

T.C.
TURKISH-GERMAN UNIVERSITY
INSTITUTE OF SOCIAL SCIENCES
EUROPEAN AND INTERNATIONAL
AFFAIRS

THE IMPACT OF TURKEY'S EUROPEAN
UNION ACCESSION PROCESS ON EU-
TURKEY ENERGY RELATIONS

MASTER'S THESIS

Fatih Hacibektařođlu

ADVISOR

Asst. Prof. Dr. Ebru Turhan

September 2021

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DECLARATION

I hereby declare that this thesis is an original work. I also declare that, I have acted in accordance with academic rules and ethical conduct at all stages of the work including preparation, data collection and analysis. I have cited and referenced all the information that is not original to this work.

Fatih Hacibektařođlu

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ÖZET

Avrupa Birliđi (AB), dünyada ekonomik ve politik olarak etkili bir kuruluştur. Kıtalararası konumuyla Türkiye, bu eşsiz birliđin en önemli ortaklarından biridir. Ancak, Türkiye'nin cođrafi konumu diđer komşularına kıyasla öncelik kazandırmaktadır. Türkiye Avrupa'nın, Asya'nın ve Ortadođu'nun tam ortasında yer alarak bir köprü gibidir. Türkiye ve Avrupa Birliđi arasındaki hukuki ilişkilerin dayanađını oluşturan Ankara Anlaşması (1963) ile siyasi ilişkiler başlamıştır. İki tarafın siyasi ilişkilerinden çok, Türkiye'nin 1999'dan beri aday ülke olması önemlidir. Söz konusu ilişkiler siyasi, ekonomik, güvenlik ve tabii ki enerji konusunu da içermektedir. Enerji kaynakları yenilenebilir ve yenilenemez olarak sınıflandırılabilir; bu çalışmada yenilenemeyen enerji kaynakları üzerinde durulacaktır. Petrol ve dođal gaz, yenilenemeyen kritik enerji kaynaklarıdır. Hazar bölgesi, Orta Dođu ve Asya'daki ülkelerin bu kaynakların önemli miktarda rezervlerine sahip olduđu bilinmektedir. Avrupa Birliđi'nin yirmi yedi üyesi vardır ve enerji kaynakları kapasitesi ihtiyaçlarını karşılamaya yetmemektedir. Öte yandan Türkiye bu alanda dışa bađımlı bir ülkedir. Her iki tarafın enerji alanındaki ortak kaygıları, iş birliđine ihtiyaç olduđunu göstermektedir. Bu çalışmada, Avrupa Birliđi ve Türkiye'nin enerji politikalarını üyelik süreci üzerinden incelenecektir. Tezin araştırma sorusu “Türkiye'nin AB'ye katılım süreci, AB ile Türkiye arasındaki enerji ilişkilerini nasıl etkiler?” şeklindedir. Bu soruya cevap verebilmek için çalışmada genel olarak üyelik öncesi ve üyelik süreci incelenmiştir. Ayrıca Komisyon tarafından yayınlanan ilerleme raporlarında enerji faslı da incelenmiştir. Her iki tarafı da ilgilendiren enerji boru hattı projeleri de kısaca açıklanmıştır. Bütün bu analizler ve açıklamalar Avrupalılaşıma yaklaşımıyla açıklanmaya çalışılmıştır. Genel olarak araştırılmak istenen cevap, “Türkiye'nin AB üyelik sürecinin iyi ve kötü dönemlerinin Türkiye-AB enerji politikalarını nasıl etkilediđi veya etkilediđi midir?”.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Enerji, Enerji Güvenliđi, Enerji ilişkileri, Avrupa Birliđi, Avrupalılaşıma, Sonuçlar Mantıđı, Türkiye'nin Katılım Süreci, İlerleme Raporları, Boru Hatları

ABSTRACT

The European Union (EU) is an economically and politically influential organization in the world. The transcontinental country of Turkey is one of the most important partners of this unique union. Barely, the geographic position of Turkey makes precedence in comparison to other neighbours. Turkey is in the middle of Europe, Asia, and the Middle East like a bridge. Turkey has been establishing political relations with the Union since the Ankara Agreement (1963), which constitutes the legal basis of relations between the European Union and Turkey. Rather than political relations, the most important thing is that Turkey has been a candidate country since 1999. However, those relations include cooperation on political, economic, security, and of course, energy issues. Energy resources can be classified as being renewable or non-renewable; in this study, non-renewable energy sources will be focused on. Oil and natural gas are critical non-renewable energy resources. It is well-known that Caspian region, Middle Eastern and Asian countries contain significant stocks of these resources. The European Union has twenty-seven members, and its energy resources capacity is not enough for their needs. On the other hand, Turkey is a dependent country in this field. The common concerns of both sides in the field of energy show that cooperation is needed. However, this study will examine the energy politics of the European Union and Turkey through the membership process. The research question of the thesis is “How does Turkey’s EU accession process affect energy relations between the EU and Turkey?” In order to answer this question, the study examined generally the pre- and membership process. In addition, the energy chapter in the annual reports published by the Commission was examined. Energy pipeline projects that concern both sides are also briefly explained. All these analyses and explanations have been tried to be explained through the Europeanization approach. In general, the answer that is wanted to be researched is how the good and bad periods of Turkey's EU membership process have affected or have affected Turkey's EU energy policies.

Keywords: Energy, Energy Security, Energy relations, the European Union, Europeanization, Logic of Consequences, Turkey’s Accession Process, Commission Reports, Pipelines

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

EU: European Union

IEA: International Energy Agency

EEC: European Economic Community

EC: European Commission

BOTAŞ: Petroleum Pipeline Company

BTC: Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan Pipeline

BTE: Baku – Tbilisi – Erzurum Natural Gas Pipeline

TANAP: Trans – Anatolian Natural Gas Pipeline

ITGI: The Interconnector Turkey–Greece–Italy

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CHAPTER 1 Introduction and Purpose

Energy has been a very crucial necessity for humankind for two thousand years. After the industrial revolution, energy sources became more essential for many states. Coal, electricity, nuclear energy, and petrol metamorphosed to supreme strategic sources in the modern world, therefore, energy became an especially important dynamic of politics. One of the most important reasons that make energy important, is a crucial element for the economy of the states (Cherp, 2012, p. 327). On the one hand, governments and international organizations are in constant competition to obtain energy resources such as oil, natural gas, and coal. On the other hand, they make huge investments for establishing and enhancing renewable energy sources, but at present, the oil and natural gas pipelines are considered especially important projects for the exporter and importer countries (Cherp, 2012, p. 328). The reason for this is, with today's technology, non-renewable energy resources are cheaper and more efficient to use. However, all these developments cause the existence of new concepts for international relations such as the security of energy. Ensuring energy security is a substantial requirement for states. In this study, a brief examination of the energy security concept aiming at explaining this latter's effect on energy strategies will be included. This thesis also aims at explaining the energy cooperation and relations between the European Union (EU) and Turkey, specifically through non-renewable energy resources. A thorough analysis of many crucial pipelines concerning both the EU and Turkey will also be included.

First and foremost, and before examining the energy situation in the EU and Turkey, an analysis of their relations is required. Turkey and the EU have been officially politically involved since the 1963 Ankara Agreement (Kuniholm, 2001, p. 25). Moreover, Turkey's foreign policy has been aiming towards overcoming the EU's membership process for a long time. The Helsinki Summit is a directly outcome of this. This summit resulted in Turkey gaining the status of a candidate country in 1999 (Dahlman, 2004, p. 556). The period between 1999 until today can be considered as an accession period during which, there was recovery, discontinuance, and backsliding periods (Directorate for EU Affairs, 2020). The developments made by Turkey in the

energy field during these three periods in order to gain accession, are related to this research's question.

The research question of this thesis is "How does Turkey's EU accession process affect energy relations between the EU and Turkey?". To answer this question, this study will analyse the annual reports of the Commission during the Turkish membership process, which has been ongoing since 1998. From 1998 till present day, the European Commission (EC) has been publishing annual reports every year, except for 2017 (Delegation of the European Union to Turkey, n.d.). A part of this study is designated for examining these annual reports. These reports show Turkey's compliance with EU standards in the energy field. Furthermore, this study aims at analysing the accession process as well as its previous periods from 1963 to 1999. Focusing on this period, which is the basis of the membership process, shows the political relations of the two sides as well as Turkey's oil and natural gas projects. An important factor to be considered is the stance of both sides towards the energy field. In order to answer the research question, the discourses of the leaders of Turkey and the EU will also be examined.

Moreover, both Turkey and the EU do not have enough energy resources compared to their necessities. EU's most prominent energy exporters are Russia and Norway (European Commission, n.d.). However, Turkey's most significant energy exporters are Russia, Iran, and Iraq (Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources, n.d.). This constitutes a strategic partnership for both the EU and Turkey because Turkey forms a bridge between the EU's exporters and its receiving countries. Turkey's geopolitics are gaining importance as energy focus grows on oil and natural gas pipelines. This thesis focuses on energy exporters for both the EU and Turkey. In addition to this, this study shows new energy security strategies and explains the importance of geopolitics when it comes to the energy field.

In the accession process and according to the annual reports of the Commission, there are continuous improvements and developments in the energy field between Turkey and the EU (Directorate for EU Affairs, 2020). The main assertion of this thesis is that these improvements and developments are continuing in the energy field because of the logic of consequences even when the two sides' relations are not good. According to European Commission the reason for this is the overlap of their interests (1999, p. 35).

The hypothesis is that Turkey energy policy has not shown a negative course due to Turkey's logic of consequences approach. The dependent variable of the thesis is Turkey-European Union energy cooperation. The independent variable is logic of consequences. When this thesis looks at the concept of logic of consequences, there are some factors that explain this concept, and examining these factors makes it useful to consider this concept as an independent variable. These concepts are preferences of government parties, certainty of the EU demands, presence veto players, size, and reliability of EU's incentives. When the relationship between dependent and independent variables is examined, the aim of this thesis is to show that the concept of logic of consequences has an impact on Turkey's energy policies. In other words, the main point in this thesis is to emphasize that Turkey's energy policies are in line with the EU, thanks to the concept of logic of consequences.

The Third Chapter of this thesis explains the Europeanization approach which is more favourable for the understanding and explaining of Turkey and EU relations. It is related to the outcomes and effects of the integration process in the domestic policies of countries (Balkır & Soyaltın, 2018, p. 43). These countries can be members of the Union, candidates, or third countries (Afşar, 2017, p. 68). Turkey has been under the effect of European norms, values, and policies for a long time. Turkish politics, economics, and social life have been affected by Europeanization. However, this part explains the meaning and features of the Europeanization and background of its evolution and very briefly its effect in Turkey. In addition to this, it clarifies the integration process's effects on the political structure, policies, and actors.

The following chapter explains the concept of Energy. This chapter is significant for the understanding of the energy relations of Turkey and the EU. It provides a basis for the upcoming chapters. It specifically explains the importance of energy and its resources for states and their international relations. However, it focuses on non-renewable energy resources, especially, oil and natural gas. Moreover, the Fourth Chapter includes information about the supply and demand of oil and natural gas statutes of the EU and Turkey. Another important part of the chapter explains the importance of Turkey for EU energy security.

The accession process of Turkey started officially with Helsinki Summit in 1999 (Balkır & Soyaltın, 2018, p. 112). However, relations did not start then. The background

of the accession process is explained in the Fifth Chapter. This chapter clarifies the Ankara agreement along with the three significant periods, which are the Preparatory, the Transition, and the Completion periods (Directorate for EU Affairs, 2020). This chapter analyses the period of 1963 to 1998. It also includes some of Turkey's and the EU's oil and gas pipeline projects. Furthermore, this chapter explains the world oil crisis (1973) that has an important effect on the emerge of new energy strategies in the world.

The Sixth Chapter is the main chapter of this thesis. It analyses the period of 1999 to 2020 as it includes the membership process mainly three parts: "1999 to 2005" (Recovery), "2005 to 2011" (Discontinuance), and "2011 to 2020" (Backsliding). During each of these periods, the relationship between Turkey and the EU has had different levels of dialogues. This study compares and contrasts these levels of dialogues with energy relations. In these three periods, of course, there are many events and mutual contacts. However, the important ones were tried to be mentioned in the thesis. The main point is to show the status of the membership process during the periods and whether the relations are going well or badly. Furthermore, this chapter analyses significant oil and natural gas pipelines' projects which concern either Turkey, the EU, or both. In this part of the thesis, the annual reports on Turkey, which are published by the EU Commission, will be examined. Turkey's energy policy interests will be better understood by examining these reports. In addition, in this section, Turkey's Eastern Mediterranean energy policies will be discussed. Conflicts of interest between the EU and Turkey in this region will be explained in terms of logic of consequences.

The last chapter which is the conclusion part answers the question of "How does the Turkish accession process to the EU affect the Energy Relations between two sides?". The energy relations between Turkey and the EU during the processes described in the previous parts of the thesis are analyzed. In other words, it has been examined whether energy relations are affected by the membership process. These analyses and examinations were carried out in accordance with the logic of consequences approach.

CHAPTER 2 Literature Review

Europeanization is a concept that has gained importance for European studies, especially after the 90s. According to Canan Balkır and Diğdem Soyaltın (2018), this concept became more important after the Maastricht treaty. With the agreement signed in 1991, the conditions to be fulfilled for the new members to join the union were determined. Signing the 1991 agreement pushed forward decisions for the new structure to be formed with the new members to join the union (Nugent, 2006, pp. 84-89). In the European Union, this has deepened. Members of the union were affected by this deepening that has become an important field of study in academia. The reason for this was the increase in the effect of the EU over member states. This has also been a subject of research by academics. While explaining this situation, Olsem (2002) likens Europeanization to an academic industry. He mentions that this industry has gained a lot of value recently. Featherstone (2003), Sedelmeier (2011), and Afşar (2017) stated that the use of the concept of Europeanization in academic resources has increased. According to Radaelli (2000): With the increasing use of the concept of Europeanization, different opinions and definitions have emerged and a single definition does not exist anymore. In general, however, the concept of Europeanization is referred to as the 'European effect' in the literature (Olsen, 2002) (Radaelli, 2000) (Sedelmeier, 2011) (Balkır & Soyaltın, 2018) (Afşar, 2017) (Featherstone, 2003) (Börzel & Risse, 2003) (Ladrech, 1994) (Mjoset, 1997).

One of the first definitions of Europeanization was given by Robert Ladrech (1994). According to Harmsen (2000), Ladrech's explanation is one of the basic definitions of the concept of Europeanization (Balkır & Soyaltın, 2018, p. 43). Ladrech (1994) points out that Europeanization is a natural outcome of the process of integration. According to him, together with integration, it is a process in which the values of the EU are a part of national values. As a result, the decisions taken, and the policies made by the national state will be in harmony with the EU. As Börzel and Risse (2003) claim, Europeanization is necessary to examine its effects as a top-down process and to understand that the EU is a force for internal changes in the political and legal structures of the candidate and member countries. The concept of top-down has gained importance

with its deepening. There is a decrease in the influence of the nation-states on the EU in general and an increase in the effect of the EU on the nation-states. The purpose of Yazgan's (2012) study is that it discusses the necessity and boundaries of the Europeanization and shows how this concept is applied in the literature. The author attempts to answer the question of “whether Europeanization is a process or a result?” (Yazgan, 2012). According to Yazgan, it should be noted that although the existence of a suitable political base in domestic policy makes it easy for Europeanization, Europeanization may still not occur (Yazgan, 2012, p. 124). Balkır and Soyaltın (2018), who described Europeanization in-depth, compared it with other international theories. It is an important source for this thesis because the authors explain the theory of Europeanization with Turkey in the accession process. However, according to Lavenex and Schimmelfennig (2009), the concept of Europeanization is valid not only for member states but also for candidate countries. A similar view occurred from Radaelli (2000), who argued that the concept of Europeanization applies to countries outside the union. Especially by combining Europeanization with the concept of modernization, he agrees that other countries will modernize as they become more European.

