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**TURKISH- GERMAN UNIVERSITY
INSTITUTE OF SOCIAL SCIENCES
EUROPE AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS DEPARTMENT**

**GERMANY’S POLICY VIS-À-VIS GERMAN MINORITY
IN ROMANIA**

MASTER’S THESIS

Yunus MAZI

ADVISOR

Assoc. Prof. Dr. Enes BAYRAKLI

İSTANBUL, January 2021

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I hereby declare that this thesis is an original work. I also declare that I have acted in accordance with academic rules and ethical conduct at all stages of the work including preparation, data collection and analysis. I have cited and referenced all the information that is not original to this work.

Name - Surname

Yunus MAZI

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ÖZET

Almanya'nın Romanya'daki Alman Azınlığa Karşı Politikası

Bu tez, temel olarak Almanya'nın Romanya'daki azınlık politikasına dair bulgular sunmaktadır. Araştırma bunu yaparken Alman azınlığa odaklanmakta ve bu azınlığın Alman-Rumen ilişkilerinde ne ölçüde rol oynadığını değerlendirmektedir. Alman azınlıkla ilgili olarak araştırmadaki temel bakış açısı Alman azınlığın bu iki ülke arasında köprü işlevi gördüğü üzerinedir. Ayrıca bu çalışmada hangi Alman şirketlerinin, vakıflarının ve eğitim kurumlarının Romanya'da aktif olduğu da incelenmektedir. Bu kapsamda, diğer Rumen kurumlar, vakıflar ve siyasi partilerle kurdukları faaliyetler ve ağ da dikkate alınmıştır. Bunların yanı sıra, tezde uluslararası ilişkilerde azınlık çalışmalarındaki çeşitli kavramlar teorik birer temel olarak kullanılmış ve Romanya'daki Almanların iki taraf arasında nasıl bir köprü işlevi kurduğunu anlamak için diaspora kavramına odaklanılmıştır. Yöntem olarak ise çeşitli Alman-Rumen vakıflarından farklı uzmanlarla görüşülerek ampirik bir saha çalışması gerçekleştirilmiştir.

Araştırmanın bulguları, Almanya'nın Romanya'daki azınlık politikası yoluyla Romanya devletiyle yakın ilişkiler kurabildiğini göstermektedir. Bu bağlamda Romanya'daki Alman vakıflarının ve kurumlarının faaliyetleri Almanya'nın azınlık politikası açısından Romanya'da geniş bir ağ oluşturulması bakımından önem arz etmektedir. Ayrıca Alman-Rumen kültürünün korunması, komünizm sonrası dönemden itibaren Almanya tarafından güçlü bir şekilde desteklenmiştir. Buna ilaveten, siyasi açıdan bakıldığında Alman'daki bazı siyasi vakıfların Romanya'da ayrıcalıklı bir rolünün olduğu tespit edilmiştir. Zira bu vakıflar, Romanya'da uzun vadede önemli pozisyonlara gelmesi muhtemel politikacıların ve akademisyenlerin eğitiminde kritik bir rol oynamaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Azınlık Politikası, Diaspora, Alman-Rumen İlişkileri.

Tarih: Ocak 2021

ENGLISH ABSTRACT

Germany's Policy Vis-à-vis German Minority in Romania

This thesis presents mainly the findings of Germany's minority policy in Romania. In doing so, the research concentrates on the German minority and considers the extent to which this minority plays a role in German-Romanian relations. Regarding the German minority, the main aspect is on its bridge function between these two countries. In addition, this study looks at which German companies, foundations and educational institutions are active. Within this scope, the activities and the network they have built up with other Romanian institutes, foundations and political parties have been considered. Furthermore, several concepts in the field of minority studies in international relations are used in this thesis as a theoretical basis and the concept of diaspora is discussed in details in order to better understand the bridge function of the Germans of Romania. As a method, an empirical fieldwork was conducted in which different experts from various German-Romanian foundations were interviewed.

The outcome of this research shows that through its minority policy in Romania, Germany is able to establish close relations with the Romanian state. In this context, the activities of German foundations and institutions are important tools for Germany's minority policy in order to build up a large network in Romania. Also, the preservation of German-Romanian culture is strongly supported by Germany from the post-communist period onwards. Additionally, from a political point of view the German political foundations have had a privileged role. These political foundations play a particularly critical role in the education of potential politicians and academics who can take important positions in the Romanian politics in the long term.

Key Words: Minority Policy, Diaspora, German-Romanian Relations.

Date: January 2021

LIST OF ABBREVIATION

- AHK** : German-Romanian Chamber of Industry and Commerce
(Außenhandelskammer)
- APD** : Association Pro Democratia
- BMI** : Federal Ministry of the Interior
(Bundesministerium des Innern)
- BMZ** : Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development
(Bundesministerium für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung)
- CDU** : Christian Democratic Union of Germany
(Christlich Demokratische Union Deutschlands)
- CSU** : Christian Social Union in Bavaria
(Christlich-Soziale Union in Bayern)
- DAAD** : German Academic Exchange Service
(Deutscher Akademischer Austauschdienst)
- DAS** : German School Abroad
(Deutsche Auslandsschule)
- DED** : German Development Service
(Deutscher Entwicklungsdienst)
- DFDR** : Democratic Forum of the Germans in Romania
(Demokratisches Forum der Deutschen in Rumänien)
- DGA** : Romanian Anti-Corruption Directorate
- DJO** : German Youth in Europe
(Deutsche Jugend in Europa)
- DPS** : German profile schools
(Deutsch-Profil-Schulen)
- DSD** : German Language Diploma

	(Deutsches Sprachdiplom)
EAS	: Evangelical Academy of Transylvania (Evangelische Akademie Siebenbürgen)
EPP	: European People's Party
EU	: European Union
FDP	: Free Democratic Party (Freie Demokratische Partei)
FES	: Friederich-Ebert Foundation (Friedrich-Ebert Stiftung)
GIZ	: German Society for International Cooperation (Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit)
GTZ	: German Agency for Technical Cooperation (Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit)
GTAI	: Germany Trade and Invest
HSS	: Hans-Seidel Foundation (Hans-Seidel Stiftung)
IFA	: The Institute for Foreign Cultural Relations (Institut für Auslandsbeziehungen)
IOM	: International Organization for Migration
ISP	: Institute for Popular Studies
KAS	: Korand-Adenauer Foundation (Konrad-Adenaur Stiftung)
NGO	: Non-governmental organisation
NSDAP	: National Socialist German Workers' Party (Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei)
PDL	: Democratic Liberal Party
PNL	: National Liberal Party

- PSD** : Social Democrat Party
- SbZ** : Siebenbürgische Zeitung
- SJD** : Transylvanian-Saxon Youth in Germany
(Siebenbürgisch-Sächsische Jugend in Deutschland)
- SOG** : South East Europe Society
(Südosteuropa-Gesellschaft)
- SPD** : Social Democrat Party of Germany
(Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands)
- SS** : Schutzstaffel
- ZfA** : The Central Agency for Schools Abroad
(Zentralstelle für das Auslandsschulwesen)

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1. INTRODUCTION

In today's international politics, ethnic minorities have acquired a special significance in interstate relations. Diasporas have the potential to influence the foreign and domestic policies of their respective states. This depends on the extent to which they play a role in their respective countries. This master's thesis deals with Germany's minority policy towards the German-Romanian minority in Romania. The main research question of the thesis is: **How does Germany shape its minority policy in regards to the German-Romanians living in Romania?**

Several German minorities live in Central and Eastern Europe as well as in Central Asia. The German-Romanians in Romania were chosen as a case study for several reasons. First of all, there is no work in the literature that analyses Germany's minority policy in Romania in a descriptive way and to what extent this has an impact on German-Romanian relations. There are books and academic papers that analyse the history of the German-Romanians in Romania with regard to their German origins. However, there is no academic study that examines Germany's policy in detail in this respect. From an academic perspective, this master's thesis aims to fill this gap.

This thesis consists of 10 main chapters. Following an introduction which explains the research question and the structure of the thesis, the second chapter defines the theoretical framework of this thesis. In this chapter, the ethnic minorities and its theoretical approaches and the role of ethnic minorities' in international relations will be discussed. In these two sub-chapters the conditions for being a minority and the human rights of minorities according to the United Nations will be demonstrated. Additionally, the term "ethnic ties" will be described and defined. Furthermore, to understand the role of German-Romanian people's foundations in Germany with respect to Germany's policy towards the German-Romanian minority in Romania, the concept of diaspora will be discussed and defined. In this discussion it will be shown that the term has a very broad understanding. The sub-chapter first discusses the terminological composition of the word "diaspora" and then describes its historical context.

In the next subchapter, the concept of diaspora is contextualized in the understanding of the discipline of international relations. Two theoretical understandings in particular are

presented: the understanding of liberalism and realism. These two perspectives are taken together and the concept of diaspora is contextualized eclectically. By presenting these two opposing theories and contextualizing the concept, a comprehensive understanding of the diaspora in international relations will be achieved. Overall, the chapter regarding the theoretical framework gives a broad understanding about the “bridge function” of ethnic minorities and diasporas between states.

In the next chapter the methodology of the thesis will be presented. In this chapter the procedure within the study will be clarified. It will explain and justify why the methods of qualitative analysis were selected. In this chapter, the extent to which the method has been carried out will be discussed. There are two sections within the methodology. In the first section it is explained to what extent the data is collected via classical literature and the internet. The second section describes the degree to which the data was gathered through interviews. In this section it will be explained why certain experts were selected for an interview and how these interviews were conducted. All circumstances are comprehensively described and reasons are provided as to why an interview with an expert from the respective association or foundation did not take place. Thereafter a general summary of German minorities and their spread outside Germany will be given. The presentation of these German minorities is only superficial and shows only the number of German minority groups in the respective countries. A table in this chapter shows that around 1.000.000 million German people live in Central and Eastern Europe as well as in Central Asia. The next chapter, which is specifically related to this, explores the history of the German community in Romania, which consists of a variety of different communities. This chapter analyses the settlement of the Germans in Romania in the 12th century and the manner in which they socialized over the following centuries. The role of the Germans as role models for the Romanian population and why this minority had largely isolated itself from the rest of the majority is also discussed. In addition, the different denominations not only within the Romanian society but also within the German minority are discussed. This history encompasses the period from the 12th century up to the present day.

In the next chapter the associations, institutes, forums, federations, foundations and parishes are presented. In this chapter, the institutions selected are those located in Romania or Germany, have a German background and deal directly or indirectly with the

German minority in Romania. The most important information about these institutions is presented. Furthermore, the conducted interviews will be included to give more information about certain foundations. It should be emphasised that the information content differs from institution to institution, as the data access does not have the same degree of transparency for all foundations.

The collected data will be analysed and contextualized in the analysis section of the thesis. As such, the data collected will be contextualized within the theoretical framework described above. Furthermore, Germany's minority policy towards the German-Romanian in Romania and the importance of the German-Romanian people as a "bridge" for German-Romanian relations will be demonstrated.

In the following chapter, the most relevant findings are summarized in the conclusion and an answer to the question is formulated. In formulating the answer, the methodology of the work, the theoretical context, the historical background of the German-Romanians and the current activities of the associations and foundations presented are used and presented as a result. At the end, a reflection on the circumstances in the work follows. In addition, an outlook for future research in this field is given.

2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND LITERATURE REVIEW

This chapter describes the theoretical framework for the thesis and provides an overview of the state of research on ethnic minority and diaspora. The German minority in Romania is considered an ethnic minority which is why a comprehensive definition of the term ethnic minority is necessary. The definition of the concept of diaspora is also important in order to be able to analyse the German-Romanian institutions in Germany and their cooperation with the German-Romanian organisations in Romania.

2.1. DEFINITION OF ETHNICITY, IDENTITY AND ETHNIC MINORITY

The term ethnicity originally comes from the Greek term "ethnos". The contextual definition of the term is that of a particular group that shares a common culture, tradition, language, religion and general background. According to the UN, the ethnic concept consists of an ethnic group with its own tradition, language, culture etc. and that which distinguishes itself from other ethnic groups (Sadat 2019, 17). The term ethnicity was first

used in ancient Greece by different philosophers such as Herodotus, Aristotle and Plato. This term was used as a tool to define groups that did not belong to their own group. Aristotle's contextualization of the term ethnicity can be cited as an example. He had used this term to define other groups as "barbaric" (Tonki et al. 1989, 12). Furthermore, until the 19th century, the term ethnicity was used primarily by Christians and Jews to exclude and defame groups with a different religion. The term was first used scientifically by the American sociologist David Riesman in 1953 (Eriksen 1993, 4).

Scientists today do not attempt to determine the differences between ethnicities in the origins of a race. Rather, the differences would arise from the influence of the environment. External influences, culture, language and religion can be given as examples. According to Türkdogan, in the sociological field, the concept of ethnicity has never been based on race or origin. An ethnic group consists of having a common culture, language and religion (Türkdogan 1997, 5). De Vos defines ethnicity by claiming that a group of people sees itself subjectively through symbols and emblems in order to express solidarity within the ethnic group and thus to distinguish itself from other groups (Sadal 2019, 18).

According to Smith (2002), ethnicity means that a particular group has a common name, history, religion, language, racial origin and culture. He also adds that this group defines its identity through a particular place and that the members of the group would support each other (Smith 2002, 47-49). According to Max Weber, members of an ethnic group can resemble each other. However, Weber states that membership of an ethnic group is not based on common characteristics. An ethnic group determines its similarities more on the basis of its collective memories and experiences rather than on its racial origin (Sadal 2019, 18).

According to Smith, Connor and Craig, the cultural aspect plays a major role as a common identity. That is why ethnicity is defined not on a biological, but on a sociological level (Sadal 2019, 20). According to Herder, belonging to a group is a natural need of a human being. This belonging is necessary to survive otherwise a person would feel socially isolated. Herder goes on to say that every group has its own "national spirit" or "folk spirit". These would determine the tradition and culture of the respective group (Bilgin 1994, 16). According to Althusser (1994), ethnicities arise when groups define themselves differently from others. In addition, ethnicities can arise when repressive

ideologies suppress other groups. Through conflict with the dominant ideology, these groups separate themselves and understand themselves as a distinct ethnicity (Althusser 1994, 1). Verkuyten states that an ethnicity or ethnic identity is created by a sense of belonging, showing solidarity and common culture and values (Sadal 2019, 20). According to Peter Andrews, ethnic minorities in a country should be seen as a strength rather than a weakness of a state. That is why the sovereign and the ethnic minority should maintain a stable relationship so that social peace can be achieved. If not, it could lead to conflict and be a point of contention which could provoke violence among ethnic minorities (Sadal 2019, 20).

As far as ethnic identity is concerned, it can be said that this understanding came into being after the French Revolution in 1789. According to Bilgin, the individual defines himself according to his social environment. Identity consists of a sum of our desires, dreams, individuals' perceptions about themselves, and the way they relate to life (Bilgin 1995, 66). According to Aydin, identity means defining oneself as an individual and placing oneself within a certain group in society. This self-categorization into a certain class is a human need. The expressions regarding connections of belonging are the basis of ethnic identity (Aydin 1998, 12). Barth states that ethnic identities are in a process of acceptance or discrimination from another group. The value of ethnic identities increases by inclusion of cultural identities (Barth 2001, 11-12). According to E. Burnett Tylor, "culture, which is a complex whole of knowledge, belief, art, law, morality, tradition, habits and abilities that a person gains as a member of a society" provides the identity of the community to which the individual belongs (Sadal 2019, 20).

An ethnic minority is defined by being smaller than the total number of the community in which it lives. It is also defined by the fact that it has a different race, religion and language from the rest of the population. Since 1948, the definition for an ethnic minority has been constantly updated by the UN General Assembly. Their first definition can be taken as an example: Under Decision 217 C(III), minorities were defined as racial, religious, linguistic and cultural groups. Later in 1950, this decision was updated by replacing the attribute "racial" with "ethnic". This is because racial membership of a group does not necessarily include cultural and religious similarities. A group belonging to the same race may nevertheless have different religions, languages and cultures (Sadal 2019, 29).

Francesco Capotorti was the Special Rapporteur of the United Nations Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities in 1977. He defined a minority as follows:

“A group numerically inferior to the rest of the population of a state, in a non-dominant position, whose members - being nationals of the state - possess ethnic, religious or linguistic characteristics differing from those of the rest of the population and show, if only implicitly, a sense of solidarity, directed towards preserving their culture, traditions, religion or language.” (UNHR - Office of the High Commissioner)

With regards to the definition of a minority, Yinger demonstrates a different perspective. He claims that symbols should be used to define a minority (Sadal 2019, 29). Louis Wirth (1970) has also made a great contribution to the definition of a minority. He claims that a group should be culturally or physically distinct from the dominant majority. However, in order for that particular group to be recognized as a minority, it must be excluded or discriminated against by the dominant majority. Wirth classifies the types of minorities into four different categories: pluralistic, assimilationist, secessionist and militant. The pluralistic minority wants the majority community to tolerate the differences between the minority and the majority. This type of minority wants economic and political unity and at the same time demands acceptance of its culture, language and religion by society. The assimilationist minority wants to be fully accepted by the majority society. The secessionist minority wants political and cultural independence. The militant minority, on the other hand, aims to become the dominant group itself and proclaim its own sovereignty (Wirth 1970, 34-36).

The Canadian lawyer Jules Deschênes defines a minority as a group consisting of a small number of people who do not have a dominant role in society and who are ethnically, religiously and linguistically different from the majority society. There is also a mutual solidarity and collective desire within this group to coexist with the majority society. Their aim is to be on an equal level with the majority society, especially in legal terms (Sadal 2019, 30).

The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights was adopted on 16 December 1966. Article 27 defines minority rights as follows: In those States in which ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities exist, persons belonging to such minorities shall not be

denied the right, in community with the other members of their group, to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practise their own religion, or to use their own language (UNHR – Office of the High Commissioner). In another report of the UN the right to education of the minority is particularly mentioned. In article 4 section 3 it says that certain conditions and requirements must be fulfilled so that members of a minority can learn their mother tongue. In addition, Article 4, section 4 states that members of a minority have the right to learn the history, tradition and culture of their ancestors. The respective state is called upon to promote this education for the minority (Sadal 2019, 31).

With a view to accession to the EU, certain conditions were laid down in the Copenhagen Criteria of 22 June 1993. For the candidate country to be accepted into the EU, there must be, among other things, a respectful treatment of minorities and protection of these minorities. In December 2000, the rights of minorities were further widened at the Nice Summit. Article 21 laid down that the exclusion of a group from society on the basis of sex, race, colour, ethnicity or social origin, language, religion or beliefs, a particular political opinion and membership of a minority is prohibited (Syuleymanova 2010, 22). According to Göka, ethnic identity plays a unifying role, especially in times of chaotic periods. Cultural identity, on the other hand, means that an individual defines itself through his or her associated nation, ethnicity, race, gender and religion and feels that he or she belongs to this group. Cultural traditions arise primarily through collective knowledge. Through this knowledge the cultural tradition is continued (Göka 2006, 261). According to Verkuyten, an ethnic identity can remain without cultural content. This means that an individual can feel that he or she belongs to an ethnic group even though the individual does not speak the language of the ethnic group. Verkeuyten states that it is not a contradiction that an individual feels that he or she belongs to the ethnic group in question and at the same time does not have the same behaviour and language from that ethnic group. The division of individuals into certain categories and groups is not initiated by the ethnic groups themselves, but this division takes place through their environment. The acceptance or discrimination of an ethnic group in a society takes place in the outside world (Sadal 2019, 21).

Another term in the context of identity is hybrid identity. “Hybrid” means that two different elements merge and a new entity emerges from it. According to Smith, hybrid identities are created through the mutual reactive relationships between local and global

levels (Sadal 2019, 22). In particular, through migration, individuals are influenced by other cultural elements. EU accession candidates, which are also emerging economies, have expanded the content of citizenship and created more flexible choices for the individual. The individual has thus been given the possibility of having several citizenships. These identities are also called hybrid identities. It has been used primarily to provide an individual with more flexible work opportunities and to avoid bureaucratic obstacles. The EU accession candidates intended to use it to accelerate their economic development. Hybrid identities became widespread, especially through migration. In recent years, the phenomenon of social media can also be considered. Through social media, individuals do not necessarily have to migrate to another country to be influenced by its cultural elements (Sadal 2019, 23).

Furthermore, there are different theories of ethnicity, especially in the sociological field. It was expected that the specifics of ethnic groups would no longer exist due to increasing globalization. However, the ethnic groups have been able to protect their distinctive characteristics. The different ethnic groups were able to protect their characteristics by founding organizations and scientific research. In the following sections the primordialist, constructivist, instrumentalist and the transactionalist approaches are presented. From a primordialist perspective, a common religion, language, race, etc. are considered indicators for a member to belong to a particular group. The primordialist perspective has three different positions. The first view is that the blood relation and the resulting legacy determines the ethnicity. The second view is that an ethnicity does not change. The third view, the primordial view, holds the view that the common biological and cultural roots shape the ethnicity (Sadal 2019, 23).

According to Geertz and van den Berghe, the existence of ethnic groups is based on their primary relationships and that their existence can continue thanks to these relationships. The Jewish ethnic group can be mentioned as an example. According to this example, the individual is a Jew from birth and this identity is passed on to future generations. It is not possible to belong to this group from outside and to change the identity of this ethnic group. Van den Berghe goes further and says that sociobiological characteristics are particularly important in determining an ethnic group. He gives the kinship within an ethnic group as an example. Since the kinship exists, the ethnicity also continues to exist (van den Berghe, 1981; Geertz, 1993).

The constructionist approach was developed as a counter-reaction to the primordialist approach. Yang argues from a constructionist perspective, claiming that ethnicity is created by a particular society as a social being. This social entity or formation is variable and dynamic. According to this approach, people who are assigned to certain groups in society according to certain categories form a certain ethnicity in response to them. According to the constructionist approach, ethnicity is built with social and cultural conditions and accumulations. People continue their involvement by forming a certain ethnicity in response to developments in society (Yang 2000, 44). Yancey et al. (1976) observe that structural conditions are very effective in the formation of ethnicity. In the formation of ethnicity, the shaping or support of dissociative ideas by the authorities and power centers as well as prejudices and negative feelings towards certain groups are very efficient (Sarna 1978, 372-373). The structuralist approach states that ethnic identities do not arise naturally, but rather are built up over time by combining social, cultural and other factors (Paul 2000, 26).

According to the instrumentalist approach, it is not only the origin of the people who make up ethnicity that is important, but also what they do and what importance they tie to ethnicity (Cohen 1969, 15). This pragmatic approach states that people use their ethnic identity as a means to gain advantages. Yang says that the reason and criterion of ownership of ethnic property is utility (Yang 2000, 46).

According to this approach, people join ethnic groups in order to make the most useful decisions for themselves. As such, the lowest costs are most beneficial to the ethnic group. The reason for the individual's belonging to the ethnic groups is to maximize benefit, and the reason for the absence of itself protection. In order not to be vilified, certain individuals conceal their ethnic origin. (Sadal 2019, 26).

Not everyone is free to choose an ethnic identity, as ethnic preference is subject to ancestral restrictions imposed by society. Nagel points out that people with a certain ethnic background cannot choose an ethnic identity the way they want to, in order to be happy by way of loyalty towards the ethnic group to which they belong. In her view, not only are ethnic groups a means to material gratification, but also a path for spiritual pleasures (Sadal 2019, 26).


According to the transactionalist approach, ethnicity is the product of social conditions. Conflicts that occur in the process of controlling economic resources play an important

role in determining ethnic identities and determine social processes such as exclusion and the inclusion of the border between ethnic groups. Ethnic groups acquire different life experiences as a result of interaction with different circles. Ethnicity is preferred because it facilitates the interaction of the individual with different groups (Barth 2001, 13-15). According to this approach, the reason why people are grouped in an ethnicity is due to the similarity between common culture and history, as well as environmental and economic conditions. For an ethnicity to survive, it is necessary to keep pace with the economic or demographic development (Alverson 1979, 13-14).

