy. The growing skepticism in Turkish politics dented the trust for other international powers, particularly the EU. The narratives from then until now frequently confront each other without hesitation.

The referendum campaign of the AKP [YES] coincided with two general elections in MEs; one in the Netherlands in March and another in Germany in September 2017. All three campaigns had the EU citizens as their voters as many Turks live as German and Dutch citizens. Two meetings organized for the AKP leaders were canceled by Germany for the imprisonment of Deniz Yücel. The tensions between the EU and Turkey grew greater by President Erdogan's Nazi reference to accuse Germany of following inherited practices for canceling the meetings of the AKP bloc.

On the Dutch front, the national government refused to permit a plane to land with two Turkish ministers traveling to the Netherlands. The general election in the country was going to be held in three days when the plane incident happened. The ministers who planned to meet the Turkish-Dutch community to campaign in favor of the 'YES' bloc were Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu and the Ministry of Family, Labour and Social Services Fatma Betül Sayan Kaya of the fourth AKP government. After the blockade on-air, Kaya entered the Netherlands by land and declared as 'persona non Grata, and deported right after. Dutch Prime minister Mark Rutte accused two ministers of persistence in trying to enter the country despite the Dutch government's decision. He also criticized the Turkish government for calling the Turkish-Dutch community 'our citizens'. Moreover, the European front,

including the Netherlands, declared its opposition to the Turkish referendum and referred to it as Erdogan's absolutism. Turkish President Erdogan replied to Dutch politicians as “Nazi remnants” in return. The out-loud dispute over the Turkish constitutional change referendum in 2017 provided opportunities for populist politicians to impair quality in the EU-Turkey relations.

Turkish economy and the majority of those dynamics depend on its relations with capital-rich countries, its economy is fragile. The most notable critic of the AKP government, the EU, described the unrest as a natural consequence of growing autocracy in Turkey. The EU's perception used for the referendum dispute was revised by the EU politicians to address the economic unrest in Turkey as a natural consequence of the AKP's undemocratic power possession growth. Former EU Ambassador Marc Pierini claimed publicly that the currency and debt crisis in Turkey had autocratic roots directly linked to President Erdogan. To Pierini, denying this bitter fact would bring way more damage to Turkey. European politicians did not have re-election concerns nor policy failures like the AKP. Additionally, the EU has very different strategies for its interests such as migration from Syria or East Mediterranean gas reserves. Although the AKP has been the sole decision-maker in the Turkish economy since 2002, over 52,59% of Turkish voters did not blame it for an economic policy failure.

#### **4.9. The Narrativity Factors**

The PA narrative on the Turkish currency and debt crisis of 2018 contains several narrativity factors in the story it tells. The first narrativity factor it utilizes is the conflict with the Foreign Powers that increases attribution of relevance in the

experience of reception and leads intense processing. The PA narrative on the issue centers the conflict with the Foreign Powers and as a result of this conflict, the Turkish currency and debt crisis of 2018 occurs. The narrativity increases as “describing a conflict should also increase narrativity, compared to describing no conflict.” (Kinnebrock and Blandzic, 2011, p.6). The story level of the narrativity in the NA narrative adopts multiplicity of possible stroylines that creates suspense rather than conflict in the experience of reception and leads to intense processing as well.

In the structure of the PA narrative, the affective structure is the narrativity factor used that contains “the sequential arrangement of events to evoke affective reactions” (Kinnebrock and Blandzic, 2011, p.7). This narrativity factor leads to curiosity in the experience of reception and creates intense processing as a consequence. The structure level of narrativity in the NA’s narrative contains affective structure as well that leads to suspence in the experience of reception and intense processing as a consequence. However, the PA and the NA narratives have different temporalities whereas the former follows an arrangement of a specific pre-conflict period with Foreign Powers –after 2016- and the latter includes the whole AKP rule since 2002.

In the discourse level of narrativity, the PA narrative uses a dramatic mode of narrativity that leads to perceived closeness and intense processing. It utilizes religious, historical and nationalist narrative elements and increases *immediacy* (Kinnebrock and Blandzic, 2011, p.6). The discourse level of the narrativity in the NA’s narrative uses dramatic mode as well that leads to perceived closeness and intense processing. It utilizes historical references, however, from a more distant history rather than close ones.