So, Turkey, which has been a candidate country since 1999, has experienced Europeanization in many areas. Being exposed to this influence especially during the accession process, Turkey tried to adopt the EU values in its domestic and foreign policies. Some regulations are recommended for Turkey to complete its harmonization with the EU. Since 1998, reports have been published annually by the European Commission (Delegation of the European Union to Turkey, n.d). These reports contain thirty-three chapters that mention the current situation of Turkey and the requests of the EU. The developments achieved in the chapters increase the harmonization with the EU and also ensure the adoption of the EU values. The chapter that includes Energy, which is the main research area of this thesis, is the fifteenth. The energy chapter is generally based on 3 main topics. They are competitiveness, security of supply, and sustainability (European Commission, 2000, p. 51). During the membership process, it will be observed through the Commission reports whether the developments in the energy chapter are progressing in a positive or a negative direction.

Along with examining the relations of the two parties in the field of energy, the concepts of energy and energy security will also be examined. As in the concept of

Europeanization, there is no precise definition of the concept of energy security. The International Energy Agency (IEA) defines energy security as “the uninterrupted availability of energy sources at an affordable price” (IEA, 2021). According to Ang, Liang, and Ng (2015), there are many different definitions of the concept of energy security, and it changes according to the situation. Both (1991) referred to this situation and argued that the definition and limits of the concept of energy security should be determined. He stated that it is difficult to make the right policies in the current state. Röhrkasten and Westphal's (2012) works which examine Germany's policy on energy security point out that the concept of energy security is not clear. Anderson (2015) focused on an important subject in his work, he declares that energy security and energy independence should not be confused with each other. Not importing energy from other countries only demonstrates the country's dominance in energy resources (Anderson, 2015, p. 77). In other words, even though countries have enough energy resources for themselves, they do not provide their energy security. Ensuring energy independence is one of the important principles for energy security. Moreover, guaranteeing continuity and the cheapest cost are important dimensions. Carley (2011) pointed out sustainability in the field of energy in her study and argued that politicians should choose renewable or non-renewable energy sources, whichever is more efficient for energy security. Deni and Stegen (2012) argue that countries should turn to renewable energy sources for energy security. They think that countries should pay attention to climate change as well as energy security. Schröder, Wessels, and Bettzge (2017), while explaining energy security in their books, they emphasized non-renewable energy sources and the importance of being independent or little dependent on energy. However, Manne, Richels, and Weyant (1979) pointed out that the concept of energy security gained importance with the oil crisis in 1973. This is the subject Schröder, Wessels, and Bettzge want to touch upon. With the oil crisis, European countries realized that they should not be dependent on certain geography in terms of energy, and alternative strategies should be planned for possible political crises.

This thesis will analyse the energy policies of Turkey with the EU, especially in the accession process, but also it will examine the period that before the membership process, that is from 1963 to 1999. In order to understand the relations between Turkey and the EU in the energy field during the accession process better, the membership

process will be examined in 3 separate periods. These are “1999 to 2005” (Recovery), “2005 to 2011” (Discontinuance), and “2011 to 2020” (Backsliding). Each term has a different dimension in the EU relations with Turkey in terms of the accession process. If the membership process as a whole is considered, it can be concluded that it is a difficult process for Turkey. It can be observed that the EU has always been at a distance from Turkey even in the periods when reforms and harmonization mostly complied.

Dahlman (2004), Bürgin (2010), and Kuniholm (2001) drew attention to the negative stances of EU politicians towards Turkey regarding the accession process. Especially in 2007, the statement made by Sarkozy against Turkey's membership was on the agenda (Deutsche Welle, 2007). In the period of backsliding, negotiations were made, and an agreement was reached between Turkey and the EU to reduce and control the transit of Syrian refugees to Europe. Benvenuti (2017) points out that the immigration policy could hinder Turkey-EU relations. This assumption turned out to be true. Turkey accused the EU of not adhering to the agreement. Even, in February 2020, on the border between Turkey and Greece, the measures of the Turkish security forces were reduced, and refugees tried to cross the European border (BBC, 2020). Turkey's accession process, there are many important issues in terms of the structure, values, and norms of the EU. One of them is the supranational structure of the EU. Suvarierol and Düzgit (2011) argued that supranationalism is a norm of the EU and it constitutes a major obstacle in Turkey's membership process. Adaman (2011) explained the membership process through the concept of corruption. According to him, Turkey has not reached EU standards in the fight against corruption.

Moreover, human rights, minority rights, and fundamental freedoms are very important values for the EU. The Commission annual report includes chapters about these issues. According to the findings of Balkır and Soyaltın's studies (2018), the number of cases that went to the European Constitutional Court from Turkey increased in 2016 and Turkey was the country that was sentenced to the highest amount of compensation. Turkey has been criticized by the EU for human rights and the rule of law in the 2016 report (European Commission, 2016, pp. 5-7). Also, Sipahioğlu (2017) examined the membership process during the Justice and Development Party (AKP) period in terms of Europeanization and found results about de-Europeanization. Tekin and Williams (2009), interpreted the membership process in terms of energy security. In their opinion,

geopolitical position plays an important role in Turkey's membership status. Because Turkey, which is a neighbor to Middle Eastern countries and the Caspian region countries, is an important factor to the EU's energy security.

CHAPTER 3 Theory and Hypotheses

Europeanization is a new concept for the field of international relations, especially for European studies (Olsen, 2002, p. 921). It is realised with the Single European Act and the Maastricht Treaty during the late 1980s, and early 1990s. In other words, the European integration process gained momentum with the Maastricht Treaty (Balkır & Soyaltın, 2018, p. 17). In this period, there was an acceleration of the integration process and gaining importance of non-governmental organizations apart from nation-states in the EU (Balkır & Soyaltın, 2018, p. 17). These developments have also directly affected European studies (Rabeharisoa & O'Donovan, 2014, p. 718). Europeanization is an academic field that is gaining in value (Olsen, 2002, p. 921). An example of the academic impact of this is the number of citations. When the 1980s is compared to the 2000s, there was an 8-time increase in the number of citations of Europeanization in the academy (Featherstone, 2003, p. 5). However, Europeanization can be explained by European influence. (Diez, Agnantopoulos, & Kaliber, 2005, pp. 4-5). Europeanization concerns the reflection of the dominance of the union over the other countries (Börzel & Risse, 2003, pp. 18-20).

The main concept of Europeanization is that the political, economic, and social dynamics of the EU affect the nation-state (Ladrech, 1994, p. 69). Those nation-states are not only members of the union, additionally, candidate countries and partners of the EU. (Lavenex & Schimmelfennig, 2009, p. 807). Considering this information, Turkey is a significant study area of the Europeanization theory. With Ankara Agreement, relations between the EU and Turkey started (Kuniholm, 2001, p. 25). Ankara Agreement was signed in 1963 (European Commission, 1998, p. 5). Afterward, the Helsinki summit ensured Turkey's candidature in 1999 (Dahlman, 2004, p. 556). So officially, Turkey has been a candidate country of the union for 22 years and has had official relations for 58 years. As a consequence of those relations, Turkey has been affecting European policies and norms (Balkır & Soyaltın, 2018, p. 127). One of the areas affected is Turkey's energy field (Directorate for EU Affairs, 2020). Within this context, energy cooperation between Turkey and the EU is also affected. With Europeanism experienced in Turkey, it has continued to progress despite the political crisis experienced in the field of energy. In the next section, the conceptual approach of Europeanization will be examined.

3.1 Europeanization

Europeanization has emerged as a new field of study in International Relations with the emerge of the Maastricht agreement especially for European Studies (Balkır & Soyaltın, 2018, p. 1). The Maastricht treaty has caused the union to turn into a more institutional structure (Sturm & Dieringer, 2005, p. 283). The Maastricht Treaty, also known as the Treaty of EU, entered into force on 1 November 1993 (Nugent, 2006, p. 93). With this agreement, it was decided to complete the monetary union until 1999, to establish European citizenship, and to establish common foreign and security and cooperation policies in justice and home affairs (Directorate for EU Affairs, 2020). As a result of these developments and reforms, nation-states transferred their authority to institutions (Balkır & Soyaltın, 2018, p. 47). Such a policy of deepening has never been seen in world history.

However, at the beginning of the 1990s, Europeanization was one of the most discussed and researched concepts in political science and European studies. Europeanization has created a new discipline in international relations. This discipline, which examines the effects of the European Union, has an especially important place (Featherstone, 2003, p. 5). The concept of Europeanization, which can be defined as the change occurring with the effect of the EU, is the result of the evolution of the EU in terms of both deepening and enlargement. (Yazgan, 2012, p. 124). Enlargement and deepening are two important concepts in EU history (Berglof, Burkart, Friebe, & Paltseva, 2008, pp. 133-134). They are two development pathways that affect each other, no matter how different they seem (Berglof, Burkart, Friebe, & Paltseva, 2008, p. 133). Enlargements with the participation of new member states and deepening with new agreements have been seen throughout the history of the EU (Van der Veen, 2014, p. 771). With new member states joining the union, the problems that arise or have the potential to arise in the system and in the operation have been solved through agreements. With these agreements, over time, the nation states started to transfer some of their authorities to the institutions (Balkır & Soyaltın, 2018, p. 51). With each treaty, the EU institutions have become stronger via-vis national states (Özçelik, 2015, p. 36). As a natural consequence of this process, the union began to affect the nation-states and change

them according to union interests (Scott & Meyer, 1994, p. 1994). This situation, which is known as a natural result, has considered the Europeanization concept as a study topic.

In fact, Europeanization is a process of structural change (Lavenex & Schimmelfennig, 2009, p. 805). It is a process in which national institutions, political actors, policies, and even national values change (Balkır & Soyaltın, 2018, p. 1). The EU tries to ensure systemic integrity by influencing nation states in line with its own interests and functioning (Ladrech, 1994, p. 70). In other words, it prevents the incompatibility that may occur between institutions and nation states (Afşar, 2017, p. 79). The Nation states that are under influence and change are starting to form their own interests in line with the EU (Balkır & Soyaltın, 2018, p. 52). The nation states that create policies and strategies suitable for the whole union to become more compatible with the EU (Ladrech, 1994, p. 70). This influence and change occur not only in policies and interests of states, but also in national institutions and political actors (Balkır & Soyaltın, 2018, p. 1).

The previously mentioned, incompatibility, and its elimination are important in the Europeanization process. The member states of the EU, while ensuring the necessary conditions at the national level, should also assume the necessary role at the EU level (Afşar, 2017, p. 79). If national states contribute to EU-level policies a lot, it becomes easier to eliminate incompatibility (Balkır & Soyaltın, 2018, p. 45). The point to note here is that this is implemented by the national state both in theory and practice. Otherwise, incompatibility increases, and the process becomes longer.

So as a result, to put it very briefly, Europeanization studies on this process of change from the EU to national states (Balkır & Soyaltın, 2018, p. 59). Although this process of change is not something that occurred suddenly, it has emerged over time (Agnantopoulos, 2013, pp. 69-70). This institutionalization and deepening that started with the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in 1951 have taken its current form (Balkır & Soyaltın, 2018, p. 14). The main issue here is that with the agreements realized over time, the national states give some of their authority to the EU institutions (Afşar, 2017, p. 67). These Institutions that have become competent in making decisions, affect countries.

The concept of Europeanization should not be mixed with other concepts. Europeanization does not mean European integration, but that Europeanization should not be separated from the European integration (Radaelli, 2000, p. 4). European

integration and Europeanization is a situation that affects each other. Europeanization increases because of the increase of European integration, and integration increases as Europeanization increases (Radaelli, 2000, p. 4).

Another important issue is that this change of being affected does not only occur in member states (Lavenex & Schimmelfennig, 2009, p. 807). At the same time, this process of change and influence is also observed in countries that are candidates for membership, neighbouring countries, and even in cooperatives with the EU (Özçelik, 2015, p. 35). There are some terms and conditions that candidate countries must ensure during the membership process (Balkır & Soyaltın, 2018, p. 68). These conditions concern the political systems, state institutions, legal, economic, and even social life of the candidate countries (Afşar, 2017, p. 67). With the correct provision of requests, candidate countries become compatible with the EU system (Özçelik, 2015, p. 47). With the renewed EU-compatible structure, the candidate state naturally begins to reduce its interests and make policies in line with the interests of the EU or harmonize its interests with it (Balkır & Soyaltın, 2018, p. 69). At the same time, state-owned institutions are becoming compatible with EU institutions and even appear to be sub-organs of EU institutions. Of course, this is the most appropriate level at which the candidate country has transformed for membership.

As a result, Europeanization is the transformation of national states in their policies, institutions, politicians, political discourses, social life, and law, and minimizing incompatibility with the EU structure and the EU institutions (Ladrech, 1994, p. 69). The transition of authority from the national state to the EU and the intervention of the EU institutions in the sovereignty areas of the national states is a natural result of this process (Marks & Hooghe, 2008, pp. 21-23). States are starting to act according to the interests of the EU rather than their rational or economic interests (Balkır & Soyaltın, 2018, p. 43). While some national states do this as an obligation, some states view this as a normalized position (Balkır & Soyaltın, 2018, p. 55). The same situation is observed in the states in the accession process or in third countries. The reason for this is countries that lag behind in terms of modernization take the EU and its members as role models. Europeanization has increased significantly in Turkey, especially with the start of the membership process. The reforms and legislative changes aimed to increase compliance with the EU. These developments can be observed in the Commission reports. However, Turkey's motivation

to achieve harmonization with the EU is only to gain membership. When it became clear that it would not be a member of the EU for a long time, Turkey started to move away from EU norms. Moreover, when it comes to its own interests, Turkey does not follow the policies expected and recommended by the EU; however, although Turkey makes policies contrary to some European values, as mentioned above, Turkey also gives importance to norms and aspirations that are in line with the EU interests, such as energy.

3.2 Europeanization and Turkey

Turkey has been a candidate country for the European Union since 1999 (Dahlman, 2004, p. 556). However, the EU-Turkey relations have only begun with the 1963 Ankara Agreement (Kuniholm, 2001, p. 25). There are three main headings that were determined in the Ankara Agreement. These are Preparatory, Transition and Completion periods (Directorate for EU Affairs, 2020). With the Additional Protocol (signed in 1970, implemented in 1973), the preparation period has ended, the transition period has started (Uysal, 2001, p. 143). Before the specified periods ended successfully, in 1987 membership application was made and a negative response was received (Directorate for EU Affairs, 2020). If we analyse those three periods, which were determined by the Ankara agreement, since 1963 Turkey has been wanting to join the EU. However, the Europeanization of Turkey became more intense and official with the membership process.

The process of the Turkish accession process to the EU is extraordinarily complex and challenging. The biggest reason for this, Turkey is the longest candidate country in the EU history. Even in the current situation, it does not seem possible to become a member for a long period. Turkey applied to the EU for membership in 1987 (European Commission, 1998, p. 5). However, the EU Commission announced its opinion on this application in 1989 and evaluated it negatively (European Commission, 1998, p. 5). Nevertheless, with the 1999 Helsinki summit, Turkey gained the status of candidate country (Karbuuz, 2014, p. 2).

In each year; from 1998 until today; the European Commission prepares annual reports on Turkey (Directorate for EU Affairs, 2020). Turkey has conditions and reforms that must be fulfilled to become an EU member. Annual reports are published to

determine the necessary fulfilled conditions and to check whether Turkey provides those conditions or not (European Commission, 1998, p. 1). There are chapters identified in the Commission reports, and through these chapters the requirements set for Turkey are expected to be fulfilled. There are 33 chapters in total specified by the EU (Directorate for EU Affairs, 2020). When chapters are completed, there will minimize a misfit between Turkey and the EU. In other words, it can be called the full effect of Europeanization. But Turkey failed to show the necessary progress in some chapters, there is even a regression in some chapters.

However, In the Europeanization concept, from 1999 up to 2007 (recovery), Turkey has been made reforms in economics, law, democracy, and many other areas (Balkır & Soyaltın, 2018, p. 115). Turkey has shown remarkable progress in many chapters and new ones have been opened by the EU (Directorate for EU Affairs, 2020). Even in this period, in Turkey, the social and political atmosphere was expecting full membership. However, in 2004 and 2007, new members have joined the EU, but Turkey's candidate status has continued (Directorate for EU Affairs, 2020). Due to this event, the period that we call recovery has ended and the discontinuance period has begun.

In the second period, reforms of Turkey started to decrease. The pace of development in the chapters has also decreased. Through chapters, Europeanization was intense in Turkey. However, there has been a decline in the reforms because the expected membership did not happen. And at the same time, it was realized that becoming a member would not occur in the near future. This shows that the reforms made by Turkey and progress in chapters so Europeanization experience, was made for only membership. And more importantly, in the last period, Turkey has experienced a backsliding in some chapters while there was progress in some of them. This approach of Turkey can be explained by the logic of consequences. To better understand this latter, the following should be looked at: rational institutionalism (Logic of consequences) and sociological institutionalism (logic of appropriateness) are also two important approaches for the Europeanization (Balkır & Soyaltın, 2018, p. 55).