Thanks to this approach, the boundaries of ethnicities and the interactions between different ethnic groups have become the subject of research. The approach whose ethnicities are dynamic and not static, as it is in the primitive approach, is emphasized here. The functions of ethnicities and actors are also emphasized in this context.

According to Yang, ethnicity is based on a common idea of ancestry. Although ethnicity is based on ancestry, it is usually built by society. Ethnic identities often do not alter, but the fear of oppression and harm can bring about change. Under normal circumstances, ethnic identities sometimes change and this takes place gradually. According to Yang's integrated theory, ethnic identities are built up again and again, depending on the common lineage, personal interests, changes in economic, political and social structure. Sometimes the inclusion of individuals in an ethnic group may be based on rational or irrational preferences of interests, or they may make this choice based on spiritual satisfaction (Yang 2000, p 48-50).

Figure 1. Overview of Ethnicity Theories



2.2. MINORITIES IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Ethnic minority groups can influence the ethnic policy of other countries. In international politics, this influence or bond is also known as “ethnic ties” across borders. Moore (2002) defines ethnic ties as follows:

“An ethnic tie exists whenever members of an ethnic group are split across a border and members of the group form either a dominant majority or an advantaged minority in one of the two countries.” (Moore 2002, 79)

Minorities may have an influence on the foreign policy of the host state. However, this is not always the case. One reason for the lack of influence is the lack of political mobilisation of the minority group. Another reason is repression by the host state against the minority group. Especially in authoritarian regimes, minorities can be restricted in their possibilities. In this case it is important to look at the role of the minority group in the government. If the host state is democratic, the minority group can gain influence

through democratic means. The minority group has the advantage that their homeland also provides financial support for the minority. However, this raises the problem of whether these minorities have any interest at all in playing an important role in foreign policy. One reason may be that these minorities first focus on domestic policy and thus strengthen their rights in the respective host state. However, if the minority group is interested in playing an important role in the foreign policy of the host state, the problem could be that conflicts of interest with other minority groups could arise. It is also important to look at the extent to which a minority group exerts influence on foreign policy. To analyse this influence, the objectives of the minority group should be considered. Above all, economic and ethnic interests are at the forefront (Saideman 2002, 94).

In order to understand the influence of an ethnic group in foreign policy, one should first of all examine its identity. After all, the identity of a single person in a group ultimately determines the group's common purpose. With regard to the economic sphere in foreign policy, it may be important for the minority group to understand the extent to which the economic relationship with other countries. However, the problem here is that individuals in minority groups do not have the same prosperity. While one part of the ethnic minority group benefits from economic cooperation with another country, another part may even be negatively affected. Therefore, one cannot speak here of common economic interests of a minority group in foreign policy (Saideman 2002, 94). On the other hand, religion and denomination play an important role in international politics for the minority group. The former Yugoslavia can be taken as an example. While Croatia was supported by Catholic countries and Serbia by Orthodox countries, Bosnia was supported by the Muslim world (Saideman 2002, 94).

Small groups can determine their goals better although they have limited opportunities. Large minority groups have the problem that certain interest conflicts within the minority group can emerge. Additionally, there is also the free-rider issue. Individuals in a larger community may profit from the efforts of the minority groups. Smaller groups can control each other better and therefore the probability that individuals will not participate in certain events is low. Furthermore, small ethnic groups are better able to mobilise themselves and thus to lobby or organise protests effectively. Moreover, in smaller groups the objectives are more focused on one area. The problem with large groups is that, as

mentioned before, there are many interests and therefore their objectives are in several areas. Therefore, larger groups are less likely to achieve their goals than smaller groups (Saideman 2002, 98).

Small ethnic groups have certain strategies to exert influence. An important factor in implementing the strategies of the minority groups is their location in their host state. If this group is very active in a particular region, they can mobilise better. It also enables your homeland to establish cooperation with the minority group more easily and effectively. Another strategy of small ethnic minorities is to exert influence through the parliament. If an ethnic minority group establishes a political party and gets enough votes to form the government on its own, it can pursue its interests at will. However, this is very rarely the case. Rather, ethnic groups with their founded parties try to form a coalition with other established parties in order to get into the government. In order to do so, however, the ethnic group as a party must be ideologically close to one of the established parties in order to at least be able to offer itself as a potential coalition partner. Furthermore, ethnic groups can form a party and do not necessarily have to join the government to exert influence. They can use parliamentary enquiries to persuade the government to make decisions in accordance with the interests of the ethnic minority group (Saideman 2002, 100-101).

2.3. DEFINITION OF THE TERM DIASPORA

In academic analyses the term diaspora is not regularly used with regards to the relations between majorities and minorities. The origin of the term “diaspora” comes from the Greek language and means dispersion or scattering (Dufoix 2008, 4). In the beginning the term was only used for the Jews, who were forced to leave their “*homeland*”. In the 20th century the term was also used for the African and the Armenian people (Yaldiz 2013, 293). Diaspora was used in regard to the religious and spiritual context and in recent centuries its definition has changed. In the beginning, the concept of diaspora was only associated with the Jews from a religious perspective. Dubnov (1931) found a new approach and secularized the term, thus widening the concept of the diaspora (Rabinovitchi 2005, 271). Robert Park also used the word diaspora in reference to the Asian people and generalized the term diaspora even further. (Dufoix 2008, 18). The word became very popular particularly in the mid-20th century. The term diaspora had a

negative connotation because it described a particular group in its *host state* as alienated and oppressed. According to Cohen, people from a certain ethnic group have fled as a result of disasters or oppression, which has caused the negative connotation of the word diaspora already mentioned (Cohen 2008, 21-22). According to Cohen, these diaspora communities could be harmful to the host state, as there would be a possibility that they could struggle for further democracy, which could lead to a call for an independent region. Woollacot (1995) states that those groups can also support groups, which are considered as hostile from the country in which they live. According to Ohliger and Münz (2003), the word has lost its derogatory connotation as it has been used so frequently in Western mainstream media and has become an important form of identity politics. As such, the diaspora term can lose its negative connotation when it's defined in an objective manner (Yaldız 2013, 299).

There is also a discussion of whether all ethnic groups living in another nation state can be defined as diasporas. According to Safran (1999), there are six conditions that must be fulfilled so that a certain ethnic group can be defined as a diaspora. The first condition is the dispersion of the group itself or its forefathers to any region. The common memory as a social group with their origin *homeland* is shown as a second condition. He emphasizes that as a third condition, a minority group does not feel accepted from the country in which they live and they have little hope that they will be ever accepted and therefore isolate themselves. The groups' acceptance of their original *homeland* as the ideal *homeland* and the intention to return to their origin *homeland* is seen as the fourth condition. The fifth condition is the group's belief in the protection of their original *homeland* and that they therefore seek to increase the security and prosperity of their *homeland*. The last condition is the maintaining of the group's relations to their original *homeland* and the definition of their ethnic consciousness through this relationship (Safran 1999, 364-365).

According to Cohen (1996), who admits that his understanding of the Jewish diaspora is influenced by Safran, the term of diaspora is always changing. As such, he illustrates the Jewish diaspora characteristics and also the general understanding of the term "diaspora". To illustrate this, he lists nine fundamental characteristics. The first two characteristics describe the reason for the emigration which can be the result of a *traumatic experience* or because of *economic or colonial reasons*. The third and fourth characteristics is a

collective memory which is related to the origin *homeland* and the idealisation of the origin *homeland*. The fifth and sixth factors are the movements back to their *homeland* and the strong consciousness about the ethnic group identity. This is tied to the seventh characteristic, which is the problematic relationship with the majority group in the country in which they reside. The eighth characteristic is the solidarity with groups which have the same identity as well as living in other countries. Cohen's final characteristics illustrate the point that the host states, which are tolerant towards minority groups, substantially enriches the quality of life of those minority groups (Cohen 1996, 515). In 2008, Cohen reviewed his book, because within the ten years of his book being published, the meaning of the term diaspora had evolved as a result of the increasing relevance of diaspora. Especially after 9/11 the term was also used in the security branches of nation states (Yaldiz 2013, 304).

According to Brubaker diaspora consists of three fundamentals which are *dispersal*, *homeland orientation* and the *protection of psychological borders* (Brubaker 2005, 5-6). In comparison to Brubaker, Sheffer's definition of diaspora is more comprehensive and is identical to Cohen's definition. He also argues that the emigration of certain ethnical groups to other countries can be forced or voluntary and that those groups show solidarity with their cognates in other countries. The only difference between Sheffer's and Cohen's argument is that, according to Sheffer, those groups are willing to play an active role in the economic, cultural, social and also political domain of the host states. Through their influential role they aim to establish broader networks (Sheffer 2003, 76-78.).

Sheffer has also had a considerable influence on the understanding of the emergence of a diaspora. Besides the already mentioned fact, that ethnical groups emigrate because they are forced to do so or because they are voluntary, Sheffer maintains that there is no difference between rich and poor people from the ethnical groups with regards to the challenges they have to face when they are living in the *host states*. Most of the migrants determine if they should establish a diaspora according to their *host states'* policy and economic situation. If the host states policy towards those ethnic groups are restrictive, despite the fact that emigrants intend on building a life there, they would prefer to migrate to another country. This is because of the consciousness of the minority's ethnical identity. They attach importance to non-assimilation of their own identity and if their identity is under threat, then they would have no interest in establishing a diaspora in the

country. Although there are close ties between the migrant groups and their origin *homeland*, there would be no full solidarity from those groups to their proportionate *homeland*, because those groups would establish their own society, which has its own identity (Sheffer 2003, 74-76).

A certain amount of time must pass in order to accept a minority community as a diaspora. Within this time, the development of the minority groups' identity must be observed if they are to be assimilated. If the minority group does not assimilate, there must be a strong consciousness about their historical past. There is also a disparity in status between migrant and diaspora. The fact that minority groups with different historical backgrounds and different reasons for their emigration, shows that the term of diaspora is still very broad and can be used for any minority group in any *host state*. There is also a debate among scholars whether an ethnic community should be considered the diaspora and what the features of the diaspora are. The discussion considers the reasons for the emigration of an ethnic group or if the ethnic group has a broad network within itself (Yaldız 2013, 306-307).

There is also a differentiation within the diaspora in two categories, which brings a new perspective to the term itself. Sheffer defines diaspora in two different classes, which is the historical and modern diaspora. From his point of view historical diaspora are the diasporas of Jews, Greeks and Armenians. The modern diaspora consists of the migration flow to North America and Europe (Sheffer 2003, 23). Cohen illustrates a more pluralistic differentiation of five various classes which are the victim, labour, imperial, trade and cultural diasporas. He underlines that the classes are not separated shortly, but the ethnical groups in which they belong can change or the classes can also overlap. However, Cohen's understanding of differentiation is not seen as a contribution to the discussion of the diasporas term since this example raises the question of the uncertainty of the interpretation of the diaspora (Yaldız 2013, 308).

According to Sheffer, the classes within diasporas can also be divided in state-linked and stateless diaspora. The state-linked classification is defined by a certain political situation of the diaspora. In comparison to this, a diaspora can be defined as stateless when the origin of the diaspora is unclear or this diaspora is governed by another national group (Sheffer 2003, 23). Reis differentiates the diaspora term in a chronological way, in which he distinguishes it as the classical period, modern period and post-modern period. Besides

the fact that the classical period consists of the Greek and Armenian diaspora, the modern period according to Reis covers the years between 1500 and 1945. The era after the end of the Second World War is defined as a post-modern diaspora. In his work, he explains the diaspora term through the diaspora of the Hispanics in the USA from the period from 1945 until today. He emphasises that through the globalisation and the major World Wars, the nature of diaspora in general has changed (Reis 2004, 42).

The economical context of diaspora is very complex and versatile. According to the International Organization for Migration (IOM), migrants in 2008 brought in 444 billion dollars and in 2009 420 billion dollars to their original *homeland*. It has also to be mentioned that the data is not clear and proven. Nevertheless, it shows the potential of the migrants and also their influence on the economy not only on their origin *homeland*, but also on their *host state* as besides these transactions, migrants have an enormous influence on the foreign trade between those states. Although there is not a in depth knowledge about the economical role of diasporas, Levitt makes a proposal on how to measure the economic influence of migrants on their *homeland*. From his point of view, economical influence should only be measured by the social remittances of migrants. Social remittance ensures that not only capital, but also ideals and ideas are returned to the home country (Yaldız 2013, 311).

The relation between politics and diaspora is considered as mutually dependent in which politics and diaspora influence each other. According to Lyons and Mandaville there are three fundamentals within this relation. The first fundamental is the *host states'* migration policy towards the migrants in their own country. The second key point is the connection to ethnic lobbying. Ethnic lobbying means that groups within the diaspora have a certain influential role in national and international politics of their *host state*. The third fundamental is the acknowledgement of those groups' contribution to the *host states'* political development and decision-making. Through globalisation, which increases communication opportunities, diaspora groups have also an influential role in their origin *homeland* (Lyons and Mandaville 2010, 91).

2.4. DIASPORA IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Diasporas were considered as a group which were dispersed over several regions and countries. Those groups also had intended to return to their *homeland*, when it was

possible for them. However, this understanding of diaspora changed after the First World War. The already mentioned “post-modern diaspora” is the period where diaspora became an influential factor in the foreign policy of nation states. The end of the First World War was the beginning for the self-determination and independence of ethnic minorities. In particular the larger empires at that time had many difficulties in holding the empire together because of the ethnic minorities’ self-determination. The fact that there was no dominant ethnicity led to fragmentation in different several countries (Abraham 2014). Diasporas in the post-modern period are seen as independent actors who have a considerable influence on their *homelands* foreign policy. They are seen as an important means for the *homelands* domestic and foreign policy. *Homelands* of diasporas can be influential in the host states of diasporas which are geographically near to them. Besides the fact that diasporas can act as a mediator between both *host state* and *homeland*, there is also the possibility that diasporas can threaten the security and stability of the *host state*. This can be by supporting the terrorism of certain groups or it can be also the importation of national conflicts in the *homeland* to the *host state* (The Economist 2003).

The motives and interests of diasporas have to be considered to understand the relations between the *homeland* and the diaspora with regards to the *homelands* foreign policy. In the discussion of academics within the International Relations discipline, two theories have to be regarded for understanding diasporas’ behaviour. The constructivist approach considers the identity of diasporas and contextualises the relations between the *homeland* and *host state*. The other approach is the liberalism theory, which looks at the intentions, interests and motives of the diaspora. By liberalism theory, the diasporas’ interests can be considered with regards to the *homelands* foreign policy strategy (Shain and Barth 2003, 450-451).

With regards to the diasporic roles, there are, in general, passive and active roles. The general roles have three sub-types of roles in the international system. The passive diaspora type is defined by the action behaviour of diaspora members, which are caused by external factors. One factor can be economical subventions for diaspora members, which eventually comes from the *host state*. A second factor can be mentioned is the use of the *homeland* of their diaspora members as means to increase their power in the international system. The third aspect of passive diaspora members is identical to the second aspect, where the diaspora has no control over their own behaviour and generally

their *homeland* determines their status in the *host state*, which ultimately depends on the relations between both countries (Shain and Barth 2003, 453).

Diasporas can be also active and can be influential in the *host states'* policy. In general, they are very influential in liberal-democratic countries, because such host states provide several opportunities to allow ethnic minorities to organize themselves. This can be beneficial to improve relations to certain countries, but it can also increase the risk that the political orientation of the *host state* can be fragmented. The fragmentation can be caused by established ethnic lobbies which can affect the foreign policy of the *host state*. The interests of diaspora lobbies and the *host states'* common policy can be in contradiction, which would limit the opportunities for the *host states'* actions (Clough, 1994).

The third sub-type is the diaspora's active influential role within the foreign policy strategy of their *homeland*. Although, *homeland* apparently determines the behaviour of diasporas, the *homeland* is also dependent on the diaspora, because it gets their financial resources from this community. Therefore, the *homeland* has to shape its foreign policy according to the interests of the diasporas, because it wants to secure the diasporas' support. Besides economical influence, diasporas can also have political influence on domestic issues of their *homeland*. This can be by organizing lobbies or the right of participating at elections (Shain and Barth 2003, 452-453).

There are different types of diasporic interests. One perspective is the effect of the *homeland's* foreign policy on the interests of the diasporic people. The interests can be determined in different ways. They can be defined by the identity of the people, by the support amongst the diasporic people each other, by the common historical memory or by economic reasons. But in general, the interests are mostly defined by identity and this has also influenced the *homeland's* foreign policy. If the diasporic interests are in contradiction to the *homeland's* foreign policy, then the diasporic people usually intervene and try to hinder the strategy of their *homeland*, because they want to protect their own image in the *host state* (Jepperson et al. 1996, 60).

Diasporas have, depending on the *homeland*, a direct influence on the *homeland's* foreign policy strategy, which can bring advantages and disadvantages. The *homeland* must decide on how it wants to include its diasporic people in its foreign policy agenda. Diasporic people can be used to enforce interests in the international system, because

those diasporas can influence their *host states'* decisions towards their *homeland*. This certainly would be the advantage of including diasporas in foreign policy strategy. Although diasporas are included in their *homeland's* foreign policy strategy, they can also be an obstacle. If they do not support the current government's policy, then the diaspora can influence the *host states'* decisions towards their *homeland* and let them make, for example, sanctions against their *homeland* (Shain and Barth 2003, 455-457).

Therefore, there is a possibility to pressure the *homeland* for changing their foreign policy, so that the *homeland* changes its strategy according to the diaspora's interests. In this case, diasporas can have a certain perception or ideology, which is in contradiction with the government's foreign policy. With the impact that the diaspora has, the *homeland* can be forced to act accordingly to the diasporas' interests, because diasporas can influence the *host state* and *homeland* ties in a negative way, which is not in the interest of the *homeland*. Diasporas also consider the foreign policy of the homeland with regards to their organization. If the *homeland's* foreign policy is threatening the standing of the diasporas' organizational status, then the diasporas intervene (Shain and Barth 2003, 455-457). Therefore the desires of the diaspora can be influenced in two distinct directions. One way is the 'over-there' type, which is a motivation for pursuing interests that come from the *homeland's* people. The other way is the 'over-here' type, which is in the *host state*, where the diaspora is motivated by organizational interests. Both of these types are the motivation for pursuing interests based on a shared identity (Shain and Barth 2003, 455-457).

In regard to diasporas in the discipline of International Relations, two theoretical approaches can be used: constructivism and liberalism. The constructivist approach considers the identity of the diaspora, which would determine the foreign policy interests of the home country. The liberal approach in turn considers the domestic dynamics of the home country that determine foreign policy with regard to the diaspora. However, both theories overlap in their main assumptions. Constructivism states that social interactions in domestic politics would determine foreign policy. On the other hand, liberalism argues that the states' interest preferences are based on ideas and identity (Moravcsik 1997, 525; Katzenstein 1996, 4; Shain and Barth 2003, 457).

According to the theory of constructivism, states are regarded as social actors behaving according to the principle of 'logic of appropriateness' (Checkel 1998, 326-327).

Contrary to classical realism, constructivist theory considers the contents of two ‘black boxes’. The national interests are to be regarded as changeable and not constant, since they are influenced by the changed identity. This shifting identity is the second level of ‘black boxes’ and is influenced by the dynamics of the international system and developments in domestic politics (Hopf 1998, 176). In order to understand the behavior of the actors, it is important to acknowledge various factors which are interrelated. Identity is seen as an independent variable, while decision as a dependent variable and interests as an intervening variable that are related to identity. These three variables together result in the actions of a state according to a constructivist view (Shain and Barth 2003, 458).

The national identity is not formed by the state itself, but by the people who live in this state. People who do not live in this country but belong to the same ethnicity also have an influence on national identity. In this case, it is the diaspora that exerts the influence (Kowert and Legro 1996, 470-472). The formation of identity is a process of discourse among the population. Through discourses, values and interests come to light that then shape identity. This process does not only take place internally, but also consists of an interaction with the environment, which influences the discourse. In this process, there is competition as to which interests prevail in order to ultimately shape the national identity. This raises the question of what influence the diaspora has in this competition of conflicts of interest (Katzenstein 1996, 5-6).

The national identity is not only considered as variable, but also as a resource for shaping the policy. Different groups belong to this identity. Diasporas are outside of the *homeland* and have therefore usually a higher appreciation for identity in comparison to other groups which are living within the *homeland*. This is because the other groups experience this identity in their everyday life, while the experience of identity in diasporic life is not so high. Consequently, diasporas do not shape their identities to pursue their interests, but they shape them to secure those identities. The image of national identities’ can be influenced by the *homeland’s* government or by other actors, which are in this case, the diaspora. Moreover, those illustrated images have also influenced the decision making of states within foreign policy (Shain and Barth 2003, 459).

The constructivist approach is therefore important because it includes in their analysis of policy processes, the diasporas, which have also influenced the construction of an

identity. There is a discussion of whether diasporas should be considered as purely domestic actors which are only acting in interest of their *homeland*. There is also the fact that diasporas are influenced by their environment, which is the result of constant social interaction within the international system. In general, diasporas mostly endeavour to have influence on their *homeland's* domestic politics (Katzenstein 1996, 23-25).

The liberalist approach considers the dynamics within the domestic politics of states. Therefore, the interests in liberalism are not fixed, but they are determined by the current government. So, the constructivist approach is also likely in liberalism: the black box of states is opened up. Another aspect, which is the fundamental difference between realism and liberalism, are the actors in the international system. While realism sees states as primary actors, liberalist theory also puts other actors as influential factors for the international system's dynamics. Also, in domestic politics individual actors and organisations have influence on states' decision-making process. Therefore, states do not act independent, but act according to individual interests. On the contrary to realism, which sees security and power as primary interests, liberalism values other areas of interests as important (Moravcsik 1997, 516-517).

There is a relation between government and society. If government respectively the state is weaker than society, then society has more influence on the states' policy and can determine its interests. Although diasporas live in another country, they are considered as part of their *homeland's* society and therefore also as domestic actors. This is very important for the liberal approach to understanding domestic actors, since diasporas, as domestic actors, increase the number of groups in a community even if they live beyond the boundaries of the homeland (Shain and Barth 2003, 460-461). The fact that diasporas exist beyond their homeland makes an impact on both the host state and the homeland - they tend to have more influence on their *homeland*. Political interests are usually enforced by financial contribution to certain parties which share the same interests like the diaspora. Therefore, those parties must also shape their policy according to the diasporas' interests. Also, the *homeland's* government establishes departments specifically in regard to diasporic affairs, which shows the importance of this mutual dependence (Shain and Barth 2003, 461).

The main difference between diasporas as interest groups compared to other interest groups is that although diasporas are not physically present in their *homeland*, they have

influence on the decision-making process. Moreover, diasporas have not only a direct influence on the foreign affairs of their *homeland* but also especially are an important actor with regards to the relations between their *host state* and *homeland*, in which diasporas as an interest group have an increasingly important role within the international system. Regarding diaspora as actors in the international system, there should be considered motive, opportunities to act and means that exist. There is an interconnectedness between the relations of diaspora and *homeland*, the diaspora's motivation to be an influential actor in *homeland's* foreign affairs and the ability to organise themselves as an influential actor, which is directly linked to the political system of *host state* and *homeland*. Those aspects provide the potential respectively capacity of diaspora's actions opportunities (Shain and Barth 2003, 461-462).