## 5- CONCLUSION

The thesis has discussed the narrative contestation over the Turkish currency and debt crisis of 2018 and Foreign Powers narrative about the issue in TGNA during 2018. It has deconstructed narratives into four elements as Character, Setting, Plot and Resolution. It has addressed economic policy failure may be a ransom for a higher priority in terms of policies such as security policies. It has also described how ‘the ransom thesis’ has become the dominant narrative and defined the strategies it has adopted. The study also explored how the EU perceived and reacted to ‘the ransom thesis’, moreover, how this perception impacted on the EU-Turkey relations.

It is crucial to shed light on certain terms and concept for clarity and precision. Economy as a branch of empirical sciences relies mostly on quantitative data and thus it has objective and factual aspect. It is, in a sense, a social product of material operationalization. For instance, devaluation of currency and its impact on purchasing power is not a matter of people’s opinion or subjective interpretation. In the same manner, any negative result of an unsuccessful economy policy is not a matter of people’s opinion or subjective interpretation. The economic downturn of 2018 in Turkey was accepted as an instance of failure both by the decision-makers, that is the government, and the opponents. Although both parties agreed on that the economic downturn was in fact an instance of failure, they disagree on who the responsible was for this failure. While the opponents held strictly that it was the government who was responsible for the failure, the government blamed the ‘Foreign Powers’ for that failure. While the opponents understood the government's statements as evading

responsibility and making excuses, the government, nevertheless, considered such a failure to be a success. They argued that failure in economy was a ransom for national sovereignty in the struggle against the interference of foreign enemies, and hence it was the best possible scenario that could happen under the enemy attack. The paradox lies in this: if the economic downturn of 2018 in Turkey was a solid case based on objective facts and not open to subjective interpretation, how could the government narrate the economic failure as a success story, vindicate the failure, and that narrative become the dominant view? The thesis contributes to the debate on policy success and failure by deconstructing the narratives into their elements and analyzing the narrativity of each.

In the first phase of the analysis, the characterization of the ‘Foreign Powers’ by both parties and the study shows that the similar analogies and historical references have been adopted, but the PA’s narrative comes to the forefront by referring to a more close history while the NA does it from relatively distant one. The second narrative element analyzed in the study is setting, where the discussion mostly moves around independence and dependence of the Turkish economy. The third narrative constituent analyzed in the study is the plot that negative and positive consequences. The fourth narrative element examined is resolution where the aim of the narratives discussed. The thesis shows that both narrative and counter-narrative on the Turkish currency and debt crisis of 2018, or ‘Foreign Powers’ narrative, have the similar structures.

In the second phase of the analysis, the PA and the NA narratives on Foreign Powers attack differentiates in terms of narrativity factors they utilizes. The PA narrative uses conflict, affective structure and dramatic mode that increases curiosity

and narrativity level. The NA narrative, on the other hand, uses a similar structure but rather than conflict, it creates suspense with no conflict what makes the PA narrative to have a more higher level of narrativity. The thesis argues that although majority of the audience [52,59% Turkish voters] supports the PA narrative with a small difference, the narrative and counter-narrative on Foreign Powers' attack has no absolute dominance over each other.

The EU's position is at the parallel of the opposition. The ransom thesis has not been agreed on by the EU, rather the EU blamed the AKP government and President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. As it is described in the previous sections, there has been a continuity towards a lower quality for the EU-Turkey relations and with Foreign Powers' attack narrative contestation, it is obvious that the movement continues.

## **CHRONOLOGY**

### **1959**

Turkey applied for being an associate for EEC.

### **1963**

Ankara Agreement was signed in 1963 between EEC and Turkey.

### **1980**

Turkish Coup D'etat happened in 1980, EEC frozen the relations with Turkey.

### **1987**

Turkey applied for EEC membership in 1987.

### **1989**

European Council declared Turkey as eligible for EEC membership, but it was delayed later.

### **1995**

Customs Union Agreement between Turkey and the EU came into force.

### **1991**

European Council re-confirmed Turkey's eligibility for membership, but it was delayed again in 1997.