The main argument of sociological institutionalism is that institutions shape actors (Checkel, 1999, p. 15). This argument is the purest form of Europeanization. It is the approach that national states see Europeanization as an aim, not a tool (Balkır & Soyaltın, 2018, p. 56). They do it not to become a member or to remain a member, but because they

really want to become European. In this concept, institutions have power and authority over national states, they can even affect them (Balkır & Soyaltın, 2018, p. 56). They can not only influence but also shape the interests of national states (Afşar, 2017, p. 77). Moreover, national states try to do the right thing rather than act in their interests (Balkır & Soyaltın, 2018, p. 56). If we consider Turkey as an example of this approach, in all kinds of crisis periods, Turkey's policy would necessarily continue with the EU's values and norms. But Turkey, especially after 2011, started to clash with the EU (Balkır & Soyaltın, 2018, p. 161). As can be seen in the annual reports, Turkey failed to show the necessary efforts and progress in some chapters, for instance, the rule of law chapter (European Commission, 2016, p. 17). According to the Turkey 2015 report, since 2014, there has been no development in the rule of law chapter (European Commission, 2015, p. 3). Especially, after the July 15th, 2016 coup attempt, Turkey's domestic policy is in contradiction with that of the EU. This situation is defined as the backsliding for this chapter in the 2016 report (European Commission, 2016, p. 13). Turkey chooses to act according to national interests and disregard the EU interests, values, and demands. As a result, Turkey's policies do not comply with Europeanization.

In the rational institutionalism approach, decision-makers shape their decisions by making benefit-cost calculations (Balkır & Soyaltın, 2018, p. 55). Decision-makers act to maximize their power (Balkır & Soyaltın, 2018, p. 55). Therefore, rational institutionalism admits that rational actors follow the logic of consequences (Afşar, 2017, p. 77). According to rational choice theory, actors choose between preferences according to the situation they encounter and use tools appropriate to the situation to maximize their profits (Rosamond, 2000, pp. 114-116). According to this view, institutions are explained for their commitment to actors, but before actors join institutions, they protect their interests (Balkır & Soyaltın, 2018, p. 55). The institution uses the actor in line with its own goals, and the actor uses the institution for its own benefit (Balkır & Soyaltın, 2018, p. 55). This approach is consistent with the case of Turkey. The Europeanization of Turkey is based on a benefit-cost approach. The development of Europeanism and discourses are used for membership in Turkey. One of the important proofs of this, as mentioned above, in 1987, Turkey was required to apply for membership without showing necessary developments. Another important argument is that after the rejection of the expected accession of Turkey in 2007, Turkey has experienced cessation of

progress and backsliding in some chapters. On the other hand, Turkey has not been backsliding in the energy chapter even in periods of crisis and tension with the EU. On the contrary, development continued in the energy chapter. Crucially, all annual reports from 2011 through 2020 (backsliding) show that Turkey has progressed in the energy chapter (Directorate for EU Affairs, 2020). Turkey acts according to national interests and meets the EU requirements in the energy field. The reason for this is the compliance of Turkey's national interests with those of EU standards in terms of energy. Turkey continues this policy for its own benefit not for Europeanization.

As a result, the Europeanization of Turkey has begun in 1963, and It gained momentum with membership status in 1999. But Turkey has not been purely experiencing Europeanisation, instead, tried to apply Europeanization in line with its national interests. When Turkey realized that it is exceedingly difficult to be a member of the EU, it is observed that Europeanization has started to discontinue and backslide. Turkey has begun to move more freely in line with national interests in the chapters. As it is understood, Europeanization is not an aim for Turkey, is a tool for the membership of the EU. The changing of Turkish domestic and foreign policy from 2007 to the present is proof of this argument. In other words, when the importance of the Europeanization approach for this thesis is examined with a general framework, the argument to be made is as follows; as stated above, Turkey, which uses Europeanization as a tool to reach membership, has decreased its desire to join the European Union due to some policies. Especially the conflicts of interest with the EU facilitated the examination of the Europeanization approach in terms of Turkey and the EU. In short, the process of Turkey's departure from the European Union is seen in many policies, but this situation is not reflected in energy policies, which makes this situation even more interesting. For this reason, it is important for this thesis to include the concept of logic of consequences, which is a Europeanization approach, in the whole analysis process. Along with this process, every period of Turkey's relations with the European Union will be examined and all the patterns of Europeanization and logic of consequences in the discourses, reports and texts will be presented to the reader.

3.3 Methodology

This research is based on content analysis, process tracing, and discourse analysis methods. The process tracing is one of the tools of qualitative research analysis methods (Collier, 2011, p. 823). The process-tracing method usually examines causal mechanisms where there is a single demand or a small number of cases (Özcan, 2018, p. 58). Within the context of the process-tracing method, the researcher defines hypotheses, and questions with evidence, and these pieces of evidence are analyzed properly. (Collier, 2011, p. 828) According to Beach, *“Process tracing is a research method for tracing causal mechanisms using detailed, within-case empirical analysis of how a causal process plays out in an actual case. Process tracing can be used both for case studies that aim to gain a greater understanding of the causal dynamics that produced the outcome of a particular historical case and to shed light on generalizable causal mechanisms linking causes and outcomes within a population of causally similar cases”* (Beach, 2017, p. 2). This thesis will analyse the energy relations of Turkey and the EU with Turkey’s EU accession process, according to periodic times, for this reason, the thesis makes use of the process-tracing method. The membership process is examined in three sections. These are “1998 to 2005”, “2005 to 2011” and “2011 to 2020”. These periods are respectively recognized as “Recovery”, “Discontinuance” and “Backsliding”. On the other hand, the period before the membership process is explained in three sections. These are Preparatory (1964 – 1970), Transition (1973 – 1995), and Completion (1996 to full economic integration).

To examine the development of Turkey's energy policy, it is necessary to analyse the Commission reports of 1998 up to 2020. The annual reports, which have been published regularly every year since 1998, are examined and analyzed. As a result of these analyses, Turkey's Europeanization will directly overlap the logic of consequences. Of course, also, analysis of the annual reports will be reviewed with developments in the Turkey-EU accession process. The content analysis method comprises the analysis of the annual reports and relevant written resources. This thesis especially focuses on the energy chapter in the Commission reports. An analysis was made on the developments on energy in the European Commission annual reports published every year and arguments were

developed with inferences as a result of the analysis. In this thesis, agreements between Turkey and the EU were examined.

Sociologists such as H. Garfinkel and E. Goffman in the 1940s made an important contribution to the development of discourse analysis in the discipline of sociology. Discourse can be an oral expression such as a speech formed by language, or it corresponds to written texts such as a book, article, newspaper article (Gül & Nizam, 2020, p. 189). Discourse analysis is a broad term that refers to the study of language used among people in both written and oral contexts (Gül & Nizam, 2020, p. 189). The reason for using discourse analysis in this thesis is to better understand the relations between Turkey and the European Union in the membership process and energy cooperation than the leaders' statements.

As a result, briefly, the EU Commission reports on Turkey, agreements between the EU and Turkey, and examination of the processes from 1963 to the present are research and analysis areas for this thesis. Because of these reasons content analysis and the process tracing methods are used in this thesis.

3.4 Independent Variables and Hypotheses

The dependent variable of the thesis is Turkey-European Union energy cooperation. The independent variable of the study is logic of consequences. The main hypothesis researched presumes that Turkey energy policy has not shown a negative course due to Turkey's logic of consequences approach. Because energy and energy policies have always been a priority for Turkey. For this reason, the energy policies implemented by the European Union have progressed in the interest of Turkey at many points. Thus, the logic of consequences approach, which is the independent variable of the hypothesis, can be considered as one of the most important factors in explaining the hypothesis of this thesis. Furthermore, it is assumed that the Turkish accession process has not important effects on energy relations, in other words, although Turkey's relations with the European Union are problematic, this situation does not have a negative effect on energy-related issues. Thanks to this result, the hypothesis of this thesis was formed.

When we look very brief background of Europeanization for Turkey, after the Second World War, Turkey decided to stay with Western Block, because of this reason, there was westernization of Turkish politics (Eser, Demirkıran, & Çiçek, 2012). Westernization gave place to Europeanization. However, The European Union requested to internalized European norms by candidate countries in the accession process (Balkır & Soyaltın, 2018). Turkey has been trying to gain these norms since Helsinki Summit (1999). During the accession process, there are positive and negative relationship periods between two sides, but, negative political relations does not affect the energy relations directly, because The EU's standards, expectations and aspirations coincide with those of Turkey. Turkey acts according to its own interests in some areas and adopts EU norms in some areas. Turkey is in areas where it acts contrary to EU norms and values. This can be seen more easily, especially during the bad periods of the membership process. However, the deterioration of the membership process or the political crises that occur do not affect Turkey's compliance with the EU in the field of energy or Turkey-EU energy relations. So, there is the Europeanization of Turkish energy politics because the interests match.

As this thesis emphasises above logic of consequences is a key concept in terms of the hypothesis of this thesis. When logic of consequences is examined, the concept of the misfit occurs. Especially the reason of logic of consequences are affected from some important concepts like veto players, size and credibility of EU incentives, reliability of EU's demands, preferences of government parties. For this reason, examining of these factors, in terms of Turkey's energy policies can be remarkable to understand relations between Turkey and the EU.

The concept of logic of consequences is a concept that can be associated with rationalism. For this reason, states act in line with their own interests with this concept. There are some situations that trigger states to act with the logic of consequences approach. The first of these is the certainty of the EU's claims. In other words, the clarity of the conditionality mechanism of the EU affects the approach of the states. So, it is important at this point that the target state finds these conditions understandable (Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier, 2017, p. 3). Another important concept is the reward mechanism of the eu. The size of the awards and the speed of their realization are one of the most important factors affecting the EU membership process of states. Especially in

the EU membership process, it acts as a carrot that triggers the membership states, which is the biggest of the awards. The states that want to have this carrot usually act with logic of consequences and they move away from all EU rules after getting the membership (Balkır & Soyaltın, 2018, p. 80). Finally, the policies of the party or parties in the government are important in terms of logic of consequences. If the policies enforced by the EU do not match the party views in the government, the states may abandon the EU membership process, and this is an important indicator of logic of consequences.

CHAPTER 4 Energy

4.1 Energy and Security of Energy

Energy is the most basic raw material of the production process due to the scarcity of resources in the world (Cherp, 2012). It has preserved its importance as an essential index of both industrialization and development of countries (Tutar, Tutar, & Akter, 2018, p. 3447). Energy has always been a subject of interest due to its importance for social life in general (Cherp, 2012). This value is indeed increasing day by day (Ruble, 2017, p. 341). Energy has become the most important source for people and states in the modern world (Schröder, Wessels, & Bettz|ge, 2017, p. 16). It has become an indispensable requirement everywhere (Lukhanyu, 2017). Energy is needed in vehicles, heating, communication and technology, factories, business centers, and many more fields (Lukhanyu, 2017). Due to these reasons, energy resources have turned into a strategic value in all respects over time. This situation has led states to form alliances and even start wars (Yılmaz & Kalkan, 2017, p. 170).


Energy resources can be classified into two different categories: Renewable and non-renewable energy resources (Deni & Stegen, 2012, p. 306). Oil, natural gas, coal, and nuclear energy are non-renewable energy resources that cannot be obtained again when they are exhausted and have no alternative (Tutar, Tutar, & Akter, 2018). Coal is a dark-colored energy source consisting of substances such as nitrogen and carbon (EIA, 2020). Petroleum in a gaseous state is called natural gas. This hydrocarbon-based energy source is odorless and colorless (The Economic Times, n.d). Petrol is a dark-colored energy source that is present as both a liquid and a solid (EIA, 2021). It is ready to use after being processed in the facilities. Nuclear energy is a type of energy that occurs in a nuclear power plant (U.S.NRC, n.d).

Additionally, the biggest advantage of non-renewable energy sources is that they can be used not only in energy production but in many different sectors (Solar Schools, n.d). Health, chemistry, and transportation are the main areas of use (Srivastava & Callahan, 2016, s. 61). However, they produce more energy in a shorter time compared to renewable resources (EIA, 2021). For these reasons, countries give more importance to non-renewable energy sources (Cherp, 2012, p. 327). Renewable energy resources are

resources that do not have the potential to be lost in nature when depleted. Examples of renewable energy sources are biomass, solar and wind energy, geothermal energy, and hydrogen energy (Tutar, Tutar, & Akter, 2018). Economically developed countries make serious investments in these energy resources (Carley, 2011, p. 213).

Countries have started to give importance to renewable energy sources and make serious investments (Cherp, 2012, p. 327). In the world, investments and use of renewable energy resources have increased compared to those of non-renewable energy (Anderson, 2015, p. 74). However, despite this given importance, the most used energy type in the world is fossil fuels, in other words, non-renewable energy sources (Ruble, 2017, p. 341). For these reasons, countries that produce and import oil and natural gas, gain important economic and political powers (Srivastava & Callahan, 2016, s. 59). On the other hand, countries that are dependent on foreign countries in terms of oil and natural gas try to provide energy security (Srivastava & Callahan, 2016, s. 60). While ensuring energy security, they aim to trade with different countries, not to be dependent on a single country, and to have cheaper access to these energy resources (Anderson, 2015, p. 77).

Figure 1: World Energy Consumption



Source: OurWorldinData. (2020, n.d n.d). Energy Mix. Retrieved from OurWorldinData: <https://ourworldindata.org/energy-mix>

According to the website of OurWorldinData's chart, approximately 84% of the energy resources used in the world are fossil fuels. With nuclear energy, 86.6% of the energy resources used in the world are non-renewable energy sources, renewable energy sources are at 11.4%. As can be understood from the chart, fossil energy resources have an especially important position in the world energy market. This importance gives countries, which has fossil fuel reserve, economic and political power. Also, this situation creates a huge economic burden for countries, which has not enough fossil fuel reserves. Energy consumption between 1973 and 2018 was compared in the 2020 report of the International Energy Agency (IEA). In 1973, 83% of the energy used all over the world was from non-renewable energy sources (International Energy Agency, 2020, p. 6). In 2018, although the total energy consumption in the world increased more than 2 times, the rate of non-renewable energy resources' consumption decreased to 81.3% (International Energy Agency, 2020, p. 6). Comparing the two years, the rate of decrease is extremely low. However, the decline in non-renewable energy sources started to increase after 2010 (International Energy Agency, 2020, p. 6).

Similarly, to the rest of the world, Turkey and the European Union are in the same situation concerning the use of energy resources. Although both sides invest in renewable energy sources, fossil resources are still the main element of the energy field. However, As stated above, energy is in a particularly important position for nation-states (Ruble, 2017, p. 341). The term energy security is an important concept in international relations for the provision, conservation, and sustainability of energy (Carley, 2011, p. 213). Energy policies of countries are formed over this term (Carley, 2011, p. 213).

Energy security is the most important security problem in the 21st century (Cherp, 2012, p. 327). It is the result of many events in the historical process. This process, which started with individual needs, turned into a set of needs that concern countries over time and became one of the policies and security priorities of countries (Yılmaz & Kalkan, 2017, p. 175). The International Energy Agency (IEA) defines energy security as the existence of affordable energy resources that are not interrupted (Hatipoğlu, 2019, p. 1). Undoubtedly, the Industrial Revolution has been effective in the development of energy security in the historical process. With the Industrial Revolution, nation-states needed more energy resources, therefore, made changes in their foreign policies accordingly

(Yılmaz & Kalkan, 2017). Today, most developed countries aim to increase the share of renewable energy in total energy consumption in order to minimize their increasing dependence on energy (Karabulut, 2016). Another point of view consists of accessing new non-renewable energy sources such as pipelines. While reaching new energy sources with pipelines, nation-states intend to turn to different countries, because trading with the same countries in energy import, creates an energy security problem (Srivastava & Callahan, 2016, s. 65). In a possible political crisis, the counterparty can use energy trade as leverage. For this reason, nation-states try to import energy from different countries, thereby reducing the risk. The EU and Turkey are also trying to move with this policy. In the following sections, this thesis will examine this argument providing examples.