Three factors affect the degree of motivation. Firstly, double loyalty can be of considerable importance for diasporas with regards to which side they support more. If the *homeland's* government's policy is not according to the diaspora's interests, then motivation will decrease for acting in favour of their *homeland*. On the other hand, if the *host state's* policy is not according to the diaspora's interests, then motivation for participation in the homeland's foreign policy towards the *host state* will increase. Another aspect can be cultural obstacles of diasporas. For instance, Chinese diasporas traditionally do not interfere in other states affairs, which decreases the motivation of organizing themselves as an influential actor in the international system. As a third aspect for motivation, frustration and anger of diasporas are mentioned and this is mainly caused by traumatic experiences. So, it can be stated that those three factors are not independently affected, but they are in constant relation to the *homeland's* and *host state's* policy for providing the fundamentals of the motivation for the diaspora (Ben-Zvi 1998, 56-57; Pye 1985, 252).

The diaspora's ability of organisation is also dependent on the *host state's* nature. If the *host state's* political system and structure is very restrictive towards other groups, then the *host state* is described as a strong state and this does not get influenced by certain groups' interests. In this case, diasporas would have less influence on their *host state's* foreign policy strategy because the potential for any organisation is very low. On the other hand, if the diaspora's *host state* is more liberal towards certain groups, then this state is described as weak and the potential for being organized as a diasporic group is much

higher. Another important factor is that the *host state* must be on the agenda of the *homeland's* foreign policy not the other way around. Otherwise, there would be no basis for the diaspora for organizing a strategy to have influence (Shain and Barth 2003, 464-465).

Also, the *homeland's* degree of democracy, which determines the restrictions of the political system, is important for the diaspora's influence. The more democratic the *homeland* is, the less impact its influence has from other groups. Apart from the democratic factor, the level of power of the *homeland* is also important in its influentiality. The lower the *homeland's* power, the more dependent it is on the support of diasporic groups to survive in the international system. Consequently, diasporas have more influence on shaping the *homeland's* identity and policy if it is not able to act independently. On the other hand, if, from the *homeland's* perspective the diaspora is not loyal, then the *homeland* can block ties which lessens the diaspora's influence (Shain and Barth 2003, 464-465).

Within the ties between diaspora and their *homeland*, two conditions must be fulfilled to achieve a stable relationship. The first condition is support by the diaspora for their *homeland*, which consists of financial and political support. Those are the so-called resources from which the *homeland* can benefit. Therefore, if those resources can be used, the second condition must be fulfilled. Diasporas must be well-organized to make full use of resources. This means that within the group there should be no fragmentation within other groups that oppose each other. A group without a common belief is not an advantageous partner for the *homeland*. On the other hand, if those conditions are fulfilled, the relations are strengthened and stable (Shain and Barth 2003, 465).

Consequently, according to the liberal and constructivist approach two conditions must be fulfilled - the *homeland* must be democratic and the motive must have a basic identity. Therefore, diasporic influence on their *homeland's* foreign policy, which is dependent on variables, is determined by the balance of power between the diaspora and their *homeland*. The balance of power as an intervening variable is determined by three independent variables, namely the power of *homeland*, the level of cohesion of diaspora regarding their *homeland's* foreign policy and how the diaspora is viewed by the homeland (Shain and Barth 2003, 465-466).

3. METHODOLOGY OF QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS AND RESEARCH DESIGN

In order to be able to analyse Germany's policy towards the German-Romanian minority in Romania, qualitative analysis is used as a method in the study. The research design consists of collecting data in different ways. The data collection mainly takes place in two steps. In the first step, the foundations and institutions, which are relevant for Germany's policy in this context, are described as such and what activities these institutions carry out are explained. Only sources and information from the internet are used to describe these foundations. It should also be noted that the DFDR (Democratic Forum of the Germans in Romania) will be presented in more detail as an example.

In the second step, data collection and analysis will be based on qualitative interviews. This interview method is chosen because there is little knowledge and data available on this research topic and the research is more explorative. Another reason given in this research is that information and expert knowledge on this topic should be generated in order to close the aforementioned gap (Blatter et al. 2018, 47). In addition, the researcher has conducted expert interviews, as the researcher wants to have insider information about these selected institutions and this information should contribute to the data collection. The qualitative interviews were carried out according to the principles of the expert interview, since this is where information is collected from representatives from the respective foundations.

A total of five expert interviews were conducted for the master thesis. Contact with the respective experts was established through e-mail correspondence. Communication was often conducted only in this manner before the interviews, and different factors such as timing and the scope of the interviews were decided upon. Information letters and declarations of consent were also sent to the respective experts as PDF files, with the signed declaration of consent being returned by e-mail. A total of four expert interviews were conducted by telephone. In addition, a further interview was conducted by exchanging e-mails. The telephone interviews were conducted via the Skype and Whatsapp applications. The interviews were conducted by telephone due to the physical location of the respective experts. The reason why this was done over the internet was

that the cost of the phone calls would have been too high for both sides, with both sides agreeing on this solution.

While the interview with Expert No.1 was done by video phone call, the other interviews were done by voice calls. Regarding the location, the experts were in their own office and the interviewer was in their own office, which created a calm professional atmosphere for the most part. In addition, an interview was conducted with another expert in writing and the questions were answered by the expert via e-mail.

- Expert No. 1 - Representative from Friedrich-Naumann Foundation
- Expert No. 2 - Representative from Konrad-Adenauer Foundation
- Expert No. 3 -Representative from DFDR (Democratic Forum of the Germans in Romania)
- Expert No. 4 - Member of Parliament with German origin in Romania and Representative from DFDR
- Expert No. 5 - Representative from Hans-Seidel Foundation

There were different parameters for the selection of experts. One parameter was that the experts are representatives of the associations and foundations that I am investigating. Another parameter in the selection was that these representatives were German speakers. This parameter was used because it was important for the study that experts from our own German minority could share their experience in the interviews without language difficulties. The study was conducted with four experts from each of the Friedrich-Naumann Foundation, Konrad-Adenauer Foundation, Hans-Seidel Foundation and the Democratic Forum of Germans in Romania. Furthermore, an interview was conducted with a Romanian member of parliament representing the German minority in the Romanian parliament.

A number of other organisations described in this paper were also asked for an interview. However, there was either no feedback, no agreement, or a response was not received from sent mails, and in one case, the email was forwarded to other institutions dealing with the issue of German-Romanians. Furthermore, the German Embassy in Bucharest and the two German Consulates in Sibiu and Timișoara were also asked for an interview. The German Embassy forwarded me to the Democratic Forum of Germans in Romania. There was a short telephone conversation with the German Consulate in Timișoara. In

this telephone conversation I was asked about my intention for this master thesis. Afterwards I was told that Timișoara would deal with the Banater Swabian and therefore the interview would not be very helpful for the study. From the German consulate in Sibiu there was no response to the interview request.

The circumstances of the interviews were mainly dependent on the internet. There were occasional situations, especially with the first and second expert, that the connection was bad and we were unable to understand each other. The recording of the interviews and the subsequent transcription was recorded correspondingly. There were also time variations between the respective interviews. While the interview with the first expert lasted for approximately 1 hour and 30 minutes, the interviews with Expert no. 2 and Expert no. 3 lasted for around 40 minutes. The interview with Expert No. 4 lasted for approximately 1 hour. It should be noted that the interview with Expert no. 2 took place on two different days, certain questions could not be answered due to lack of time.

There was also a difference between the interview with Expert No. 1 and Expert No. 2, Expert No. 3 and Expert No. 4. The interviews with Expert No. 2, Expert No. 3 and Expert No. 4 were very dialogue-oriented and mostly followed the planned interview guidelines. The experts gave precise answers to the questions. The interview with Expert No. 1 resembled more a narrative style interview. The expert was quite verbose and included a lot of detail about his personal life, while the interviewer was more reserved in this interview. Nevertheless, the interview guidelines were largely followed. One reason for this may be that the characteristics of the Expert No. 1 are different from those of the other experts. Another reason may be that the interview with Expert No. 1 was the only interview that was conducted over a video phone call. In the interview it was therefore possible to communicate via facial expressions and gestures and this led to the interviewer tending to hold back and let the expert tell the story. The interview with Expert No. 5 was conducted through a series of e-mails. On the one hand, the answers were very precise and these were helpful for filling the lack of information. On the other hand, there was the problem that the interviewer could not ask further questions to get more information regarding a certain topic.

The information of the interviews was added to the data that the researcher has obtained from the internet. Therefore, the information of the interview complemented the missing data. In the next step, the information is analysed and contextualized according to the

presented theoretical framework. The researcher analysed the information according to the documentary method. The researcher has created an overview of the thematic course of the interviews and identified meaningful passages in the interview. In addition, the researcher summarised the most important contents in his own words, without dividing them into sociological and theoretical categories.

4. GERMAN MINORITIES IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE AND CENTRAL ASIA

Until the 19th century, Germans defined themselves outside their home country as a “German-speaking minority”. Until then, the German-speaking minority defined itself by its legal status, social standing and denomination. After the term “nation” had become established, Germans defined themselves as a “German minority”. During this nationalization process, the German minority gave up its autonomy, although they had formed the majority in many regions. They then officially defined themselves as a national minority or considered to be assimilated. In general, members of the German minority have the citizenship of the country in which they reside. They are still considered autochthonous ethnic minorities today. Autochthone minorities are a group of people who have an economic or emotional bond to a region and who see themselves as descendants of their ancestors in that region. According to the Declaration of the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, states are obliged to protect and promote the identity of national or ethnic, cultural, religious and linguistic minorities by adopting appropriate measures. This means that nation states are not allowed to restrict the use of languages of minorities (UNHR - Office of the High Commissioner).

Figure 2. Map of German Minorities in Central and Eastern Europe and Central Asia



A large number of German minorities can be found all over the world. These minorities have moved to different areas at different times. The first German colonists emigrated to Eastern Europe in 1000 AD. The colonization in the Baltic and Slavic areas is also referred to in literature as German Eastern settlement (*deutsche Ostsiedlung*). The first colonized areas are today's Poland, Hungary, Romania and Moldova. However, major events in history such as the First and Second World Wars and the end of the Cold War have not only had a decisive influence on the dynamics of the international system, but have also affected the dynamics of the waves of migration. The German minorities were particularly affected by these events. As a result of these events, especially during the Cold War, parts of the German minority migrated to Central Asia. Many German minorities no longer exist due to assimilation, expulsion or emigration to Germany. However, especially after the end of the Cold War and thus with the collapse of the Soviet Union, the largest part of this minority emigrated back to Germany. In the following chapter, we will briefly describe the countries in which the German minorities still live today.

Table 1 Population of German Minorities in Central and Eastern Europe and Central Asia (BMI)

Country	Population of German Minority	Percentage of Total Population
Armenia	No information	No information
Azerbaijan	500	0,005 %
Belarus	2500	0,026 %
Bosnia and Herzegovina	No information	No information
Denmark	15000	0,26 %
Estonia	900	0,068 %
Georgia	1000	0,025 %
Kazakhstan	182000	0,97 %
Kyrgyzstan	8000	0,12 %
Croatia	3000	0,073 %
Latvia	5400	0,29 %
Lithuania	3200	0,12 %
Poland	148000	0,39 %
Romania	36900	0,19 %
Republic of Moldova	2000	0,05 %
Russia	400000	0,27 %
Serbia	4000	0,046 %
Slovakia	4700	0,087 %
Slovenia	1600	0,077 %
Tajikistan	500	0,005 %
Czech Republic	18700	0,17 %
Turkmenistan	100	0,002 %
Ukraine	33000	0,075 %
Hungary	186000	1,93 %
Uzbekistan	10000	0,03 %

According to the Polish Statistical Office, 45.000 inhabitants of Poland stated an exclusively German identity. 96.000 stated that they spoke German at home, 33.000 of whom only stated a Polish identity. Approximately 20% of this German-speaking group

are over 65 years old. 58.000 people have stated German as their mother tongue, of whom about 68.5% stated only one German identity (Nowak et al. 2013). According to the statistics of the German Federal Ministry of the Interior overall 148.000 people who belong to the German minority live in Poland (BMI).

In the last census in 2001, 39,000 people in the Czech Republic said they were German. The people of the German minority are also called German Bohemian, German Morevian or Sudeten Germans and make up 0.4% of the Czech population (German Embassy Prague). However, according to the statistics of the German Federal Ministry of the Interior overall 18.700 people who belong to the German minority live in the Czech Republic. According to the last census there are about 6.000 ethnic Germans living in Slovakia, who are also called Carpathian Germans (FUEN).

According to the last census in 2001, 33.000 people of German descent live in the Ukraine. This ethnic group includes Bukovina Germans, Galician Germans, Carpathian Germans, Black Sea Germans, Volhynia Germans and Crimean Germans. These population groups are also scattered in other countries in Eastern Europe (Internetportal der Deutschen der Ukraine).

According to the last census in 2010 there are approximately 395.000 people of German origin in Russia. In 2010 this ethnic group, also called Russian-Germans, represented the largest minority in the Altai region and in the Novosibirsk area (RG, 2011).

In the former Yugoslavia there were still 50.000 Yugoslavs of German descent accounted for in the 1980 census. After the end of the Cold War and with the division of Yugoslavia, the number of Germans has decreased significantly. According to the census in 2012, a total of 10.000 Germans lived in Croatia, Serbia and Slovenia (Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung).

In Hungary, the number of the German minority in the 2001 census was estimated at around 200.000. Approximately 62,000 Hungarian Germans stated that they were German-speaking. The rest of the minority professes its origin, but does not speak German and is therefore considered assimilated. In a new survey in 2011 132.000 people said they were German. 32.000 Hungarians said that their mother tongue was German and 96.000 Hungarians said that they spoke German at home (Funkforum, 2013). According to the statistics of the German Federal Ministry of the Interior overall 186.000 people who belong to the German minority live in Hungary.

There is also a German minority in Denmark, where the number is about 20.000. The largest of this German minority lives in North Silesia, which explains they are also called German North Silesians (Nordschleswig Homepage). However, the statistics of the German Federal Ministry of Interior states that approximately 15.000 Germans live in Denmark.

In Central Asia, too, there is a large number of the German minority who used to live in the former Soviet Union. There are 8.000 Germans living in Kyrgyzstan, 500 Germans in Tajikistan, 100 Germans in Turkmenistan, 500 Germans in Azerbaijan and 10.000 Germans in Uzbekistan. IN particular in Kazakhstan there are over 180.000 Germans which is a significantly large number for a German minority. These people are called Kazakh Germans, but they see themselves as Russian Germans (Bundesministerium des Innern, für Bau und Heimat, 2018).

With this brief description, it can be seen that the German minority is still present in the abovementioned regions. It must be said that before the outbreak of the Second World War and the collapse of the Soviet Union, the German minorities had a much stronger presence. Especially after these two events, the presence of the German minority has decreased significantly. Nonetheless, the presence of the German minorities can still be felt because of the historical past of the respective territories. Especially in Southeastern Europe and Central Asia, there is a considerable amount of German people who still live there and have preserved their culture. To this end, it must be made clear that the reputation and standing of the German region is changing from region to region. In the next chapter, the historical background of the German minority in Romania will be discussed in detail.

5. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE GERMAN-ROMANIANS IN ROMANIA

The German-speaking minorities in Central and Eastern Europe have been residing for several centuries. During the Second World War, in the context of the presence of the National Socialists and forming homogenous communities, the number of the German minority decreased. Although the German minority lost its presence in Eastern Europe, in particular after the Second World War, in Romania, even with a decreased number of Germans, the culture and language are still present. During the Ceaușescu regime

numerous Germans emigrated to the Federal Republic of Germany, which was mainly because of the reunification of families. After the Ceaușescu regime the restrictions for leaving the country were removed, which led to an increasing emigration to Germany (Ursprung 2015, 7).

Figure 3. German-Romanians in Romania



In 1930, after the First World War, 745.421 people in Romania defined themselves as Germans, which is 4.1 percent of the total population. Although the Germans were dispersed over the whole country, most of them lived in Banat (275.369 German people) and Transylvania (237.416 German people), which is 69 percent of the total population of Germans in Romania. Bessarabia (81.089 German people) and Bukovina (75.533 German people) are the regions where the second most number of Germans resided. Also 12.581 Germans were registered in Dobruđja (1.7% of all Germans in Romania). 32.366 Germans (4.3%) were also registered in the so-called Romanian Old Kingdom, the

territories of Wallachia and Moldavia. Due to the National-Socialist invasion in this region, the German people were resettled to Germany during World War II. Also, Germans from Dobrudja, a place in the Black-Sea coast region, were resettled to Germany. Between 1940 and 1943 overall 214.630 people migrated to Germany (Ursprung 2015, 7).

Transylvania and Banat were the regions where the German minority lived the most at that time. Between the Middle Ages and 1918 they belonged to Hungary and the Hapsburg Empire. These regions were also ruled by the Ottoman Empire during the 16th and 17th centuries. Both regions' communities, regarding history and culture, were different from each other, which led to the problem that there was no common "Romanian-German identity". Those differences can be explained by the historical background of immigration. The German minority, which was called the "Transylvanian Saxons" at the time, arose from colonization during the High Middle Ages. This situation was identical to the emergence of German ethnic groups in the Baltics, Poland (Silesia), Bohemia (Sudeten Germans) and Slovakia (Carpathian Germans) (Ursprung 2015, 9).

The second immigration movement was after the defeat of Hungary against the Hapsburgs in the 17th century. Colonialists moved to these conquered regions which led to settlement of many German speaking people in the 18th century. From that time the ethnic group of Germans was in a new process of establishment. The newly emerged minorities in Southern Hungary were called "Swabians". In the west of Romania, the so-called Banat Swabians were settled near the city of Temeswar and are Catholic. They defined themselves as Germans, which led to a huge emigration flow to Germany after the Cold War. Today, although the Satu Mare Swabians, who belong to Hungary were assimilated, they still define themselves as Germans, mainly due to the prestige attached to being German (Ursprung 2015, 9-10).

The Transylvanian Saxons are the most present group of the Germans and are known for their different traditions. During the Hungarian reign, the first Hungarian king, Saint Steven decided to colonize the eastern region with settlers from the west, because he was of the opinion that diversity would make the Hungarian kingdom stronger. The duration of the colonization process in Transylvania was from the middle of the 12th century until the end of the 13th century. The German language in this region spread consistently. In the early beginnings of the settlement, the city Sibiu (Hermannstadt) was established. The

German-speaking settlers were called “Saxons”, which was a symbolic recognition of those who were privileged settlers from West Europe (Gündisch 1998, 30).

The status of right of the western colonialists, who were most of them German origin, was defined in 1224 by the so-called ‘Andreanum’, which provided enhanced legal rights, several extended advantages in terms of property and also an adjustment of self-administration capacity. Through the National University, which was initiated by King Matthias Corvinus in 1486, a national community for the Saxons in a certain region was established. The community has three centres, which are around Sibiu in the South, in the South East around Brasov in Tara Bârsei and in the North around Bistrita in Țara Năsăudului. The autonomy status of those regions remained until 1876 and was a legal basement for Saxons to have an existential right as a minority. From the 13th century, the Saxons were besides nobility and Hungarian speaking people in leading positions of political institutions, in which Romanian people were eliminated (Ursprung 2015, 11).

There were three fundamentals, namely the military, economic and confessional situation of the settlers, which influenced the shaping process of the Transylvanian Saxons’ identity. Accordingly, the Saxons since the 15th century were constantly surrounded by Ottomans, and they prioritised the fulfilment of military conditions to survive. The military was well-structured and in most villages in Transylvania where the so-called church fortresses were established. Besides the fact that those fortresses’ purpose was only for protection of the people, it was also a symbolic figure for the Saxons’ identity (Ursprung 2015, 11-12).

With regard to economic fundamentals, the Saxons were very important for the economic development of the Hungarian Kingdom. Sibiu and Brasov were two crucial cities for long-distance trades such as the Orient. Although the Romanian people were the majority in Transylvania, they were, compared to the Saxons, a minority, and in terms of their rights were at a significant disadvantage. The Saxons were isolated from the Romanian and Hungarian settlers and also cut off from the nobility. This caused an establishment of their own German-speaking environment that was completely isolated from other parts of the society, which remained for several centuries. After the Second World War this established fundament for economic development was resolved by the Communists (Ursprung 2015, 12).

The third factor is the confessional status of the Saxons. Due to the close ties to the German region of the Saxons, the reformation reached Transylvania in 1545 fairly quickly. Besides the ethnic differences between the German Saxons and the other people in the Romanian region, there was now Evangelism as a different confession. The Evangelical-Lutheran faith, which was adopted by the German Saxons, was different from the orthodoxical faith, which was adopted mostly by the Romanians. During the reformation process Hungarians remained Catholic or they converted to another reformed faith like Calvinism. Those facts led to an increasing complexity of differences between German Saxons and the other citizens and eventually caused increased isolation of German Saxons from the others. In the 19th century the confession should become an important factor for shaping the nationhood (Ursprung 2015, 12-13).

Although there was a strong community of German origin people, they were not interested in gaining autonomous territory for self-government. Instead, they wanted to join the German Empire, which was in the unification process during 1871. They strengthened their ties to Germany by making use of the standard German language rather than the Transylvanian-German dialect in certain society classes in preparation for the integration in the unified German Empire. Unfortunately, the main issue was that the distance between German Empire and Transylvania was too wide and this could not be resolved. Moreover, the German-Romanians were overly fragmented in the region which was an obstacle for establishing a homogenous ethnic community with power (Ursprung 2015, 13).

After the First World War, Transylvania was integrated in Romania, in which the integration process was supported by the Saxons. During the dictatorship of Hitler, a considerable part of German-Romanians supported the ideology of National-Socialism and were radicalized, which granted them a certain status in the Romanian society. Another reason for getting this status was that Romania was also a close ally of Germany during the Second World War (Ursprung 2015, 13).

After the Second World War ended, the most German speaking people fled or were dispersed from the East European countries to Germany. Others who remained in those regions were subjected to an assimilation process or they were deported to Central Asia. Due to the assimilation, which was mainly initiated by Stalin, the knowledge of the German language decreased. Compared with other European countries, the policy of

Soviet Union towards German speaking people in Romania was different. During the Ceausescu regime in the 1960s, due to many constraints and unification of their families years earlier, many German people emigrated to the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG). After the end of the Cold War, more than 200,000 people migrated from Romania to the unified Germany (Ursprung 2015, 13).

Although the migration flow maintained in the following years, the older generation in particular chose to stay behind in Romania. Despite the emigration to Germany or the assimilation of the Hungarian population, especially the young generation, the German identity was deeply rooted among the German-Romanians in Transylvania, since irrespective of anything else, the elder generation had managed to preserve this identity. The limitation of the rights of certain groups in the 19th century, the Nazi period - which had influenced the perception of German rights - and the subsequent socialism regime, especially under Ceausescu, are listed as the three main reasons for the dwindling presence of the German ethnic group in Romania (Ursprung 2015, 14).

Even though the amount of German speaking people decreased and they are now in the minority, there are some regions and villages where they are in the majority. There are some areas where there is a German school system which continues from primary school until university. On the other hand, it must be stated that German children are the minority in those schools, as mostly the Romanian and Hungarian families send their children to those schools. Due to the strong reputation of German education, they send their children to these schools (Ursprung 2015, 14-15).

Romania's domestic politics was hugely affected by the Second World War, especially between 1940 and 1944. Besides the fact that the Third Reich occupied Hungary, Bulgaria and Romania by the Hitler Stalin pact in 1940, there were also some adjustments made with regards to the German minority in Romania. Due to the pressure by the Third Reich, the former Foreign Minister Mihail Manoilescu was forced to sign an agreement for the judicial status of the German people in Romania. Two main judicial rights were altered, which were equal treatment of Germans and the right of developing their own character according to the Alba-Iulia declarations, which came into effect in 1918 (Trașcă 2015, 16).

Additionally, to this agreement, there were other events which increased the Third Reich's influence on Romania. Between September and November 1940, King Carol II

resigned, General Ion Antonescu participated in the Iron Guard, which was also named as “National-Legionary”, the German military invaded Romania and on November 23, 1940 Romania signed the Tripartite Pact. Those events gave the Third Reich further opportunities for structuring the regime in Romania to their own advantage. With regards to the German minority’s leader Dr. Bruckner, he was replaced on 22th September 1940 by Andreas Schmidt, who was in comparison to Brucker a more radical figure. Andreas Schmidt, who received orders from the Central Office for Ethnic Germans from Abroad, had close ties to the commanders of the “Protection Squad” (german: Schutzstaffel). The orders included also the “Gleichschaltung” of the German minority, which was the alignment process of the whole Third Reich, for homogenising the economic, political and societal structure (Trașcă 2015, 16-17).