### **1999**

EC has announced Turkey as a candidate state.

### **2004**

EC decided to open accession negotiations.

### **2005**

Opening Turkey's accession negotiations.

### **2006**

First and only negotiation chapter, 'Science and Research' was closed.

### **2012**

Turkey-EU relations were still on a positive agenda.

### **2013**

The Police Response and Attitude of the AKP Government against the protestors of Taksim Gezi Park Demonstrations target for the EU critics.



## **2016**

**18 Mar** - Turkey-EU signed an agreement on Syrian migration.

**6 July** - EP votes for the suspension on the accession negotiations with Turkey.

**15 July** - Coup d'état attempt by the Gulenists took place.

**16 July** - Turkish authorities overcame the coup attempt.

## **2017**

**16 Apr** - The executive presidency within a new governmental system brought to the public as a referendum. The results approved the change with 51,41% of the total votes. The disapproving voters counted as much as 48,59%.

## **2018**

**19 Jan** - Fitch Ratings cancelled its operations in its Istanbul office in response to President Erdoğan's critics on financial rating institutions.

**12 Feb** - Turkish currency and debt crisis started with the loan re-structuring request by Yıldız Holding over 7,0 bn USD.

**24 June** - Turkish presidential and general elections were held to execute the last year's public choice.

**9 July** – Berat Bayraktar, former Energy Minister of Turkey and President's son in law, was appointed as the Minister of Treasury and Finance by President Erdoğan.

**10 Aug** – The ECB announced its concerns for the EUR as Turkey was/is one of the biggest lenders

**10 Aug** – The US government began to impose some economic sanctions against Turkey in response to the imprisonment of the US citizen Andrew Brunson (a.k.a. Pastor Brunson). President Trump announced that the US doubling tariffs on Turkish steel and aluminum as the first part of the planned sanctions. Between 1 January – 10 August 2018, TRY had already lost 34% of its value against USD.

**31 Dec** - The devaluation ratio of TRY against USD counted as 40% at the end of the year. Both currencies started to the year 2018 at 3,77 TRY/USD level. However, after

10 August, 1,00 USD became almost as valuable as 7,00 TRY due to the tensions. It closed the last session of the year at 5,27 TRY/USD level.<sup>4</sup>

---

<sup>4</sup> [The Turkish Economic Slowdown in 2018 | Center for Strategic and International Studies \(csis.org\)](#)

## LIST OF REFERENCES

Adler, E. (1997). Seizing the middle ground: Constructivism in world politics. *European Journal of International Relations*, 3, 319-363.

Andrew Bennett and Colin Elman (2009). *The Oxford Handbook of International Relations* Edited by Christian Reus-Smit and Duncan Snidal doi: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199219322.003.0029

Cevdet Küçük and Tevfik Ertüzün (1994). DÜYÛN-ı UMÛMİYYE - TDV İslâm Ansiklopedisi retrieved from: <https://islamansiklopedisi.org.tr/duyun-i-umumiyye>

Debra Satz and John Ferejohn (1994). Rational Choice and Social Theory, *The Journal of Philosophy*, Vol. 91, No. 2 (Feb., 1994), pp. 71-87

Finnemore, M., & Sikkink, K. (2001). Taking stock: The constructivist research program in international relations and comparative politics. *Annual Review of Political Science*, 4, 391-416.

Freedman, L. (2006). Networks, culture and narratives. *The Adelphi Papers*, 45(379), 11–26.

Hom, A. R. (n.d.). Time, narrative, and IR theory. Retrieved January 21, 2021, from [Ecpr.eu](http://ecpr.eu)

website: <https://ecpr.eu/filestore/paperproposal/0ff1d1f2-7f7d-4b0f-a278->

Martinez, M., & Scheffel, M. (2003). *Einführung in die Erzähltheorie* [Introduction into narrative theory] (5. ed.). München: C.H. Beck.

Marsh, David & McConnell, Allan. (2010). Towards a Framework for Establishing Policy Success: A Reply to Bovens. *Public Administration*. 88. 586 - 587. 10.1111/j.1467-9299.2009.01805.x.