4.2 Supply and Demand of Oil and Natural Gas of the European Union

The European Union has an important place in the energy field because it is one of the world's largest importers (Schröder, Wessels, & Bettz|ge, 2017, p. 52). Similar to other parts of the world, fossil resources consume a lot in terms of energy use in the EU. However, there have been serious investments in the use of renewable energy resources in recent years in the EU. Consequently, the rate of renewable energy sources in production is increasing. However, the current technology level does not allow the realization of innovations that will eliminate the dependence of economies on fossil fuels yet (Seki & Yılmaztürk, 2018, p. 676). For these reasons, the importance of non-renewable energy resources continues. The EU's non-renewable energy resources are also not sufficient for its own needs (Schröder, Wessels, & Bettz|ge, 2017, p. 16).

Nonetheless, the EU supplies a significant majority of its energy needs from other countries (Schröder, Wessels, & Bettz|ge, 2017, p. 16). This problem, which creates energy dependence, can also create an important security problem for the union (Seki & Yılmaztürk, 2018, p. 676). The EU has made plans to import energy from different countries such as the project of the Southern Gas Corridor (SGC) (Schröder, Wessels, & Bettz|ge, 2017, p. 52). Yet, Russia is one of the countries from which the EU imports energy, and even has an important share, the EU wants to reduce this dependence on Russia with the SGC (Yıldız, 2013, p. 160). The main purpose of this project is that the EU will have access to Azerbaijan energy resources. With this and similar strategic

projects, the EU tries to ensure energy security (Nanaya & Stegen, 2012, p. 343). In this area where it cannot reduce foreign dependency, the EU is trying to reach new sources instead of importing energy from the same countries.


Figure 2: Gross Inland Energy Consumption by Fuel, EU-27, 2008-2018



Source: Eurostat. (2020, June n.d.). Energy production and imports. Retrieved from European Commission: https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Energy_production_and_imports#Production_of_primary_energy_decreased_between_2008_and_2018

According to the graph, published by Eurostat, non-renewable energy sources have an important place in the energy consumption of the EU. Although the consumption of renewable energy resources has increased in the last 10 years, the dependence on oil and natural consumption continues. On the other hand, there was a decline in the consumption of non-renewable energy sources between 2008 and 2018. But despite this decline, the proportion of non-renewable energy sources is still high. At this rate, the EU's resources are not sufficient for fossil fuel consumption. For this reason, it imports the necessary resources from outside.


Figure 3: EU Imports of Crude Oil (2018)



Source: Eurostat. (2021, March 1). From where do we import energy and how dependent are we? Retrieved from European Commission : <https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/cache/infographs/energy/bloc-2c.html>

According to the chart above, the EU imports crude oil from many countries. Those are; Russia (30%), Iraq (9%), Saudi Arabia (7%), Norway (7%), Kazakhstan (7%), Nigeria (7%), Libya (6%), Azerbaijan (5%), Iran (4%), United Kingdom (4%), United States (2%), and others (12%) (Eurostat, 2021). Russia draws attention to countries from which the EU imports oil. It supplies almost one-third of the oil imported by the EU. When we look at the ratios of all other countries, we find that they are close to each other. It is difficult to say that the EU provides energy security within the scope of oil because when Russia ends the oil trade with the EU, there will be a big gap. For this reason, the EU aims to reach agreements with new countries and access new sources of energy imports. Pipeline projects passing through Turkey to Europe are also part of its output.

Figure 4: EU Imports of Natural Gas



Eurostat. (2021, February 8). *Imports of natural gas by partner country*. Retrieved from European Commission: <https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/cache/infographs/energy/bloc-2c.html>

According to the chart, the EU imports crude oil from Russia (40%), Norway (18%), Algeria (11%), Qatar (5%), and others (26%). However, Russia draws attention to countries from which the EU imports natural gas (Nanaya & Stegen, 2012, pp. 353-355). The situation in oil imports of the EU is more evident here. Russia provides a particularly important part of the natural gas demand of the EU (Ruble, 2017, p. 342). When this chart is analyzed in terms of energy security, the situation of the EU appears to be negative. As in the situation of oil, Russia ending the oil trade with the EU will cause a big deficiency. The project of SGC is one of the significant strategies for EU energy security (Schröder, Wessels, & Bettz|ge, 2017, p. 52). With this pipeline, the dependence of Russia on natural gas imports will decrease. The EU aims to provide energy security with the new importing countries (Krickovic, 2015, p. 22).

Consequently, as can be seen in the figures above, in terms of energy consumption, the EU uses fossil fuels more than renewable resources. It does not have sufficient resources for this consumption. Because of this reason, The EU supplies its oil and gas needs from outside. Russia is one of the leading countries exporting oil and natural gas to the EU. This situation creates an energy security problem for the EU.

4.3 Supply and Demand of Oil and Natural Gas of Turkey

Generally in the world, Turkey attaches importance to fossil fuels in energy consumption as it is more economically efficient (Saritaş, Genç, & Avcı, 2018, p. 182). Coal, natural gas, and oil have a significant share in Turkey's energy consumption (IEA, 2020). However, coal is one of the important sources of Turkey's total energy demand. Coal is used in all sectors of the economy, including power generation, industry, and heating (BOTAŞ, 2018). Due to its wide use, the share of coal in total energy demand has remained generally around 30% since the 1990s (BOTAŞ, 2018). Natural gas, which had a low share in energy consumption in the 1990s, became the most consumed resource after 2011 (BOTAŞ, 2018). Due to the increasing energy consumption and lack of resources, Turkey's energy imports increased (Saritaş, Genç, & Avcı, 2018, p. 184). Turkey is a country dependent on gas imports significantly. Most of the gas imports are met from Russia (EPDK, 2020). Furthermore, the country with the most significant share in Turkey's oil imports is Russia (EPDK, 2020).

Table 2: Natural Gas Market Outlook by Years of Turkey (million sm³)


	2016	2017	2018	2019	change% (2018-2019)
imports	46.352,17	55.249,95	50.282,05	45.211,47	-10,08
production	367,28	354,15	428,17	473,87	10,67
export	674,68	630,67	673,29	762,68	13,28
consumption	46.395,06	53.857,14	49.204,14	45.285,50	-7,96
period-end balance	1.700,25	2.948,37	3.167,23	3.095,44	-2,27

Source: EPDK. (2020). *Turkish Natural Gas Market Report 2019*. Ankara: Republic of Turkey Energy Market Regulatory Authority.

According to the report of EPDK, Turkey is importing almost all of its gas needs. Turkey's natural gas resources are very minimal. This table shows that there are problems with Turkey's energy security. On the other hand, Turkey's oil production and

consumption balance show the same situation. Oil production in Turkey constitutes only 8% of consumption (PETFORM, 2020).


Figure 5: Oil Import Amounts by Country (tons)



Source: EPDK. (2020). *Turkish Petroleum Market Report 2019*. Ankara: Republic of Turkey Energy Market Regulatory Authority.

In Turkey's oil imports, Russia and Iraq are the most important trade partners. Russia meets about one-third of Turkey's oil needs and Iraq meets about one-fifth of Turkey's oil needs so Iraq and Russia, provide more than approximately half of Turkey's needs of oil. Turkey has not achieved energy security when it comes to the issue of oil.

Figure 6: Gas Import Amounts by Country



Source: EPDK. (2020). *Turkish Natural Gas Market Report 2019*. Ankara: Republic of Turkey Energy Market Regulatory Authority.

Russia's importance can be seen when looking at natural gas imports. Russia meets about one-third of Turkey's oil needs of gas-like oil import situation. On the other hand, Azerbaijan, Iran, and Algeria are important natural gas import countries for Turkey. Turkey is a dependent country on the energy situation. Energy resources cannot meet their consumption. There is an imbalance in importing and it is dependent on certain countries such as Russia. Therefore, Turkey will need access to new sources of energy. Turkey plans to ensure energy security with pipeline projects. This research will examine this issue in more depth in the following chapters.

4.4 Importance of Turkey for the European Union Energy Security

First of all, as mentioned above, Turkey and the EU prefer fossil energy sources, however, their resource capacities are not sufficient for consumption. This situation forces them to import energy. Russia has extraordinarily rich energy sources and is also geographically close to both the EU and Turkey (Schröder, Wessels, & Bettz|ge, 2017, p. 54). Both sides are dependent on Russia when it comes to energy. Therefore, Turkey and the EU would like to import their energy importations from other countries. This strategy will positively affect energy security and energy economy. Turkey's and the EU's goals

are the same (European Commission, 1999, p. 35). Both sides want to reduce dependence on Russia and have to act together to achieve this goal (Schröder, Wessels, & Bettz|ge, 2017, p. 18).

However, the European Union meets its natural gas needs mostly from Algeria, Russia, and Norway (Koçaslan, 2011, p. 253). The EU is trying to make some strategies and policies against this situation (Krickovic, 2015, p. 22). In this context, Turkey has an important place. Because Turkey is located between Europe and the oil and gas-rich countries (Schröder, Wessels, & Bettz|ge, 2017, p. 55). Pipelines from the Middle East and Central Asia to Europe must pass through the territory of Turkey or Russia. Of course, in this case, choosing Turkey will be more correct. Because the aim is to decrease dependence on Russia. As a result, the EU needs Turkey for energy security policies. The geopolitics of Turkey gives great importance to the energy area. For these reasons, some pipeline projects are designed and implemented. This whole situation continues, except for the relations of the two parties and the membership process. This situation will be examined in more detail in the next chapters.

CHAPTER 5 Historical Background of the Membership Process

5.1 Preparatory (1964 – 1970)

The European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) was established with 6 members comprising Belgium, Federal Germany, Luxembourg, France, Italy, and the Netherlands in 1951 (Wallace, Wallace, & Pollack, 2005, p. 51). Coal and steel were important energy resources for the industry of the period. This structure is established for economic purposes and explains the importance of energy. Although France and Germany battled in World War II, they soon came together for economic interests. In 1957, the Treaty of Rome was signed, and the European Economic Community (EEC) was established (Directorate for EU Affairs, 2020). This structure also has attracted the attention of Turkey because the EEC had begun to grow and get stronger. And at the same time, the policy of westernization in Turkey has an important place.

However, Turkey has found an application to the Community for the partnership on 31 July 1959 (Directorate for EU Affairs, 2020). A partnership agreement, which is the Ankara Agreement, has been signed between the two parties in 1963 (European Commission, 1998, p. 5). This agreement constitutes the foundation of the EU's relations with Turkey (Directorate for EU Affairs, 2020). The purpose of the agreement is to strengthen commercial relations, improve the welfare of Turkey, and consideration of full membership if the conditions are met (Kuniholm, 2001, p. 25). The ultimate aim for Turkey is to take full membership rather than just economic relations (Directorate for EU Affairs, 2020). The Ankara Agreement and its terms were seen as a path to membership. For Turkey achieving European standards was not a purpose though, just a tool.

However, according to the Ankara agreement, there were three periods, which are "Preparatory", "Transition", and "Completion" (Directorate for EU Affairs, 2020). In the first period, the aim was for Turkey's economic power to be closer to the EEC standards (Delegation of the European Union to Turkey, n.d). In this period, some institutions have been established between Turkey and the EEC, and among these, the highest decision-making body is the Association Council (Directorate for EU Affairs, 2020). Turkey did not have any responsibility in this period. With the Additional Protocol agreement, which

was signed in 1970, the preparation period has ended (European Commission, 1998, p. 5).

5.2 Transition (1973 – 1995)

The Additional Protocol agreement was signed on 23 November 1970 and entered into the work frame in 1973 (European Commission, 1998, p. 5). With this agreement, the preparation period has ended (Additional Protocol , 1970). On the first page of the agreement, the following is stated: "*BELIEVING that the conditions have been established for passing from the preparatory stage to the transitional stage..*" (Additional Protocol , 1970). The terms and conditions of the second term, which is the transition, have been determined with the Additional Protocol Agreement (European Commission, 1998, p. 5).

However, there were three main important outputs of the agreement. These are 1-) "Mutual and balanced obligations" being essential between the parties; 2-) The establishment of a customs union between the Community and Turkey, 3-) Ensuring the approximation of the economic policies of the parties and the development of joint activities for the partnership to function well (Additional Protocol , 1970). As can be seen, it is mostly based on economic conditions and partnerships.

Especially, the establishment of the customs union is the main purpose of the agreement (Directorate for EU Affairs, 2020). The customs union is an economic integration model in which the trade between the participating countries can be carried out free of all kinds of taxation and equivalent taxation and the parties adopt the common customs tariff for the countries outside the union (Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2011).

Turkey-EU relations, approximately between the years 1970-1983, was followed by an unstable trend (Directorate for EU Affairs, 2020). Relations were formally suspended following the September 12th, 1980, military coup (Hauge, Wessels, & Bedir, 2016). The military government has been ended in 1983, therefore, Turkey began the process of opening up to the outside. In 1987, Turkey applied for full EU membership which was rejected in 1989 (European Commission, 1998, p. 13). This situation shows

that Turkey's motivation was not to achieve EU standards, instead, the ultimate aim of Turkey was to become a member of the EU. To better understand Turkey's application for membership without meeting the necessary conditions, it is recommended to look back to 1981. In 1981, Greece gained EU membership status (European Union, n.d). Turkey applied for membership to the EU early because of Turkey-Greece historical crisis and the Cyprus issue. Turkey's EU membership application before the preparation process was completed shows that Turkey acted according to its national interests, not to the EU requests.

5.2.1 1973 Oil Crisis

As it is known, oil is not an available resource for every country. An important part of the oil and natural gas reserves is found in the Middle East. USA, Russia, Venezuela, Iraq, Iran, Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan are important oil and natural gas producers (Arslan, 2011). The Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries, or OPEC, is a structure established by 12 countries (Sırım, 2018, p. 5754). They are the countries that export oil and hold two-thirds of the known world oil reserves (Sırım, 2018, p. 5754). OPEC was founded in Baghdad, the capital of Iraq, in 1960 (Licklider, 1988, p. 213). It consists of 14 countries including Saudi Arabia, Venezuela, the Islamic Republic of Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, UAE, Libya, Nigeria, Qatar, Algeria, Angola, Gabon, Indonesia, and Ecuador (Arslan, 2011). One of the main objectives of OPEC is to provide coordination by combining the oil policies of the member states of the organization (Arslan, 2011). At a meeting held in Beirut in January 1968, it was decided to establish the Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC) (Sırım, 2018, p. 5753).

In 1973, there was an Arab-Israeli war (McGowan, 2011, p. 487). After the war, the Arab states wanted to use oil as a political weapon against the western countries (Graf, 2012, p. 188). As a result, an oil crisis occurred all over the world. OAPEC declared that it will no longer export oil to the US and countries that have taken a pro-Israeli stance during the war (Graf, 2012, p. 188). However, OPEC member countries decided to increase their importing resources by raising the world oil prices (Dursun, 2011, p. 42). The increase in oil prices in 1973 and the collapse of the stock market during the 1973-

1974 period was a global economic crisis that has not been witnessed ever since the 1929 crisis took place (Dursun, 2011, p. 42).

As a result of the crisis, the EU member states reduced their oil imports and during this period the European Communities aimed to increase the share of coal in energy use (Dursun, 2011, p. 43). Fluctuations in oil prices and the value of the dollar caused serious turmoil in the EC economy through the energy sector (Licklider, 1988, pp. 206-209). In the meetings held in 1978 and 1979, it was recognized that the European Community should develop a more effective energy policy as soon as possible (Yorkan, 2009, p. 16). In 1974, the International Energy Program was accepted and in the same year, the International Energy Agency Agreement was approved (Yorkan, 2009, p. 17). International Energy Agency members (IEA) are Austria, Belgium, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Italy, Spain, Switzerland, Denmark, Norway, Sweden, England, Ireland, Turkey, Japan, Canada, and the United States (Dursun, 2011, p. 44). The IEA aims to cooperate on measures to be taken against oil shocks, energy security for its members, and economic development and protection of the environment (Yorkan, 2009, p. 27).

The oil crisis and the aftermath show how important energy resources and the concept of energy security are. The EU is aware that it must take various measures to avoid a similar crisis. The problem with the Arab countries can also be experienced with Russia. Because Russia exports significant amounts of natural gas and oil to the EU (Nanaya & Stegen, 2012, pp. 353-355). Evidently, Turkey must also ensure its energy security by taking various precautions. The reason for this is Russia exports significant amounts of natural gas and oil to Turkey (Schröder, Wessels, & Bettz|ge, 2017, pp. 55-56). In the event of a possible energy crisis, both the EU and Turkey would be negatively affected. Intuitively, Turkey and the EU are expected to work together to reduce the share of Russia's energy trade and plan new pipeline projects.