The already mentioned Iron Guard, which was the main dialogue partner of the National-Legionary government, gathered together on November 9, 1940 in Medias with Andreas Schmidt, who announced the new party for the German ethnic group in Romania, the NSDAP for DVR (german: Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei der Deutschen Volksgruppe in Rumänien). The fundamentals of the party, which were based on the legal rights of the German people, was due to a national-socialist approach and the fact that those fundamentals included the prohibition of the establishment of other parties, which was against the former Romanian law. On November 21, 1940, after Schmidt agreed to modify the course of the party according to the request of the Council of Ministers Vice-President Sima, the party was acknowledged by the law in Romania. The party’s acknowledgment prepared certain action opportunities especially for the Third Reich, to be able to have influence in the domestic politics of Romania. It provided the repression of all parties and political organizations, which opposed the policy of Andreas Schmidt’s party. The party resumed the autocratic leadership style of the Nazi regime in the Third Reich and obtained complete control over the public life of the Germans in Romania (Trașcă 2015, 17-18).

During the process of gathering of the whole German ethnic group by the party of Andreas Schmidt, there were also opponents amongst the German people. Especially Germans, who were members of the Lutheran and Catholic churches, were seen as considerably hostile for the NSDAP in Romania. Therefore, Schmidt decided to remove the leaders from those church communities, which were generally the bishops, and replaced them by

bishops whose thoughts were in line with the Nazi ideology. Consequently, the “alignment” had also reached Romania and the Lutheran church had lost their control over their community. As such, the German ethnic group in Romania was under full control of the Third Reich (Trașcă 2015, 18).

Although the Third Reich was very present and dominant in Romania’s political environment, the Antonescu regime maintained the withstanding against the established German Ethnic Group party. The regime did not want to acknowledge Germanic people as Romanian citizens as this would most likely pave the way for further opportunities to have influence in politics and in particular, the Romanian military. The resistance of the Romanian regime affected the relations between Berlin and Bucharest. The fact that Germans were not able to take part in public policy and military in Romania led to the participation of Germans in the Third Reich’s military and the SS. It is estimated that approximately 65.000 Romanian Germans were members of the SS during the Second World War, in which 8.000 to 15.000 Romanian Germans died. The period of the Third Reich, was, as it was for all Germans, was considered as the most difficult era for the German minority in Romania. It affected not only the relations between the Romanian Germans and the Romanian government at that time, but it also affected their minority rights and the perception of the Romanian people during the Cold War era (Trașcă 2015, 19).

With the end of the Second World War, the Soviet Union occupied the whole of East Europe, including Romania. As a result of the damage caused by the Third Reich in the Soviet Union during the Second World War, the German people had to take the responsibility for paying the reparations. At the Yalta Conference in February 1945, the decision that the Germans should be responsible for the reparations was confirmed. In order to pay for the reparations, German citizens as well as East Europeans with German roots were sent against their will to Soviet labour camps. The deportation mainly affected Germans who were from the Oder and the Neisse rivers. The deportation finally began after the Soviet Union had liberated and conquered this region from the Nazis (Baier 2015, 20).

On December 15, 1944, the Soviet Union had intended to ascertain the number of citizens with German roots in Bulgaria, Hungary, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia and Romania and therefore conducted a census to send potential workers to the labour camps for reparations

in Ukraine. According to Soviet data, 551.049 citizens with German roots lived in these countries at that time, 421.846 of whom lived within Romania's borders. Originally it was planned to send only men between the ages of 17 and 45, in which 97.484 of whom were from this group, to the labour camps, but many of them were unable to work due to health problems. Therefore, women between the ages of 18 and 30 were also sent to the labour camps (Baier 2015, 21).

Between December 1944 and February 1945 Germans were deported to rebuild black iron metallurgy in a certain region. According to the published statistics of the Soviet Union, during this period overall 112480 people were sent to labour, from whom were 61.375 men and 51,105 women. The majority were Germans with 69.332 persons. According to documents from the end of 1944 until January 1945 there can be seen that Soviet Union demanded for a name list of Romanian citizens with German origin. Besides women with children who were infants and men with disabilities, women with Romanian husbands, citizens with a non-German parent and active members of the church such as nuns and priests were not deported. Although there were those regulars, some citizens did not fulfil the age conditions or did not consider themselves as Germans although they had German roots and were deported by the Soviet Union. In hindsight, there is the impression that Romania sent the Germans immediately to the Soviet Union and did not do anything to prevent this systematic deportation (Baier 2015, 22).

According to the presented statistics of the Romanian Ministries of Internal and Foreign Affairs, the number of Romanian citizens who were deported to the Soviet Union in 1945 for rebuilding was 70,148 with Germans as majority. It is estimated that the overall amount of Romanian Germans during the whole deportation period was approximately 70,000. According to statistics, which were presented by the Soviet Union in March 1946, 53.946 Romanian citizens with German roots were mobilized since the beginning of deportation. The decrease in the number of the German workers is caused by the fact that some of them were sent back home as they were not able to work. The Soviet regime established a five-year plan for the workers. That means that they had to work for five years as laborers. The people who were first deported returned to their home in 1949. However, many people died during the deportation to labour camps and also died in these camps whilst they were working. It is estimated that 3.000 German ethnic people died during the deportation and 600 during the way back to home. Overall, between 14,5 and

20 percent of the Germans, who lived in Transylvania, were deported to the Soviet Union, with children and the elderly remaining behind in this region (Baier 2015, 23).

The deportation strongly affected the relations between Romania and the Saxons. The Romanians with German roots felt betrayed by the deportation which was allowed by Romania. Although the communist government in Romania had taken over the property of the Germans immediately after the end of the Second World War and this had had a negative effect on the prosperity of the Germans as well as their social status, the breach of trust in regard to the deportation had a greater impact on the relations between the Romanians and the Germans. In addition to the deportation of the Germans to the Soviet Union, Romanian citizens with German roots were also sent to Romanian labour camps. The reason for the forced labour for the Romanian Germans was that the deportation to the Soviet Union had a negative effect on the Romanian economy as there was a severe shortage of labour. For this reason, on 19 February 1945, shortly before the end of the war, the Romanian government decided to disperse Romanian Germans who had resisted deportation throughout the country to labour camps (Baier 2015, 23-24).

After the end of World War II, the situation of the German minority in Romania was better than of the German minority in Poland and Hungary. Despite the deportation of 70,000 male German-Romanians to today's Ukraine and the displacement of around 100,000 Germans to Germany, the structure and community of the German-Romanians in Romania still remained. Moreover, Romania had maintained a minority-friendly political system until the mid-1960s. In February 1945, the Romanian parliament had accepted the so-called minority statutes. However, the German minority remained excluded from this decision for the next several years. The status of German-Romanian citizenship was unclear for some years (Wolff and Kordell 2003, 112).

After the German-Romanians received their citizenship in the following years, the German-Romanians had the right to learn their German mother tongue at educational institutions. In addition, they were allowed to publish their own daily newspapers, received support from the Romanian government in the publication of German books, and received financial support for cultural organizations and programs. German radio and television were also allowed by the Romanian government (Wolff and Kordell 2003, 112).

The minority policy, however, changed in the mid-1960s. The Romanian regime turned away from multicultural politics and viewed Romania as a homogeneous nation-state. As a result, several cultural freedoms of various minorities were repressed. However, unlike other ethnic minorities, the German minority was able to identify itself through its ethnic identity and also organize cultural activities, even if they were very limited. The reason for the advantages for the German minority is that the Romanian regime had seen the German minority as a good source of revenue.

In the context of the Ostpolitik of West Germany 150.000 German-Romanians were given a visa between 1977 and 1988. The Federal Republic of Germany paid between 8.000 and 12.000 Deutschmarks per German-Romanian. On the one hand, the Romanian regime put pressure on the German minority to emigrate. On the other hand, they assured the German-Romanians that German culture would continue to remain intact in Romania. The emigration of the German-Romanians after 1977 was thus marked by a trade-off between West Germany and Romania. The next wave of emigration of the German minority to Germany was after the reunification of Germany in 1989-1990. While the population of the German minority in 1977 was still 360.000, the number of German-Romanians in 1990 was only 200.000. In 1996, during Romania's transformation process, another 180.000 German-Romanians emigrated to Germany. The majority of the emigrated German-Romanians was a much younger population. For this reason, from a demographic perspective, the German-Romanian population in Romania has a much older population.

Article 32 in the Romanian Constitution states that members of a national minority have the right to learn their mother tongue and receive education in their mother tongue. Furthermore, Article 59 states that "organizations of citizens belonging to national minorities, which fail to obtain the number of votes for representation in Parliament, have the right to one Deputy seat each". This is intended to give each national minority the opportunity to be represented by one deputy seat in parliament. Furthermore, article 127 states that "belonging to national minorities... have the right to take cognizance of all acts and files of the case, to speak before the Court and formulate conclusions, through an interpreter...". In addition, a bilateral agreement was concluded between Germany and Romania in 1992. Subsequently, in 1995 and 1996, the two countries concluded cooperation agreements in the fields of culture and education. The bilateral agreement

and the cooperation agreements are the foundation for the positive developments within the German-Romanian relations.


In the field of education, the German-Romanians have access to all educational institutions. The Romanian government has established multicultural schools for the national minorities in order to establish an adequate educational system. In these multicultural schools, the classes were divided into the classes of the national minorities and the classes of the Romanians. Between 1997-1998, there were 286 of these types of educational institutions which were attended by 20,000 children from Bucharest and eight other districts. The population of these districts is predominantly German.

Even if the tradition of the German minority is no longer as present as it used to be, culture still remains an important part. There are four cultural centres in Iais, Cluj, Sibiu and Timisoara. These cultural centres offered different activity programs and access to German newspapers, books and movies. There are also several local German newspapers and radio stations in the minority settlements. Furthermore, there are two nationwide cultural magazines in German language are co-financed by the Romanian government. In addition, there are television programs on state television that are specifically aimed at the German minority. Moreover, there is a 45-minute German-language weekly program on the regional TV Cluj-Napoca. The program reaches 10 districts in the northwest and west of Transylvania. In addition to this, there is a local German-language radio program that broadcasts 14 hours a week.

6. GERMAN-ROMANIAN RELATIONS

In this section, the economic relations between Germany and Romania have been taken into account, since the end of the Cold War in 1990 relations between both countries have increased since the fall of the Soviet Union.

Figure 4. Germany's Trading Volume with Romania Between 1990 and 2019



(Städtisches Bundesamt)

The German-Romanian economic relations improved as good political relations increased. The most important German investment projects are in the automotive industry, aviation, electrical and electronic components, electrical appliances, energy and environmental protection, metals, wood and building materials, transport and infrastructure, tourism and trade. The above diagram shows that the trade balance between Germany and Romania was relatively balanced until 2001. From the year 2001 until the year 2011 an uneven trade balance between both countries can be seen. Despite the increase of exports and imports between Germany and Romania, the value of exports from Germany to Romania clearly exceeds the value of imports from Romania to Germany. From 2011 onwards, an even trade balance between Germany and Romania can be seen.

Table 2 Romania's Trade Balance with Germany Between 2007 and 2011

	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011
Total	7.556	8.800	11.598	12.516	13.861	12.065	13.756	17.191
Export	3.159	3.483	4.370	4.742	4.883	5.665	6.464	8.394
Import	4.397	5.317	7.228	7.774	8.978	6.400	7.292	8.797
Trade balance	-1.238	-1.834	-2.858	-3.032	-4.095	-735	-828	-403

(Embassy of Romania in Germany)

Germany is considered Romania's most important trading partner and Romania is also considered an important trading partner for Germany despite its size. Between 2005 and 2006, with 5.317 billion Euros in 2005 and 7.228 billion Euros in 2006, a clear jump in imports from Germany to Romania can be seen. After the accession of Romania to the European Union in 2007, a smaller increase can be seen with an import value of 8.978 billion Euros in 2008. However, in the same year the highest difference in the trade balance was also seen, with a value of 4.095 billion Euros. This is mainly due to the global economic crisis, which had a negative impact on the balance of trade and the economy globally. The stable economic relations are also evident especially in 2008 and 2009 during the global economic crisis. Romanian exports to the German market also increased significantly during the crisis years 2008/2009, while exports to other EU Member States decreased. From 2009 onwards, a significant decrease in the difference within the trade balance can be seen. While the negative trade balance in 2008 was 4.095 billion euros, the negative trade balance fell to 735 million euros. In 2011, Romania achieved the highest growth rate among European countries on the German market with 29.9% increase in exports. The most important exports to Germany are in the fields of machinery and equipment, modes of transport, textiles, metals, chemical products and plastics. In contrast, the most important imports from Germany are in the areas of machinery and equipment, vehicle construction, chemical products, metals and metal goods with plastics considered the most important (Romanian Embassy in Germany).

Germany is the No. 1 trading partner and with EUR 7.99 billion (2015) taking third place in terms of foreign direct investment. Formally, 21,595 companies, with German participation in the capital amounting to EUR 4.65 billion at the end of January 2017, are active in Romania. According to adjusted figures about 8,000 of them are actually active on the market. A number of German companies also make their investments via subsidiaries in other EU member states which therefore do not appear as German investments in the Romanian statistics (German Embassy in Romania). Romania ranks 18th among Germany's trading partners. Germany was Romania's most important supplier country in 2018 and is also one of the largest investors in Romania after the Netherlands and Austria (OAOEV).

In addition, institutions were founded by Germany to deepen the economic cooperation with Romania. On September 5, 2002, the German-Romanian Chamber of Industry and

Commerce (AHK) was founded in Bucharest with approximately 500 member companies. According to AHK estimates, its members employ approximately 300,000 people in Romania. Furthermore, the German Business Clubs were founded in Bucharest, Sibiu, Braşov, Timișoara, Arad, Cluj-Napoca, Satu Mare, Bacău and Tîrgu Mureş. These serve to advise German companies in the respective regions in which these companies wish to invest. In addition, a network between these companies is to be created through these business clubs. Moreover, Germany Trade and Invest (GTAI) opened a correspondent office in Romania in 2008 (German Embassy in Romania).

Romania is generally considered as an important investment location, especially for EU countries. The share of the total stock of foreign direct investment (FDI) in the manufacturing sector amounts to 30.9 % respectively 25 billion Euros. In addition, the construction sector including real estate transactions (16.8%), trade (15.8%) and financial services and insurance (11.5%) are considered particularly important for FDI. Bucharest is considered the favorite of foreign direct investors with a share of 60.7% of the total FDI stock. This is followed by the Central Region, which includes the districts of Alba, Brasov, Covasna, Harghita, Mures and Sibiu, with an FDI share of 9%, and the Western Region, which includes the districts of Arad, Caras-Severin, Hunedoara and Timis with 8.6%. According to the statistical evaluation at the end of 2018, Germany is in second place with 12.7% of the investment share of the total FDI stock, behind the Netherlands with 23.9% and ahead of Austria with 12.2%. With regard to the number of foreign projects in Romania between 2015 and 2019, Germany is in first place with a total of 179 projects surpassing France that has 108 projects and the USA with 100 projects during the same period. The most recent FDI project by Germany, which was launched in May 2018 and is expected to be completed in 2021, is by B.Braun in the district of Timis. With a value of 120 million euros, a production facility for perfusion solutions will be constructed, which is expected to create 250 new jobs (GTAI).

According to the German Embassy in Romania the cultural relations are described as follows:

“Bilateral cultural relations are formally based on the Convention on the reciprocal establishment and operation of cultural and information centres of 1990, the Treaty of Friendship of 1992, the Convention on Cultural Cooperation of 1995 and the Convention

on Cooperation in Schools of 1996. The main focus is on science and higher education and the promotion of the German language. Romania feels closely connected to the German cultural area. Through the German minority, there is a common tradition that keeps the interest in German language and culture alive in Romania.” (German Embassy in Romania)

The Goethe Institute (GI), the Institute for Foreign Cultural Relations (ifa), the Alexander von Humboldt Foundation (AvH), the German Academic Exchange Service (DAAD), the Central Agency for Schools Abroad (ZfA) and the German political foundations are mentioned as particularly active institutional institutions. The work of the Goethe-Institut is complemented by the German cultural centres in Iași, Cluj-Napoca, Sibiu, Brasov and Timisoara. The increase in the number of university and school partnerships is continuing (German Embassy in Romania).

7. INSTITUTIONS AND FOUNDATIONS AS ‘BRIDGE’ IN GERMAN-ROMANIAN RELATIONS

In this chapter, foundations, associations, institutes, federations and municipalities are considered to have links with the German minorities or play a role in German-Romanian relations. This is intended to provide a comprehensive overview of the extent to which German foundations and associations are active with regard to the German minority in Romania and the extent to which these associations play a role in German-Romanian relations. These foundations are not only active in Romania, but there are also associations from Germany that actively organize events regarding the German-Romanians in Romania. In the following chapters Germany’s minority policy towards German-Romanians in Romania will be shown and described. Furthermore, foundations in Romania which are represented by Germans, but do not have a direct link to Germany’s minority policy, will be described. Following that, institutes in Romania which are founded by the German-Romanian minority will be explained. In the next chapter, institutes in Germany which were established by German-Romanians will be presented.

7.1. GERMANY'S MINORITY POLICY TOWARDS GERMAN-ROMANIAN MINORITY IN ROMANIA

As mentioned earlier, there are currently approximately one million Germans living outside Germany who are defined as minorities in their respective countries. The Federal Ministry of the Interior is responsible for German minority policy and has also established certain guiding principles. The German state sees these minorities as a bridge between Germany and the Central and Eastern European countries. In particular, the German state considers cultural aspects to be very important. Therefore, Germany places a lot of emphasis on preserving the cultures of the German minorities in the successor states of the Soviet Union (BMI).

The German Federal Ministry of the Interior emphasises following measures that are necessary to support the German minority in the different countries: language promotion, preservation and further development of the ethnocultural identity, youth work, partnership measures and strengthening the self-organizations of the German minorities (BMI).

Furthermore, the Ministry states that the German language is the foundation for the preservation of cultural identity. Therefore, the German government is responsible for promoting the German language. Furthermore, the German Federal Ministry of the Interior states that Germany supports the development of well-organized and sustainable self-governments in which the German minority can be an active participant. In addition, special emphasis would be placed on youth work, since the aim is to continue to use them in their role as a bridge for the German minority in the future (BMI).


With regard to Germany's minority policy in Romania, Germany became very active, especially after the end of the Cold War. On 21 April 1992, the "Treaty on Friendly Cooperation and Partnership in Europe between the Federal Republic of Germany and Romania" was established. In the following years, the agreement formed the basis for close cooperation. Between 1990 and 2000, the German government invested around 90 million Euros to preserve the cultural traditions of German minorities. In particular, in the first half of the 1990s, the German government increased its financial support for the German minority. Starting in the second half of the 1990s, the financial support gradually decreased. From 2000 onwards, the German government decided that the German minority in Romania was no longer the highest priority. Financial support for the German

minority was still maintained, but this financial support is on a rather moderate level. Nevertheless, financial support continues to be provided in the area of education and culture (Wolff and Cordell 2003, 113-114).

In 1998 a teacher training college was established in Sibiu with financial support from Germany. In addition, a course for training primary German school teachers was founded at the University of Bucharest together with the Goethe Institute. Furthermore, the Babes-Bolyai University offers 12 courses in German. In addition to this, the University College of Bystrica offers courses in tourism management and German and the German-Hungarian-Ukrainian university was founded in Transylvania in the year 2000. There are 400 teachers in total who teach German as their mother tongue. Another 60 teachers are active in teacher training, which is co-financed by Germany. There are also various organizations and institutes that work on behalf of the German government. These will be explained in the following graphs (Wolff and Cordell 2003, 114-115).

Figure 5. Worldwide Distribution of German Learners by Region

Worldwide distribution of German learners by region



(German Federal Foreign Office)

Every 5 years the German Foreign Office publishes a data collection in which the number of German learners worldwide is presented. Figure 1 shows the percentage distribution of German learners worldwide. The number of German learners in Romania has increased in recent years and a positive trend can be seen and it has increased by 20,956 persons

compared to 2015. A total of 205,207 people in Romania state that they are learning German - 4,600 of them at Goethe Institutes and 6,483 as students at universities. The largest group, however, is made up of the 194,124 pupils who attend one of the 1058 schools, where 1758 teachers teach German (ADZ). The number of German-speaking schools in Romania or the number of schools where one can obtain a German qualification is officially 53, with one German School Abroad (DAS), two German Profile Schools (DPS) and two Fit schools. Furthermore, 48 Romanian schools cooperate with the German Language Diploma (DSD). While the DAS, DSD and DPS schools are supervised by The Central Agency for Schools Abroad, the Fit schools are supervised by the Goethe Institute. In the following, the individual school types are listed for an overview:

- DAS - German Schools Abroad
- DPS – German Profile Schools: Schools in national education systems with a distinctive German teaching and final profile.
- DSD-Schools: Schools in national education systems offering the German Language Diploma.
- Fit-Schools: Schools in national education systems where German language teaching is established or expanded.

(Pasch-net).

7.2. GERMANY’S INSTITUTIONS AND FOUNDATIONS IN ROMANIA

Goethe Institute Romania

The Goethe-Institute e.V. is the German cultural association and is represented worldwide and was established with its headquarters in Bucharest, Romania in 1979. It sees its task in strengthening the discourse of civil society and promoting German culture and above all, the German language in Romania. Language courses, workshops and seminars are offered, primarily to train teachers in the field of the German language. In addition, there is a wide range of German literature available for learning about German culture and history. The institute also cooperates with other cultural institutions in Romania and Moldova (Goethe Institute Bukarest).

The institute has cultural centres in several Romanian cities. In addition, the Institute cooperates with regard to exams not only with the cultural centres but also with the

University of Ovidius Constanța. The German sources and literature can also be found in the university libraries of Craiova and Mihai Eminescu. The German Embassy is also considered an important cooperation partner of the institute (Goethe Institut Bukarest). The Goethe Institut Bucharest is active not only in Romania but also in the Republic of Moldova. The institute cooperates with several German cultural centers, examination partners, language course cooperation partners and partner libraries. In addition, the Goethe Institut offers courses that are included in the advanced training courses for teachers of German. The following section lists the teaching material centers with which the Goethe Institut cooperates:

- Goethe Center Cluj-Napoca
- German Cultural Center Iași
- German Cultural Center Brasov
- German Cultural Center Sibiu
- Național Pedagogical College “Andrei Șaguna” Sibiu
- German Cultural Center Timisoara
- German Cultural Center AKZENTE Chișinău
- Faculty of Philology Constanța
(Goethe Institute Bukarest).

Furthermore, there are several cultural societies with which the Goethe Institute cooperates with closely. However, these cultural societies are not German institutions and they were established in Romania. The cultural societies work together with local and German institutions. They offer German language courses and examinations. They also provide information about current events in Germany.

The cultural societies are listed in the following section:

- German Cultural Center Sibiu
- German Cultural Center (Iași)
- Goethe Center Cluj-Napoca

- German Cultural Center Braşov
- German Cultural Center Timisoara
- Centrul Cultural German Akzente

(Goethe Institute Bukarest).

In addition, as already mentioned, there are examination centers in different cities, which are listed in the following section:

- German Cultural Center Iaşi
- Goethe Center Cluj-Napoca
- The Schiller House Bucharest
- German Cultural Center Braşov
- German Cultural Center Sibiu
- Fundația Calepinus Târgu Mureş
- Universitatea Ovidius Constanța - Chair of English and German Language
- German Cultural Center Timisoara

(Goethe Institute Bukarest).