Miskimmon, A., O'Loughlin, B., & Roselle, L. (2013). Strategic narratives: Communication power and the new world order. doi: 10.4324/9781315871264

Miskimmon, A., O'Loughlin, B., & Roselle, L. (2018). Forging the world: Strategic

Narratives and International Relations (7th ed.; A. Miskimmon, B. O'Loughlin, & L.

Roselle, Eds.). Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

Oppermann, K., & Spencer, A. (2017). Narrating success and failure: Congressional debates on the 'Iran nuclear deal'. *European Journal of International Relations*, 24(2), 268-292. doi:10.1177/1354066117743561

Price, R. M., & Reus-Smit, C. (1998). Dangerous liaisons? Constructivism and critical international theory. *European Journal of International Relations*, 4, 259-294.

Pouliot, V. (2007). "Subjectivism": Toward a constructivist methodology. *International Studies Quarterly*, 51, 359-384

Reus-Smit, C. (2004). The Constructivist Challenge after September 11. In *International Society*

and its Critics (pp. 81-94). Oxford University Press.

Ricoeur, P. (1986). *Time and Narrative: v. 2* (D. Pellauer & K. McLaughlin, Trans.). Chicago, IL:

University of Chicago Press.

Ringmar, E. (2011). *Cambridge cultural social studies: Identity, interest and action: A cultural*

explanation of Sweden's intervention in the thirty years war. Cambridge, England:

Cambridge University Press.

Ruggie, J. G. (1998). What makes the world hang together? Neo-utilitarianism and the social constructivist challenge. *International Organization*, 52, 855-885

Susanne Kinnebrock, Helena Bilandzic (2011). *How to Make a Story Work: Introducing the Concept of Narrativity into Narrative Persuasion*

Waltz, K. N. (1979). *Theory of international politics*. Reading, Mass: Addison-Wesley Pub. Co., p.37-38

Wendt, A. (1992). Anarchy is what states make of it: The social construction of power politics. *International Organization*, 46, 391-425.

Wendt, A. (1999). *Social theory of international politics*. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.

# **LIST OF FIGURES**

## **PAGE NO**

**Figure 1. Components of a narrative .....16**

## LIST OF TABLES

	<u>PAGE NO</u>
<b>Table 1.</b> Triad of Narrativity from Kinnebrock & Bilandzic’s study.....	14
<b>Table 2.</b> The Data Set – Source: TGNA webpage.....	18
<b>Table 3.</b> Codes.....	18

# CURRICULUM VITAE [CV]

## UFUK OLGUN

**Address:** Dikilitaş Sok. No:9/11 Besiktas/IST/TR

**e-mail:** ufuk.olgun@monteforeks.com

---

## ACADEMIC BACKGROUND

**Türkische-Deutsche Universität, European and International Affairs**

**Expected graduation:** September, 2021

**Thesis:** The Narration of a Falling Economy: The Case of Turkey in 2018

**Supervisor:** Prof. Dr. Kai Oppermann

**Bogazici University, History – BA**

Graduated in 2016

**Research Project:** Public Enemies and the State of the Emergency in Ancient Rome

**Supervisors:** Prof Dr. Nevra Necipoglu and Assistant Prof. Dr. Noemi Levi Aksu

---

## PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE

**Journalist at Montel-Foreks, 2020-Current Job**

Montel News Istanbul Office - Istanbul/TR

**Freelance News Production, 2016-2018**

Financial Times with Erika Solomon (Reporter) - Istanbul/TR

Aftenposten with Tor Arne Andreassen (Middle East Correspondent) – Istanbul/TR

**Foreign Trade Specialist, 2017 - 2018**

Mari Tobacco – Istanbul/TR

**English Teacher: 2016 - 2017**

Turkish Ministry of Education - Diyarbakir/TR

**English Teacher: 2016 - 2017**

Volunteer at Dicle Community Education Center - Diyarbakir/TR

**Office Assistant: 2013 – 2014**



Bogazici University Corporate Communications Office – Istanbul/TR

## **LANGUAGES**

**Turkish** – Native

**Zazaki** – Native

**Ottoman Turkish** – Advanced in Printed

**English** – Fluent

**Latin** – Advanced in both Printed and Paleography