5.2.2 Iraq – Turkey Crude Oil Pipeline

Petroleum Pipeline Company (BOTAS) was established in 1973 for the Iraq – Turkey Crude Oil Pipeline (BOTAS, n.d). BOTAS, which initially only transported oil through pipelines, has also started its activities related to the trade and transportation of natural gas since 1986 in order to meet the increasing energy need (BOTAS, n.d).

In 1973 Iraq-Turkey Crude Oil Pipeline (Kirkuk–Ceyhan Oil Pipeline) was constructed (Bowlus, 2017, p. 13). The first pipeline was ready to operate in 1977 (Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources, n.d). The second pipeline was launched in 1985 and its construction was completed in 1987 (Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources, n.d.). It is one of the most important oil export lines of Iraq. BOTAŞ is the owner and operator of the pipeline in Turkey (Bowlus, 2017, p. 14). Iraq meets approximately 21% of Turkey's oil needs, so, Iraq is a major trading partner of Turkey.

5.2.3 Russian-Turkey Natural Gas Pipeline (West Line)

Russia is a country with significant natural gas reserves. It is the most significant trading partner of the EU and Turkey in the energy sector as it exports oil and natural gas to Turkey and the EU. A significant part of the EU and Turkey's energy needs are supplied by Russia. For this reason, Russia plays an important role in energy security. The first natural gas pipeline deal between Russia and Turkey occurred in 1984.

However, in 1984, Turkey and the former Soviet Union signed an agreement on natural gas deliveries (Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources, n.d). Natural gas was exported to Turkey for the first time through this treaty (Tiftikçigil & Yesevi, 2014, p. 62). It is also the basis of energy trade with Russia. In 1986, a 25-year Natural Gas Purchase and Sale Agreement was signed in Ankara between BOTAŞ and SoyuzGazExport (GAZPROM) (Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources, n.d). SoyuzGazExport is the old name of Gazprom (Gazprom, 2021). Pipeline reaches out to Turkey from Ukraine, Romania, and Bulgaria (Tiftikçigil & Yesevi, 2014, p. 62).

5.3 Completion (1996 to full economic integration)

In 1989, the EU rejected Turkey's membership application, though relations have continued to be affected positively (Hauge, Wessels, & Bedir, 2016, pp. 13-14). In 1995, the European Union and Turkey signed the customs union agreement (Association

Council, 1995, p. 1). The customs union is one of the natural processes of the Ankara Agreement and the Additional Protocol Agreement (Association Council, 1995, p. 1). The Customs Union entered into force on the 1st of January 1996 (Kuniholm, 2001, p. 26). With this agreement, the "Last Period" of EU-Turkey association relations began (Directorate for EU Affairs, 2020). After the political crises of the 1980s, these positive developments were very crucial for the relations. The good relations between the two sides were not done with the Customs Union agreement. Relationships have gained a vastly different dimension with the developments in 1999 (Dahlman, 2004, p. 556).

The EU summit was held in Helsinki on the 10-11 of December 1999 (Gözen, 2006, p. 124). The EU summit took its name from the city where it was held so it was called the Helsinki Summit. With the Helsinki Summit, Turkey has gained candidate status (Directorate for EU Affairs, 2020). Interestingly, Greece also supports this situation (Turhan, 2016, p. 466). In fact, Greece has supported Turkey for different political reasons (Turhan, 2016, p. 466). However, Turkey's candidacy was approved at the Helsinki Summit. With candidate country status, the Turkish accession process officially commenced.

5.3.1 Blue Stream Gas Pipeline

The agreement of the Blue Stream Gas Pipeline was signed between BOTAŞ and Gazexport (Gazprom former name) on December 15th, 1997 (Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources, n.d.). The agreement sets out the 25-year natural gas exchange trade. (Sak & Zengin, 2015, p. 3) It is an important project for Turkey because it is directly linked to Turkey via the Black Sea (Tiftikçigil & Yesevi, 2014, p. 62). The pipeline was built in the Black Sea between Djubga and Samsun cities (Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources, n.d.). According to the agreement, the annual 16 billion cubic meters of natural gas is supplied to Turkey through Blue Stream Pipeline (Tiftikçigil & Yesevi, 2014). The blue stream pipeline has been in use since the end of 200. (Sak & Zengin, 2015). Russia is important for Turkey's natural gas needs because it provides an important part of Turkey's needs. The Blue Stream pipeline was not sufficient. Therefore, the Turkish Stream pipeline project was implemented.

5.3.2 Eastern Anatolian Natural Gas Main Transmission Pipeline (Iran - Turkey)

A Natural Gas Purchase and Sale Agreement was signed between Iran and Turkey on August 8th, 1996, (Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources, n.d). Within the scope of the agreement, 10 billion m³ of Iranian natural gas comes to Turkey through the pipeline annually (Winrow, 2004, p. 30). Approximately 1491 km of pipeline has been constructed and the pipeline starts from Doğubayazıt and going to Ankara via Erzurum, Sivas, and Kayseri (BOTAŞ, n.d). With the completion of the construction of the line, it started operating in 2001 (Winrow, 2004, p. 30).

CHAPTER 6 The Accession Process and Energy

6.1 The Period of 1999 – 2005 (Recovery)

At the end of the 1990s, Relations between the European Union and Turkey have witnessed good developments. In 1999, the Helsinki summit took place in the European Union. The Helsinki Summit is considered a critical turning point for Turkey (Dahlman, 2004, p. 556). With this summit on 10-11 December 1999, relations between Turkey and the EU have gained a new dimension (Alessandri, 2010, p. 91). Together with this European summit, Turkey has gained the status of candidate country (Tekin & Williams, 2009). This was the most important achievement in the process since the Ankara agreement. Especially in the 1980s, after a period of nonintercourse in EU-Turkey relations, this gain was particularly crucial for both sides (Soyaltın Colella, 2020, p. 29). After 1999, relations have started to improve further (Alessandri, 2010, p. 91). By gaining candidate status, Turkey-EU relations have gained clarity and Turkey's strategy began to be clearly defined (Soyaltın Colella, 2020). At the beginning of the 2000s, Turkey has started to publish reforms and legislative packages conforming with the European Union standards and systems (Tocci, 2005, pp. 73-75).

The Constitutional amendments in 2001 are examples of harmonization efforts with the Copenhagen political criteria, and especially, in the period from 2002 till 2004, Turkey announced and implemented a total of eight reform packages (Republic of Turkey Prime Ministry General Secretariat of the European Union Administration, 2007). These reforms showed clearly that Turkey was willing and committed to EU membership. The crucial issue that should be considered during this period is the change of power (Tocci, 2005, p. 80). In the election held on the 3rd of November 2002, the Justice and Development Party, led by Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, ascended to power (Alessandri, 2010, p. 89). The significant point is that coalition government was a normalcy in previous periods. The statements of Erdoğan and his party, when he took power, were about westernization and full membership. Erdoğan followed the political trend from the end of 1999 and made adaptation reforms for full membership (Tocci, 2005, p. 74).

As a result of these reforms, the 2004 Brussels Summit had an important place in the membership process (Podeh, 2007, p. 317). The EU responded positively to the

reforms that were made by Turkey. So, they decided to start negotiations with Turkey in 2005 for full membership (Dahlman, 2004, p. 553). Brussels summit is one of the most important turning points in the Turkey-EU relations following the Helsinki Summit. A decision was made that stimulated great excitement in Turkish politics, art, media, the business world, and the public in general.

With the Intergovernmental Conference of Luxembourg in 2005, Turkey began its EU accession negotiations formally (Directorate for EU Affairs, 2020). In general, during this period, Turkey showed good results in its membership process (Tocci, 2005, p. 77). Turkey made good progress in catching up with EU standards with the reforms and legislative changes. Considering the entire history of Turkey-EU relations and the accession process, this could be considered as the finest period for the both-side. This favourable situation of the accession process was reflected also in the Commission annual reports. There were particularly good developments in the commission reports published during this period (European Commission, 2004, pp. 5-10). There have been satisfactory developments in energy chapters as well which were included in the reports in general (European Commission, 2005, pp. 85-89).

6.1.1 Energy Chapter in Turkey Reports

In the sections to follow, the annual reports are examined yet the focus will be on the energy chapter. Nevertheless, since 1998, the European Commission has been publishing reports evaluating the progress made by candidate countries annually (Turhan, 2016, p. 466). While preparing reports, compliance with the Copenhagen criteria was taken into consideration, and reports were called the "Progress Report" until 2016 where they took the name "Country Report" (Directorate for EU Affairs, 2020). Turkey's first regular report was published in 1998 (European Commission, 1998, p. 4). Energy chapters were included in all of the published annual reports starting from the 1998 report up until today. Upon examination, the energy chapter of the 1998 report's objectives and recommendations are found to be unspecified. In the report, the current situation of Turkey energy-wise was mentioned. It was stated that a more detailed analysis should be made (European Commission, 1998, p. 42). The Strategy of the EU, noted as important, gave high priority to the approximation of laws in this sector (European Commission,

1998, p. 43). However, the first sentence of the 1999 report on the Energy chapter states the following: “*Turkey’s energy policy objectives remain to a large extent in line with those of the EU and include security of energy supplies, diversification, market principles, environmental norms and increased efficiency.*” (European Commission, 1999, p. 35). Consequently, Turkey's energy policy goals were in line with those of the EU, in other words, it was a natural process for the two sides to establish strong cooperation on energy. Turkey's satisfactory progress towards EU harmonization in this area also corresponds to Turkey's own interests.

According to the report of 2000, there has been no progress on energy efficiency and energy supply security, and it was stated that in that same year that there was little progress and much more to be done (European Commission, 2000, p. 51). An important issue that draws attention in the 2000 report was the situation about BOTAS. It was stated that BOTAS is a monopoly in the energy sector and different companies should be established instead of BOTAS and then, these new companies should be privatized (European Commission, 2000, p. 52). According to the EU, this sector should be opened to foreign investors. In the next year, according to the 2001 report, there have been legal changes and progress in the electricity and natural gas sectors (European Commission, 2001, p. 70). Additionally, it was anticipated that it would be beneficial to reduce state control in the energy sector and specified that important steps have been taken regarding the security of supply according to this report (European Commission, 2001, p. 70). In the 2000 regular report, it was recommended to reduce state control through BOTAS (European Commission, 2000, p. 51). This recommendation was renewed in 2001, without mentioning BOTAS.

In 2002, Turkey has made significant progress towards further harmonization of its energy legislation to the EU, especially in the internal market of energy (European Commission, 2002, p. 95). However, another positively stated subject that regarding competitiveness and internal energy market, significant progress has been made, but, Turkey has not made progress in terms of security of supply and oil stocks for the acquis (European Commission, 2002, p. 96). It was also mentioned that the construction of the natural gas pipeline between Iran and Turkey has been completed and the construction of the Blue Stream pipeline (between Russia and Turkey) continues (European Commission, 2002, p. 96). Looking at 2002, progress was ongoing, but the improvements that the

Commission anticipated especially on energy supply security have yet to materialize. In 2003, as in previous years, Turkey has not made progress in terms of security of supply and oil stocks for the acquis, but significant progress has been made regarding competitiveness and the internal energy market (European Commission, 2003, p. 91). It has been stated in that report that due to the activation of the Blue Stream natural gas pipeline, the importance of Turkey, as an energy transit country, increased even more (European Commission, 2003, p. 91). An overall look at 2003, Turkey made significant progress towards further alignment with the Community's energy acquis (European Commission, 2003, p. 92). Compared to previous reports, Turkey's geopolitical position and investments in the energy field were appreciated for the first time. Undoubtedly, this was an important achievement and motivation for Turkey and its future policy planning.

According to the 2004 regular report of the European Commission, there were substantial developments in the energy field (European Commission, 2004, p. 114). These significant improvements, unlike other reports, were that Turkey made progress on the security of supply, including oil stocks with the legislation of oil law (European Commission, 2004, p. 114). As mentioned above, there has been no significant development in oil stocks in previous years. On the other hand, as in the 2003 report, the European Commission mentioned that Turkey has an important position between Europe and the regions that have rich oil and natural gas reserves (European Commission, 2004, p. 114). Likewise, the importance and policies of Turkey on Mashreq countries for the Nabucco project were mentioned in the report (European Commission, 2004, p. 114). As stated previously, in the 2000 report, advice was given again on the separation and privatization of BOTAS into 4 separate companies (European Commission, 2000, p. 52). In conformity with the 2004 regular report, two distributors previously owned by BOTAS have been privatized (European Commission, 2004, p. 114). This situation, which took place 4 years after the Commission proposal, was important in the direction of the decrease of state control in the energy sector. The reduction of state control over the sector was a regularly recommended issue in previous reports. The 2005 progress report stated that Turkey has substantially aligned with the acquis on the security of supply and limited progress has been made in the area of the internal energy market (European Commission, 2005, p. 85). As in previous reports, it was mentioned that Turkey is a significant energy

transit country and It is crucial for Europe's energy supply security (European Commission, 2005, p. 86).

Looking at the Commission reports from 1998 to 2005, Turkey made significant progress and developments in the Energy Chapter. It is not surprising that Turkey is willing at this level to meet the EU criteria when it comes to energy. The reason for this is, as stated in the 1998 regular report, the interests of the European Union and Turkey in the field of energy coincide (European Commission, 1999, p. 35). At the same time, the accession process between Turkey and the EU, which started with receiving the candidate country status in 1999, progressed very well until 2005. In other words, in a period when relations were improving and in an area where interests coincided, Turkey performed well on the energy chapter.

6.1.2 Baku – Tbilisi – Erzurum Natural Gas Pipeline (BTE)

Baku - Tbilisi - Erzurum Natural Gas Pipeline (BTE) is a crucial pipeline project for Turkey and Azerbaijan. Within the scope of the pipeline agreement, it was agreed upon the arrival of 6.6 billion cubic meters of Azerbaijani natural gas annually to Turkey (Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources, n.d). The agreement has been concluded for 15 years and construction of the pipeline started in 2004 (Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources, n.d). The completion of the construction and opening of the pipeline took place in July 2006 (BOTAŞ, n.d). So, the natural gas to be produced in the Shah Deniz field located in the Southern part of the Caspian Sea, part of Azerbaijan, reached Turkey (Habertürk, 2018). Gas Pipeline uses the same corridor as the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan Crude Oil Pipeline (Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources, n.d). As the name suggests, the Pipeline reaches from Baku to Tbilisi (Capital of Georgia) and from there to Erzurum i.e. Turkey. The part of BTE in the territories of Azerbaijan and Georgia is also known as the "South Caucasus Pipeline". This project is strategically important for Turkey also for other countries in the region (Öztürk & Hepbaşlı, 2004). With this line, Turkey's dependence on Russia for energy in natural gas has decreased (Winrow, 2004, p. 24). It has been a foundation for the Trans-Anatolian gas pipeline (TANAP), which will be the continuation of this project. On the other hand, for the Azerbaijan side, there has been a significant gain in the sector of energy exports (Habertürk, 2018). It was a critical

agreement and pipeline project that enabled both sides to achieve their energy targets. The same gain was seen also from the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan Oil Pipeline project.

6.1.3 The Interconnector Turkey–Greece–Italy (ITGI)

The Interconnector Turkey–Greece–Italy (ITGI) is the pipeline that enables natural gas coming from Azerbaijan to Turkey to be supplied to Greece via Turkey (Öztürk & Hepbaslı, 2004, p. 294). The agreement was signed between Turkey and Greece on 23 February 2003 for 15 years (Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources, n.d). The Natural Gas Exchange Agreement was signed between BOTAŞ and DEPA (Greece State Natural Gas Company) on December 23, 2003 (Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources, n.d). In 2007, the construction of the pipeline was completed and the prime ministers of the two countries inaugurated it (Milliyet, 2010). An Agreement was signed between Turkey, Greece, and Italy on the 26th of July 2007, but it has not been implemented yet (Grigoriadis, 2008, p. 1).