In addition, there are partner libraries of the Goethe Institute, where German books, magazines and films with a focus on literature, German as a foreign language and German regional studies can be found. The partner libraries are listed below:

- German Cultural Center Braşov
- German Cultural Center Sibiu
- German Cultural Center Timisoara
- German Cultural Center Cluj-Napoca
- Craiova University Library - German Reading Room
- Central University Library “Mihai Eminescu” - German Reading Room
- Biblioteca germană “Alexander Tietz”

(Goethe Institute Bukarest).

The Goethe Institute has indicated that they are financially supported by private promoters, foundations and sponsors. A concrete sum was not provided.

German Academic Exchange Service (DAAD)

The DAAD was founded in 1925 and since then has provided financial support to approximately 2.3 million students and scientists. It serves as an exchange service for students and supports the students during, for example, a research project in the form of financial funding. In addition to awarding scholarships, the DAAD also focuses on the internationalization of German universities and the expansion of their networks. Furthermore, the DAAD is also dedicated to the promotion of the German language abroad. The DAAD cooperates very closely with the German Foreign Office.

The DAAD is also active in Romania and supports not only the exchange of students, but also especially the fostering of the German language. In 2018, the DAAD supported 480 students and scientists from Germany and 379 students and scientists from abroad. In the following table the DAAD funding in Romania in 2019 is presented in detail:

Table 3 Romania Country Statistics 2019 - DAAD

	Funded from abroad		Funded from Germany	
	Total	New	Total	New
Individual Funding	141	93	26	16
Project Funding	171	125	76	45
EU Mobility Programs	2	2	332	332
DAAD Funding Total	314	220	434	393

(DAAD)

The table shows that the DAAD supports more students and scientists from abroad than from Germany. It makes no difference whether the students and scientists are funded individually or as part of a project. Furthermore, this table shows that funding is

increasingly focused on German language courses. However, the table also shows that the Erasmus mobility program supports students exclusively from Germany. With regard to lectures and other staff, it is evident that more scholars from Germany are funded than those from abroad.

Institute for Foreign Cultural Relations (IFA)

The Institute for Foreign Cultural Relations (IFA) is the oldest intermediary organisation of the Federal Foreign Office and is based in Stuttgart. Since the end of the 1980s it has also been promoting the educational, cultural and media work of German minorities in Central and Eastern Europe on behalf of the Federal Foreign Office. Institutions of the German minority can apply to IFA for project funds for their media, cultural and educational work. The IFA also supports some projects initiated by the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe. However, minority support has been reduced in recent years. The reason for this is that no emergency aid is provided for the German minority as a result of the consequences of the war. The IFA expects the German minority to initiate projects on its own initiative (Siebenbürger.de).

The IFA has a regional coordination office in Timisoara. Cornelia Hemmann is currently the IFA regional coordinator for Romania, Serbia and Hungary. The regional coordination office keeps up to date with the current affairs concerning the German minority, especially in regard to politics. Furthermore, the regional coordination office exchanges information with the partners in Germany to organise annual meetings. Additionally, the regional coordination office looks after the cultural managers in the region. There are four delegates or cultural managers in Romania: at the German Forum in Sathmar (Arthur Glaser), at the Radio Forum in Timisoara (Florian Kerzel), and in Sibiu, Aurelia Brecht works for both the German Forum and the Kirchenburgen Foundation. The task of the IFA's regional co-ordinator is to look after the cultural managers during their secondment, to keep in touch with the host institutions and to advise them on their projects.

In general IFA, together with the local cultural managers, promotes various projects such as reading series with German-language authors, workshops to teach media skills or alternative city tours and exploratory apps in German. Projects that strengthen the organisations of the German minority as civil society actors are also supported (ADZ).

German Society for International Cooperation (GIZ)

The German Society for International Cooperation (GIZ) is a service provider of international cooperation for sustainable development and international education work. It was formed on 1 January 2011 by merging the German Agency for Technical Cooperation (GTZ), Capacity Building International, Germany (InWEnt) and the German Development Service (DED). The promotion of GIZ focuses on the economy, energy, environment and security. The GIZ states on its homepage that it works closely with the German Federal Government, the UN, the EU, companies and other governments. In addition, GIZ cooperates with civil society and scientific institutions and thus contributes to the development policy of different countries. It states the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) as its main client. GIZ is based in Bonn and Eschborn. The business volume in 2019 amounted to approximately 3.1 billion euros. Of the 22,199 employees in 120 countries, almost 70 per cent work on site as national staff (GIZ Homepage).

The former German Society for Technical Cooperation (GTZ) was in fact the organization that contributed significantly to Romania's post-Cold War development policy. GTZ's goal was to prepare Romania for EU accession by providing advice, especially on reform processes. The German Federal Government assigned this task to GTZ in 1991, which ended in 2010 after almost 20 years. The BMZ provided a total of 129 million euros during these 20 years. In the reform processes, GTZ has advised Romania primarily on economic promotion and administrative capacity building. In addition, GTZ has helped to preserve German-Romanian culture and traditions by renovating and restoring buildings in danger of collapsing and fortifying churches in Sibiu and Timisoara. In concrete terms, GTZ has concentrated on economic and employment promotion, wholesale markets for fresh produce, the establishment of a milk control system, the dismantling of technical barriers to trade, training and further training for administrations and businesses and the establishment of German-Romanian administrative partnerships. Apart from the rehabilitation of the old towns in Sibiu and Timisoara, GTZ has focused on culture and tourism in Transylvania, regional development in the Apuseni Mountains and the development of renewable energies and

energy efficiency. GTZ ended its unilateral development policy support for Romania in 2010, as Romania had successfully completed its transformation process (GTZ).

The Central Agency for Schools Abroad (ZfA)

The Central Office for Schools Abroad has over 100 staff, more than 50 specialist counselling services for German as a foreign language and 16 process support services, and provides support for German schools abroad. The ZfA was founded in 1968 and is based in Bonn. It is considered a department of the Federal Administrative Office. Around 1,200 schools worldwide, including 140 German schools abroad, which are mainly privately run, receive personnel and financial support. Around 2,000 teachers in various functions are employed at these institutions. During their work abroad, they are supported organisationally, pedagogically and financially by the Central Office for Schools Abroad.

The tasks of the ZfA are:

- pedagogical and administrative advice for German schools and educational institutions abroad as well as support in setting up a quality management
- Recruitment, selection and placement of teachers for assignments at German schools abroad, German profile schools and language diploma schools as well as in the public education system
- Preparation, in-service and further training of teachers
- Financial support for foreign service teachers and programme teachers
- Preparation for German and international degrees
- Development and implementation of examinations in the field of German as a foreign language (German Language Diploma of the Conference of Ministers of Education and Cultural Affairs)
- German-language subject lessons
- Vocational education and training
- Grants within the framework of foreign cultural and education policy
- Establishment of structures for international cooperation

(ZfA).

ZfA is also a partner in the initiative “Schools: Partners of the Future” (PASCH). The ZfA also cooperates very closely with the German Language Diploma of the Conference of Ministers of Education and Cultural Affairs (DSD). It also supervises 300 teachers at DSD schools.

ZfA has been active in Romania since 1990 and has its offices in Bucharest, Sibiu and Timisoara, which are directly linked to the German embassy and German consulates (ZfA).

German-Romanian Chamber of Industry and Commerce (AHK)

The AHK Romania sees itself as an economic community that acts as a consultant for foreign companies and advises them on their investments in the fields of economy, politics, administration and society in order to contribute to Romania’s economic development. In addition, there is the AHK Romania Office Transylvania, which focuses primarily on economic development in the Transylvanian region. The central tasks are to develop and implement solutions for companies in order to increase the availability of qualified workers and to promote the system of dual vocational training. In addition, the cooperation between the private sector and the university is to be strengthened with the creation of new opportunities. It is also seen as an important task to generally contribute to the development of the city. The last task was also set to present the image of Germany in this region in the best possible form (AHK Rumänien Homepage).

7.3. GERMAN INSTITUTIONS AND FOUNDATIONS IN ROMANIA

South East Europe Society

The Southeast Europe Society (SOG) was founded in 1952 and is considered the most important cultural institute of the German Foreign Office with regard to Southeast Europe. It views itself as an intermediary between Germany and the countries of South Eastern Europe and sees its task in promoting scientific, political, economic and cultural relations with them, deepening knowledge of current developments in this region. The SOG sees itself as independent and non-partisan and as an association of scientists, politicians, representatives of the economy, culture and media with headquarters based in Munich. It regularly publishes academic publications and analyses and also organises panel discussions and symposia, thus not only creating a channel of communication

between Germany and the respective countries, but also providing a forum for policy advice (SOGDE Homepage). In addition, the SOG cooperates with the Fritz and Helga Exner Foundation. This foundation supports research on Southeastern Europe and awards scholarships for short-term research stays (SOGDE Homepage). In addition, an annual prize is awarded for prospective doctoral students with outstanding achievements (SOGDE Homepage).

With regard to Romania, the SOG has focused on several thematic areas. One topic area is communism in Romania and the scope to which this historical background is examined. In particular, the role of the German minority during the Cold War and why, for example, the reasons for why were not expelled directly after the Second World War in 1945 are also discussed (SOGDE Homepage). Another topic is Romania's transformation process and the extent to which Romania is approaching the EU criteria. The focus here is primarily on how the rule of law is being consolidated in Romania. Annual reports are provided for this purpose. Comparative analyses and reports with other countries, such as a comparison of political developments in Hungary and Romania, are also carried out. In addition to basic structures such as social policy, current political and economic developments are also discussed. In addition to analyses, reports and panels, regular study and cultural days are organised (SOGDE Homepage).

Hans-Seidel Foundation

The Hans-Seidel Foundation is a party-bound foundation of the CSU and is also represented in Romania in Bucharest. The office in Bucharest was opened in 1992 and has set itself the project goal to support the socio-political and state transformation of Romania by promoting civil society participation, citizen-oriented administration and internal security. Civil society, local elected officials and officials of local authorities, the Ministry of the Interior and the police have been identified as target groups (Hans-Seidel Stiftung Homepage). According to Expert No. 5 determines its goals in Romania as follows:

“The framework conditions of a functional democracy require a change in the attitude of citizens, especially at the socio-political level, in order to become a developed and consolidated democracy. The promotion of the European Dialogue of experts and multipliers, the participation of civil society in

political and economic development, as well as raising awareness of corruption and the fight against it are at the center of the project work of many years.” (Expert No. 5)¹

The Foundation’s mode of operation consists of organising seminars and workshops in civil society organisations that focus on the understanding of democracy. These events are aimed primarily at young citizens. This should contribute to increasing political participation and economic development. To improve the understanding of democracy among these young citizens, political identity and European values are also addressed. In addition, the focus is on raising awareness of corruption and civil society partnerships are organised for this purpose. These partnerships work with the Anti-Corruption Directorate, which is state-bound. The think tank “Institute for Popular Studies” serves as a communication channel between civil society and politics. This think tank provides political analysis, training for people in politics and administration, and contributes to public debate through critical questions in the political field.

To support the implementation of EU standards in Romania, Hans-Seidel Foundation focuses mainly on local politics regarding its cooperation with the School of Administration in Sibiu. Regarding these standards, democracy and the rule of law are the main focus. For this purpose, training courses are held in the Ministry of Interior and the police, focusing on leadership within domestic politics and the behaviour of the police regarding organized crime. This is intended to further strengthen democratic and constitutional structures in Romania (Hans-Seidel Stiftung Homepage).

In addition to this, Expert No. 5 added that there are three dialogue formats in total. The first dialogue format is described as follows:

“The aim is to improve the exchange between Romanian and European experts, but also to improve the internal Romanian dialogue among experts and civil society to promote the formation of opinions and positions and the Romanian policy formulation. An important part of this will be the assessment of current issues on the basis of conservative and Christian values in the European dialogue and the Formulation of political and social positions on this basis.” (Expert No. 5)²

The second dialogue format deals with the structure within the Romanian police:

“In continuation of a long-standing project line, dialogue measures between European police forces as well as European police structures (EUROPOL, Interpol, etc.) on topics concerning the self-location of the police in a democratic state are continued. The Romanian police have largely reached “eye level” with

¹ Translated by author.

² Translated by author.

other democratic police forces; the dialogue promotes mutual exchange and learning in a European context.” (Expert No. 5)³

The third format of the dialogue deals with the history of recent years, particularly the invasion of the Nazis during the Second World War:

“On the one hand, the lack of an examination of Romania’s recent history prevents the processing of historical victim-perpetrator relationships, such as those that arose during pogroms against the Jewish population, collaboration with Nazi Germany or collaboration in the Securitate secret service under Ceausescu. On the other hand, historical lines of democratic development in the 1940s or the resistance under the communist regime are not used to develop a comprehensive assessment of Romanian society in a European context.

30 years after the revolution of 1989, a new generation of Romanians is experiencing their country formally and institutionally on a European level. However, the framework conditions of a functional democracy require, above all at the socio-political level, a change in the attitudes, perceptions and behaviour of citizens towards this state - as well as some fundamental changes in the services the state provides to its citizens in order to become a truly developed and consolidated democracy.

The impact hypothesis of the project is based on a positive influence on socio-political discourse and policy-making through qualified representation of the interests of the committed population. The deficits described above in Romania’s pre-political area call for a systematic development of political and social awareness raising. The project measures therefore promote a qualified examination of one’s own past and the democratic deficits to which Romania was exposed in the second half of the 20th century. Against this background, the need to become actively involved in shaping and consolidating the country’s democratic development becomes almost self-explanatory. Work with the Democratic Forum of Germans in Romania (DFDR) is of particular importance in this respect.” (Expert No. 5)⁴

Regarding conferences, seminars and other events for the German minority in Romania

Expert No. 5 listed these as follows:

“In recent years, the HSS has carried out measures with the DFDR on the following topics:

- Conference: 70 years since the deportation of Romanian Germans to Russia
- Conference: 100 years of Great Romania
- Delegation trip to Munich
- Conference: 100 years of the Karlovy Vary resolutions: Swabia
- Conference: The German minority’s view of the Romanian Revolution
- Seminar: Peace Conference in Paris“ (Expert No. 5)⁵

The following organizations were listed as official partners of the Hans-Seidel Foundation:

- School of Administration Sibiu
- European Institute for Participatory Democracy Quorum
- Association Pro Democratia (APD)
- Institute for Popular Studies, (ISP)

³ Translated by author.

⁴ Translated by author.

⁵ Translated by author.

- Democratic Forum of the Germans in Romania (DFDR)
- Romanian Anti-Corruption Directorate (DGA)

(Hans-Seidel Stiftung Homepage).

Friedrich-Ebert Foundation

The Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung is a party-bound foundation of the German party SPD. In 1994, the Foundation opened its office in Romania and has set itself the goal of supporting democracy, social justice and the rule of law in Romania. This support consists of political education, conferences, workshops, scientific research and publications, international exchange programs and meetings between experts and scientists.

The Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung has set itself priorities in its objectives which correspond to social democratic values. One of these is democracy, participation and the rule of law. The FES aims to achieve this goal by advising democratic institutions and thus further promoting democracy in the political culture. By facilitating the political participation of civil society organisations and NGOs, the FES supports democratisation not only in political parties, but also by consolidating structures based on the democratic model in the legal system.

Another important goal of the FES is the promotion of economic, social and environmental policy. In this context, the FES focuses on cooperation with organizations that focus on a sustainable and balanced economy. To achieve this goal, projects have been launched that focus on reforming social security systems, improving labour market policies and fostering sustainable development. Further priorities of the FES are labor relations, social dialogue and labor. These consist of promoting the modernization of Romania's Trade Union movement, protecting labour rights and to provide an effective system of social dialogue. Seminars, workshops and courses are also organized for this purpose, mainly to support the Romanian Trade Union (Friedrich-Ebert Stiftung Office Romania).

In terms of publications, the FES publishes analyses and reports mainly in English and Romanian and partly in German. Romania's EU strategy and how far Romania is making progress in meeting EU requirements are one of the key topics. This thematic area analyses whether Romania is moving closer to EU standards and is pursuing its

policy in accordance with the Maastricht Treaty. Another topic is Romania's security and its relations with the USA and Russia. This field goes hand in hand with relations with the EU and analyses the extent to which Romania is forming its foreign policy in the US-EU-Russia triangle. Another topic area is social policy in Romania. Here, the FES provides analyses and reports on topics such as the minimum wage or labour rights in Romania. These analyses are generally written from a social democratic perspective. Current topics, such as the influence of the refugee crisis on Romanian domestic policy and the relations between the EU and Romania, are also addressed in these analyses (Friedrich-Ebert Stiftung Office Romania Office Romania).

Friedrich-Naumann Foundation

The Friedrich Naumann Foundation for Freedom is a political foundation of the German party FDP with its headquarters in Potsdam. The foundation represents a liberal ideology by defining the values that everyone has the freedom to strive for goals they want and that everyone has the equal rights to do so. Its ideology consists of the foundations of human rights, equality, the rule of law, individual freedom, private property, economic freedom and liberal democracy.

Since 1990, the Friedrich-Naumann Foundation has been active in South Eastern Europe, especially in Bulgaria and Romania. According to its own statements, the foundation has also partly contributed to the fact that Bulgaria and Romania have fulfilled the requirements for EU membership and were able to join the EU in 2007. The foundation's work in South Eastern Europe was extended to Macedonia and Moldova at the end of the 1990s.

One of the biggest problems and what is also on the main agenda of the foundation is the problem of justice and corruption in Romania. Because of this problem, Romania was not accepted into the Schengen Area despite its EU membership. Nevertheless, Romania has made some progress in this area. Politicians have been arrested for corruption and the Friedrich-Naumann Foundation has also contributed to this with its cooperation National Anticorruption Institution (DNA). Apart from all local liberal parties and NGOs close to the liberal ideology, the main partner of the foundation is the Institute for Liberal Studies (ISL). The foundation has set itself the task of supporting

all those liberal forces and movements who fight for freedom (Friedrich Nauman Foundation Southeast Europe).

According to Expert No.1, who represented the Friedrich-Naumann Foundation, there were also foundations, which were working against the rule of law. With regard to the FES and its cooperation with Romanian foundations, Expert No.1 stated:

“There are foundations that have also worked against the rule of law. The FES, for example, has ended its cooperation because of this.” (Expert No. 1).⁶

Konrad-Adenauer Foundation

The Konrad-Adenauer Foundation is an institution which is directly linked to the German conservative Christian Democrat Union party CDU. Apart from Europe, the foundation is also present in Africa, Asia, North and South America and in the Middle East. It acts according to the values and interests of the party. In Romania, the foundation is very active, which can be seen at the publications, organized events and seminars.

Publications

The articles and reports are published in German, English and sometimes in the Romanian language. They are usually about the domestic politics of Romania and how political development affects the Romanian-EU relations. There are two segments: a country report as well as a report about the events organized from the foundation about the country.

In the country reports, the developments in Romania since 2005 -i.e. since the CDU has been in government - are published. In addition to extensive reports, short analyses of the state of politics in Romania are also published. The reports and analyses deal with processes that the Romanian government has to go through in order to be admitted to the EU and accepted by the member states.

For example, the processing of the Securitate past during the Communist era is reported as positive news to the EU. Securitate is an organization founded in 1944 and was dissolved after the end of the Cold War in 1990. At the time of its dissolution, the organisation had 40,000 official and approximately 400,000 unofficial members. It was a secret organization that had acted in the interest of the former Soviet Union. At the

⁶ Translated by author.

time of the processing, in the year 2006, several files were collected and published, in order to accomplish a “self-cleaning” according to legal principles. Between the years 2000 and 2004 when the government was socialistically led, an alleged processing was accomplished, however most files were not published and only a handful of the Securitate were caught. At that time, CNSAS was also sabotaged because, due to unpublished data, its work was not considered credible. After the change of government, a more consistent processing was carried out also due to the pressure of the EU. In 2006, a total of 80,000 inquiries were received for the identification of journalists and editors, university rectors, trade unionists, politicians, teachers, etc. Among the people was the very popular former Minister of Culture, Mona Musca. This “self-cleaning” is seen in the analysis of the Konrad-Adenauer Foundation as an important step and positive signal for the EU accession, which also took place in Januar 2007 (Konrad-Adenauer Stiftung Homepage).

Furthermore, the analyses and reports provide a detailed account of political developments and events. However, it is important to note that rather decisive developments affecting the whole country are taken into account and local events seem to be ignored. In the articles, the events are always linked to their significance with respect to the EU and Germany.

There was special coverage during the presidential elections in 2014, when Klaus Iohannis, a Romanian with German roots, was nominated for election. In November, he won the elections only in the second ballot. In the analysis, the author notes that above all, it was the Romanians abroad who had a major influence on Iohannis’ victory. A total of 380,000 Romanians abroad participated in the election with the majority voting for Klaus Iohannis. It is suspected that the electoral conditions for Romanians abroad were made more difficult because Iohannis enjoyed a broader approval than his competitor Victor Ponta. For example, voters in Brussels and Paris had to wait up to eight hours before they could vote.

The then Prime Minister Ponta dismissed the responsible persons for the voters abroad in order to appease the criticism. There were conflicts between the German Foreign Office and the Romanian government in particular. The Romanian government claimed that Germany would not allow any additional polling stations and that therefore no applications were made. The German Foreign Office denied this claim. The only

German MPs who had criticised it was CDU MP Günther Krichbaum and CSU MP Bernd Fabritius. The European Parliament and the EU Commission also closely observed the elections. The Social Democrats in Europe, on the other hand, expressed no criticism. The then SPD chairman Siegmund Gabriel and the later party chairman Andrea Nahles had announced their support for Ponta. Although the CDU was passive as a party, Chancellor Merkel supported Klaus Iohannis as a candidate. The analysis shows his credibility as the reason for Iohannis' victory. He had always turned against corruption, displayed honesty and in doing so had a positive image with the population. On the contrary, Ponta had maintained rather populist arguments which were not considered favourable (Konrad-Adenauer Stiftung Homepage).

Events

In addition, there are events by the Konrad-Adenauer Foundation, which thematize current topics in Romania in the form of public discourses. Within the events there are public panels and seminars which deal with professionalizing politics. Furthermore, the foundation organizes summer schools, where Romanian students can participate. Besides those events, there is also a dialogue program, where usually politicians from the German Christian Democrat Union party (CDU) are invited. The aim of this dialogue program is to increase German-Romanian relations.

On 10 July 2014, Hans-Gert Pöttering, Chairman of the Board of the Konrad-Adenauer Foundation, visited Romania to discuss the current situation of Romania in Europe. In his speech the party leaders and general secretaries of the PDL (Democratic Liberal Party), the PNL (National Liberal Party), the UDMR (Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania) and the deputy of the Democratic Forum of Germans in Romania were also guests. At the time, Romania was under great pressure from the EU because of non-compliance with EU requirements. Pöttering underlined in his speech that Romania had made good progress in politics and economics, but nevertheless demanded that Romania must continue to operate within a democratic framework (Konrad-Adenauer Stiftung Homepage).

Regarding the cooperation with the German minority the Expert of the KAS foundation states:

“The German minority in Romania has a forum in Romania. These are used to organise training programmes for future candidates in local elections. This is one type of event. For example, a dialogue programme was organised in Berlin for the members of parliament from the forum. He was accompanied during discussions. Historical aspects were also dealt with at events. In general, there is a regular dialogue with representatives of the Forum. Meetings with representatives of the Forum have also been organised as part of the Romanian dialogue programme.” (Expert No. 2)⁷

Furthermore, not only does the KAS concentrate on the German minority but also:

“We are a political foundation. We do not primarily do something for the German minority. It is not on the agenda. There are other institutions for that. There were dialogue programmes where top representatives from the Forum came to Germany via the KAS and had conversations with relevant representatives from politics and society. The foundation does not do anything extra in this area. Synergies should be created. There are broadcasting programmes for teachers. The Federal Administrative Court is responsible for these. We support measures for education but not just for the German minorities. Once again, the German minority is part of our standard programme. There are many delegations that we bring not only to Bucharest, but also to Sibiu or Kronstadt.” (Expert No. 2).⁸

Furthermore, the KAS organizes courses for students, academicians and potential politicians. In some of these courses also the DFDR takes place:

“This is different. There is no common format. The German Forum has been able to establish itself at the municipal level. Last year there were two seminars with a view to the local elections. In 2017 there was a seminar on organisational developments together with the German Forum. Very different formats as you can see. We have no fixed framework.” (Expert No. 2)⁹

Additionally, the KAS also organizes courses on Romanian history, which is relevant for the contemporary policy:

“Historical events that are important for today’s political processes are reviewed. The long history is relevant for historians. [...] There is a wide range of measures for the reappraisal of communism. These are carried out with relevant institutional actors. There are conferences with participants from the academic world. There are also summer schools for pupils and students. Former communist prisons are visited. There was also an event in 2016 regarding the suffering of Germans from Banat and Transylvania who had been deported to Soviet labour camps. [...] The relationship with the German minority is one aspect and the reappraisal of communism is another. When both aspects come together, that is the way it is. We are not talking about the German minority coming to terms with communism, but the whole Romanian population is being considered.” (Expert No. 2)¹⁰

⁷ Translated by author.

⁸ Translated by author.

⁹ Translated by author.

¹⁰ Translated by author.

The KAS does not cooperate directly with other German political foundations, but is still in regular contact with them:

“There is an institutional relationship. For administrative reasons, no events are organised jointly. Because otherwise there would be mixed financing. There are different objectives between the foundations. But there is regular exchange between the foundations.” (Expert No. 2)¹¹

The KAS is not working closely with state institutions because these are not political. The foundation follows his own political agenda, but this agenda needs to be in the framework of the foreign policy of Germany:

“There is a regular dialogue with representatives from the embassy and consulates. We also include MdBs from Germany in our programmes. It is difficult to organise events that the KAS and the embassy organise together. After all, the German embassy is non-political. That is why it is difficult to organise joint events. But we have certainly had events where the German Embassy has spoken a word of welcome. Although we are independent in our actions, we adhere to the guidelines of German foreign policy. There is not so much dialogue with the consulates. But we have had guests from German consulates on several occasions.” (Expert No. 2)¹²

With regard to the professionalisation of politicians, young politicians from Romania are invited to Berlin in order to bring the structures and values of the CDU/CSU closer to them. The delegation comes from the parties PDL (Democratic Liberal Party) and PNL (National Liberal Party). The two parties have decided on a party alliance and are members of the EPP (European People’s Party), the party that also the CDU is a member of. As the regionalism of the state was being discussed in Romania at the time, the foundation wanted to bring the federal system closer to the Romanian delegation. The reciprocal relationship between politics and economy, which includes trade unions, was also an important topic. The foundation emphasises that the relations between Romania and Germany must be deepened and such programmes must be expanded, especially because of the election of Klaus Iohannis (Konrad-Adenauer Stiftung Homepage).

“We support our political partners on request. The National Liberal Party wanted support in the form of seminars etc. We support future politicians through professionalisation. Members of the Bundestag and representatives of the National Liberal Party come together through the mediation of the KAS. Support of the German-Romanian relations. Institutionally these relations should be supported.” (Expert No. 2)¹³

¹¹ Translated by author.

¹² Translated by author.

¹³ Translated by author.

German Business Clubs

The German Business Clubs are represented in several regions of Romania. These business clubs serve as the first point of contact for companies from Germany that want to invest in Romania. For this purpose, the German Business Clubs organize meetings where there is an exchange of experience between the member companies, the provision of information for the member companies and the maintenance of a constructive dialogue with the representatives of politics and public administration. In total, 800 German companies are members of these German Business Clubs (Deutscher Wirtschaftsclub Siebenbürgen).

The German Business Clubs are represented in the following cities:

- German Business Club Transylvania
- German speaking Business Club Banat
- German-Romanian Business Club Arad
- German Business Club Kronstadt
- German-speaking Business Club Northern Transylvania
- German Business Club Moldova
- German speaking Business club Mureş
- German-Romanian Business Club for the Sathmar Region
(German Embassy Bucharest).

7.4. ESTABLISHED INSTITUTIONS AND FOUNDATIONS OF GERMAN MINORITY IN ROMANIA

Democratic Forum of the Germans in Romania (DFDR)

The “Democratic Forum of the Germans in Romania” foundation is an organisation, which was founded after the Cold War in 1990 with the purpose of political representation of the German ethnicity in Romania. According to the foundation, German Romanians should be not considered as normal immigrants but as a group which has had a significant contribution to the emergence and development of Romania.

The structure of the Forum consists of the Executive Board, the State Executive Board of the DFDR, the Business Office and a Member of Parliament representing the German minority in Parliament. The DFDR Executive Board is chaired by Dr Paul-Jürgen Porr,

Chairman of the DFDR, and Ovidiu Victor Gant, Member of Parliament. The duties of the State Executive Committee are defined as follows:

“The State Executive Board determines and coordinates the current activities of the DFDR. It is accountable to the Representatives’ Assembly and regularly informs the sub-organisations about its work. It takes its decisions by consensus. If unanimity is not reached, the draft resolutions are submitted to the Representatives’ Meeting of the National Association for resolution. The National Executive Committee meets at least once every three months or as often as at least one Regional Forum is requested. It has a quorum if more than half of the regional associations are represented.” (DFDR)

The National Executive Committee also consists of the chairmen of various regional forums. The regional forums are active in Altreich, Banat, Buchenland, Northern Transylvania and Transylvania. The Chairmen of the Regional Forums are also the Vice-Chairmen of the National Executive Committee. Members of the National Executive Committee are also elected representatives from the regions mentioned. The number of elected representatives differs from region to region. Three elected representatives each from Banat and Transylvania, two elected representatives from Northern Transylvania and one elected representative each from Buchenland and Altreich are members of the National Executive Committee. In addition, the Chairmen of the School Commission, the Economic Commission and the ADJ (Arbeitsgemeinschaft Deutscher Jugendorganisationen in Rumänien e.V.) are members of the National Board. As such, the state executive board consists of a total of 20 members. Furthermore, the office is managed separately from the managing director. The managing director is responsible for the financial affairs of DFDR.

With regards to cooperating with the political German foundation, the DFDR cooperates very closely with the Konrad-Adenauer Foundation and the Hans-Seidel Foundation, which represents the CDU and CSU. Furthermore, the DFDR has a partial cooperation agreement with the Friedrich-Naumann Foundation, which represents the German liberal FDP (Freie Demokratische Partei) party. Expert No. 3, i.e. the representative of the Forum, said that the cooperation with the Naumann Foundation was actually very little.

“The conservative foundations do most of their work with the Forum. With the Naumann Foundation, it’s selective because it’s small and not for ideological reasons.” (Expert No. 3).¹⁴

Expert No. 4 stated that he is generally not aware of a cooperation with the Naumann Foundation:

“Cooperation with the Naumann Foundation is rather weak. I have no personal contact with the Naumann Foundation. [...] I am not familiar with the Naumann Foundation. It may be that there is a closer cooperation in Sibiu. But I personally have closer contact with KAS and the Seidel Foundation.” (Expert No. 4).¹⁵

On the other hand, the DFDR has no connections to the Heinrich-Böll Foundation, which represents the German Green Party (Bündnis 90/Die Grünen). Also, cooperation with the German political foundation Friedrich-Ebert Foundation in conjunction with the German social democrat party SPD (Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands) is not particularly close. According to Expert No. 3, for example, the members of the Bundestag from the SPD and the Greens are not able to address the issue of the German minority in Romania.

“Especially the Social Democrats and the Greens can’t grasp the issue.” (Expert No. 3).¹⁶

The same statements were also made by Expert No. 4:

“It is because of the attitude and interest towards the German minority. [...] The Heinrich-Böll Foundation, for example. Never. Although we have no fear of contact with the Greens. I also had something to do with the Ebert Foundation until 2007. We are also not ideologically bound. We also have projects that can be carried out primarily with the Greens. But this initiative was not taken or not recognized by them.” (Expert No. 4).¹⁷

The close cooperation with the conservative political German foundations creates the perception that the DFDR takes a conservative position. Expert No. 4 has commented on this perception in the interview:

“I cannot confirm this because I have not asked the members. It is not relevant to us what ideology the members have. I personally am a member of the EPP and can confirm that I am rather conservative. [...] Since I am a mathematician, I don’t want to make such a statement unless a scientific study exists.” (Expert No. 4)¹⁸

¹⁴ Translated by author.

¹⁵ Translated by author.

¹⁶ Translated by author.

¹⁷ Translated by author.

¹⁸ Translated by author.

The DFDR have not officially shown which party in Romania they support. Although there is a tendency that they support the former member of the DFDR Klaus Iohannis as well as his party, they do not make this official and cooperation with the party of Klaus Iohannis is made directly. On the other hand, the DFDR had distanced itself to the Romanian social democratic party PSD. Expert No. 4 did not directly indicate with which party the German minority cooperates the most. However, he has expressed his dissatisfaction with the social democratic party PSD several times in the interview:

“However, there were also negative phenomena after the election of Klaus Iohannis from the ranks of national populists from the so-called social democratic party. Klaus Iohannis was attacked by these people because of his ethnic origin. They said: ‘This is a foreigner, he has no say here. We Romanians have the say here.’ So there were nationalist tones. This was a massive defamation campaign against the German minority and Klaus Iohannis. There was great support from the Jewish community and Romanian intellectuals. The confirmation that it didn’t work in society is the re-election of Klaus Iohannis with 67% against the so-called social democratic candidate. I call them so-called because they have nothing to do with social democracy and are to be classified as nationalistic-populist. They have an extremely anti-European attitude and constantly act against the EU.” (Expert No. 4)¹⁹

Events

The Forum’s activities generally consist of regular meetings to discuss project planning. In addition to the meetings, the Forum also organises visits by high-ranking German politicians. With these visits, the Forum keeps its relations very close to Germany. The German government supports the Forum with funds so that the projects can be implemented. On 23 January 2010, the German Federal Government confirmed its continued support for the Forum in Romania in order to protect the culture and identity of the German minority. The German Federal Ministry of the Interior has confirmed in a declaration that 1.656 million euros will be made available to the Forum for “social-humanitarian and community-promoting” funds. The money will be used to provide economic aid to small and medium-sized enterprises in the craft, trade and agricultural sectors. Most of the money will be invested in old people’s homes and social stations, which will be made available to the German minority. The money will be allocated to the cities of Sibiu, Timisoara, Sanktanna, Bakowa, Kronstadt, Billed, Sathmar, Suceava and Bucharest (DFDR, 2012a). The aid is also justified by the fact that the German minority would further strengthen relations between Germany and Romania (DFDR, 2010a). On

¹⁹ Translated by author.

February 9, 2011, the Federal Ministry of the Interior confirmed the 1.661 million Euro grant for the Sibiu district (DFDR, 2011).

The Democratic Forum of Germans in Romania illustrates their good relations with Germany with meetings with successful German politicians. During a trip through Eastern Europe on 25 June 2010, Guido Westerwelle, then German Foreign Minister, visited Klaus Iohannis, then Mayor of Sibiu, who was also Chairman of DFDR. Westerwelle said: “With this visit we want to underline how much we want to participate in your fate, in your life and in your culture also in the future. It is a short visit, but it is a visit of great symbolic value”. Westerwelle went on to say that the German minority served as a mediator between Germany and Romania within relations. He also emphasized the importance of Klaus Iohannis, who, according to Westerwelle, would well lead the structures in Sibiu and be a good leader for the German minority. The German Foreign Minister also said that the German federal refusal would remain a reliable partner for the DFDR and would help with economic, social, cultural and educational projects as well as the promotion of the German language and the teaching of German as a native language. Iohannis thanked Westerwelle for his visit and said that the existence of schools in the German mother tongue and German media was very important (DFDR 2010b). According to the experts, the fostering of the German language is very important for the bridging function of the German minority between Germany and Romania. The experts list several reasons why families send their children to German schools. On the one hand, the education at German schools is significantly better than those at Romanian schools.

“Assimilationist tendencies have never existed. The German language has remained at a good level. Romanian children go to German schools and close the gap left by the Germans through their emigration. The schools are considered ‘elite schools’. Romanian parents send these children to the schools so that the children learn German and so that they have many advantages, especially in the economic sector. German schools are much freer and not so strict. 95% of the pupils are of Romanian descent. The pass rate of the Abitur in Romania is between 54-66%. In German schools it is 98%.” (Expert No. 3)²⁰

Expert No. 4 has also further elaborated on which sides would benefit from German educational institutions. Without the Romanian community the German schools would not exist and therefore the German language could not be kept alive. The Romanians would have access to the German language and culture. There were also more Romanian

²⁰ Translated by author.

graduates who became teachers at the German schools. In addition, students from Germany and Austria who come to Romania to obtain a high school diploma that is recognized in Germany and Austria. This would be a “win-win-win situation”, as three sides would benefit from it (Expert No. 4).

The Forum’s cooperation with the Protestant and Catholic Church was also important in order to strengthen the coexistence of all religious communities. During the visit, the economic importance of Germany for the district of Sibiu was also presented on the basis of statistics. According to the statistics available to the district council, half of the foreign investors are German companies. The presence of German companies is mainly due to the fact that there are no language barriers in this region (DFDR, 2010b).

The DFDR was visited by other German politicians, such as Barbara Stamm, President of the Bavarian Parliament. Between the 1st and 3rd of September 2010, Stamm visited Bucharest and Sibiu. In addition to Klaus Iohannis, she had talks with the DFDR delegate Ovidiu Grant. She stressed the importance of the German minority as a bridge within German-Romanian relations and made clear her supportive position for Romania’s accession to the EU by saying it was the right decision (DFDR, 2010c). The DFDR also received a few visits from Chancellor Angela Merkel. On 12 October 2010, for example, Merkel met with various representatives of the German minority. These representatives are generally close partners of the DFDR. The meeting was attended by DFDR Chairman Klaus Iohannis, Dr. Christoph Klein, the Bishop of the Evangelical Church in Romania, Member of Parliament Ovidiu Ganț, Undersecretary of State Helge Fleischer and the chairmen of the five regional forums. In the foreground was the importance of maintaining the mother tongue and to what extent this could be promoted (DFDR, 2010d). The DFDR is also visited by representatives of certain German parties. On 17 June 2011, a delegation from the Bavarian CSU state parliamentary group visited Klaus Iohannis to discuss the wave of departures after 1989, the problems of returnees and the safeguarding of schooling in the German language. The delegation consisted of five Bavarian members of parliament and the former Bavarian Prime Minister Dr. Günther Beckstein. They were accompanied by the Federal Chairman of the Association of Transylvanian Saxons, Dr. Bernd Fabritius. They also discussed the economic situation in Sibiu, the method of financing in local government, the effects of the Capital of Culture year and the city’s development concept. The situation in Romania in general was also discussed, as were

the development of the infrastructure, the retrieval of European funds and Romania's admission to the Schengen area (DFDR, 2011b).

On 16 September 2011, Klaus Iohannis and Hartmut Koschyk, Parliamentary State Secretary in the Federal Ministry of Finance, met to discuss German-Romanian relations. The DFDR Member of Parliament Ovidiu Gant, Undersecretary of State Helge Fleischer, President of the State Parliament of Hesse Norbert Kartmann and the German Consul General Thomas Gerlach also took part in the discussion. In addition to the relations between Germany and Romania, the administration of finances for Sibiu was also discussed. According to Klaus Iohannis, the role of the German minority in particular is an important part of a "well-functioning bridge" in German-Romanian relations (DFDR, 2011c).

A government commission was also established to discuss the future of German-Romanian relations with regard to the role of the German minority in Romania. The 15th meeting of the Commission took place on 6 and 7 October 2011 in Berlin, which was chaired by the Commission Chairmen, and Bogdan Aurescu and Dr Christoph Bergner, who are also State Secretaries. In the meeting Ovidiu represented Gant Klaus Iohannis and spoke about the positive developments for the German minority. According to Gant, important steps had been taken, especially in school lessons. The education law, the printing of textbooks for German as a mother tongue and the normal conditions in the social and cultural sector are important factors in preserving the identity of the German minority. But Gant also mentioned negative aspects, which primarily concerned the cultural development and financial situation of Sibiu. At the end of the session, he testified that the 16th session would be held in Sibiu (DFDR, 2011d).

High-ranking Romanian politicians have also discussed talks about the German-Romanians with German civil servants. On 10 November 2011, Romanian President Traian Băsescu visited Berlin to talk to German President Christian Wulff about the current development of German-Romanian relations and, most importantly, the situation of the German minority in Romania. Wulff praised the Romanian government that the German minority would be treated very well and that they would not be excluded from society. His counterpart sees a need for improvement with regard to German-language teaching in schools. The lack of specialists and personnel in kindergartens and schools was seen as a pressing issue. Basescu therefore demanded that teachers from Germany

should continue to be sent to Romania. The Romanian President then invited Wulff to come to Romania the following year. DFDR deputy Ovidiu Gant was also part of the delegation and invited the Federal President to come to Sibiu during a state visit to Romania. Băsescu also spoke with Chancellor Angela Merkel about the role of the German minority. Merkel said that the German minority was the main reason for the close German-Romanian relations and that it would serve as a bridge between the two countries. Following the discussion, DFDR member of parliament Gant added that German-language instruction was being provided with great success. He showed the pupils in Lyezeen as an example, where 90 percent of them had passed the Abitur (DFDR, 2011e).

The DFDR shows its influence by organizing meetings with German politicians. On 10 April 2012, the President of the State Parliament of Hesse, Norbert Kartmann, visited DFDR Chairman Klaus Iohannis, DFDR Member of Parliament Ovidiu Gant and German Consul General Thomas Gerlach from Sibiu. The discussion focused on the current political situation in Romania. Furthermore, the German-Romanian relations were discussed. The main topic was the preservation of the German educational and cultural tradition (DFDR, 2012b).

Chronology (DFDR)

23 January 2010	The German Federal Ministry of the Interior has confirmed in a declaration that 1.656 million euros will be made available to the Forum for “social-humanitarian and community-promoting” funds.
27 May 2010	Horst Seehofer, then Prime Minister of Bavaria, visited the then Mayor Klaus Iohannis in Sibiu together with his delegation during his visit to Romania.
25 June 2010	Guido Westerwelle, then German Foreign Minister, visited Klaus Iohannis, then Mayor of Sibiu, who was also Chairman of DFDR.
1-3 September 2010	Barbara Stamm, President of the Bavarian Parliament, talked to Klaus Iohannis and DFDR member of Parliament Ovidiu Gant.
12 October 2010	Merkel met with various representatives of the German minority. These representatives are generally close partners of the DFDR.
9 February 2011	The Federal Ministry of the Interior confirmed the 1.661 million Euro grant for the district of Sibiu.

17 June 2011	A delegation from the Bavarian CSU state parliamentary group visited Klaus Iohannis.
16 September 2011	Klaus Iohannis and Hartmut Koschyk, Parliamentary State Secretary in the Federal Ministry of Finance, met to discuss German-Romanian relations.
6-7 October 2011	The 15th meeting of the German-Romanian Commission took place in Berlin.
10 November 2011	Romanian President Traian Băsescu visited Berlin to talk to German President Christian Wulff. Băsescu also spoke with Chancellor Angela Merkel about the role of the German minority.
10 April 2012	President of the State Parliament of Hesse, Norbert Kartmann, Ovidiu Gant and German Consul General Thomas Gerlach from Sibiu.
14-16 May 2012	The Saxony CDU regional group, led by Dr. Michael Luther, visited several cities in Romania and met with Klaus Iohannis and Ovidiu Grant.
31 May 2012	A delegation from the CDU Baden-Württemberg state group in the German Bundestag was received by DFDR Chairman Klaus Iohannis at the town hall in Sibiu.
4 March 2013	The 16th meeting of the German-Romanian Commission took place in Sibiu.
10 March 2015	The Romanian President Klaus Iohannis, the Romanian Foreign Minister Bogdan Aurescu and the German Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier took part in the celebration of the 25th anniversary of the DFDR.
29 January 2016	There was a discussion between the DFDR Chairman Dr. Paul-Jürgen Porr, the Federal Government Commissioner for Aussiedler Affairs Hartmut Koschyk and the speakers of the Federal Ministry of the Interior Alexander Schumacher and Frithjof Zerger.
20-22 April 2016	The 19th meeting of the German-Romanian Commission took place in Goslar.
23 May 2016	Johannes Singhammer, Vice President of the German Bundestag, visited the DFDR Chairman Dr. Paul-Jürgen Porr and the Chairman of the Hermannstadt Forum Hans Klein in Sibiu.
3-4 June 2016	The Prime Minister of Hessen Volker Bouffier met with representatives of the DFDR forum, among others with the chairman Dr. Paul-Jürgen Porr, the delegate Ovidiu Gañ, Martin Bottesch, the chairman of the

	Transylvania forum as well as managing director Benjamin Jozsa.
21 June 2016	During his visit to Romania, the then German Federal President Joachim Gauck visited the DFDR in Sibiu together with the Romanian President Klaus Iohannis.
3 March 2017	The German Ambassador to Romania, Cord Meier-Klodt, visited the DFDR Forum and held talks with the Executive Board.
19-21 June 2017	The DFDR deputy Ovidiu Ganț belonged to the official delegation of President Klaus Iohannis during his state visit to Berlin. The programme of the visit included talks with Federal Chancellor Angela Merkel and Federal President Frank-Walter Steinmeier.
18 September 2017	German Foreign Minister Heiko Maas was met in Bucharest by DFDR Chairman Dr. Paul Jürgen Porr and DFDR Member of Parliament Ovidiu Ganț. The German Ambassador to Romania, Cord Meier-Klodt, also took part.
9 May 2019	German Chancellor Angela Merkel, together with Romanian President Klaus Iohannis, attended a meeting of the German minority organised by the DFDR.
13 June 2019	The 22th meeting of the German-Romanian Commission took place in Sibiu. The meeting was chaired by Bernd Fabritius, the Federal Government Commissioner for Emigrants and National Minorities, together with the Romanian Minister for European Affairs, George Ciamba.

Evangelical Augsburg Confession

The Protestant denomination was recognized as an official denomination in Romania in 1550. “Evangelical A.B.” stands for “Evangelical Augsburg Confession”. From 1572 to 1867 the Protestant Church was located in Biertan. Since 1867 the church has been based in Sibiu. In 1900, the church had 1,000 teachers and reached its peak in the schools. After the First World War, the locations of the Evangelical Church also increased due to the creation of Great Romania. In addition to the area in Transylvania, parishes were also founded in other former Hungarian regions (Banat), Bukovina and the so-called “Old Kingdom” (Wallachia and Moldavia), including the Bessarabian German Lutheran parishes. Due to the rise of National Socialism in the 1930s, more pressure was put on the church and the bishop was replaced by Wilhelm Staedel, who was close to the Nazi

regime. After the end of the Second World War and the conquest of the Soviet Union, the church had to relinquish several plots of land. Many church members were deported to Soviet camps. In 1949 the Protestant Theological Institute that provided a university degree was founded in Cluj-Napoca. In the German-speaking area in Sibiu, the pastors of the Evangelical Church A.B. in Romania were trained. Although Romania was under totalitarian rule at that time and the teaching of religion was prohibited, the Protestant religion could be taught in Romania.

After the end of the Cold War in 1990, two thirds of the community members emigrated to Germany. This number decreased significantly. In 2013 the number of parishioners was approximately 12,700. Due to this wave of emigration to Germany, the church has also lost its function as a “people’s church”. Today it is used as a “diaspora church”. In addition to its religious activities, the church focuses in particular on cooperation with institutions from abroad. The Evangelical Academy of Transylvania is engaged in church, social, political and cultural activities and also organizes events to this end. The Academy was founded by the couple Dorothea Koch-Möckel and Rev. Gerhard Möckel in Sibiu in 1991 and in the following years influenced the process of democratization and integration in Romania.