However, this pipeline project is important for European Energy security (Karbuş, 2014, pp. 10-13). It is a project developed within the scope of the European Union INOGATE (Interstate Oil and Gas Transport to Europe) Program (Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources, n.d). The INOGATE Programme is an international cooperation program between the European Union and the coastal states of the Black Sea and Caspian Seas and their neighbouring countries (EU NEIGHBOURS, n.d). These projects cover the energy field such as oil, gas, and renewable energy sources. Countries participating in the project would be able to bring their energy markets up to the standards of EU internal energy market principles and gain benefits such as increasing their energy security and ensuring energy efficiency (Winrow, 2004, p. 36). The ultimate goal of this program is to ensure Europe's energy security (INOGATE, n.d). The EU wants to reduce the dependence on Russia by bringing the rich energy resources of 3 different regions to Europe and these three rich regions are Eastern Europe, Caucasus, and Central Asia (INOGATE, n.d). Turkey's importance is revealed here once again. The pipelines that will come from the Caucasus and Central Asia have to cross to Europe via either Russia or Turkey. Turkey is like an energy hub between rich energy regions and Europe. It will continue to preserve this feature with the projects it participates in in the future.

6.1.4 Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan (BTC) Pipeline

Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline is a crucial project for the countries in the region. It is aimed to transport the oil produced in the Caspian Region, including Azeri oil, to Ceyhan via Azerbaijan and Georgia, and from there to reach the world markets by tankers (Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources, n.d). In 1999, the agreement was signed between Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Turkey (BOTAS, n.d). The total length of the pipeline is 1,768 km (BP, n.d). The BTC oil pipeline was fully operational in 2006 (DAILY SABAH, 2021). Thus, Azerbaijan started to increase its oil revenues by selling its natural resources to the world energy market. With this pipeline, Azerbaijan can rival Middle Eastern countries in the oil trade. Since 2006, the crude oil loaded from the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan Crude Oil Pipeline's sea terminal in Ceyhan has reached 3 billion 522 million 209 thousand 875 barrels (TRT HABER, 2020). With this oil pipeline, Turkey's strategic location has once again demonstrated itself valuable (Winrow, 2004, p. 39). Turkey has an important place in the transportation of oil produced in the Caspian region to the world. It plays an important role in transportation, not only that of oil but also natural gas. As mentioned above, not only Turkey but also Azerbaijan benefits politically from this project economically. For oil-importing countries, reaching new producers is also an important gain.

6.2 The Period of 2005 – 2011 (Discontinuance)

As mentioned in previous sections, Turkey officially began its EU accession talks with the Intergovernmental Conference in Luxembourg in 2005 (Podeh, 2007, p. 317). The start of the negotiations with the decision taken in 2005 gave a new impetus to the membership process (Delegation of the European Union to Turkey, n.d). This decision is incredibly significant for the Turkish side. It could not avoid the crisis to be experienced in the accession process. However, the proper progress of the membership process with the start of the negotiations did not reflect on the political relations. During this period, 14 chapters were blocked (Turhan, 2016, p. 463). The major problem in these blocked chapters is the Cyprus problem. In 2004, Southern Cyprus officially became a member of the European Union (European Union, n.d). An Additional Protocol to the Ankara

Agreement had to be made between Turkey and new members of the EU, including South Cyprus. The Cyprus problem had emerged again between Turkey and the EU with this situation. If Turkey would have signed this agreement, it would be formally recognizing South Cyprus as a country. As a result, in July 2005, Turkey has not signed the agreement by issuing a declaration.

However, in 2006, the EU declared that until Turkey signs the agreement, the eight chapters will not be opened (Turhan, 2016, p. 468). These are the free movement of goods (Chapter 1), the right of establishment and freedom to provide services (Chapter 3), financial services (Chapter 9), agricultural and rural development (Chapter 11), fisheries (Chapter 13), transportation policy (Chapter 14), customs union (Chapter 29), and foreign relations (Chapter 30) (Delegation of the European Union to Turkey, n.d).

Southern Cyprus unilaterally blocked six chapters in 2009. These are the free movement of workers (Chapter 2), energy justice (Chapter 15), judiciary and fundamental rights (Chapter 23), justice, freedom, and security (Chapter 24), education and culture (Chapter 26), and foreign security and defense policy (Chapter 31) (Delegation of the European Union to Turkey, n.d). Also, during this same period, there were chapters blocked by France.

On the other hand, The EU leaders had negative comments about the Turkish accession process in this period. According to news of the Deutsche Welle, which is Germany's international broadcaster and relevant international media outlets, French President Nicolas Sarkozy, communicated to German newspapers that he was totally against Turkey's EU membership, and also according to Sarkozy, instead of the full membership of the Union, it would be more useful to have a common economic zone with Turkey and Russia (Deutsche Welle, 2007) Moreover, Germany's Interior Minister Wolfgang Schäuble, who is a member of Germany's Christian Democratic Union Party, stated that Turkey should not be accepted as a member of the Union (Deutsche Welle, 2007).

As a result of all these experiences, Turkey has realized that full membership will not be as quick and easy as desired, and maybe even full membership is nothing but a utopia. Turkey started to respond to these events through rhetoric. In 2009, Turkey's President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan stated that Turkey is considered a bridge in energy transmission to Europe, from Asia and the Middle East. He invited European leaders to

ensure that Turkey's accession to the EU sees more effort (Republic of Turkey Prime Ministry General Directorate of Press and Information, 2009). Erdoğan has begun to use Turkey's geopolitical position as a trump against the EU. The important point here is that he did this over the energy field. This situation shows how important the issues of energy are for the EU and the countries of the region. Erdoğan's energy discourses were strategic in this period when relations came to a standstill during the accession process. In 2009, Herman Van Rompuy, the former prime minister of Belgium, said in his speech that Turkey could never become a member of the EU (Phillips, 2009). Herman Van Rompuy became the President of the European Council in the same year after this speech was made (Phillips, 2009). However, looking at the speech of former British Prime Minister David Cameron, it is clear that she did not view Turkey's membership negatively. He said that *“my view is clear: I believe it is just wrong to say that Turkey can guard the camp but not be allowed to sit in the tent”* (Stephen Castle, 2010). Looking at this period in general, there was no desire and effort in reforms and adaptation packages as in the early 2000s. For the reasons mentioned above, the reluctance was formed against the European Union in Turkey. In the next period (after 2011), the membership process relations started to decline. This process in relations shows Turkey's political stance. The events taking place over the chapters during the membership process and the discourses of EU leaders have changed Turkey's policies. It became clear that the main motivation was not to reach EU standards and norms. Throughout the entire process, Turkey's ultimate goal was to become a member of the EU. Realizing that this will not happen soon especially with all the negative developments that took place, Turkey made changes in its discourse. These changes were experienced by Turkey in both domestic and foreign policy. They can be seen more clearly especially after 2011.

6.2.1 Energy Chapter in Turkey Reports

In the period from 1998 to 2005, There were important developments in the accession process of Turkey. These developments were also reflected in the reports. Overall, a certain level of improvement has been achieved, following the recommendations and wishes of the European Union. The period from 2005 to 2011 did not go as expected. For this reason, this period is named discontinuance. In general,

reforms and legislative changes have decreased in Turkey within the scope of harmonization with the European Union. However, developments in the field of energy continued.

In the 2006 Turkey report, the Commission mentioned that Turkey's readiness for energy supply security is excellent, but the calculation of Turkey's oil stocks is not harmonizing with EU procedure and there has been no progress in the area of energy efficiency (European Commission, 2006, p. 46). Also, it was noticed in the report that there is progress in the internal energy market (European Commission, 2006, p. 47). Turkey made limited further progress on energy supply security, at the same time, BOTAS monopoly in the energy market decreased in 2007 (European Commission, 2007, p. 49). According to the 2007 report, the situation in Turkey is described as follows: *“In the field of energy, some progress can be reported. Turkey adopted a framework law on energy efficiency. Legislative alignment is advanced but uneven. Implementation needs to be strengthened.”* (European Commission, 2007, p. 50).

In the 2008 report, some progress has been made in the field of energy, however, it was also stated that progress was not sufficient (European Commission, 2008, p. 58). In 2009, Turkey has made progress on energy supply security, energy efficiency, and the internal energy market, but limited progress has been made in the natural gas sector (European Commission, 2009, p. 59). Also, according to the 2009 report, European Commission has recommended and supported Turkey to join the Energy Community (European Commission, 2009, p. 59). It is an especially important development that the Commission particularly supports Turkey's participation in the Energy Community. This may be one of the most important outputs of the developments and improvements experienced in the energy chapter. It appears that Turkey fulfils its responsibilities at a sufficient level in this area and has a potential for substantial improvement. As in 2009, in 2010 report too, there was progress on energy supply security, energy efficiency, and internal energy market, also good progress regarding reducing the monopoly of BOTAS (European Commission, 2010, p. 65). Developments in the energy chapter of 2011 were similar to the previous two years. Specifically stated by the Commission was that further efforts were needed for the law-making to be fully in line with the harmonization (European Commission, 2011, p. 74).

During the period from 2005 to 2011, there was a discontinuance in relations between Turkey and the EU, within the accession process. As can be seen, these relations were not reflected in the energy chapter. Certain progress has continued to happen, even if it was limited. The overlap of energy policies of both sides has an important effect in this case. The situation in the energy chapter after 2011, which is the next period, will be more revealing. Because the political crisis between the two sides will grow, there will be backsliding in some chapters. Whether the developments in the energy chapter continue or not, will show the political stance of Turkey better. However, as a result, looking at the general situation until 2011, Turkey has made significant and steady progress in the energy chapter since 1998.

6.3 The Period after 2011 (Backsliding)

The last period in the accession process is the 10-year period between 2011-2021, which is named backsliding. The reason to name it a period of backsliding is that relations have deteriorated, and crises occurred between the two parties. One of the most important reasons is the backsliding in some chapters as mentioned before (European Commission, 2015, p. 4). However, there have been some remarkable situations that should not be ignored in Turkey such as the Gezi Park Protests (May 2013), the July 15 coup attempt (2016), and arresting of Selahattin Demirtaş (2016). During and after these events, the practices, policies, and sanctions of the Turkish government were met with clear criticism by the EU. On the other hand, these clear criticisms by the EU were met by denunciation from the Turkish government for not supporting the Republic of Turkey in these crisis times. These events caused the two sides to politically diverge. In particular, the policies and laws passed by the Turkish government against these events contradicted the negotiation chapters.

The Gezi Park is located next to the Taksim Square, which is one of the most historical and touristic areas of the city of Istanbul. Moreover, it has a particular importance due to its ecological status in the Taksim area. This latter has high traffic movement. Within the scope of the pedestrianization project of Taksim square of 2013, the "Artillery Barracks" which were destroyed in 1940 were planned to be reconstructed

on the Gezi Park territory (Chrona & Bee, 2017, p. 50). It is important to mention that this project was meant as a historical touristic and not military sense. On May 27th, 2013, a small group of eco-friendly protesters took the stance against this project claiming that it would affect the surrounding area negatively (Anadolu Agency, 2020). As a response, police forces intervened somehow harshly. These series of events brought even more interest and support in favour of the protesters (Deutsche Welle, 2021). The Turkish government critiqued the protests and declared that the project will go on. This declaration was the cause of a series of much more severe events that followed (David & Côrte-Real Pinto, 2017, p. 307). The opposition parties' officials embraced the protests (Habertürk, 2013). Shortly after, protest spread across the country (Moudouros, 2014, p. 193). Police forces intervened even more harshly which flamed the protests. The Gezi Park protests which started as small protests in favour of the environment turned into street protests across the whole country (Sözcü, 2019). The government considered the protests to be illegitimate, arguing that their aim was political and not ecological. Erdoğan's most central statement in this period was "We hardly keep 50% at home" (Hürriyet, 2013). Insinuating that keeping his side supporters from going in force against the protesters is hard enough. According to Erdoğan, these actions were initiated by opposition parties against him personally. As a prevention measure against the escalation of these events, Erdoğan stated that the project has been seized therefore protests should end as soon as possible. On June 6th, a poster of the founder and former leader of the PKK terrorist organization Abdullah Ocalan along with the KCK flags were hung in Gezi Park (Anadolu Agency, 2020). Famous television channels such as CNN International and BBC, and news agencies such as Reuters twisted the truths to make-believe that a "civil war" has erupted in Turkey. This was greeted severely by the Turkish Government (NTV, 2013). The German government's spokesperson Steffen Seibert declared that the German government is following the developments with deep concern and that the Turkish government should work towards reducing the tension (Deutsche Welle, 2013). German newspapers stated that the Turkish police responded violently. The British broadcaster BBC stated that "the police raided the park twice in a row" (Sözcü, 2013). Two doctors claimed that the water sprayed by the police had chemical substances (CNN Türk, 2013). The fact that the EU Commission reacted on the first day of events, the first of which was a warning and the second a condemnation, is a clear evidence of the importance Brussels

attaches to what happened (BBC, 2013). Gezi Park events were on the agenda not only in Turkey but all over the world. As a result, the Turkish government has been criticized for harsh interventions against the protestors. In addition to this, It has been criticized over different issues such as human rights, freedom of expression and the right to protest. In 2013 progress report, the EU criticized Turkey in the areas of rule of law and human rights (European Commission, 2003, p. 5).

Another important event, perhaps the most important event in this period, was the 15th of July 2016's coup attempt (Hauge, Wessels, & Bedir, 2016, p. 20). Earlier in 2013, police operation targeting the Turkish government officials, businessmen who were close to the government along with the son of back-then Prime Minister R. T. Erdoğan took place (Anadolu Agency, 2020). It was declared that the police officers and prosecutors involved in the operation were members of a secret terrorist organization known as Fethullah Gülen Terrorist Organization (FETO) (Anadolu Agency, 2020). In the same year, this organization started to be known as the "parallel state" until the 15th of July 2016's coup attempt. It is important to note that at the time of the coup attempt, the Prime Minister of the Republic of Turkey was Binali Yıldırım and the President of the republic was Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. A group of military officials, which describes itself as the "Peace at Home Council", attempted a coup on the evening of 15 July (Hammond, 2020, p. 5). On the evening of July 15th, government officials, noticing the military activity, made statements. Prime Minister Binali Yıldırım first made a statement condemning the military coup attempt (CNN Türk, 2016). In the following hours, President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan made statements inciting the people to stand against the coup which was broadcasted live (Sözcü, 2020). The majority of people protested the soldiers who attempted the coup (Anadolu Agency, 2019). 241 people have fallen martyrs that night (Sözcü, 2020). The stance of the people played an important role in the failure of the coup attempt. After this failure, Turkey made drastic measures. When the coup attempt was suppressed, a state of emergency was declared in Turkey on July 21st, 2016, and lasted for 3 months until 18 July 2018, with constant renewal (Deutsche Welle, 2018). Due to the state of emergency, the cabinet of ministers led by the president was empowered to delegated legislation without parliamentary approval. After July 2016, tens of thousands of people were arrested, and more were detained due to cases linked to the coup attempt (BBC, 2018). In the report published on the first anniversary of the coup attempt,

Republican People's Party (RPP) announced that a judicial action was taken against nearly 170 thousand people (BBC, 2018). While it was stated that a total of 125 thousand 678 people were expelled from state institutions with the statutory decrees and the most exported was by the Ministry of Interior, Ministry of National Education and Ministry of National Defence (Yeni Şafak, 2019). With the issued decrees, 2 thousand 761 institutions and organizations were closed (Yeni Şafak, 2019). Following the precautions taken after the coup attempt, the EU called on the Turkish government to observe the standards on the rule of law and fundamental rights (European Commission, 2016, p. 5). With this process, the deterioration of relations continued between the two sides.

The most important event in EU-Turkey relations after the coup attempt was the arresting of Peoples' Democratic Party (HDP) leader, Selahattin Demirtaş, in the same year (Cunningham & Fahim, 2016). The reason for his arrest was the previous street events (Toksabay, 2017). However, on October in 2014, despite the siege of Kobani by ISIS, street protests started in Turkey, which was centrally located in Diyarbakır, because the Turkish government did not support the YPG (Sözcü, 2014). In this process, also known as the 6-8 October events, Selahattin Demirtaş made statements inciting people to participate in the protests (Anadolu Agency, 2016). In the following process, the EU argued that Demirtaş was unfairly arrested and that he should be released, it also accused the government of violating human rights (European Commission, 2018, p. 13). The European Parliament adopted a draft resolution demanding the release of political prisoners in Turkey, especially Selahattin Demirtaş, and respect for fundamental rights (Euronews, 2021). As a result, relations continued to relapse because of HDP leader Selahattin Demirtaş, who was arrested because of the protests in Diyarbakır in 2016.