There are a total of five church districts which are active in Sibiu, Kronstadt, Mediasch, Mühlbach and Schäßburg. Apart from Mediasch, these districts also have diaspora communities with whom they cooperate. The current number of members is 13,400, and these members live in 250 different localities. The church districts are led by the dean, the district consistory together with the district church curator and the district church assembly. The district church assembly organizes the budget for the church district, takes care of administrative tasks, is mainly active in the field of education and also deals with tasks in the media. It deliberates drafts of the Regional Consistory and the Regional Church Assembly, elects the dean, the members of the District Consistory and the members of the Regional Church Assembly as well as the representatives of the district in other church institutions. In their meetings important decisions concerning the church districts are discussed. The District consistory (BK) consists of spiritual and secular members. The highest secular representative of the district is the district church curator, who is elected voluntarily and remains in office for four years. The dean is elected by the district church assembly for a period of four years and is appointed by the bishop to his

office, which he exercises in addition to his office as parish priest and represents the church in public and in the media.

There are also church-related institutions, in addition to the Evangelical Church A.B., which are in close contact with the church and regularly work together. These institutions are active in the scientific, political and societal fields. These institutions are as follows:

- Evangelical Academy of Transylvania
- Institute for Ecumenical Research
- Diaconal Work Romania
- Dr. Carl Wolff Society
- Faculty of Protestant Theology

In relation to the internal structure of the church, the national church assembly forms the so-called “parliament”, in which decisions are made on various matters such as legal and financial matters. One third of this parliament consists of theologians and they have the task of making long-term decisions that influence church life. In addition, the President of Women’s Work, the President of the Youth Ministry and the Director of the Department of Protestant Theology at the “Lucian Blaga” University in Sibiu are also members of the Regional Church Assembly.

The Bishop, the Vicar Bishop, the Curator of the Regional Church and the spiritual and secular members of the State Consistory elected by the Regional Church Assembly form the Regional Consistory, whereby all members, except the Bishop, are active in this office on an honorary basis. In this body the bishop is the chairman and the curator of the regional church is his representative. The deans, whose task is to support the bishop in the spiritual direction of the congregations, form the advisory “Spiritual Committee”, which meets prior to the State Consistory meetings. The bishop represents the church in public. In addition, the state church curator is the highest secular representative of the church and representative of the bishop. (Evangelische Kirche A.B. in Rumänien Homepage).

7.5. GERMAN-ROMANIAN NEWSPAPERS IN ROMANIA

The German newspapers in Romania were and still are an important medium for preserving the culture and tradition of the German minority. Through this medium, the German minority has been able to communicate with each other for centuries and thus build their network. In the following chapter, the history of the former newspapers of the German minority will be presented first. Thereafter, an overview of today's newspapers of the German minority will be presented.

In today's Romania, the first German newspaper was called "Timisoara News" and was published for six years from 1771 as a weekly newspaper. Also, the daily newspaper "Timisoara Newspaper" was active from 1852 to 1949. Another newspaper, the "Oraviczaer Wochenblatt" was active between 1872 and 1940, but this weekly was limited to the Orawitza region. There was also the "Schwäbische Volkspresse", which was renamed to "Banater Deutsche Zeitung" in 1925. In addition, there was the "Pollerpeitsc" newspaper from 1935 to 1945, however these published articles of a more humorous nature and therefore cannot be considered a classic daily newspaper. There are also the newspapers "Die Siebenbürger Zeitung", since 1972 "Siebenbürger Bote", "Siebenbürger Wochenblatt", the "Kronstädter Zeitung", the "Siebenbürgisch-Deutsche Tagblatt", the newspapers "Dobrudscha-Bote" and the "Czernowitzer Allgemeine newspaper". After the Romanian People's Republic was proclaimed in 1948, all German-language newspapers were dissolved; however, the magazine "Neuer Weg" was allowed to publish German articles from 1949 to 1992. In 1993 the "Neuer Weg" newspaper was renamed the "Allgemeine Deutsche Zeitung" (Krpátová 2016, 41-42).

The ADZ is considered a daily newspaper and publishes approximately 3,000 copies five times a week. Eight editors work in the editorial office in Bucharest and there are twelve editors in other editorial offices in Kronstadt, Hermannstadt, Timisoara and Reschitza. The daily newspaper reports not only about Romania, but mainly news in regard to the German minority in Romania and is also largely read by the German minority. The ADZ consists of seven sections, consisting Domestic, Economy, Opinion and Report, Local, Culture, Sports and Tourism. The ADZ also includes the "Banater Zeitung" and "Karpatenrundschau", which are published weekly and report more regional news than national news. The "Banater Zeitung" is based in the city of Timisoara and is published by the Democratic Forum of the Germans (DFDR) in Romania. The seat of the

“Karpatenrundschau” is in Brasov and is published by the Foundation for the Promotion of German Literature in Romania (Krpátová 2016, 41-42).

In addition to the ADZ, there is also the “Hermannstädter Zeitung”, a weekly newspaper that has published approximately 2,000 issues every Friday and has been doing so since 1968. The “Hermannstädter Zeitung” is politically independent and consists of the sections society, culture, politics, economy and sports.

The following gives an overview about all German-language newspapers that have existed or still exist today will be given:

The German-language newspapers whose publication was terminated:

- “Timisoara News” (1771-1777)
- “Timisoara Newspaper” (1852-1949)
- “Oravicza Weekly” (1872-1940)
- “Schwäbische Volkspresse” (1919), since 1925 “Banater Deutsche Zeitung”
- “Pollerpeitsche” (1935-1945)
- “Kronstädter Zeitung" (1849-1944)

Other German-language newspapers which are not publishing anymore:

- “Siebenbürger Zeitung”, since 1792 "Siebenbürgische Bote”
- “Siebenbürger Wochenblatt”
- “Siebenbürgisch-Deutsche-Tagblatt”
- “Dobrudscha-Bote”
- “Czernowitzer Allgemeine Zeitung”
- “Bukarester Tageblatt”
- “Deutsche Zeitung Bessarabiens”

The German-language newspapers that still publish in Romania:

- “Allgemeine Deutsche Zeitung für Rumänien”
- “Neue Banater Zeitung”

- “Karpatenrundschau”
- “Hermannstädter Zeitung”

(Krpátová 2016, 43-44).

7.6. ESTABLISHED INSTITUTIONS AND FOUNDATIONS OF GERMAN-ROMANIAN MINORITY IN GERMANY

Association of Transylvanian Saxons

The Association of Transylvanian Saxons was founded in 1949 and has 24,000 family members. The association has its office in Munich and is thus the largest association in Germany representing the Transylvanian population. In addition to the integration of the Transylvanian population, the association also contributes to the preservation of their culture. Today, the association has set itself the task of helping the migrants who come to Germany from Transylvania to move and also helps to support them in their bureaucratic affairs. After the German-Romanian Cultural Agreement, the Association has been working closely with the local church and the DFDR since 1995. The association sees itself as a bridge for relations between Germany and Romania (Siebenbürger Verband Homepage). The association is made up of several state associations and district groups. These are located in Baden-Württemberg, Bavaria, Berlin, Schleswig-Holstein, Hesse, Lower Saxony, North Rhine-Westphalia, Rhineland-Palatinate and Saarland (Siebenbürger Verband Homepage).

The association sees its main task in integrating the Transylvanian population in Germany and also presents successes regarding the goals they have set themselves. The association presents as the greatest success since the acquisition of German citizenship for migrants from Transylvanian Saxony who migrated to West Germany during the Cold War. As a further task, the association has set itself the task of preserving the Transylvanian culture for future generations. The association defines their culture as tolerant and that this culture contributes to the welfare of the community and therefore deserves to be protected. In addition, it is also very active in cultural work, social work and the media (Siebenbürger Verband Homepage).

The organization has organized regular cultural days and events since 1981 that bring Transylvanian culture closer to public attention and that which also demonstrates the cultural heritage. These events take place in the form of exhibitions, readings, seminars, music, customs and sports events in Germany and Transylvania. The largest event takes

place on Whit Sunday in Dinkelsbühl, the twin town of the Transylvanian Saxons. Every year, 12,000 Transylvanian Saxons as well as high-ranking politicians take part in this event. To preserve the cultural heritage, the history of the Transylvanian Saxons is discussed. In order to achieve this goal, cooperation with institutions such as the “Transylvanian Museum”, “Transylvanian Institute Research and Documentation Centre for Transylvanian Regional Studies” and “Transylvanian-Saxon Cultural Council e.V.” is essential (Siebenbürger Verband Homepage).

In the field of social work, the association officially assumed responsibility for the Transylvanian Saxons for the first time in North Rhine-Westphalia in 1957. In the years that followed, the work for the Transylvanian population was extended to other federal states, especially Baden-Württemberg and Bavaria. The association is especially committed to the integration of the Transylvanian Saxons into the German community and helping them to improve their living conditions to the same level as a normal German citizen. The focus is on the construction of old people’s homes and Transylvanian settlements. The association also cooperates with the Ergo Group AG regarding death benefits and accident provisions. One of the most important institutions of the association is the “Sozialwerk der Siebenbürger Sachsen”, which primarily provides social assistance for needy and old Transylvanian Saxons not only in Germany, but especially in Transylvania Saxony in Romania. In order to fulfil this task and to support the German minority in Romania, the association cooperates with the Democratic Forum of Germans in the form of projects (Siebenbürger Verband Homepage).

The association also has a media arm that focuses specifically on events that are only related to Transylvania. Since June 1950, the “Siebenbürgische Zeitung”, which is based in Munich, has acted as the media representative and regularly reports on the Transylvanian community. The newspaper is published 20 times a year and has sold 24,500 copies in 20 different countries. The newspaper serves as the most important means of communication for the Transylvanian Saxons. The newspaper reports on culture, history, information about local life, issues regarding Transylvania and the German-Romanian relations. The “SbZ” also cooperates with other institutions and publishes special issues. One of them is the magazine “Kirche und Heimat” (Church and Homeland) and is published in cooperation with the “Gemeinschaft Evangelischer Siebenbürger Sachsen und Banater Schwaben im Diakonischen Werk der EKD e.V. (aid

committee)” ten times a year. In addition, institutions and organizations also publish individual publications which then appear in the newspaper. Since October 2000 there is also the website Siebenbuerger.de, where you can access the newspaper online (Siebenbürger Verband Homepage).

The association also has a youth department called the Transylvanian-Saxon Youth in Germany (SJD), which functions as a sub-organisation. The SJD sees its main task in preserving the tradition of the Transylvanian Saxons, bringing it closer to the youth and thus securing their future. It belongs to the umbrella organisation German Youth in Europe (DJO). Another 50 youth groups also belong to the SJD. The profile of the members consists of those who are of Transylvanian descent and have a connection to Transylvania. Besides leisure activities and cultural trips, the SJD also organises workshops and further education seminars (Siebenbürger Verband Homepage).

Transylvania Institute at the University of Heidelberg

The Transylvanian-Saxon Cultural Council, which is the union for all Saxon institutions important in cultural matters, is the supporting body of the Transylvanian Institute and has been institutionally supported by state authorities for decades. This funding was provided by the states of North Rhine-Westphalia, the sponsor state of the Transylvanian Saxons, and Baden-Württemberg, the state where the cultural institutions are located. The Transylvanian Institute at the University of Heidelberg is a scientific institution dedicated to the research, documentation and teaching of the history and culture of Transylvania. This is done through the publication of several book series at the Cologne publishing House Böhlau Verlag as well as in the *Zeitschrift für Siebenbürgische Landeskunde*, at scientific conferences, a doctoral colloquium for the promotion of young scientists, teaching positions at the University of Heidelberg, as well as through research and documentation projects (Gundelsheim Homepage).

The Transylvanian Institute is also linked to the Transylvanian Library Foundation. The establishment of the foundation was initially met with a great response. By the end of the year 2000, the assets of the foundation already amounted to about 390.000 euros. Since then, the inflow of donations, grants and legacies has averaged 60.000 euros per year. As a result of this and the performance of the investments along with the assets at the end of 2013, 14 years after the foundation was established, this amount increased to almost two

million euros. The foundation states, however, that the continued work requires assets of around 4 million euros (Stiftung Siebenbürgische Bibliothek Homepage).

The Danube Swabian Cultural Foundation of the State of Baden-Württemberg

The foundation was established in 1988 by the state of Baden-Württemberg and has set itself the goal of preserving the German cultural heritage and promoting the German language in the former Yugoslavia, Hungary and Romania. Most importantly, the promotion of the German language is seen as the highest priority in order to create a dialogue for networking. This is intended to promote advantages especially within the economic sphere. Young people, student teachers, pedagogues and teachers are mentioned as target groups. The Romanian cultural centres, the Department of Pedagogy and Didactics at the Babeş-Bolyai-University Cluj-Napoca, Youth Centre Seligstadt, Danube Swabian Central Museum, Centre for Teacher Training in Sibiu and the student association Gutenberg are named as partners in the field of Romania (DSKSBW Homepage).

Romanian Cultural Institute “Titu Maiorescu” Berlin

The Romanian Cultural Institute has its headquarters in Bucharest and is represented in 17 countries worldwide, including Germany in Berlin. After an agreement on cultural cooperation between Germany and Romania was concluded in 1999, the Romanian Cultural Institute “Titu Maiorescu”, which is directly attached to the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, was founded in Berlin. Since 2006, the Institute “Titu Maiorescu” has also been a member of the EUNIC network (Community of European Cultural Institutes). The cultural institutes are managed by the headquarters in Bucharest. The Institute has set itself the task of preserving the cultural heritage and thus the Romanian identity for the Romanian diaspora. It is financed by their own income, subsidies from the state budget and contributions from sponsors (Berlin.de Homepage).

German-Romanian Forum

The German-Romanian Forum sees itself as a partner for Romania and would like to support Romania in its transformation process to meet EU standards. The political developments in Romania should be brought closer to the German public’s attention and

in doing so strengthen public interest in Germany. In order to achieve this goal, the Forum proposes to establish a Romanian lobby in Germany that can network with other organisations. The Forum in Germany should act as an umbrella organisation for other organisations. The main objective was stated that the understanding on both sides should be promoted through various activities and thus a great contribution should be made to German-Romanian relations (German-Romanian Forum Homepage).

The foundations and organisations with which the Forum cooperates are the Konrad-Adenauer Foundation, Friedrich-Ebert Foundation, Heinrich-Böll Foundation, Friedrich-Naumann Foundation and the Southeast Europe Association (German-Romanian Forum Homepage). The Forum also has direct diplomatic contacts as partners. These include the Embassy of Romania, Romanian Consulates General in Bonn and Munich, the German Embassy in Bucharest and the German Consulates in Timisoara and Sibiu (German-Romanian Forum Homepage).

There are also other German-Romanian associations, but these are more regionally represented. Therefore these foundations are listed as an overview:

- German-Romanic Associations Göttingen
- Romanian-German Company for Ethnography and Folklore “Ioan Bocsa” e.V. Kaiserslautern
- Romanian-German Association e.V. Karlsruhe
- German-Romanic Association “Westfalia” e.V. Minden
- German-Roman Cultural Society “Apozitia” e.V. Munich
- Society for Romanian and German Writers “Asrg”
- Bürgerallianz “Freunde Rumäniens” e.V. Munich
- “Un Alter Ego” - German-Romanian Cultural Association Nuremberg
- Association of Citizens from Romania Stuttgart
- German-Romanic Forum e.V. Stuttgart
- “Agero” - German-Romanic Associations e.V. Stuttgart
- Association of Romania In Berlin and Brandenburg e.V. - Berlin
- German-Romanian Cultural Association “Romanima” e.V. Nuremberg
- Association for Intercultural Meetings “Ars Longa” e.V. Nuremberg

- German-Romanian Association Lower Saxony
- Support Group “Friends oRomania” Offenbach
- Romanian Community “Crom Rhein-Main” e.V. In Offenbach And Frankfurt/Main
- Society for The Promotion of Romanian Culture and Tradition e.V. Munich
- Society for Literature, Music and Art “Alexandru Ioan Cuza” e.V. Heidelberg
- Societatea Germano-Romana “Bodensee” e.V. Konstanz
- German-Romanian Association In Sachsen-Anhalt e.V. Aschersleben
- Romania Association - Culture, Sport, Travel Gummersbach
- Romanian Centre of Cultures e.V. Cologne
- German-Romanian Cultural Group “Dialogue” Cologne
- Cultural Events Hoffmann & Panz Düsseldorf
- The German-Romanian Cultural Association Danubium e.V.
- Aro Romanian Association In Frankfurt, Offenbach Und Umgebung e.V.
- German-Romanian Association of Lawyers e.V.
- Romanian-German Association in Baden - Würtemberg e.V.
- German-Romanian Society for Northern Germany e.V.

(Embassy of Romania in the Federal Republic of Germany).

8. ANALYSIS

In this chapter, we will firstly examine whether the German-Romanian population in Romania fulfils the criteria or characteristics of a diaspora. For this purpose, the definition of a diaspora from the first chapter, the historical background from the second chapter and the collected data from the third chapter are used. In the next step, the collected data and information are analysed and evaluated with regard to the research question and the corresponding theoretical basis. The extent to which areas the foundations mentioned in the previous chapter are active will be discussed. In particular, the activities of the foundations in the political, cultural and denominational fields are analysed. In the analytical part, a mixture of liberalist and constructivist approaches is applied.

The contextualization of the historical background of the German-Romanians in Romania with regard to the definition of an ethnic minority shows that most of the criteria are sufficient in order for the German-Romanians to be classified as ethnic minority in Romania. For many centuries the German-Romanian population was an isolated community and therefore had its own autonomous areas and church societies. However, this isolation can be seen as “positive discrimination” on the part of the Romanian population, since the Romanian population had regarded the German-Romanian as role model. The fact that the German-Romanians have been regarded as a role model for the Romanian population for several centuries is a sign that the Romanian population’s view of the German minority went beyond tolerance. If you look at today’s Romania, it becomes clear that the German minority is still a group of its own, that it’s represented in parliament and no longer lives isolated from the majority of society as has done so in the past. Therefore, according to the aforementioned classification standards of Peter Andrews, the German-Romanian minority can be classified as pluralistic minority.

Furthermore, Althusser’s definition of ethnic minority is only met partially. On the one hand, the German-Romanian saw themselves always as different from the majority and therefore lived an isolated life from the rest. On the other hand, this self-isolation was not caused by the Romanians’ suppression. The German-Romanian minority chose to live in their own villages and remain a homogeneous population for many centuries. The main distinctive aspects were culture, language and especially religion. The protestant denomination of the Transylvanian Saxons and later the Banater Swabians’ catholic denomination provided a community, which was different from the orthodox denomination of the Romanians’ people. The churches in particular which were institutions for social interaction amongst the people increased the isolation between the German-Romanian and the vast majority. In order to be an ethnic minority, the German-Romanian minority also came to the Weber understanding of being a collective. Over several centuries, the German-Romanians have always seen themselves as settlers from Germany and thus had created a common foundation for the German-Romanians’ community.

In the context of the German-Romanian minority and its relation to Germany, a stable relationship between Germany and the German-Romanian minority over many centuries was established. Thus, strong ethnic ties between Germany and the German-Romanian

minority could be built up. From a historical perspective, it can be seen that German-Romanian people had always close relations with their country of origin as a result of trade. By trading, they were constantly in contact with their actual homeland. The German-Romanians were considered important trading partners for the German Empire for several centuries after their settlement in Romania. However, it can be said that it contributed more to the prosperity of Romania than to the German Empire. The fact that they had close relations led to the common will of unification. There were many unification attempts with Germany, which can be categorised in three stages. The first stage was in 1871, when the German-Romanian population strove for the unification of Transylvania with the German Empire. This goal could not be achieved because of the large geographical distance and also because the German-Romanian population was far too scattered within Romania. The second stage is the invasion of Nazi-Germany in Romania, where most German-Romanians cooperated with the Nazis, which should be seen as an attempt to return to the homeland. The last stage is the great wave of emigration of German-Romanian people to Germany during the Cold War and shortly after the fall of the Berlin wall in 1990.

Another aspect of ethnic ties is the political influence of an ethnic minority in the country in which they live. With regard to the German-Romanians, it can be stated that through many centuries the interests of the German-Romanian minority changed. The intention of the German settlers in Romania was primarily for trade so as to be able to exert an economic influence on Romania and the German Empire. In 1871, for the first time one could also see the results of political influence on Romania, when the German-Romanians strove to integrate Romania into the German Empire. As a second factor of political influence, one can consider the cooperation with the Nazi regime. The third factor is the political role of the German minority in present-day Romania. The German minority is represented in the Romanian parliament by at least one member. In addition, the DFDR as a German forum also exerts a significant influence on Romanian politics, which can be seen in the example of the current Romanian president Klaus Iohannis.

For a considerable political influence in a certain country, the ethnic minority group must have the opportunity to mobilize itself. Thus, for mobilization the amount of people which belong to the ethnic minority and also the area in which they live is important for successful mobilization. With regards to the German-Romanian people, it can be seen

that the amount of people compared to the rest of the population in Romania was small. Especially in the post-Cold War era, the German-Romanian population decreased drastically.

Culture, Language and Religion

When it comes to culture, the German minority has shown particular sensitivity since its settlement. Although the Transylvanian Saxons have lived in Romania for 850 years, they have managed to keep the Transylvanian Saxon culture alive. Even the change of rule over the centuries had virtually no influence on the life of this minority. Although the number of German-Romanians in today's Romania amounts to approximately 40,000, this small minority have still been able to preserve their culture. In regards to this, apart from the culture, the language and denomination of the minority have also been taken into account.

With regard to the history, it can be stated that due to the conscious isolation of the German minority the German-Romanians have been able keep their culture alive for centuries. No outside influence, whether it be Hungarian or Romanian culture, could be exercised because of this isolation. It was to go beyond the prudence of culture when the German-Romanians strove to unite with the Empire in 1871. The German-Romanians already played an influential and dominant role as a minority at that time. In the following years, this became clearer when the Nazi government invaded Romania in 1945. The majority of the German minority cooperated with the Nazi regime. The Nazi ideology is known to wipe out other cultures and ethnicities in order to establish the Nazi ideology. If you apply this to the German minority in Romania, it is fair to say that instead of the restraint of the culture that prevailed in the previous centuries, at the time of the Nazi regime, the dominance over other cultures now prevailed.

After the end of the Second World War, it can be said that for a while German-Romanian culture was not vivid. Between 1945 and 1950, all men and women capable of work under the communist regime were deported to Soviet labour camps for five years. During these years the German minority had only limited opportunities to live out their culture properly. After the wave of deportation had almost stopped in 1950 and the communist regime had consolidated itself in Romania, the German minority was able to live out its culture again. However, this cultural expression was limited under communist influence.

The German language continued to be taught and the teaching of conformation was also continued. Regarding the German minority and its expression of their culture, it can be said that the German minority was able to live their culture relatively freely despite the repressions of the communist regime in Romania. However, it must be emphasized that the expression of their culture was not as free as it had been centuries before.

Directly after the fall of the Berlin Wall, the DFDR was founded with the intention of representing Romanian Germans in the new Romania as an ethnic minority. During and after the transformation process, German foundations and cultural institutions, which have been described in detail in the third chapter, have opened institutions in Romania. With regard to culture and language, the Goethe Institute in particular contributes to keeping the German culture and especially the language alive. The DFDR also organizes joint events in the field of religion, especially with the EAS.