Problems were and still are growing in the membership process and bilateral relations between the two parties. The decision proposing the suspension of accession negotiations between Turkey and the EU was adopted in Strasbourg by the European Parliament (Karaca, 2019). The discussions about maritime jurisdiction in the eastern Mediterranean in recent years and natural gas exploration activities caused political problems between the two parties. Although energy resources in the Mediterranean are one of the problems, progress continues in the energy chapter.

European Union (EU) leaders, in the final declaration published after the summit in Brussels, for Turkey, it was announced, "*The European Council strongly condemns*

Turkey's ongoing illegal activities in the Eastern Mediterranean and Aegean Sea and underlines its full solidarity with the Greek Cypriot Administration (GCA) and Greece." used the phrase (Anadolu Ajansı, 2018). President Erdoğan made statements for Turkey own interests to the eastern Mediterranean. In his speech in 2020, President Erdoğan said: *"We aim to make our country a global energy hub. As Turkey, we have never sought regional tension. The sole purpose of our hydrocarbon exploration efforts in the Eastern Mediterranean is to protect the interests of our country and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus."* (Presidency of the Republic of Turkey, 2020). President Erdogan, in a speech he gave about the search for energy reserves in the Mediterranean in 2020, *"We will continue to struggle for the independence of our country in energy as well as in economy"* (Presidency of the Republic of Turkey, 2018). In her first speech above, President Erdoğan gives confidence to her neighbors in the field of energy by also referring to Europe. When he says global energy hub, it points to a hub going to the EU countries. While he gave messages of cooperation in the field of energy in his first speech, his discourse changed in his second speech. Looking at his second speech, he gives a message to Greece and Southern Cyprus, which are EU countries, and therefore to the EU. President Erdoğan stated that he will act in accordance with Turkey's interests in the fields of energy and sovereignty. This situation shows that Turkey acts according to the logic of consequences. Cooperation between the two parties is a good option for Turkey when Turkey's interests in the field of energy coincide with the EU, while when interests conflict, Turkey acts according to its own interests, not EU wishes. In a speech he gave in 2021, emphasizing that Turkey has made significant contributions to Europe's energy supply security with the energy projects it has implemented so far, Erdoğan said, *"We do not demand anything that we do not have a right to in the Eastern Mediterranean"* (Euronews, 2021). As it can be understood from his speech, Turkey cooperates with the EU in the fields of energy in which it fit its interests, and moves away from cooperation when it does not comply with its interests.

As a result of the events between the European Union and Turkey since 2011, the membership process has experienced its worst periods. These events between Turkey and the EU reveal that Turkey does not attach importance to EU recommendations and requests as before. Rather than EU standards and norms, Turkey acted according to its own interests in times of crisis. This experienced crisis during the membership process

was of course also seen in the Commission reports. There was a backsliding in some important chapters. But this backsliding has not been experienced in the energy chapter and even, progress in the energy chapter continued. The continuation of the developments in the energy field, which is of strategic importance in terms of politics and economy, shows better Turkey's membership process policy.

6.3.1 Energy Chapter in Turkey Reports

In the period extending from 1998 to 2005, relations improved. Around 2005 and 2011, there was a discontinuance in ties between Turkey and the EU as part of the accession process. However, when looking at the energy field, it is seen that the membership process, especially in the period between 2005-2011, did not have much of impact. According to reports, in this period, developments on the energy chapter continued. Nevertheless, looking at the overall situation until 2011, Turkey has made substantial and consistent gains in the energy sector since 1998. The period to be discussed in this section is an important criterion for the Turkish politics on accession process. Because during this period, the relations were affected negatively, and this situation appeared as a backsliding on the chapters in the accession process. At the same time, developments in the energy chapter have moved in a different direction by comparing the general situation.

Moreover, looking at the 2012 progress report published by the Commission, Turkey made some progress on natural gas market, energy supply security and energy efficiency (European Commission, 2012, p. 60). Especially, in the 2012 report, Commission mentioned that Turkey; overall, showed a relatively advanced level of alignment on field of energy (European Commission, 2012, p. 62). The positive progress of the Commission's reports on the energy chapter was a significant achievement for Turkey. In the 2013 report, the TANAP natural gas pipeline, which has an important place in the EU, was mentioned and information was given about its current situation and according to the report, under TANAP, progress has been made in energy supply security (European Commission, 2013, p. 36). According to this report, in general, developments in 2013 were at the desired level and Turkey's harmonization with the EU in the field of energy was remarkably successful (European Commission, 2013, p. 37).

In 2014, progress was made in the field of energy including energy supply security and renewable energy (European Commission, 2014, p. 38). In general, positive developments took place on the energy chapter in 2014 and progress continued. Developments in the field of energy in 2015 were satisfactory and the commission's appreciation for them was a crucial achievement. In the report in 2015, it is stated that Turkey is moderately prepared energy-wise which is in line with the European Union criteria (European Commission, 2015, p. 46). The statement that Turkey was moderately prepared in the field of energy shows the importance of policy and legal changes. Also, according to the 2015 report, significant progress was made on energy supply security and renewable energy as in 2014. Turkey's good developments in the energy field continued in 2016 as well (European Commission, 2016, p. 53). Apart from the oil and natural gas issues, which are the focal point of this study, the situation in other energy sub-headings was good, both in 2016 and in the previous years (European Commission, 2016, p. 53). These progresses are stated in the 2016 report as “*Good progress continued in the area of security of supply, electricity and the renewable energy sector.*” (European Commission, 2016, p. 53). Political relations between the two sides were damaged after the coup attempt in Turkey in 2016. In the face of this situation, it was a vital fact that Turkey's developments in the field of energy in accordance with EU standards continue.

In 2017, the commission did not publish report for Turkey. The reason for this was the process experienced in 2016 and after. The state of emergency, which was declared in July 2016 and extended 7 times, was completely abolished in July 2018. After the July 15, 2016's coup attempt, and under this state of emergency, the authority and power of the parliament have been reduced by delegated legislation. This situation has been criticized by the European Union. Another important issue was the Constitutional amendment referendum held in Turkey in 2017. The constitutional amendment was accepted with approximately 51% "yes" votes. With this amendment, Turkey switched from a parliamentary system to a presidential system. This was criticised by the EU since the powers of the parliament were held low, and the balance of power was not sufficiently protected (European Commission, 2018, p. 3). At the meeting where EU-Turkey relations in Malta were discussed, EU foreign ministers, stated that the report will not be published in 2017, the commission officials pointed out that Turkey has time until April 2018 to revitalize the process (Milliyet, 2017).

After 2016, the commission published a report again in 2018. According to this report, some progress has been made in this area, particularly in the energy supply security, energy efficiency and renewable energy sector (European Commission, 2018, p. 78). Developments in the energy chapter continued in 2018 as well. The political environment experienced in the membership process and relations did not affect the harmonization efforts in the field of energy. In the report published in 2019, the following statements are used; “*Turkey is moderately prepared in this chapter. Good progress has been made on security of supply, renewable energy, and energy efficiency*” (European Commission, 2019, p. 79). Turkey's current progress in the energy chapter continued. The result in the 2020 report is remarkably similar to the result in the 2019 report. In the 2020 report, which is the last report by the time this study is published, the commission noted the positive developments on the security of supply and renewable energy.

Generally speaking, after 2011, this is the worst period of political relations between Turkey and the EU throughout the history of the accession process. And again, in this period, Turkey continued to make policies in line with EU standards in the field of energy. As stated in the Commission report published in 1999, the interests of both sides in the field of energy coincide with each other (European Commission, 1999, p. 35). The fact that the development in the energy chapter depends on this is an important phenomenon that should not be overlooked. Because the energy field is a significant factor that directly affects the economy and foreign policy. Regardless of the membership process, Turkey's compliance with European standards in the energy field is related to its own interests. As a result, positive developments took place in the Energy chapter from 2011 to 2020, despite the crises in the political field.

6.3.2 Trans – Anatolian Natural Gas Pipeline (TANAP) Project

Trans – Anatolian Natural Gas Pipeline (TANAP) Project is significant for Azerbaijan, Turkey, and the EU (Kozma, 2017, p. 101). This new natural gas agreement was signed between Turkey and Azerbaijan in 2011 (Sánchez-Martín, Francés, & Borda, 2015, p. 624). This agreement was needed due to the increasing use of natural gas in Turkey and naturally increasing its need (European Commission, 2012, p. 60). Within the scope of the agreement, 6 billion m³ of Azerbaijani gas has been supplied to Turkey

annually (Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources, n.d). The agreement to be signed with Azerbaijan, not with Russia, was for the purpose of ensuring energy security (Winrow, 2016, pp. 5-7). On the other hand, there is a great friendly relationship between Azerbaijan and Turkey due to their ethnic origin. The slogan "two states, one nation" has been widely used in political relations (BOTAŞ, n.d). In the construction of TANAP, more importantly than the historical relations of the two sides there was the strategic importance of the project.

However, a new agreement was signed the following year (European Commission, 2012, p. 60). It has been agreed upon the transit of natural gas to Europe via Turkey under favour of a new pipeline to be constructed (Sánchez-Martín, Francés, & Borda, 2015, p. 624). With the new agreement, 10 billion cubic meters of Azeri gas will flow to Europe annually (Delegation of the European Union to Turkey, n.d). It is one of the projects in which Turkey actively uses its geopolitical position (Müftüler-Baç, 2017, p. 15). It is important that this project, since it provides the needs of Europe and reduces Europe dependence on Russia (Kanapiyanova, 2018, p. 538). The date of the agreement is an important detail because Turkey-EU relations came to backsliding period. During this period, Turkey's cooperation in the energy sector with the European Union continues in a positive sense (European Commission, 2019, p. 79). Turkey strategically wanted to be an energy hub between the European Union and the alternative natural gas-rich countries to replace Russia. Having no alternative other than Russia, it has been easy for Turkey to make progress with these strategic moves.

Moreover, The European connection of the TANAP was opened in 2019 (Anadolu Agency, 2019). Natural gas was not to reach Europe until 2020 (Habertürk, 2021). Because the pipeline to be built from Greece to Italy was not yet completed. Gas flow has begun on the Trans Adriatic Pipeline (TAP), which is the last part of the Southern Gas Corridor, as it transfers Azerbaijani gas to Europe (Habertürk, 2021). The name of the part of the pipeline within the borders of Turkey is TANAP. The name of the part of the European borders is Trans Adriatic Pipeline and the name of the whole project is Southern Gas Corridor (Winrow, 2016, p. 8).

The Southern gas corridor project is one of the most important projects put forward by the European Union against Russia's energy dependency. The EU aims to ensure the flow of energy from the Caspian and Middle East regions to Europe to protect

energy security. With this project, they established the connection through Turkey with the Caspian region, which has rich energy reserves.

6.3.3 Turkish Stream Gas Pipeline

A natural gas pipeline agreement, Turkish Stream Gas Pipeline, was signed between Turkey and Russia in Istanbul in 2016 and was opened in 2020 (Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources, n.d). The pipeline has been planned to come from Russia to Turkey via the Black Sea (BOTAŞ, 2020). There are two separate lines in the pipeline project which have the capacity to pass 30 to 50 billion m³ natural gas in total (Delegation of the European Union to Turkey, n.d). This high-capacity project will serve not only Turkey, but also the European Union countries. An important aspect of this project is that natural gas reaches Turkey directly from Russia, there are no third countries involved (Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources, n.d). Pipeline projects coming from Azerbaijan to Turkey, pass through Georgia. It is a situation that creates a problem in terms of energy security. Because, in a crisis to be experienced, Georgia can stop the gas flow but with this line from Russia, there is no such danger.

In this context, from the perspective of the European Union, Turkey may pose a threat to Europe regarding energy security. Natural gas reaches Europe via Turkey, from the Caspian region with TANAP and from Russia with Turkish Stream (Kanapiyanova, 2018, p. 540). Pipelines reach Europe from two alternative natural gas-rich regions, but both pass through Turkey. It would be beneficial for the European Union to act jointly with Turkey in energy cooperation, so the EU avoids working with Russia. The European Union, therefore, needs an alternative pipeline projects and a new region. It is the Mediterranean Sea gas pipeline project, which has been the most important research and discussion subject of recent years on this subject. Because, with a pipeline project that will reach Europe from the Mediterranean, Turkey's importance to the EU in the energy field will decrease.

6.3.4 Eastern Mediterranean and Energy Policies of Turkey

The Mediterranean is one of the most important geographies that mankind has been interested in throughout history. Many civilizations and empires on this geography have struggled to maintain their existence and increase their power and they saw benefiting from fertile lands as a national idea. While the Eastern Mediterranean has been at the center of attention of global powers throughout history due to its geostrategic location, this interest has increased with the emergence of energy resources. In addition to the geopolitical importance of the Eastern Mediterranean, the energy resources found off the island of Cyprus have greatly increased the importance of the region. Due to the new energy basins discovered and waiting to be discovered, there are some ongoing problems between the riparian countries today. With the increasing importance of energy, global powers have entered into an energy race to be the dominant power in the international system. This race has turned into an energy-based struggle over time. The current global energy struggle causes alarming developments due to the policies implemented by the states that want to be effective on these geographies and it still maintains its freshness today.

Turkey as the country with the longest coastline to the Eastern Mediterranean, is closely interested in this region stretching from Syria to Libya, from Greece to Egypt and Palestine. With the increase in the problems in the region, the number of actors who are parties has also increased and new actors have been included in the geopolitics of the region as a part of the conflicts and power struggle. Also, the discovered oil reserves and natural gas deposits have brought the sharing of sea areas to the agenda as well as the sharing of these energy resources. In the face of this situation, the disputes regarding the sea areas between the littoral countries of the Eastern Mediterranean caused an increase in tension in the region (Ceyhun, 2014, pp. 28-29). Additionally, the Greek Cypriot Administration's division of the natural gas fields discovered off the southern coast of the island of Cyprus into thirteen parcels without the approval of the riparian countries, drew the reaction of these countries (Yıldız, 2008, p. 88). However, within the scope of the founding agreements of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, Turkey, which has the right to be a guarantor on the island of Cyprus, is also the country with the longest coastline to the Eastern Mediterranean. Therefore, demanding to benefit from the

hydrocarbon resources in the region within the framework of international law rules is among the most natural rights of Turkey. Because, when the subject is considered as the TRNC, this is the basic responsibility of the Republic of Turkey as a duty as well as a right (Sandıklı, 2013, p. 2). Moreover, defining the Mediterranean as an inland sea, the European Union controversially included the Greek Cypriot Administration of Southern Cyprus as a member in 2004, using this situation to its advantage. The Greek Cypriot Administration saw itself as the only legal representative of the island; and continued to unilaterally declare an Exclusive Economic Zone. However, the legal status of the decisions taken is also controversial, since, according to the Constitution of Cyprus, 30% of the institutions should be represented by Turkish Cypriots. For this reason, it is natural that Turkey does not recognize the practices of the Greek Cypriot Administration, which claims to act through the Republic of Cyprus. On the other hand, when we look at the path that Turkey has followed in the face of these initiatives, we can say that there is a policy that consists of a combination of legal, economic and military steps. Within the framework of Turkey's legal steps, it has made the necessary objections to the United Nations about the actions of the opposing countries violating Turkey's rights. Moreover, it signed agreements with the TRNC and Libya to determine the boundaries of its continental shelf. It can be seen that when taking these steps, Turkey bases itself on numerous international court decisions regarding the limited maritime jurisdiction areas of the islands and the principle of non-cut off. and Turkey argued that these islands, which are too far from the Greek mainland, cannot cut Turkey's continental shelf. Also, it can be said that Greece has an inconsistent attitude with Turkey, Italy and Egypt in the delimitation issues of the continental shelf. For example, in the EEZ agreement that Greece signed with Italy, it agreed to set borders without taking into account its islands in the Ionian Sea. In the EEZ agreement signed with Egypt, it accepted the ignoring of some islands. When it comes to a limitation with Turkey, it is seen that Greece claims that the islands should be a continental shelf (İnat, 2020, p. 27). Whereas, Turkey, which has established a powerful energy fleet consisting of two seismic survey and three deep drilling vessels in order to show its presence on the continental shelf, whose borders it has declared with the agreements it has signed in the region, shows that these vessels are an actor to be reckoned with in the Eastern Mediterranean with their exploration activities and the presence of military ships accompanying them. (İnat, 2020, p. 28)

Another factor in the inability to solve regional problems is the support provided by the EU to the Greek Cypriot Administration in the regional energy equation. The effort of the Greek Cypriot Administration to legitimize its illegal activities by using the name of the union to which it is a member in every step it has taken with its membership to the EU makes trust and cooperation difficult. In addition, the EU, which tries to make concessions at every opportunity by constantly hitting Turkey over the Cyprus problem in the EU membership process, still applies this attitude in the form of open and covert activities today. The main reason why the EU concentrates so much on the Eastern Mediterranean energy geopolitics is its energy dependence on Russia and its desire to get rid of this situation. With the energy fields discovered in the Eastern Mediterranean, the Greek Cypriot Administration, which is seen as a potential new energy supplier to the EU, is seen as an important state in terms of supplying the energy needed by the union. Therefore, the island of Cyprus as a whole is an indispensable strategic area, internalized with the politics of the union, in terms of the interests of the EU (Korkmaz, 2019). For this reason, it can be said that the EU is sided with the Greek Cypriot administration and Greece regarding Turkey's Eastern Mediterranean policy.

Judging by the recent statements of Turkey and the EU on the eastern Mediterranean issue, it is possible to say that they have diverged opinions and interests on the eastern Mediterranean. For instance, the European Union stated that if the tension between Greece and the Republic of Cyprus and Turkey in the Eastern Mediterranean is not resolved through diplomatic means, sanctions may be imposed and the EU is working on types of sanctions for this. After the meeting of the EU foreign ministers in Berlin, the host German Foreign Minister Heiko Maas and the EU High Representative for Foreign Relations and Security Policy Josep Borrell held a press conference together. Borrell said they could impose sanctions against individuals, assets or ships to prevent Turkey from exploring hydrocarbon resources in the disputed waters of the Eastern Mediterranean. He said that they wanted to give diplomacy a chance to solve the problem, and also stated that Turkey should create the necessary conditions and avoid provocation for dialogue to occur (DW, 2020).

In response to the EU's sanctions declarations, Turkey's response was as follows. Hami Aksoy, Spokesperson of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Turkey, announced that the cause of the tension in the Eastern Mediterranean is Greece and the

Greek Cypriot Administration, with their maximalist and unlawful actions and demands. These two states tried to ignore the legitimate rights and interests of our country and the Turkish Cypriots in the Eastern Mediterranean. The unconditional support of the EU to these two on the pretext of unity solidarity further escalates the tension. He added that *‘It is not permissible for the EU to criticize our country's hydrocarbon activities within its continental shelf and demand that we stop them. Because, as confirmed by the EU Court of Justice, the EU has no authority on this issue. This demand is against both the EU's own *acquis* and international law.’* (T.C. Dışişleri Bakanlığı, 2020) With these discourses, Turkey tried to show the double standard situation in the region and tried to prove its justification and, in addition, invited the EU and EU member states as follows. *‘We invite the EU and EU member states not to support Greece's maximalist demands, which are contrary to international law, on the pretext of unity solidarity. While Turkey always emphasizes dialogue and diplomacy, the EU's use of the language of sanctions does not help to solve the current problems, but also increases the determination of our country. Despite all the unlawful alliances established against Turkey, it will continue to protect its own interests and the interests of the Turkish Cypriots. If a sincere solution to the issue is desired, Greece and the Greek Cypriot Administration of Cyprus should see that this situation is no longer sustainable and they should understand that those behind them should not act with the wrong calculations. In conclusion, if the EU wants a solution in the Eastern Mediterranean, it must act impartially and be an honest mediator.’* (T.C. Dışişleri Bakanlığı, 2020). It is out of the question for Turkey to remain indifferent to this geography, where countless non-regional actors try to be influential and unacceptable in economic and security interests.

In conclusion, considering the above-mentioned and repeated discourses of Turkey and the EU on the eastern Mediterranean, the issue of energy resources in the eastern Mediterranean has revealed a difference of opinion and interest. Before the eastern Mediterranean problem, Turkey and the EU followed a parallel process regarding their energy policy interests, but the interests of both sides conflicted on the Eastern Mediterranean issue. As the interests conflict on the Eastern Mediterranean, Turkey acts in line with its own interests, not the interests and wishes of the EU. This situation shows that Turkey makes policy in line with the logic of consequences approach.

CHAPTER 7 Conclusion

Energy has an important place in terms of economy and politics for the state as well as being necessary for the continuation of human life. Changes and transformations of energy resources have occurred throughout history. There are breaking moments at the point of importance of energy resources and increasing demand. One of the most important of these is the industrial revolution. With the increasing industrialization, energy resources have had an important place for the industrialized state. The most important energy source of the mentioned period was coal. Energy resources such as oil and natural gas were available at the same period, but the utilization rate was extremely low. The increase in the use of oil and natural gas began in the 20th century. Especially oil and natural gas, which has become easier to transport with pipelines, has become an economic and political dynamic. However, as it is known, oil and natural gas are non-renewable energy sources. When we compare renewable and non-renewable energy sources, the rate of use of non-renewable energy sources is higher. Although there is an increase in the use of non-renewable energy resources, states continue to use non-renewable energy resources at a high rate in terms of economy and accessibility.

As mentioned above, energy resources have become an economically and politically strategic dynamic for countries. With this change, the concept of energy security has also become crucial. The value of energy security increased with the oil crisis in 1973. To put it simply, it is an event that occurs when OPEC increase prices excessively. With the increase in prices, the problem of accession to energy and economic problems have occurred in oil-importing countries. Not only the price increase, but also embargo was imposed on some western countries and reduced production. This situation has revealed that the concept of energy security is especially critical for states. Those who are dependent on foreign energy, such as the European Union and Turkey, attach more importance to this concept. Within the scope of energy security, countries may be dependent on foreign energy. But they should not be dependent on a single country. Looking at this statement, Turkey and the EU cannot fully ensure energy security. Although both sides import energy from different countries, Russia has the largest share for both sides. Russia has rich oil and natural gas reserves. It exports a significant amount

of oil and natural gas to both Turkey and the European Union. Against this strategic advantage that Russia has, the EU and Turkey should cooperate on energy. Turkey has a strategic significance in transporting the rich energy resources of the Caspian region to Europe via pipeline. This energy plan, which is beneficial for both Turkey and the EU, actualize with the TANAP project.

Under favour of common aims, the two sides need to act in cooperation in the field of energy, but they also have relations of accession process. Turkey's official relations with the EU started in 1963 with the Ankara Agreement. With this agreement, it is aimed to increase the harmonization between Turkey and the EU, especially in the economic field. With the Single European Act agreement signed in 1971, relations gained a new dimension. Before the Ankara agreement terms were completed, Turkey applied for EU membership in 1987 and the Commission rejected it in 1989. However, Turkey gained the status of candidate country with the Helsinki Summit in 1999. Although the period from 1963 to 1999 is based on economic cooperation, the perspective of Turkey and the European Union on the process is different. As mentioned above, the Ankara agreement is about increasing economic cooperation and harmony. The European Union's view of the process is based on this discourse, but Turkey's goal from the beginning has been full membership. The agreements made and the harmonization tried to achieve were made in order to become a member of the EU.

This effect, which is mentioned above, of the EU on Turkey can be explained through the concept of Europeanization. Historically, this concept has been increasingly used in academia since the late 1980s and early 1990s. The Europeanization approach has become evident as a result of the deepening in the European Union and has an essential place in European studies. The Europeanization approach is an approach that explains the impact of the EU on the member states and candidate countries. With this effect, the interests of the countries become compatible with the interests of the EU. Harmony between the parties increases and integrity is ensured. The impact of the EU and the harmony experienced can be in two different directions. Firstly, countries can experience this change when they really want to adopt the norms and values of the EU (sociological institutionalism-logic of appropriateness). Secondly, countries experience this change because they have to (rational institutionalism-logic of consequences). When look at

Turkey's relationship with the EU and its membership process, it is observed that Turkey acts according to a logic of consequences.

When the pre-membership process is examined, Turkey's view of European Union harmonization is understood. Considering the 1980 coup in Turkey and the events after it, there have been incidents contrary to the values of the EU. The fact that there is a military administration in Turkey has shown the lack of democracy and the understanding of the rule of law. Numerous arrests and grievances suffered by people have also damaged politically to Turkey-EU relations. It is clear that the political environment and structure in line with EU standards has not been achieved. Another important issue is Turkey's application for full membership in 1987. As explained in the previous sections, some conditions that Turkey must fulfil for harmonization with the EU have been decided by the Ankara agreement. However, Turkey applied for full membership at an early date without acting in accordance with the agreement criteria. Turkey focused on full membership rather than the contribution of the criteria. And as a result, Turkey's application was rejected in 1989. It is observed that Europeanization did not fully affect Turkey for this period. But, with the start of the membership process, clearer and more inclusive criteria for harmonization with the EU were determined.

With the Helsinki Summit in 1999, Turkey became a candidate country and the membership process officially started. With the annual reports published every year, it is noted how well Turkey complies with the criteria. Political developments in the membership process naturally affect the criteria and are seen in the annual reports. In this thesis, the effect of Turkey's EU membership process on energy relations is examined through reports. Progress in the energy chapter and pipeline projects, affecting both sides, are important research resources.

The opinion of the commission in the energy chapter of the report published in 1999 is very vital. According to the report, the objectives of Turkey and the EU in energy policy are in line with each other. The fact that the two sides have common aims on energy has also facilitated energy cooperation. In this study, all Commission reports, published from 1999 to 2020, were examined. And the membership process was examined in three different periods which are "1999 to 2005" (Recovery), "2005 to 2011" (Discontinuance), and "2011 to 2020" (Backsliding). Looking at the period from 1999 to 2007, we can say that it is the golden period of the membership process. Turkey is issuing many important

harmonization packages and making legal changes. Perhaps this was the period when Turkey was closest to full membership. Considering all the reports in this period, there has been progress in the energy chapter every year. Thanks to the harmonization packages and legal changes, significant developments were achieved in other chapters as well. The Interconnector Turkey–Greece–Italy (ITGI) pipeline project was signed in 2003 and the construction between Turkey and Greece was completed in 2005 and the opening ceremony was held. In general, during this period, the relations with the membership process went well, progress continued in the energy chapter in the reports, and a pipeline project of interest to both sides was made. The time between 2005 and 2011 is seen as a discontinuance period. In this period, it is seen that Turkey showed less effort in EU harmonization than before. It is a period in which leaders also change from their language and both sides began to look at each other more suspiciously. Looking at the annual reports of the period, the progress in the energy chapter continued. In general, the reports do not show as much progress in the chapters as the previous period. As mentioned before, the completion and opening of the pipeline project between Greece and Turkey took place during this period. In general, the energy relations between the EU and Turkey in the period from 2005 to 2011 were not affected by the membership process and progress continued.

The period after 2011 is the time when relations come to a different dimension. This time period can also be defined as the backsliding. During this period, political tensions arose between the two sides, especially due to the crises in Turkey's domestic politics. The views and expectations of the two sides were different in events such as the Syrian crisis, the Gezi protests, the July 15 coup attempt and the events that followed. Political tensions increased with the two sides criticizing each other severely. Various reasons such as the change in Turkey's foreign policy, legal changes, and arrests as a result of the events mentioned above have adversely affected the relations and accession process. Severely affected relationships also had a significant impact on the reports. In some chapters, progress has stopped, while in others, backsliding has begun. In fact, the commission did not publish a report in 2017 in response. However, when look at the energy section of the reports published every year in this period, progress continued. On the other hand, two important pipeline projects were also carried out. The TANAP natural gas pipeline project was signed in 2011 and opened in 2019. With this project, Azerbaijani

gas reaches Europe through the pipeline passing via Turkey. This project, which reduces the EU's dependence on Russia for energy security, is of great significance. Another important natural gas pipeline project is Turkish Stream Gas Pipeline. The Turkish stream natural gas pipeline project was signed with Russia in 2016 and opened in 2020. Natural gas from Russia not only reaches Turkey, but also reaches Greece, so Europe, via Turkey. However, in general, during this period, crises occurred in political relations, the membership process was negatively affected, and a backsliding was observed in some chapters. But in the field of energy, progress in the chapter continued and important pipeline projects were carried out.

When we focus on all the historical processes mentioned above, it is possible to say that the relations between Turkey and the European Union have fluctuated from good to worse. However, it is clearly observed that there is no such trend in the concept of energy, which is the main focus of this thesis. This analysis was made by examining the leader discourses and the EU reports in the thesis. The following conclusions have been reached from the EU reports examined within the framework of the hypothesis of this thesis. A positive trend is observed in all reports submitted by the European Commission to Turkey from 1999 to 2020. Looking at the period from 1999 to 2011, it is seen that Europeanization has been effective in all areas in general. However, during the backsliding period that started in 2011 and continued until today, de-Europeanization is also seen in Turkey. But progress continues in the energy field. The reason for this is the energy agreements between Turkey and the EU and the energy pipelines passing through Turkey to the EU. In other words, the energy policies implemented by Turkey are in line with the rules of the European Union. But here a very important question arises. This question is why Turkey has acted in accordance with the European Union *acquis* in terms of energy policies despite the bad relations with the European Union? This question is fully explained by logic of consequences. However, when we look at the energy chapter of the 2020 report, Commission stated that “*On hydrocarbons, Turkey continued its unauthorised drilling activities in the Eastern Mediterranean*” (European Commission, 2020, p. 84). Although the progress in the energy field in general continued in the report, the crisis experienced due to the Eastern Mediterranean was reflected in the energy chapter, but after the report was published, Turkey's Eastern Mediterranean policy

continued. In other words, we can say that Turkey does what is fit for its own interests and does not do what is misfit.

When we look at the discourses, although there was a positive picture in the backsliding period in the energy field before the Eastern Mediterranean issue, it followed a negative speech in the discourses with the Eastern Mediterranean issue. Especially in recent years, tensions between Turkey and the EU have increased due to the events in the Eastern Mediterranean. One of the main reasons for this crisis, which is caused by energy resources, is the sovereignty area in the Eastern Mediterranean. As mentioned in the sections above, the EU criticizes Turkey's eastern Mediterranean policy and accuses Turkey of acting illegally. The President of Turkey also states that Turkey's policies have a sovereign right and energy resource research will continue. As can be seen, when the interests of the EU and Turkey conflicted in the field of energy, Turkey continued to act in accordance with its own interests.

As a result, Turkey's EU membership process has not affected energy relations both in good times and in terrible times. Cooperation in the field of energy and Turkey's harmonization with the EU continued on a regular basis. The most important reason for this is the common interests and goals of the two sides, as mentioned in the 1999 Commission report. Both sides want to reduce their dependence on Russia in order to ensure energy security and they want to import energy from different regions. On the other hand, progress continued as the technical and legal advice given by the EU to Turkey in the field of energy did not conflict with Turkey's interests. In fact, it is in Turkey's interest as it will positively affect the joint agreements made. When it contradicted Turkey's interests and policies, Turkey moved away from EU standards. The backsliding in other chapters can be given as proof of this. When considered within the scope of Europeanization, it is seen that Turkey acts in line with its own interests. Turkey considers the EU's interests, expectations and recommendations that are in line with its interests and ignores those that do not. Relations are going well in this field, as the EU's standards, goals and interests in energy are the same as with Turkey. However, Although Turkey is bound by the EU legislation in the field of energy as progress, the crisis with the European Countries in the Eastern Mediterranean has begun to negatively affect the leaders' discourse in the field of energy. At this point, it is possible to see the harsh statements of both Josep Borrell and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. In other words, since the

hypothesis given in the thesis defends the concept of logic of consequences arising from the relationship of interest between Turkey and the European Union, it is possible to reach the following conclusion. Turkey's situation in the eastern Mediterranean is against its interests and territorial sovereignty. For this reason, especially Turkey's discourse on energy has changed in a negative way. Especially in the energy part of the 2020 Commission report, the EU's accusation of Turkey on this issue shows the EU side of the relationship between Turkey and the EU. At this point, the fact that Turkey keeps its discourses negative despite continuing its policies shows that Turkey acts with the logic of consequences approach. And this proves the hypothesis given in the thesis. In other words, if we return to the research question of this thesis, the membership process has no effect on Turkey's EU energy policies. The reason for this is that Turkey acts completely in line with its interests at this point. Especially these interests can be analysed very easily thanks to the pipelines passing through Turkey.

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