With regard to the German language and the training of teachers, there are exchange programs. Prospective teachers from German schools are sent to Germany by the DAAD exchange program to be trained there. After the program is completed and these teachers have raised their language skills to a very high level, they return as teachers and give lessons at German schools. It can be assumed that here the education of the German language and the economic sector are interrelated. Companies like BOSCH, SAP or Continental are interested in expanding in Romania (Bidder, 2017). The reason given is that Romania is the EU country where the economy is growing fastest. In 2017 Romania had a high growth rate of 7%. In the following years this growth fell to about 3% (Statista, 2019). Nevertheless, these companies are very interested in investing in Romania. According to a report of the “Germany Trade and Invest” (GTAI), trained specialists return from Germany to Romania because the working conditions and career opportunities are better for them.

On an analytical level, it can be said that despite the communist regime and the great wave of emigration to Germany after the fall of the Berlin Wall, German-Romanians culture was nevertheless able to stay alive. It is also striking that the German minority was able to mobilize immediately and establish its own forum to represent it politically. Although the German-Romanians no longer live isolated from the Romanian population as in the past, but actively participate in Romanian society, the German minority was able to maintain its language with its own dialect, its own culture and its Catholic and

Protestant denomination. This shows that over the centuries the German-Romanian identity has been consolidated in this minority and that this minority has been able to integrate itself into Romanian society without having to assimilate. However, in maintaining the language, it must be emphasized that the German state actively contributes to this by co-financing the training of teachers in German schools.

The problem-free integration of the German minority is tied to the historical background, as the German-Romanians have always been associated with German virtue for centuries and the Romanians have therefore seen the German minority as role models. Regarding the German schools in today's Romania, it can be seen that the role model function of the German minority still exists. Models of the German curriculum are also used in the education of future politicians. These curriculum templates are also used due to the excellent status of the Germans, since the standard is one of the best and of the highest quality.

In summary, the education of the German language, the investment of German companies in certain Romanian cities and the cultural background are factors for the high presence of the German minority in Romania. Romania has a positive attitude towards the German minority due to its historical background especially because the German-Romanians are distinguished by their "German virtues". Although the number of the German minority has decreased so much, this feeling has remained within Romanian society. This can better be explained by the fact that children from the upper class are sent to German schools, as the education that is offered there in Romania are considered elite institutions. Germany as a home country supports these German schools indirectly by training teachers through exchange programs like the DAAD, thus keeping the German language alive in Romania, despite the decreasing number of the German minority population. This in turn has an impact on the German and Romanian economy. Through the investment of the previously companies, both countries use the economic sector to benefit from this. This means that both the host country and the home country benefit economically from the diaspora very much. Even though the number of the German minority is very small, it has made a great contribution over centuries to the point where a certain section of today's Romanian population is interested in working in areas that have a German connection. The return of trained specialists to Romania also shows that German-Romanian people

feel a greater attachment to Romania and have migrated to Germany for economic reasons.

German-Romanian Minority and Political Foundations

In the political sphere, the party-bound think tanks Konrad-Adenauer Stiftung, Friedrich-Ebert Stiftung, Friedrich-Naumann Stiftung, Hans-Seidel Stiftung and DFDR are particularly active. In addition, the German-Romanian Forum is also very active in the political arena and is primarily making an effort to strengthen the German-Romanian dialogue. In the following piece, the data collected will be used for analytical purposes.

With regard to the party-bound foundations, it can be seen that these foundations work primarily with political parties that are very close to their political ideology and values. Many common features of these foundations can be seen in their working methods and strategies. However, there are differences with regard to the goals set and the cooperating partners with whom the joint projects are organized. These differences are mainly due to the prioritization of the objectives of the respective foundations. This prioritization is related to the ideology and values that these foundations represent. In the case of the party-bound foundations, regular events such as symposia, panels, podium discussions, exchange programs and seminars are in the foreground. These events are primarily aimed at young budding politicians and scientists. Through these regular events, these politicians and scientists are trained. In this manner, these foundations are investing in the future, as it enables them to build relationships with, above all, potential high-ranking politicians and influential scientists.

Regarding the data collection in the third chapter, it can be seen that the German minority is more likely to be categorized within the conservative spectrum. This is also evident in the Democratic Forum of Germans and the Forum's cooperation partners. According to the collected data, the DFDR works very closely with the Konrad-Adenauer Foundation and the Hans-Seidel Foundation. There is also selective cooperation with the Friedrich-Naumann Foundation. The Friedrich-Ebert Foundation, on the other hand, has little interest in working specifically with the German minority, since the agenda of the foundation is determined by the rule of law and trade union rights. The Heinrich-Böll Foundation, on the other hand, has no presence at all in Romania.

It must be underlined that the DFDR is the only partner of the KAS with whom the KAS is actively working in the field of the German minority. These programs are attended by young prospective politicians, especially those who belong to the PNL. They are referred to the KAS via the DFDR and the KAS in turn refers these young politicians to German political representatives or members of the German Federal Parliament in order to exchange ideas.

The reason why the FES does not work specifically in the area of the German minority, although it is well aware of the existence and role of this group, is because the FES represents social democratic values and does not focus on an ethnic or religious group, but rather works in a class-specific manner. The focus is on improving the rights and conditions of the working class and, in a general sense, the rule of law in the country. The Friedrich-Naumann foundation cooperates with the Forum in specific areas, because the foundation generally works for minorities. This means all minorities, including minorities that are not considered to be minorities because of their ethnic origin. For this reason, the target groups of the DFDR and the Friedrich-Naumann Foundation overlap, which is why this selective cooperation comes about. The perception that the Friedrich-Naumann Foundation tends to be less cooperative than the other two conservative close foundations differs. Expert No. 1, i.e. the representative of the Friedrich-Naumann Foundation, confirms that cooperation with the Forum is rather low.

“Unfortunately, little was done for the German minority. Very little. Very little was done, even though the offer was there.” (Expert No. 1)

The focus is not only on the German minority, but on all kinds of different minorities, such as homosexuals. Nevertheless, Expert No. 1 expresses his disappointment that in general, the activities with regard to the German minorities from all aspects of the foundations were fragile. Expert No. 3, the representative of the Forum, said that the cooperation with the Naumann Foundation was actually quite little.

“The conservative foundations do most of their work with the Forum. With the Naumann Foundation, it’s selective because it’s small and not for ideological reasons.” (Expert No. 3)²¹

²¹ Translated by author.

Expert No. 4 stated that he is generally not aware of a cooperation with the Naumann Foundation:

“Cooperation with the Naumann Foundation is rather weak. I have no personal contact with the Naumann Foundation. [...] I am not familiar with the Naumann Foundation. It may be that there is a closer cooperation in Sibiu. But I personally have closer contact with KAS and the Seidel Foundation.” (Expert No. 4)²²

Regarding the Konrad-Adenauer Foundation and the Hans-Seidel Foundation, the close cooperation with the DFDR can be seen in the fact that these two foundations belong to the conservative spectrum. This conservative understanding leads to the fact that these foundations are primarily concerned with protecting the values and culture of a group. For the most part, the members of the DFDR can also be classified as conservative. This can be explained by the fact that for several centuries the German minority has attached great importance to maintaining its culture, denomination and language. By focusing on these aspects, a natural development of a minority that automatically classifies itself as conservative can be claimed. This is another reason as to why this close cooperation with these two foundations is a natural development, as the agenda of both foundations is very conservative.

Nevertheless, it should be made clear that these party-bound foundations, in comparison to the DFDR, have not set a specific agenda for the German minority. In general, the foundations have set the rule of law and anti-corruption as their main agenda. Therefore, it cannot be said that German political foundations focus primarily on the German minority. However, since representatives of the DFDR generally join the Romanian PNL party and the German political foundations Friedrich-Naumann, Konrad-Adenauer and Hans-Seidel cooperate with this party, there is also an overlap with the German minority in their cooperation.

Furthermore, the function of German political foundations should be underlined. Although they work largely independently of each other, many programs overlap in their agendas. The exchange of ideas among the foundations helps to create a synergy in their work and thus the foundations do not work against each other, but rather complement each other in their goals. The KAS expert has stated that the foundation follows its own agenda due to its political affiliation, but nevertheless remains true to the line of German foreign policy. This is also true for the other political foundations, which regularly share

²² Translated by author.

details with the German embassy. This means that Germany, as a country of origin, sets an overriding goal by determining the line in foreign policy.

With respect to the statements of the experts in the different subject areas, it can be seen that despite many similarities in their content statements, the experts evaluate some subject areas differently. In the area of politics, the experts agree that the aim is to support the rule of law and democracy in Romania. The experts of the foundations in particular also confirm that they would work independently of each other and that cooperation or joint projects would be more likely to occur automatically, thus creating synergy in their working methods and objectives. The experts also confirm that the foundations would work independently of the German government, pursue their own agenda, but follow the guiding principles of German foreign policy. Furthermore, all experts also agree that no foundation would primarily pursue the German minority in its agenda, but that the German minority could also be addressed if the objectives were pursued. Furthermore, all foundations agree that the election of Klaus Iohannis as President of the Republic would not only contribute to improving German-Romanian relations, but would also pave the way for the stabilization of democratic and constitutional structures in Romania.

Furthermore, when the issue was raised with other political foundations, the experts also confirmed that the FES and especially the Heinrich-Böll Foundation does not carry out any activity in the field of the German minority. According to Expert No. 3, for example, the members of the Bundestag from the SPD and the Greens are not able to address the issue of the German minority in Romania.

“Especially the Social Democrats and the Greens cannot grasp the issue.” (Expert No. 3)²³

The same statements were also made by Expert No 4:

“It is because of the attitude and interest towards the German minority. [...] The Heinrich-Böll Foundation, for example. Never. Although we have no fear of contact with the Greens. I also had something to do with the Ebert Foundation until 2007. We are also not ideologically bound. We also have projects that can be carried out primarily with the Greens. But this initiative was not taken or not recognized by them.” (Expert No. 4)²⁴

At the analytical level it becomes clear that the German minority as a whole is willing to cooperate with the Greens. It is striking in the statement that Expert No. 4 does not include

²³ Translated by author.

²⁴ Translated by author.

the FES in addition to the Naumann Foundation. In the interview he had stated that the cooperation had been very good until Romania joined the EU. Expert No. 4 did not talk about the current relations of the German minority with the FES. This may be related to the fact that certain factors prevent cooperation with the German minority, and Expert No. 4 as a political representative is aware of these factors and wants to keep the relations stable despite the current weak cooperation. One of these factors could be that the FES has broken off its cooperation with the social democratic party PSD and that the FES therefore deliberately does not want to cooperate with a specific group in general in order to not harm this particular group. Instead, the FES pursues more general goals in its agenda such as supporting the rule of law and trade unions. Although Expert No. 3 and Expert No. 4 come from the same community, different statements are made about cooperation with the other political foundations Heinrich-Böll and the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung. This may have to do with the fact that Expert No. 4 operates within the public arena and therefore has to be cautious with the statements that he makes, whereas Expert No. 3 works behind the scenes and does not have to pay attention to public issues.

With regard to cooperation with the various political parties and movements in Romania, there were also different statements. Expert No. 1 states that the Friedrich-Naumann Foundation cooperates most with the Union for the Rescue of Romania, which the expert classifies as civil-liberal. The cooperation with this movement serves to fight populism. On the other hand, according to Expert No. 2, the Konrad-Adenauer Foundation cooperates very closely with the Romanian conservative party PNL. This cooperation is about the professionalization of future politicians of the PNL in the form of seminars and excellence and exchange programs. The representative of the HSS, i.e. Expert No. 5, did not want to make any direct statement in this regard. Expert No. 3 and Expert No. 4 did not suggest a party that they support as representatives of the German minority. The two experts stated that the German minority would support the respective candidates who would also represent the German minority, especially in local elections. The German minority had shown great unity, particularly in the municipal and presidential elections of Klaus Iohannis.

With regard to the statements, it can be stated on an analytical level that the approach and perspectives regarding Romania's domestic policy differ among the experts. While the Friedrich-Naumann Foundation cooperates with a political movement that works on

broad issues like populism, the KAS supports a special group, in this case the political party PNL, in the form of professional training of prospective politicians through seminars and excellence programs. The difference in approach is that the Naumann Foundation works together with a political partner to achieve its goals on its agenda, while the KAS supports its political partners in order to achieve its goals within its the agenda through them. It can be argued that the working method of the KAS, in contrast to that of the Naumann Foundation, is a long-term one, since the training of prospective politicians in a political party can promise a potentially large network. This network can then be used by the KAS to realize more extensive projects together with the partner. Regarding the statements of Expert No. 3 and Expert No. 4 it becomes quite clear that the German minority actually makes its decisions independently of parties and rather according to its identity in politics.

The DFDR has a major role to play in this as a bridge builder. In the previous section, it was already mentioned at the beginning that foreign ministers during their visits repeatedly emphasized how important the DFDR and the German minority are with regard to German-Romanian relations. The DFDR's mediation of mainly budding politicians from the PNL to the German political foundations, who in turn come from the Bundestag in regular exchanges with German members of parliament, simplifies the dialogue within German-Romanian relations for the future as well. The best-known example is Klaus Iohannis. As a member of the DFDR, he was already in regular contact with German ministers of state as mayor of Sibiu. Since he was elected President of Romania in 2014, Germany has been able to conduct regular dialogues at the highest level with Romania, as the foundation for this was laid in previous years. This is also a sign that the relations between Germany and Romania are very close. A symbolic example of this is the visit of Angela Merkel together with Klaus Iohannis at a cultural event organized by the DFDR. For the first time in history a German chancellor visited a cultural event organized by the German minority.

There was a general consensus among all experts that the German minority had an important bridging role to play in German-Romanian relations. This was important for close diplomatic and economic relations. The bridging function of the German minority is particularly important for the German political foundations, as the foundations sometimes also use detours of the German minority to expand their networks in the

political field. It should be emphasized that the German minority also benefits greatly from this bridging function, as they too benefit from special services provided by the political foundations. Independently of each other, the experts made the same statement, e.g. that the member of the German minority, Expert No. 4, met with German members of the Bundestag through the intermediary of the KAS. However, the German minority does not only fulfill the bridging function at the level of foundations, but also at the highest political level. The German minority contributes to make the communication within the German-Romanian relations on an intergovernmental level more transparent by consulting high-ranking politicians. This transparent communication takes place, for example, through the accompaniment of the Romanian Prime Minister or Foreign Minister by the representative of the German minority to Germany. Since Klaus Iohannis is now President of the Republic, this advice is no longer necessary, as Klaus Iohannis has the necessary knowledge for his role. The experts' statements clearly show that all of them confirm in their core statement that the bridging function of the German minority contributes to the fact that all participants who make use of this function have an advantage in their own fields. The German schools also have an impact on the investment behavior of German companies in Romania. The Romanian high school graduates from German schools are potential workers for German companies. German companies invest where most German-speaking citizens in Romania are. These companies are most present in Sibiu, Timișoara and Sate mare. Here it becomes clear that the areas of economy and education overlap with regard to the bridge function of the German minority.

Germany has a strong interest in maintaining and strengthening the stability of the EU. In Eastern Europe it is particularly important for Germany to maintain good relations with these countries. Given the historical background, German-Romanian relations are of particular importance. Germany would like Romania to adhere to EU guidelines in order to be able to bind a close partner within the EU to itself. Therefore, aspects such as the rule of law, anti-corruption and equal rights are not only in the interest of German political foundations, but also for the state of Germany itself.

German-Romanian People in Germany

The emigration of German-Romanians to West Germany was mainly the result of the repression of various minorities in Romania. Another reason were the economic

advantages and opportunities in Germany. The majority of the German-Romanians hoped for a better future by emigrating to Germany. However, the establishment of various clubs, institutions and associations shows that the German-Romanians have a special place in German society. The German-Romanians in Germany also fulfil the so-called “bridge function” between Germany and Romania. Relatives and families of emigrated German-Romanians still live in Romania. Therefore there is still a connection between the German-Romanian immigrants and Romania.

With regard to the concept of diaspora, it can be stated that several characteristics of the diaspora concept are fulfilled in the case of the emigrated German-Romanians. However, the German-Romanians cannot be regarded as a classical diaspora. In their so-called homeland of Romania they themselves are a minority. While their true roots are based in Germany, they vary from the majority of society. The institutions, clubs and associations that have been established are there to strengthen the community of the emigrated German-Romanians. The best example of this is the Association of Transylvanian Saxons. This association not only brings together the associations in Germany all under one umbrella, but networks with other German-Romanian associations in the USA, Canada and Austria. Furthermore, the activities of the association in Romania show that the attachment to the homeland is still very strong. A statement by the DFDR representative describes this connection very accurately:

From the ‘90s to 1998, there was a big wave. But mainly for family reasons and since joining the EU, there is no longer any interest in emigrating. [...] There are three groups. The adventure generation, their children and their grandchildren. Some of the adventure generation have thoughts of emigrating back and come to Romania for holidays. They are also called ‘Summer Saxons’. People come back, but it cannot be said that this is a wave. [...] They (the grandchildren) try to get closer. They only know Transylvania from the stories of their grandparents. And the dialect could be kept. They come once and get infected with the ‘Transylvannifikus’. [...] In 2017 there was an event in Sibiu, where 12 thousand emigrated Transylvanian Saxons came from Germany. I have never seen so many smiles in the streets in my life.” (Expert No. 3)²⁵

9. CONCLUSION

With regard to the question “How does Germany shape its minority policy in regards to the German-Romanians living in Romania?”, the summarized results of the study can be presented as an answer to this question. Although the German minority has been living in Romania since the 12th century, it has always been able to develop its own culture and,

²⁵ Translated by author.

despite its relatively small number compared to the past, it has been able to preserve this culture and therefore its language. This is remarkable, especially considering the developments in Europe during the 20th century. Despite the invasion of the Nazi regime in Romania, the deportation of Romanian citizens of German origin to Soviet labor camps and the communist regime in Romania during the Cold War, the German minority still exists in Romania today. In particular, during the Cold War, the German minority, like other minorities, had been oppressed under the communist regime. Nevertheless, certain areas such as religious freedom and the teaching of the German language were tolerated for the German minority.

If we look at the situation of the German minority after the Cold War, we can see that the German minority was completely absorbed into Romanian society for the first time. The Treaty of Friendship of 1992, the Convention on Cultural Cooperation of 1995 and the Convention on Cooperation in Schools of 1996 increased the bilateral relations between Germany and Romania, which created more opportunities for the German minority. The best concrete example of this is the possibility offered by the Romanian state for the political participation of minorities in Romania in general. The German minority is given the opportunity to be represented as a minority in parliament. The election of Klaus Iohannis as the Romanian President shows that the German minority is not discriminated against and isolated by the Romanian majority because of its origin. On the contrary: German minority is considered a “role model” for the Romanian people. As a concrete example of this, the German schools are known as “elite schools”, although just like the Romanian schools are state-financed schools. Romanian parents send their children to German schools, so that their children have more advantages in the labor market. This positive discrimination is not only today very present, but it has deep roots with regard to the history of the German minority. The German minority has always been seen as a good role model by the Romanians ever since they settled in Romania. In an Eastern European country this is certainly not an issue. Romania is considered the most German-friendly country in Eastern Europe.

The history of the German minority also means that Germany, as a homeland, takes on the responsibility for supporting the German minority in Romania. Historically, the relationship between the German minority and Germany has always been highly positive and cooperative. In 1871 the German minority in Romania had a desire to belong to the

German Empire, but could not do so because of the large geographical distance. During the Second World War, a large majority of the German minority in Romania supported the Nazi regime in Romania. During the Cold War and shortly after the fall of the Berlin Wall, many German-Romanians fled to Germany, which gave a whole new perspective to the relationship with regard to fugitive German-Romanians in Germany and their surviving relatives in Romania. Consequently, the German minority now had a direct relationship not only with Germany, but also with the people there. Germany gained a new perspective regarding the German minority in Romania because of the separation of the German-Romanian people in Germany and Romania which means that the relations between Germany and Romania were not only on a state-level anymore, but also on an individual level. The election of Klaus Iohannis as Romanian President of German origin can be considered as the culmination of the relations between the German minority and Germany, since the President, as a German-Romanian, has the opportunity to be in regular contact with his home country at the highest political level.

This rapprochement becomes very obvious particularly after the end of the Cold War, because the political, economic, educational and cultural institutions created mainly by Germany, are now supporting the German minority. Through these institutions, relations have been raised to a higher level as these institutions cooperate primarily with the German minority in achieving their objectives. The cooperation gives the German minority the opportunity to expand their network in the *host state* and thus strengthen their presence in majority of Romanian society. The areas of education, politics and economy create a synergy due to the overlap in their set goals in the agenda, thus preserving German culture in Romania despite the small number of the minority.

With regard to the results of the interview analysis, it can be stated that the German minority is a homogeneous community which has integrated itself into the Romanian majority society despite its different denominations. With regard to German political foundations, it can be seen that they do not work directly with the German minority, but rather focus on the structures in the country of Romania and when the objectives overlap, cooperation with the German minority takes place. It can also be said that the German minority is rather conservative, even if there were differences of opinion among the experts interviewed. The close cooperation of the DFDR with the KAS and the HSS can be used to substantiate this assumption, as these foundations belong to the conservative

spectrum. In the expert interviews it also became clear that the German minority is integrated in the Romanian majority society and works closely with the institutions there. In terms of the connection, the bridging function of the German minority in the relations between the two countries must be emphasized above all. Despite the non-involvement of the German minority, the stability of German-Romanian relations was, at one time provided with a combination of the teaching of the German language at German educational institutions and investments by German companies. However, it is evident that the German minority gained importance in German-Romanian relations when the DFDR was established. With the foundation of the DFDR, which was state-financed by both Germany and Romania, the German minority could also be represented politically and be active in these relations. The fact that the DFDR became increasingly active, especially in local politics, and also hosted high-ranking politicians from Germany, meant that the German minority gained more and more decision-making powers and Germany increasingly perceived the German minority as a bridge function in German-Romanian relations. With this perception, the importance of the German minority increased not only for Germany, but also for Romania. The best example is the role of the German member of parliament in Romania, Ovidiu Gant, who acts as an advisor to Romanian ministers with regard to Germany. The height of this importance was reached when Klaus Ioahannis was elected Romanian President and therefore is in regular exchange with Germany at the highest political level. From the results of the study, it can be concluded that the role of the German minority in German-Romanian relations has been in a state of constant change. The will to belong to the German Empire in 1871, the cooperation of the majority of the German minority with the Nazi regime during the Second World War, the waves of migration to Germany during and shortly after the end of the Cold War, the establishment of a political representation on behalf of the German minority in the form of the German Democratic Republic and finally the election of Klaus Iohannis as Romanian President shows the increasing importance of the position of the German minority that is continuously growing.

10. REFLECTION AND OUTLOOK

Different conclusions can be drawn from this research. First of all, it must be stressed that this study does not provide representative results in this thematic area. The choice of theory and method also influences the final result of this thesis. When choosing the method, which is the qualitative method, and especially when carrying out the method, different factors lead to different results compared to other research carried out in the same subject area. The first factor to be mentioned when implementing the method is the fact that it has been limited to interviewing representatives of institutions and that these representatives speak only on behalf of this institution. If these interviews had been conducted with other institutions or with a member of the German minority public, the analysis would have gained several perspectives on the subject and would have made way for a different final result. As a further factor, it can be taken into account the fact that several interview requests were not answered and therefore no interviews were conducted. Another factor is the form of the interviews. Face-to-face interviews would have led to a better communication during the interview and also to more questions on certain topics. This would probably also have had an impact on the researcher's interpretation of the statements. However, due to the pandemic that reached Europe in mid-February, trips to other countries were not possible. The fact that the researcher does not speak Romanian also meant that primary Romanian literature could not be accessed. Future research in this subject area could provide new insights in the academic field, especially through comparative analyses with other minorities. These analyses could, for example, include comparisons with German minorities in other countries. Germany's policy towards the German minority in Romania could also be compared with other ethnic minorities in the world. Above all, the comparative analysis should focus on the bridging function of the minorities, since in the future, with increasing globalization, these minorities could play a key role in international relations.

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